Judgment Choudhary, J. 1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff, who succeeded in the trial Court, but lost the suit in the lower appellate Court. It appears that Buka and Chaitan were two brothers. Buka had four sons, (1) Dubraj, (2) Kabiraj, (3) Thakurdas and (4) Baidu. Chaitan had a son Kartick, who had three sons (1) Nunu, (2) Nayan and (3) Bhadra. Dubraj had a son, Doman, and the plaintiif, Manik, is the son of Doman. Shibu (defendant No. 1) is the son of Kala, one of the sons of Kabiraj. Defendants 5 and 6 are grandsons of Kabiraj, by his second son, Luthu. Defendant No. 2 is the grand-son of Thakurdas. Defendant No. 3 is the son of Kartick, and defendant No. 4 is the grandson of Kartick by another son, Nayan. The area of the lands in suit is 15 bighas 17 dhurs which are a part of khata No. 63 of the revisional Survey, commonly known as "Abdul Settlement", situated in village Holudboni, within Serai kela police station. The above area forms part of Thicadari Man lands having an area of 41 bighas and odd. In the cadastral Survey, commonly known as "Connolly Settlement" the entire Thiccadari Man lands, along with some other rayati lands of the parties, were recorded in Khata No. 42 jointly in the names of Dubraj, Kabiraj, Thakurdas, Baidu and Kartick. In the revisional survey, however, the Thicadari Man lands were recorded in Khata No. 63 in the name of Doman, the father of the plaintiff; but the lands in dispute in the present suit were recorded in the remarks column as being in possession of Kala, father of defendant No. 1, Jethu, lathes of defendant No. 2, and Nunu, the eldest son of Kartick. All these three persons have been described in the Swatwalipi (Exhibit 8), prepared at the time of the preparation of the record-of rights ia connection with the Abdul Settlement as "Bhai Thicadar" (brothers of the Thicadar). All these three persons have been described in the Swatwalipi (Exhibit 8), prepared at the time of the preparation of the record-of rights ia connection with the Abdul Settlement as "Bhai Thicadar" (brothers of the Thicadar). According to the rule of the Seraikela State, the Thicadar used to be given Man lands for rendering services, and on the death of a Thicadar, the same used to be resumed by the State, which had a right to appoint a new Thicadar; and on such appointment, the Man lands used to vest in the newly appointed Thicadar, ordinarily however, the eldest son of the deceased Thicadar used to be appointed as such. The above Thicadari Man lands were neither transferable nor heritable : 2. The case of the plaintiff is that Dubraj, his grandfather, was appointed Thicadar of the village, and he got the Man lands, including the suit lands, as Thicadari Man lands. On his death, his son, Doman, was appointed Thicadar of the village, and he got the suit lands, along with other Thicadari Man lands, and was, accordingly, recorded in Khata No. 63 of the revisional servey. Doman died in 1940, and the plaintiff then made an application for being appointed as Thicadar in his place. The suit lands, along with other Man lands, however, were on the death of Doman, resumed by the State. Subsequently, the plaintiff was appointed Thicadar of the village, and a patta, dated 19-9-1941, was granted to him. Since then, the plaintiff was in peaceful possession of all the Thicadari Man lands, including the suit lands. In 1948, when the political situation in the State regarding its merger in Bihar or Orissa was unsettled, the defendants and their ancestors forcibly trespassed into one of the plots of the Thicadari Man lands, which is not the subject matter of dispute in the present suit. The plaintiff filed a criminal case against them under Sections 143 and 447 of the Indian Penal Code, and all the accused persons were convicted. Nevertheless the defendants again wanted to disturb the possession of, the plaintiff, which led to a proceeding under Sec.144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in which also the order was made absolute against the defendants. Nevertheless the defendants again wanted to disturb the possession of, the plaintiff, which led to a proceeding under Sec.144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in which also the order was made absolute against the defendants. But, on expiry of sixty days of the order, the defendants, in June, 1949 forcibly dispossessed the plaintiff from the suit lands, and a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was started. In that case, the defendants were declared to be in possession of the suit lands. The plaintiff, therefore, instituted the suit, out of which the present appeal arises, for a declaration of his title to, and recovery of possession over, the suit lands after evicting the defendants therefrom. 3. The defendants filed a joint written statement contending, inter alia, (1) that the disputed lands, along with other lands of the family, were jointly recorded in the Connolly Settlement in Khata No. 42 in the names of the different members of the family, and all the members of the family owned and possessed them jointly; (2) that, a few years before the Abdul Settlement, there was amicable partition amongst the members of the family, and the suit lauds fell to the share of the defendants, who have been continuing in possession thereof since the date of partition; (3) that the lands in dispute were acquired by Buka and Chaitan; and (4) that, the defendants and their ancestors having remained in possession for over twelve years, acquired occupancy rayati by adverse possession, and are not, therefore, liable to be evicted. At the trial, one more point was taken in defence, and it was alleged that the ancestors of the defendants had converted the suit lands, which were waste lands, into paddy lands by their own labour, and thereby also they acquired occupancy rayati right therein. The other pleas taken in defence need not be mentioned, because, on those points the decision of the Courts below is in favour of the plaintiff, and they have not been pressed before us in this Court. 4. The trial Court found that the suit lands were Thicadari Man lands, and that Dubraj, and after him, his son, Doman, and after Doman, the plaintiff was appointed Thicadar of the village, and, therefore, the plaintif is entitled to hold the suit lands by virtue of his office as Thicadar. 4. The trial Court found that the suit lands were Thicadari Man lands, and that Dubraj, and after him, his son, Doman, and after Doman, the plaintiff was appointed Thicadar of the village, and, therefore, the plaintif is entitled to hold the suit lands by virtue of his office as Thicadar. It further held that the Thicadari Man lands were not heritable or transferable, and there was nothing to show that any rayati or occupancy right could be acquired either by the Thicadar, or his relations, or anybody else, by long possession. The trial Court negatived the contentions of the defendants that the suit lands were acquired by Buka and Chaitan, and that the defendants ancestors converted the same into paddy lands from waste lands. It further held that, after the death of Doman, the suit lands were resumed by the State, and were made over to the plaintiff on his being appointed as Thicadar; but neither the State nor the plaintiff could get actual physical possession of the same, and the defendants were in possession since after the revisional survey. The story of possession and dispossession, as alleged by the plaintiff, was therefore, not accepted by that Court. The trial Court, however, held that, since the plaintiff got title to the suit lands in his capacity as the Thicadar, he is entitled to be in possession of the same, and the defendants are liable to be evicted. It, therefore, decreed the suit of the plaintiff. On appeal, the lower appellate court affirmed the findings ot the trial Court that the plaintiff was appointed Thicadar by means of the patta (Exhibit 1), dated 19-9-1941, and that the suit lands are the Thicadari Man lands, and were not acquired by Buka and Chaitan, as alleged by the defendants. It also affirmed the findings of the trial Court about the story of possession and dispossession as alleged by the plaintiff, to be not acceptable, and about the defendants being in possession over the same since after the revisional survey. With respect to the question of resumption, it found that, though there was an order of the Collector for resumption of the lands, the State did not get actual possession of the same, and, therefore, could not deliver possession of the same to the plaintiff on his being appointed as Thicadar. With respect to the question of resumption, it found that, though there was an order of the Collector for resumption of the lands, the State did not get actual possession of the same, and, therefore, could not deliver possession of the same to the plaintiff on his being appointed as Thicadar. As such, the lower appellate Court came to the conclusion that the suit of the plaintiff could not be decreed. It, therefore, allowed the appeal, and dismissed the suit. 5. In support of the appeal, Mr. Mukherjee has urged that, in view of the fact that both the Courts below have found that the plaintiff was appointed Thicadar in the year 1941, after the death of Doman, and the suit lands are the Thicadari Man lands, the plaintiff acquired title thereto, and even it he could not get possession thereof, his suit should have been decreed, as it was filed within twelve years from the date on which the plaintiff became entitled to take possession of the same. On the other hand, Mr. Ghose, appearing for the respondents, has urged that they have been adversely in possession of the suit lands from the time of the revisional survey in the year 1927, and have thus acquired title by adverse possession against the plaintiff as well as the Ruler of the Seraikela State, from whom the plaintiff alleges to have derived title; and therefore, the suit of the plaintiff was barred by time. 6. It is not now in dispute that the suit lands are the Thicadari Man lands, and that Dubraj, and, after him, his son Doman, and, after the death of Doman, the plaintiff was appointed Thicadar. It is also not disputed before us that the Man lands used to be given to the Thicadar in lieu of remuneration for his services, and that, on the death of a Thicadar, the same could be resumed by the State, and, on the appointment of a new Thicadar it would vest in him. It is also well established that, on the death of a Thicadar, ordinarily, his eldest son was to be appointed Thicadar in his place, if there was nothing against him; and this is also manifest from the Swatwalipi (Exhibit 8). Therefore, on the appointment of the plaintiff as Thicadar, after the death of his father. It is also well established that, on the death of a Thicadar, ordinarily, his eldest son was to be appointed Thicadar in his place, if there was nothing against him; and this is also manifest from the Swatwalipi (Exhibit 8). Therefore, on the appointment of the plaintiff as Thicadar, after the death of his father. Doman, he undoubtedly became entitled to hold the Man lands as the Thicadar. Title in the plaintiff over the suit lands is, therefore, clearly established. 7. It is, however, contended by Mr. Ghose, for the respondents, that the defendants obtained possession of the suit lands more than twelve years before the suit, and Doman, who was entitled to have possession over the same, must have either been dispossessed by the defendants, or Could not get possession over the same. It is, therefore, contended that the limitation started to run at least from the year 1927, when the respondents were shown to be in possession of the suit lands in the revisional survey; and it having once started to run, nothing could stop it. Reliance has been placed on Section 9 of the Limitation Act, which states that, where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to sue stops it. In my opinion, the contention put forward in this regard is barren of substance, and is based on confusion. On the facts found, all that appears is that the respondents kept Doman out of possession from the suit land at least from the year 1927, and the time started to run against Doman from that date, Doman was holding the suit lands only for his life in lieu of his services as Thicadar and, after his death, the Ruler of the State was entitled to resume the same. The time, which started to run against Doman, could not, in any sense, run against the Ruler of the Sate, who could resume the lands only after the termination of the Thicadari services of Doman. That being the position, Section 9 of the Limitation Act has no application to the case, so far as the Ruler of the State is concerned. That being the position, Section 9 of the Limitation Act has no application to the case, so far as the Ruler of the State is concerned. It is well established by now that possession adverse against a tenant can-not be adverse against the landlord until the termination of the tenancy, and the reason is very obvious, that so long as the tenancy continues, the landlord has no immediate right of possession, and, therefore, can have no right to sue for possession. It is true that he could have, during the continuance of the tenancy brought a suit for declaration under Sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act. But, the granting of a decree for declaration is in the discretion of the Court, and the landlord is not bound to bring a suit for such a declaration unless a right to take possession of the land accrues to him. In the present case, Doman himself could not have instituted a suit, after being out of possession for over twelve years, against the defendants, as the suit would have been obviously barred by time. But that could not apply to the Ruler of the State, who acquired the right of resumption and khas possession only after the death of Doman in the year 1940. In my opinion, the time against him started to run in the year 1940 on the death of Doman, and, consequently, the limitation against the plaintiff, who has derived his title from the Ruler, would also start only after the death of his father, Doman, in the year 1940. The suit, having been brought within twelve years of that date, is, therefore, not barred by time. 8. A point was raised as to the applicability of a particular article of the Limitation Act. According to the appellant the article applicable was either 139 or 140 or 144 of the Limitation Act, whereas, according to the respondents, article 142 applied. All these articles prescribe twelve years as the period of limitation, which starts to run, under Article 139, when the tenancy is determined; under article 140, when the estate falls into possession; under Article 142, from the date of dispossession or discontinuance of possession and under Article 144, when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. All these articles prescribe twelve years as the period of limitation, which starts to run, under Article 139, when the tenancy is determined; under article 140, when the estate falls into possession; under Article 142, from the date of dispossession or discontinuance of possession and under Article 144, when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. It is not necessary to decide in the present case as to which of the above articles would be applicable, because, in any case, the period of limitation is twelve years from the date on which the cause of action arises under each of the articles, and as in the present case, the cause of action for the Ruler or for the plaintiff, deriving title from him to get possession of the lands in suit arose only in 1940, after the death of Doman, the suit is within twelve years from that date, and is not, therefore, barred. 9. The above view gains full support from authorities. In Womesh Chunder Goopto v. Raj Narain Roy. 10 Suth WR 15 it was contended that the plaintiffs cause of action accrued when the trespass was committed upon his tenant, and that he could have instituted a suit for a declaration that the land, upon which the trespass had been committed was a part of the estate included in the tenure. It was held that, assuming that he could have brought such an action, it would Have been merely for a declaration of right, and not for relict -- a very different cause of action from that which he has instituted to recover possession. It was pointed out in that case that the difficulties and dangers of zemindars would be great if they were bound to sue for declarations of right whenever they should discover any person other than the tenant in possession of any part of the land included in a putnee-tenure. It was pointed out in that case that the difficulties and dangers of zemindars would be great if they were bound to sue for declarations of right whenever they should discover any person other than the tenant in possession of any part of the land included in a putnee-tenure. It was further observed that, to hold that a grantor is bound to sue immediately a trespass is committed upon his tenants, and that he will be bound, by limitation if he does not sue within 12 years from the time that the trespass was first committed, would open such a door to fraud and collusion between tenants and trespassers that the zemindar or land-owner, when he seeks to enforce the payment of his rent would often find trespassers, whom, in consequence of limitation, he could not get rid of, in possession of the greater portion of the tenure and who, as soon as he should have defeated the land-owner by the plea of limitation, would probably share the spoil with the defaulting tenant. In Krishna Gobind V/s. Hari Churn, ILR 9 Cal. 367, at the time when the land was purchased by the plaintiffs, it was subject to Ijara to certain persons. During the currency of the Ijara, the Ijaradars were dispossessed. A question arose as to when did limitation begin to run against the plaintiffs. It was held that possession adverse to the Ijaradars was not possession adverse to the plaintiffs, and, whether Article 139 or Article 144 of the Limitation Act applied, the suit was not barred, because the cause of action to the plainliff arose only on the expiration of the Ijara. Similarly, in Sharat Sundari Dabia V/s. Bhobo Persad Khan, ILR 13 Cal 101, the zamindari interest of the plaintiff in a certain tauzi was let out in Ijara, and during the continuance of the Ijara the defendant, in the year 1278 B. S., dispossessed the Ijaradar. The Ijara lease, however, terminated in the year 1285, and in the suit brought by the plaintiff for possession of his zemindari interest, it was alleged that ho was dispossessed from the disputed land in the beginning of 1286. It was contended on behalf of the defendant that the limitation started to run against the plaintiff in the year 1278, when possession was taken by the defendant, and the suit was accordingly, barred. It was contended on behalf of the defendant that the limitation started to run against the plaintiff in the year 1278, when possession was taken by the defendant, and the suit was accordingly, barred. Their Lordships applied Article 144 of the Limitation Act to the case, and held that, as the adverse possession of the defendant against the plaintiff commenced only on the termination of the Ijara lease, within twelve years of the suit, the suit was not barred. 10. In Uday Kumar Das V/s. Katyani Debi, ILR 49 Cal 948: (AIR 1922 Cal 87), a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that the possession of a trespasser, during the continuance of a lease, does not become adverse against the lessor; and this decision was affirmed by the Privy Council in Katyayani Debi V/s. Udoy Kumar Das, ILR 52 Cal 417: (AIR 1925 PC 97). Their Lordships pointed out in that case that the duty of a tenant under a tenure is to protect himself against illegal encroachments by others on the lands of which he has the exclusive possession, and that, if he fails to do so, he cannot prejudice the landlords claim for rent. Their Lordships approved the decision in 10 Suth WR 15 referred to above. The same view has been reiterated in another Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Rahim Bux V/s. Osman Gani, AIR 1948 Cal 71. In that case, at the time when the defendants encroached upon the suit land, it was in possession of a tenant, who surrendered the holding to the landlord in 1935, about ten years after the encroachment. The plaintiff then took settlement of the land from the landlord sometime in 1936, and instituted a suit for recovery of possession. The suit was contested on the ground that it was barred by limitation, as it was brought more than twelve years after the encroachment. It was held that the adverse possession which had commenced against the tenant could not continue against the landlord, and limitation would begin to run against him, or a person deriving title from him, only from the date of surrender. 11. In Ramlakhan V/s. Digbijay Narain, ILR 26 Pat 278: (AIR 1948 Pat. It was held that the adverse possession which had commenced against the tenant could not continue against the landlord, and limitation would begin to run against him, or a person deriving title from him, only from the date of surrender. 11. In Ramlakhan V/s. Digbijay Narain, ILR 26 Pat 278: (AIR 1948 Pat. 274), a Bench of this Court, after considering most of the decisions referred to above, came to the conclusion that the adverse possession against the lessee does not become adverse against the lessor. The same view has been taken by a Full Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Punjaram Jagoba V/s. Ramu Chintoo, AIR 1940 Nag 49 (F. B.). It was held in that case that the landlord cannot sue for possession during the continuance of a tenancy even if there is a trespasser on the land, and His rights in that respect do not accrue until the tenancy is determined and that as soon as the tenancy has been determined, he is free to sue the trespasser and the adverse possession of the trespasser would not run against the landlord during the currency of the tenancy. In Mt. Dilafroz V/s. Raja Gauhar Zamir Khan, AIR 1946 P. C. 165 a certain person gifted some land in 1908 to another person. In 1928, the son of the donor brought a suit against the donee tor a declaration that the gift was null and void as against him and did not affect his right to inherit the land after the death of his father. That suit was dismissed as being barred by time. Thereafter, the donor died in 1936, and his son, again in 1938, brought a suit for possession alleging that the gift was invalid. It was pleaded in defence that the suit was barred by limitation. Their Lordships held that the claim to possession which the plaintiff was asserting in this suit only arose on the death of his father in 1936, and the fact that his claim to a declaration relating to his reversionary interest may have been barred in 1928 was irrelevant since that was upon a different cause of action. 12. Their Lordships held that the claim to possession which the plaintiff was asserting in this suit only arose on the death of his father in 1936, and the fact that his claim to a declaration relating to his reversionary interest may have been barred in 1928 was irrelevant since that was upon a different cause of action. 12. On a consideration of the authorities referred to above my concluded opinion, therefore, is that the adverse possession of the defendants against Doman in this case could not be adverse to the Ruler of the Serikela State, or to the plaintiff, who derived title from the Ruler, till the lifetime of Doman, and the right to sue for possession actually accrued to the Ruler, and, therefore, also to the plaintiff, only in the year 1940, on the death of Doman. The suit, having been brought within twelve years from that date, is, therefore, obviously within time, and not barred by limitation. 13. Mr. Ghose, appearing for the respondents, however, has contended that in this case the plaintiff instituted the suit on a clear assertion of possession having been taken by the Ruler of the State and then delivered to him; but the Courts below held that the plaintiff has failed to prove the story of possession and dispossession, as alleged by him. It is urged, therefore, that the suit of the plaintiff was rightly dismissed by the lower appellate Court. It is an admitted fact in the case that, after the death of Doman, the Collector passed an order for resumption, and that order is on the records of this case. The Ruler of the State, on such resumption, was entitled to take possession of the suit lands from the defendants, but he could not get possession. He could, therefore, have instituted a suit for recovery of possession within the time allowed, by law and the plaintiff, similarly, as having derived title from the Ruler of the State, could have brought the suit for recovery of possession within the same period. The failure of the plaintiff to establish his case of possession and dispossession doe not in my opinion, alter the situation. The failure of the plaintiff to establish his case of possession and dispossession doe not in my opinion, alter the situation. Even though the Ruler of the State or the plaintiff did not get actual possession, they acquired the right to get such possession, and that right could be enforced by institution of a suit within the period of limitation prescribed for the same. As, in the present case, the suit has been brought within the period of limitation, the plaintiff was entitled to succeed. The above view is borne out by a Bench decision of this Court in Bankey Behary Lal V/s. Gudo Chaudhry, 11 Pat LT 447: (AIR 1930 Pat. 476). In that case, the suit of the plaintiffs was dismissed on the ground that they had brought the suit on the basis of dispossession after the expiry of the lease, and not on the basis of an encroachment during the period of the lease. Their Lordships observed that the determination in a cause should be founded upon a case either to be found in the pleadings or involved in, or consistent with, the case made thereby, and that it does not follow from this that every variance between pleading and proof is material and justifies a dismissal of the claim. Their Lordships quoted with approval the following observation made in the case of Nabadwipendra Mookherji V/s. Madhusudan, 18 Cal WN 473: (AIR 1914 Cal. 703): "The particular mode in which the ouster of the plaintiff took place, or the specific point of time when it happened, is really not material. The plaintiff has to prove his title first; if he does so, he has further to prove his possession within twelve years prior to the suit: on what precise date, within the twelve years, he lost possession, is not a matter of consequence". In that case, their Lordships differed from the view taken by the learned District Judge that, because the cause of action alleged in the plaint was dispossession after the espiry of the lease, the plaintiff could not succeed when he came to the view that this portion was encroached upon by the defendant during the currency of the Thica lease. In that case, their Lordships differed from the view taken by the learned District Judge that, because the cause of action alleged in the plaint was dispossession after the espiry of the lease, the plaintiff could not succeed when he came to the view that this portion was encroached upon by the defendant during the currency of the Thica lease. It was also pointed out in that case that possession taken by a trespasser during the currency of an Ijara lease does not become adverse to the Zamindar until upon expiration of the term, and a suit for possession may be brought within twelve years of that date. 14 It was next contended on behalf of the respondents that the lands in suit were waste lands and the ancestors of the defendants had made them culturable and thus acquired korkar right under the provisions of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act. The finding, however, in this case is that there is no evidence that the suit lands were waste lands, and the defendants or their ancestors made them culturable. Moreover, this was not pleaded in the written statement. The determination of the question about the acquisition of korkar right depends on the determination of several facts. Since, however, there was no pleading or any issue raised in regard to this matter, it is not possible to permit the defendants respondents to raise it in this court in second appeal for the first time. 15. Lastly, it was contended that the Thicadari Man lands must have vested in the State ot Bihar under the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, and the plaintiff, therefore, has no right to continue the suit. There is nothing to show that the plaintiff was or is an intermediary and the Thicadari Man lands have vested in the State of Bihar. 16. No other point has been raised. The result, therefore, is that the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are set aside, and the decree passed by the trial court is restored. The suit of the plaintiff is, accordingly, decreed with costs throughout. V.Ramaswami, J. 17 I agree.