JUDGMENT : Misra, J. - This is a second appeal against the confirming judgments of the two courts below. The Appellant is admittedly the tenant of the Respondents in respect of the suit house. The suit was one for ejectment and for recovery of arrears of rent and damages. The present appeal is confined only to the decree for ejectment. The three point that were urged in the appeal were (1) that the Respondents had accepted rent after the termination of the tenancy, (2) that the notice determining the tenancy was hot a valid one, and (3) that the provisions of the present House Rent Control Act stood in the way of the decree for ejectment. 2. As to the first question, notice had been served on the Appellant to quit by the end of 28th of February 1955. After that date, the Appellant continued in possession and offered rent to the Respondents for both February and March. In his reply in Ext. 3, Respondent No. 1 made it clear that in view of the notice to quit be was to receive rent for the month of February, and if any money was sent for the month of March, he could not accept it as rent, but could accept the same as damages for use and occupation. On receipt of Ext. 3, when the Appellant sent money, Respondent No. 1 appropriated the same in the manner indicated in Ext. 3. So, actually there was no acceptance of rent after the termination of the tenancy. 3. As to the notice to quit, the tenancy, which was a monthly one, had commenced from 30-11-1910, and the notice required the Appellant to vacate by the end of February, 1955. Since the tenancy commenced from the 30th of a particular month, the last date of the monthly tenancy would be the 29th of any month. But in the month of February 1955, there was no such date as 29'. According to Mr. Misra, the learned Counsel for the Appellant, the corresponding month of tenancy would continue up to the 1st of March, and so the notice was defective. The validity of the notice to quit had been challenged in the courts below, not on this but on other grounds. The period of a monthly tenancy is not 30 days, but is one month calculated according to the Gregorian calendar. The validity of the notice to quit had been challenged in the courts below, not on this but on other grounds. The period of a monthly tenancy is not 30 days, but is one month calculated according to the Gregorian calendar. So, for every date in a month, there must be a corresponding date in the fallowing month, and when this February, the corresponding dates for 30th or 31st of any other month would be the last day of February. In that view of the matter, this contention has no merit. 4. The next point urged is that the decree for ejectment ineffective in view of the provisions of the Orissa Rouse Rent Control Act (Act 31 of 1958) which came into force while the present second appeal was pending. u/s 2(5) of the said Act, 'tenant' means any person by whom or on whose behalf rent is payable for any house and includes every person who from time to time derives title under a tenant, or a person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy otherwise than under the provision of this Act, and shall include any person against whom a suit for ejectment is pending in a Court of competent jurisdiction; but not a person against whom a decree or order for eviction has been made by such a Court". Mr. Misra sought to urge that since the said Act intended to prevent unreasonable eviction and give relief to tenants, its provisions should be beneficially construed in favour of a tenant, and so, according to him, the word 'suit' in the definition of 'tenant' should mean to cover an 'appeal', and the word 'decreea' in that definition means the 'decree of the trial court', No doubt, it is the duty of Judges to make such construction of a statute as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. Even where the usual meaning of the language falls short of the whole object of the legislature, a more extended meaning may be attributed to the words if they are fairly susceptible of it. The construction must not, however, be strained to include cases plainly omitted from the natural meaning of the words. The definition of 'tenant', while includes tenants under pending suits, seeks to exclude tenants against whom a suit is no longer pending by virtue of a decree. The construction must not, however, be strained to include cases plainly omitted from the natural meaning of the words. The definition of 'tenant', while includes tenants under pending suits, seeks to exclude tenants against whom a suit is no longer pending by virtue of a decree. There might be four classes of tenants-(1) against whom a suit is pending, (2) against whom a suit has been decided, but the matter is pending in appeal, revision, restoration or review by the time the House Rent Control Act came into force (3) against whom a suit has been decided, but no appeal etc., are pending and (4) against whom a suit with appeals etc., has been finally adjudicated. So far as the first and the last classes are concerned, they present no difficulty. By the by it may be noted that according to the scheme of the House Rent Control Act, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any agreement or law, no tenant is liable to be ejected except as provided by the said Act. If the extended meaning to suit land 'decree' is given as sought to be put by Mr. Misra for the purpose of furthering the object of the legislature, then not only the word 'suit' must include an 'appeal' but also it should include review, revision and restroration also. Such an extended meaning for 'suit' is not supported by the very scheme of the Code of Civil Procedure, wherein there are several provisions specifically laid down as to how certain procedures prescribed for a suit might be followed in appeals, review etc. No doubt, for certain purposes, an appeal is a continuation of the suit, but it is specifically laid down in the CPC that a decree in a suit might be proceeded with in execution irrespective of an appeal pending. Mr. Misra sought to seek some support from Ct. A. Ct. Nachiappa Chettiar and Others Vs. Ct. A. Ct. Subramaniam Chettiar, in which their Lordships were considering the power of the appellate court in referring matters to arbitration under the provisions of the Arbitration Act, and for purposes of that Act, their Lordships held that the suit included an appeal. In that decision, their Lordships were mainly concerned with the powers of the appellate Court, and taking into consideration the antecedent position before the Arbitration Act was amended, their Lordships came to that view. In that decision, their Lordships were mainly concerned with the powers of the appellate Court, and taking into consideration the antecedent position before the Arbitration Act was amended, their Lordships came to that view. So, that decision may not be taken to mean that in every case a suit includes an appeal. Though, in the present case, we are concerned with an appeal, as I have indicated before, there might be cases of revision, review and restoration, in which the self-same question might arise, and to give the liberal interpretation sought by Mr. Misra, an extended meaning to 'suit' shall be given, not only to include an appeal, but those proceedings also, If such an extended meaning to 'suit' to include review, revision or restoration cannot be given we shall have to be confronted with four categories of tenants, as I have classified above, whereas the definition of the word 'tenant' by the inclusive and exclusive clauses, refers to only two categories of tenants. Even the extended meaning to pending suits to cover appeals, review, revision and restoration cannot cover the third category that is, cases where suits have been the time the Act came into, force, were no pending appeals etc., at the time and such appeals etc., were filed later. On the other hand, the interpretation given by Mr. Ramdas follows from the plain meaning of the words. There is another aspect also from which one may come to the same conclusion. According to the scheme of the House Rent Control Act, if a suit is pending for ejectment of the tenant from a house, that suit becomes abrotive, and one has to proceed u/s 7 of the same Act in a different forum and not in a Civil Court for getting an order for ejectment. If the word 'suit' includes appeals also, then for the same reason the pending appeal would prove abortive, and in that case, the decree passed by the trial court not being affected by the pending appeal, which becomes infructuous, would stand as a good decree. So, the very purpose for which the extended meaning could be given to the order 'suit' would be defeated. So, the very purpose for which the extended meaning could be given to the order 'suit' would be defeated. It might possibly be urged that if a suit does not include appeals and a decree means the decree of the trial court, in the appeal against that decree an argument may be taken that since the Defendant is no longer a tenant, the appeal by him becomes infructuous, inasmuch as he has lost his character as a tenant under which alone he could maintain the appeal, and this would lead to manifest injustice. Though such a tenant may not be a tenant under the definition of the House Rent Control Act, he must be still deemed to be a tenant under the Transfer of Property Act, and so by holding that be is not a tenant under the definition of the. House Rent Control Act, he does not lose his right to proceed in the appeal. Hence, I do not accept the contention of Mr. Misra that the decree has become infructuous by virtue of the provisions of the House Rent Control Act. 5. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Leave to appeal is allowed. 6. Appeal dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed