Chhangani, J.—This is a plaintiffs second appeal in a suit for declaration that the order No. 507/S (iii) L/Gen/MD dated 19th August, 1952 of the Director of Medical and Health Services, Rajasthan, Jaipur of the defendant State dismissing the plaintiff from services is irregular, illegal, void and inoperative and that the plaintiff continued to be in the service of the defendant as a Male nurse-cum-compounder entitled to pay and for arrears of salaries amounting to Rs. 2,808/3/. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal may very briefly be stated as follows: 3. The plaintiff was employed as a Male nurse-cum-compounder and was posted in the General Hospital, Kotah in the employment of the defendant, the State of Rajasthan in the Medical and Health Department. According to him, he was getting a salary of Rs. 88/- plus dearness allowance of Rs. 25/- per month in what is known as the third-grade Male nurse-cum-compounder. He was suspended from service by an order of the Assistant Director of Medical and Health Services dated 3rd July, 1952 and was eventually dismissed by the order of the Director of Medical and Health Services dated 19th August, 1952. He instituted the present suit on 9th July, 1954 in the court of the Civil Judge, Kotah and prayed for the declaration stated above, on the ground that the dismissal order was passed without proper compliance with the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution of India. The defendant State opposed the plaintiffs suit and pleaded that there was no irregularity in the proceedings resulting in the dismissal of the plaintiff. The State did not admit the plaintiffs allegations regarding his grade and scale of salary and took a stand that he was in the fourth grade and was getting a salary of Rs. 48/- plus dearness allowance of Rs. 20/-. 4. The trial court framed the following six issues: — (1) Whether the plaintiff was getting salary of Rs. 88/- p.m. plus dearness allowance of Rs. 25/- and was placed in third grade male compounder? (2) Whether the order of suspension is unauthorised, illegal, and without jurisdiction? (3) Whether the order of dismissal dated 19th August, 1952 is void and illegal ? (4) Whether two responsible opportunities are necessary before dismissal of government servant and if so, whether the same was not given to the plaintiff before dismissal. (2) Whether the order of suspension is unauthorised, illegal, and without jurisdiction? (3) Whether the order of dismissal dated 19th August, 1952 is void and illegal ? (4) Whether two responsible opportunities are necessary before dismissal of government servant and if so, whether the same was not given to the plaintiff before dismissal. (5) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover Rs. 2808/3/- from the defendant? (6) Whether proper notice under sec. 80 C.P.C. was given to the defendant. (7) To what relief the parties are entitled ? 5. After recording the evidence of the parties, the trial court decided issue no. 1 against the plaintiff and held that the plaintiff failed to prove that he was getting Rs. 88/-as salary plus Rs. 25/- as dearness allowance. Issue no. 2 was also decided against the plaintiff and it was held that there was nothing wrong in the order of suspension. Issues No. 3 and 4 were decided in favour of the plaintiff and the trial court held that the order of dismissal was illegal having been passed without giving reasonable opportunity to the plaintiff against the proposed punishment as required by Art. 311 of the Constitution of India. Issue no. 5 was decided against the plaintiff on the findings of issue No. 1. In the result, the trial court gave a declaration that the dismissal of the plaintiff from the defendants service was illegal, void and inoperative. However, instead of declaring that he continued to remain in service and was entitled to his pay, the trial court recorded a conclusion that the setting aside of the order dismissing the plaintiff from service, amounted to the restoration of the order of suspension and it would be for the administrative authorities to decide the plaintiffs claim for salaries or subsisting allowance on an application, if any, made by the plaintiff. The plaintiff went in appeal to the District Judge, Kotah, who has affirmed the decree of the trial court. The plaintiff has filed this second appeal. 6. I have heard Mr. C.L. Agarwal for the plaintiff-appellant and Mr. R.A. Gupta, Dy. Government Advocate. 7. It has been very vehemently contended by Mr. The plaintiff went in appeal to the District Judge, Kotah, who has affirmed the decree of the trial court. The plaintiff has filed this second appeal. 6. I have heard Mr. C.L. Agarwal for the plaintiff-appellant and Mr. R.A. Gupta, Dy. Government Advocate. 7. It has been very vehemently contended by Mr. Agarwal that the present case stands concluded by a judgment of the Supreme Court in Omprakash Gupta vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (1), and that the District Judge has seriously erred in holding that the Supreme Court judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case. A perusal of the judgment of the District Judge, Kotah shows that he has taken a view that the Supreme Court judgment is applicable to cases where a civil court sets aside the order of dismissal from service on merits. He probably meant that in order to attract the applicability of the Supreme Court judgment, the civil court should examine the grounds on which the dismissal order is based and record its own findings on those grounds. In other words, the civil court should decide whether the charges against the person dismissed from service are proved or not and if proved, they justify an order of dismissal. 