JUDGMENT MIABHOY, J. : This is an appeal by the State against four respondents. These respondents were prosecuted for an offence under S. 447, Indian Penal Code. The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, DevgadBaria, District Panch-Mahals, before whom these respondents were prosecuted, convicted respondent No. 1 Bharatsing Odharsing, (hereafter called the 'respondent' simpliciter), for the offence under S. 447, Indian Penal Code, and acquitted the rest for that offence. The present appeal has been directed against the three respondents against the order of acquittal in respect of this offence under S. 447, Indian Penal Code. However, the learned Government Pleader, very fairly conceded that he could not press the appeal against these respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4 and consequently it is not necessary to discuss the case against these three respondents. Respondent Bharatsing was also charged for the offence under S. 326, Indian Penal Code, on the allegation that, whilst committing the criminal trespass on 27-6-1958 at about 11-00 A. M. in the village Paroli in survey Number 100, he had voluntarily caused grievous hurt to the complainant Vaja Ratna with a 'Dharia'. The learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that respondent had caused grievous hurt to complainant Vaja Ratna, but he acquitted respondent Bharatsing of the offence under S. 326, Indian Penal Code, on a finding that the respondent Bharatsing had a right of private defence and he had caused the grievous hurt in the exercise of that right. The State has challenged this part of the acquittal order against respondent Bharatsing. Having regard to the concession made by the learned Government Pleader regarding the case against respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4, the only question which survives for consideration in the present appeal is, whether the learned Magistrate was right in holding that respondent Bharatsing had the right of private defence when he caused grievous hurt to complainant Vaja Ratna. Mr. Barot, the learned counsel for the respondent Bharatsing, challenged the finding of the learned Magistrate regarding the possession of the field in question and the allegation of criminal trespass. The learned Government pleader contended that respondent Bharatsing had no right to challenge this finding, because respondent had not preferred an appeal against the conviction recorded by the learned Magistrate and the order of conviction under S. 447, Indian Penal Code, had become final. The learned Government pleader contended that respondent Bharatsing had no right to challenge this finding, because respondent had not preferred an appeal against the conviction recorded by the learned Magistrate and the order of conviction under S. 447, Indian Penal Code, had become final. In our judgment, the mere fact that the order of conviction under S. 447, Indian Penal Code, had become final as against respondent Bharatsing, does not preclude him from putting forward a case which would be inconsistent with the findings which ultimately led to the conviction under S. 447, Indian Penal Code. In challenging these findings, respondent does not challenge the conviction under S. 447, Indian Penal Code. The conviction under that section would remain intact, but, in so far as the State now presses the case as against respondent under S. 326, Indian Penal Code, it is open to the respondent to show that, in fact, he was in possession of the field in question and that when he caused the grievous hurt, he had the right of private defence. Under the circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that the finding of the learned Magistrate relating to possession of the survey number does require to be considered in the present appeal. 2-3. (His Lordship after stating the facts and evidence proceeded :) The defence, however, very strongly relied upon the entry in the combined Register, which shows that, in the year 1957-58, respondent Bharatsing had sown groundnut and 'Tuver' crops in the field bearing survery number 100. The contention was that this entry is presumptive evidence of the possession of respondent Bharatsing. We cannot agree. Under S. 135-J of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, it is the entry in the record I of right which has a presumptive value and not the entry in the tenancy Register. The extract which has been produced by the defence is an extract from the combined Register which consists both of the record of right and the tenancy Register. In the record of right, the name of Vaja Patna still appears as the protected tenant. It is this entry which has got a presumptive value. It is extremely improbable that the name of Vaja Ratna would still continue to be shown as protected tenant if he had surrendered the field in question by executing a document. In the record of right, the name of Vaja Patna still appears as the protected tenant. It is this entry which has got a presumptive value. It is extremely improbable that the name of Vaja Ratna would still continue to be shown as protected tenant if he had surrendered the field in question by executing a document. The tenancy Register is maintained with a view to show as to who had cultivated a land in a particular year and the Pahanipatrak would show the same fact. It is true that the fact that respondent Bharatsing has been shown to be the cultivator of the crops in the year 1957-58 may have some value, but, it cannot have a presumptive value, such as the entry that Vaja Ratna was the protected tenant will have. In view of the testimony of the independent person Vala Jetha and the probabilities of the case, we are not prepared to place any reliance upon the aforesaid entry in the tenancy Register or the Pahanipatrak. The Police Patel of the village was present at the time when this entry was made, but no attempt was made by the defence to prove as to, under what circumstances, that entry had come to be made and whether complainant Vaja, who is an illiterate person, had any notice, about that entry having been made. Having regard to the fact that Vaja was a protected tenant, that he had been cultivating the land, and the improbability of his having surrendered possession on account of a simple notice having been given by Sada, it is impossible to place any reliance upon the extract from the tenancy Register or the Pahanipatrak. In our opinion, having regard to the aforesaid facts, there would be a presumption about the continuity of possession by the complainant Vaja Ratna. (His Lordship gave the respective versions of the incident and proceeded to examine medical evidence of the injuries caused.) 