8. I have very carefully considered the judgment of the Supreme Court and I do not find any justification for the view taken by the District Judge. The report of the Supreme Court judgment as given in Omprakash Gupta vs. State of Utter Pradesh(l) does not clearly state the circumstances in which the civil court set aside the order of dismissal from service. The judgment was in an appeal from the judgment of the Allahabad High Court reported in Omprakash vs. United Province (2). Consequently I referred to that case for a correct idea of the facts of the case. From the facts given in that judgment, it appears that the order of dismissal was declared null and void on the ground that the enquiry conducted by the Commissioner was improper and in violation of the provisions of Rule 55 (C.S.) Qualification Rules, 1938 and no opportunity had been given to him to show cause against the proposed punishment. These being the facts, I have no doubt that the Supreme Court judgment was not in respect of cases where the dismissal order was set aside on merits as used by the District Judge. These being the facts, I have no doubt that the Supreme Court judgment was not in respect of cases where the dismissal order was set aside on merits as used by the District Judge. It was also a case of a dismissal with non-compliance with the provisions of the rules as also non-compliance with a provision requiring the authorities to give show cause notice against the proposed punishment. The District Judge, consequently, is clearly in error in distinguishing this case on unwarranted assumptions. 9. Secondly, the District Judge has quoted some passages from Sabhagmal vs. The State (3) and Meghraj vs. The State of Rajasthan (4) and emphasized the directions made in these observations to the administrative authorities to comply with the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution of India and then proceed to pass such punishment as they may deem proper. The learned judge thought that the High Court purported to have restored the status quo ante as obtaining on the date of dismissal; thereby the restoration of the state of suspension These directions, I must observe, were incidental and casual and were made in order to guide the administrative authorities in future proceedings. Even in the absence of these directions, the tight of the State authorities to take actions on the lines indicated, does not admit of any doubt. A plain reading of these directions does not provide a basis for an assumption that the High Court restored the state of suspension. I have no doubt that the learned judge has read some thing in these observations which is plainly not there. Assuming that there is some room for such an inference, still these observations are absolutely of no assistance in the present case. These observations were made by the High Court in deciding writ applications. In dealing with writ applications, the High Court exercises a sort of supervisory jurisdiction over the administrative proceedings. The High Courts jurisdiction is recognised even where the jurisdiction of the civil courts is barred. Therefore, whatever may be the view with regard to the competence of the High Court to issue appropriate directions under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, it is not possible to hold that the civil courts also can exercise such powers. The position of a civil court is fundamentally different. The civil court does not sit in appeal over the judgments of the administrative authorities. The position of a civil court is fundamentally different. The civil court does not sit in appeal over the judgments of the administrative authorities. It is mainly and primarily concerned with the determination of the legal rights and I cannot conceive that a civil court can issue directions regulating proceedings of the administrative authorities apart from recording findings on the rights of the parties. I do not, therefore, find any justification for an inference drawn by the District Judge on the observations quoted by him. 10. In fact, it is improper to attempt a distinction drawn by the District Judge. It must be remembered in this connection that the civil courts do not sit in appeal over the findings of the administrative authorities and ordinarily they do not possess jurisdiction to review the findings of the administrative authorities and to record their own findings and one cannot ordinarily expect a civil court setting aside the dismissal from service on a review of findings on the charges, i.e., on merits as termed by the District Judge. The dismissal is generally set aside on grounds on non-compliance with the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution of India, or Rules relating to Service Conditions, or non-observance of the principles of natural justice. It will be hardly fair to take all these cases from the application of the judgment of the Supreme Court and to limit that judgment to only rare and exceptional cases, where the dismissal from service is set aside on a review of the findings on the charges. I also feel a good deal of hesitation in drawing a distinction between decrees setting aside dismissal for noncompliance with the provisions of the Constitution or Rules relating to Service Conditions and dismissal on review of findings and to term the latter a decree on merits and the former otherwise. A decree is in adjudication on the rights of the parties and should always be treated as on merits. It appears to me that the District Judge has been led into this confusion on his having treated the suit as a continuation of the departmental proceedings which in fact it is not. The District Judge in discussing an illustration which he gave, made the following observations to support his conclusion. It appears to me that the District Judge has been led into this confusion on his having treated the suit as a continuation of the departmental proceedings which in fact it is not. The District Judge in discussing an illustration which he gave, made the following observations to support his conclusion. He says that if the salary was to be given to him by the court from the date of suspension till the decision of the case, it will amount to exonerating him from the charges. He should be exonerated even though the enquiry against him had not resulted in his exoneration or censure. A decree would mean that the charges against him are effaced and that he is acquitted of the charges by the civil court even though that may be found proved or mostly admitted by him in the departmental inquiry." 11. I regret, I cannot agree with these observations. There is nothing to prevent a civil court from passing a decree setting aside a dismissal order on the ground of noncompliance with the provisions of the Constitution of India or Rules relating to Service conditions and I also cannot agree that such a decree must in all cases be treated as an exoneration of the person from the charges levelled against him. The passing of the decree will not preclude the Government from directing a further enquiry into the charges and passing fresh orders on the merits of the case. 12. On all these considerations, I am quite clear that the view taken by the District Judge is clearly erroneous and cannot be maintained. The case is fully covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court and the plaintiff was entitled to his salary on the, findings or the civil court that his dismissal from service was illegal and inoperative. 13. The learned Deputy Government Advocate has not been able to successfully meet the above position. However, he urged some additional grounds to maintain the decree of the courts below. 13. The learned Deputy Government Advocate has not been able to successfully meet the above position. However, he urged some additional grounds to maintain the decree of the courts below. He put in an application on 3rd March, 1960 seeking per-mission to bring on record copies of a few documents, including the following two order:- (1) Order of the Director of Medical and Health Services, Jaipur dated 22nd April, 1957 directing that the plaintiff should be considered to remain as suspended from the date of his dismissal as per this office order No. 5078/ML/Gen/MD dated 19.8.52 came into effect. (2) Order of the Director of Medical and Health Services dated 18th January, 1958 dismissing him from service from the date of his suspension. 14. This prayer was opposed by Mr. Agarwal, but in view of the fact that these orders were passed subsequent to the filing of the present appeal, I granted the request of the Deputy Government Advocate and admitted these documents in evidence and marked them as Ex.R/1 and Ex.R/2 respectively and heard both the learned counsel for the parties on this aspect of the case. 15. Mr. Agarwal contended that these subsequent orders do not in any way affect the plaintiffs right to claim salary. It was pointed out that the order dated 22nd April, 1957 suspending the plaintiff retrospectively is wholly illegal and inoperative, because it is not open to the Government to suspend a Government servant from retrospective effect. He cited a number of authorities Hemanta Kumar Bhattacharjee vs. S. N Mukherjee (5), Probodh Chandra Ghose vs. Executive Engineer (6), Mohammed Azam vs. State of Hyderabad (7), Abid Mohammad Khan vs. The State (8) and Prafulla Mohan Mukherjee vs. The Inspector General of Police (9). It appears to me that the Supreme Court judgment(1) itself impliedly negatives the rights of the State to suspend raised before the Supreme Court, yet ther State had resisted the claim of the Government servant in the exercise of its right to treat the Government servant who was dismissed from service s being under suspension and this contention was over-ruled by the supreme Court. It is true that there was no formal order of the U.P. Government suspending the plaintiff Om Prakash with retrospective effect, but the absence of a formal order is of no material consequence as, in my opinion, even in the absence of such for salary in the exercise of power to retrospectively suspend a Government to resist the plaintiffs claim there was really any such inherent power to do so. The plaintiff having discharged no duties and having not remained in service actually, I have no doubt that on a premise that the Government have inherent power to retrospectively suspend their employees then in the absence of a formal order, the State Government could legally assert its right having held that Om Prakash could not be treated as under suspension impliedly held that a Government servant cannoit be suspended retrospectively. A part from the above implied inference from the judgment of the Supreme Court, there are numerous authorities of the High Courts cited above, clearly laying down that a Government sevant cannot be suspended retrospectively in the exercise of the inherent power of the Government. It is quite unnecessary to refer in detail to all these cases, but it will be just as well to notice a few of them to elucidate the reasons for the view taken. 