4. Both the sides were examined by a Doctor on 27-6-1958 and the Doctor's evidence shows that complainant Vaja had two injuries on his person. The first was an oblique incised wound on left forearm just above the wrist on the volar and the radial aspects, measuring 2¼" X 1½" cutting the muscles and the left radius through and through. There was a compound fracture of the left radius as a result of this injury. The first was an oblique incised wound on left forearm just above the wrist on the volar and the radial aspects, measuring 2¼" X 1½" cutting the muscles and the left radius through and through. There was a compound fracture of the left radius as a result of this injury. The evidence shows that the wrist had been completely cut off, except that the hand had remained joined with the arm by a thin narrow skin. The second injury was an 'L' shaped superficial incised wound on the eminence of right hand, measuring 1/3" x 1/2" x skin deep. The respondent Bharatsing had three incised wounds. One on the forehead on outer third of left eye-brow, measuring 1'' x 1/2" x deep with black ecchmosis on left upper and lower eye-lids and the other two in the parieto-occipital region, both of them being bone deep, one above the right ear and the other above the left ear. In addition, Bharatsing had one abrasion on the back of the right hand, one contusion on the left leg and the vertical wheel mark in the middle of the left side back. But, Umed had one oblique wheel mark on the outer side of the left arm, measuring 2" x 3". In addition to this, the witness Girdhar Khatu had also an oblique incised wound on the outer side of the right leg in the middle, measuring 3½'' x 1/6" x skin deep. 5. On the date of the offence, after Vaja Ratna had received the aforesaid injuries, he was carried by Girdhar Khatu and Navalsing Anopsing, first to the Police Patel and thence to the police Station and it was from there that Vaja was first taken to the dispensary and ultimately removed to the hospital at Godhra. Vaja filed a First Information before the Police, in which the version which he gave was somewhat different as to the number of persons who took part in the incident. But, the role which was attributed by complainant Vaja in that complaint to respondent Bharatsingh was the same as that which Vaja attributed to him in the trial Court. 6. Vaja filed a First Information before the Police, in which the version which he gave was somewhat different as to the number of persons who took part in the incident. But, the role which was attributed by complainant Vaja in that complaint to respondent Bharatsingh was the same as that which Vaja attributed to him in the trial Court. 6. It appears that, at about 3-00 P. M., respondent Bharatsingh appeared before the Police Patel and he was also sent to the Police Station with a report and he filed also a counter-complaint against complainant Vaja and five other persons, in which he alleged that the injuries on his person and on the person of his wife Umed were caused by complainant Vaja and those live persons, included the witnesses Girdhar and Navalsing. 7. The prosecution relies upon the testimony of complainant Vaja Ratna and witnesses Girdhar and Navalsing in support of its case. The defence has not led any evidence in support of the establishment of its own version. 8. (His Lordship reviewed the evidence and then continued). On the whole, the evidence given by Navalsing substantially represents the truth in the matter and that evidence shows that, probably, after Vajesing came on the field, there was a light between him and respondent Bharatsing, in the course of which Bharatsing received injuries and subsequently respondent Bharatsing gave a blow which caused grievous hurt on the hand of the complainant Vajesing. In our judgment, therefore, the learned Magistrate was right in holding that it was the respondent Bharatsing who had caused the grievous hurt with a 'Dharia' on the hand of the complainant Vajesing. 9. We also agree with the learned Magistrate that respondent Bharatsing had committed the offence of criminal trespass. We cannot agree with the submission of Mr. Barot that respondent Bharatsing had no intention of causing mischief to the seeds sown by complainant Vaja and that Bharatsing had entered the field only with the intention of asserting his possession or depriving complainant Vaja of the possession of the fields. Having regard to the facts that the respondent Bharatsing was never in possession of the field and that he knew that complainant Vaja had sown millet and groundnut, Bharatsing must necessarily know that his act of ploughing over the sown seeds must destroy them and he must be presumed to intend the natural consequence of his act. Having regard to the facts that the respondent Bharatsing was never in possession of the field and that he knew that complainant Vaja had sown millet and groundnut, Bharatsing must necessarily know that his act of ploughing over the sown seeds must destroy them and he must be presumed to intend the natural consequence of his act. The act of respondent Bharatsing in remaining there with the plough with his servants and his insistence to plough the field must necessarily cause annoyance to Vaja and Bharatsing must be presumed to intend to cause annoyance to Vaja. 10. On the above findings, the main question which requires to be considered is whether the respondent Bharatsing had the right of private defence when he inflicted the injury on Vaja. In arriving sit his conclusion, the learned Magistrate appears to have ignored completely the law relating to private defence. He has not considered this aspect of the case at all. In our judgment, by not doing so, the learned Magistrate has fallen into an error of law. Ordinarily, an error of law constitutes a substantial and compelling reason for interfering with an order of acquittal. 11. As respondent Bharatsing committed criminal tresspass complainant Vaja had the right under Sec. 97, Indian Penal Code, subject to the limitations mentioned in Sec. 99, Indian Penal Code, of protecting his field from the act of criminal trespass. That right extended up to causing grievous hurt if necessity arose for the purpose. If Vaja did not exceed that right, then, under Sec. 96, Indian Penal Code, Vaja's act of causing hurt or grievous hurt to Bharatsing would not be an offence at all. Such an act of Vaja would be a lawful act and there cannot be a right of private defence against a lawful act. All the injuries on the person of Bharatsing were simple injuries. It is true that three of these injuries were caused by means of a 'Dharia'. However, there is nothing on the record to suggest that, at the time when 'Dharia' was being wielded against him, a reasonable apprehension was caused in the mind of respondent Bharatsing that complainant Vaja intended to exceed the right of private defence given to him by law. However, there is nothing on the record to suggest that, at the time when 'Dharia' was being wielded against him, a reasonable apprehension was caused in the mind of respondent Bharatsing that complainant Vaja intended to exceed the right of private defence given to him by law. So long as Vaja was causing or intended to cause simple or even grievous hurt to Bharatsing, within the limits prescribed by the law of private defence Vaja was doing something which he was entitled to do under the law. Therefore, there cannot be any doubt that respondent Bharatsing would not have any right of private defence against such an act of Vaja. Mr. Barot submitted that this view of the law was not the correct view. We cannot agree with this submission. Whether a person has a right of private defence or not has got to be answered with reference to the provisions contained in section 97 of the Indian Penal Code and that section, in so far as it deals with the right of private defence of persons, clearly states that every person has a right, subject to the restrictions contained in Sec. 99, to defend his body against 'an offence'. This section, which contains the law relating to private defence, clearly states in terms that that right is given to protect one's body against 'an offence' only. Therefore, if Vaja did an act which he was justified in doing by virtue of the provisions contained in sections 97 and 104 of the Indian Penal Code, the respondent Bharatsing would have no right of private defence even if the act of Vaja caused him an injury. So long as the criminal trespass continued and so long as Vaja did not cause reasonable apprehension in the mind of Bharatsing that he intended to exceed the right of private defence, Bharatsing has no right to cause any injury whatsoever to the complainant Vaja. Therefore, we have no doubt that the learned Magistrate was wrong in taking the view that respondent Bharatsing had the right of private defence and had not committed the offence under Sec. 326 of the Indian Penal Code. 12. As we have already said, the injury on Vaja had resulted in fracture of the radius bone and was caused with a 'Dharia'. Therefore, the offence clearly falls under section 326 of the Indian Penal Code. 12. As we have already said, the injury on Vaja had resulted in fracture of the radius bone and was caused with a 'Dharia'. Therefore, the offence clearly falls under section 326 of the Indian Penal Code. Under the circumstances, in our opinion, the respondent Bharatsing was clearly guilty of the offence under section 326, Indian Penal Code. 13. Mr. Barot relied very strongly upon the case reported in Bhartu v. State, 1954 Cri LJ 54 : (AIR 1954 All 35). He contended that, in this case, it was decided, under similar circumstances, that the accused had a right of private defence and no offence was committed. We have looked into the facts of this case. We do not think that the facts of the case justify the submission made by Mr. Barot. From the last but one paragraph of the judgment, it is quite clear that, in that case, the complainant Yadram, though he was entitled under an appellate decree to receive possession of the northern part of a field, had not still received possession thereof and possession was with the accused Bhartu and others. In that case, the complainant Yadram came into that part of the field with the express intention of forcibly dispossessing the accused Bhartu and others of the plot in dispute and in which plot Bhartu and others had cultivated sugarcane crop and, in order to achieve this object, the complainant Yadram had called his relations from a neighbouring village. Under these circumstances it is quite clear that the accused Bhartu and others were not criminal trespassers but were only civil trespassers. Therefore, in that case, complainant Yadram was not defending his field against criminal trespass but he intended to take possession thereof from a civil trespasser and, with that end in view, he took the law into his own hands and illegally assaulted Bhartu and others. Therefore, the facts in this case are distinguishable from the facts of the present case. 14. The order of acquittal is due to the fact that the learned Magistrate has not correctly applied the law applicable to the facts of the present case and that, in our judgment, would constitute a substantial and compelling reason for interfering with the order of acquittal passed by the learned Magistrate. 15. As regards the sentence, the offence is now nearly two years' old. 15. As regards the sentence, the offence is now nearly two years' old. There is no doubt that the injury on Vaja was a serious one inasmuch as his hand was practically cut off; but at the same time, we must also take into account that the offence is now pretty old and respondent Bharatsing had also some injuries on his person and his wife Umed had also received a fractured injury. In our judgment, the ends of justice will be served by sentencing the respondent Bharatsing to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years. 16. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow the appeal, set aside the order of acquittal in respect of respondent Bharatsing of the offence under Sec. 326, Indian Penal Code, and convict the respondent Bharatsing of the offence under section 326, Indian Penal Code, and sentence him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years. Appeal as against respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4 is dismissed. Appeal allowed.