16. The earliest and probably the leading case is Hemant Kumar Bhattacharjee vs. S.N. Mukherjee (5), which has been followed in a number of subsequent cases. In that case, Chakravartti C.J. after quoting the meanings of "suspension," "suspend" and "suspended" made the following observations : — "Thus the basic idea underlying the root word suspend and all its derivatives is that a person, while holding an office and performing its functions or holding a position or privilege, should be interrupted in doing so and debarred for the time being from further functioning in the office or holding the position or privilege. He is interrupted in the exercise of his functions or his enjoyment of the privilege and put aside, as it were, for a time, excluded during the period from his functions or privileges. Such being the concept of a suspension order, suspension with retrospective effect is a contradiction in terms. He is interrupted in the exercise of his functions or his enjoyment of the privilege and put aside, as it were, for a time, excluded during the period from his functions or privileges. Such being the concept of a suspension order, suspension with retrospective effect is a contradiction in terms. The antecedent period which an order of suspension with retrospective effect might be intended to cover, would ordinarily be a period during which the person concerned had already performed the duties of his office or held the relevant position. There can be no meaning in suspending a man from working during a period when the period is past and he has already worked or suspending a man from occupying a position or holding a privilege in the past when he has already occupied or held it. If the suspending authority had the powers of a legislature, he could undoubtedly have said that although an employee might have actually worked during an antecedent period, he would be deemed not to have worked and to have been under suspension or although a person might have actually occupied a position in the past, he would be deemed not to have been bereft of the privileges attaching thereto. But the Govt. of India not being a legislature and having given itself by the rules no more power than a power to suspend, the ordinary meaning of suspension must apply to the construction of the power. Any order made must be within the limits of the power to suspend and those limits must be taken to be such as are possible under the meaning of the word suspension. If so, an order of suspension with retrospective effect under the authority of Rule 2 is impossible in the nature of things." 17. It will be useful to clear two points at this stage : (1) A reference in these observations to the general and ordinary position where a person after having performed duties is sought to be suspended retrospectively, should not be understood to distinguish cases of the kind before me where on account of a dismissal order having remained in force, there was actually no performance of duties. The reference to the position has been made to reach the general conclusion, which must apply to all cases. The reference to the position has been made to reach the general conclusion, which must apply to all cases. In my opinion, the case of a person who is treated on duty under an order of a civil court setting aside his dismissal from service comes within the principle stated above. (2) There is also no reason to distinguish the case on account of some reference to the Rules relating to service. The Rajasthan Service Rules do not justify any different conclusion, for they also contemplate a dismissal of a government servant, i.e. a person being in a state of service and do not empower the Government to retrospectively suspend a person. 18. The observations of Chakravartti, C.J. were quoted with approval by Jagan-mohan Reddy J. as he was then sitting with Subha Rao C. J. in Mohammad Azam vs. State of Hyderabad (7) in supporting the following conclusion arrived at in that case :— "The word suspension generally connotes temporary deprivation of office, position or of ones privilege. This being the meaning, suspension of a person retrospectively has no meaning. The rules do not empower the authority to suspend person retrospectively nor is such power consistent with the nature of suspension. 19. In Abid Mohammad Khan vs. The State (8), the proposition was stated in following words:— "Suspension thus connotes temporary cessation of something as right, work or labour. This very concept of the word suspension rules out a Government servant who is in service and who has in law performed the duties of his office during a certain period being placed subsequently under suspension for that period. When in law be has performed the duties, then there can be no question of forbidding him from exercising the functions of his office in that period which is already past." 20. The reasons given in these cases for the view taken are very convincing and weighty and I have no hesitation whatsoever to express my complete agreement with the view and to observe that it should be treated as a settled law that ordinarily a Government servant cannot be suspended with retrospective effect. The reasons given in these cases for the view taken are very convincing and weighty and I have no hesitation whatsoever to express my complete agreement with the view and to observe that it should be treated as a settled law that ordinarily a Government servant cannot be suspended with retrospective effect. It is indeed true as expressly or impliedly indicated in these cases that the legislature can pass a law and by a legal fiction treat a Government servant as having performed no duties in spite of his having remained in duty, but as observed by Dixit J. in the Madhya Pradesh case(8). it must be done by an express rule and cannot be derived from the ordinary meaning of the words "suspension" and "suspended*. No rule in the Rajasthan Service Rules empowering the Government to suspend a government servant retrospectively has been pointed out to me. 21. The Deputy Government Advocate also referred to Rule 52 of the Rajasthan Service Rules to resist the claim for salary and argued that rightly or wrongly, the Government having dismissed the plaintiff vide order dated 18th January, 1958, he cannot claim salary so long as this order remains in force and is not set aside. This dismissal order is based upon an assumption that the earlier order dated 22nd April, 1957 suspending the plaintiff with effect from 19th August, 1952 is a valid order. The assumption is entirely unwarranted as the order in question suspending, as it does, the plaintiff retrospectively is quite illegal, void and in-operative and consequently, the later order is equally invalid and cannot be recognised. The plaintiff having filed his suit some years before the issue of this order could have no opportunity of getting it set aside, but at the same time, the defendant by passing such an order cannot adversely affect the rights of the plaintiff, who has a clear right to request this Court to ignore it and treat it as nullity as obviously it is not a legal and valid order, in so far as it gives retrospective effect to suspension and to dismissal upon that assumption. 22. 22. In these circumstances, it is not possible to maintain the decree of the courts below and I must hold that the plaintiff is entitled to his salary from 19th August, 1952, when he was dismissed from service and when the order of suspension lapsed, to the date of the institution of the suit. His case for salary from 3rd July, 1952 to 19th August, 1952 raises the question whether the order of suspension itself was without jurisdiction or not. In view of the extremely short period, Mr. Agarwal rightly agreed not to press his claim for that period. So far as the salary and emoluments subsequent to the date of the institution of the suit is concerned, I think, it will not be proper to decide them in these proceedings. The cause of action with regard to that was not in existence at the date of the suit and I do not feel justified to exercise a discretion in favour of taking note of events subsequent to the suit and decide them, particularly in view of the subsequent orders passed by the Government in this case. 23. Having held that the plaintiff is entitled to his salary for the period commencing from 19th August, 1952 to the date of the institution of the suit, the next question arises as to the mode of calculation of salaries. The parties are at variance on this point. The trial court found in favour of the defendant. The appellate court omitted to record any finding on this issue. Two courses are open to me in this connection : either to appraise the evidence and arrive at a finding, or to send the case to the lower appellate court for recording a finding on this issue. Mr. Agarwal brought to my notice that in another suit filed by the plaintiff for his arrears of salary up to the date of suspension, he has been granted salary at the rate claimed in this suit by the District Judge in civil appeal no. 61 of 1956 and that the matter in the present appeal should be disposed of on the basis of that judgment, as it operates as res judicata. Mr. Gupta, Deputy Government Advocate, was not prepared to make his submissions on this aspect in the absence of proper notice. 61 of 1956 and that the matter in the present appeal should be disposed of on the basis of that judgment, as it operates as res judicata. Mr. Gupta, Deputy Government Advocate, was not prepared to make his submissions on this aspect in the absence of proper notice. Both the learned counsel for the parties, therefore, desire that the case should be sent back to the District Judge, Kotah for giving his findings on issue no.1 and decide the appeal on merits. 24. I, therefore, accept this appeal, set aside the decrees of the courts below and hold that the plaintiff is entitled to his salary for the period indicated above. The lower appellate court will decide issue no. 1 relating to the scale of salary payable to the plaintiff after hearing the parties and then pass a proper decree in favour of the plaintiff. The costs of this appeal shall abide the result.