ORDER H.R. Krisknan, J. The applicant was convicted by the learned Magistrate, First Class, Indore under Section 34-A of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act for the possession of forty bottles of illicit distilled liquor, which he was taking with him on his bicycle in a motor-wheel tube kept on the carrier. He was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six months, but on appeal, to the Sessions Judge, it was reduced to rigorous imprisonment for three months. He has come up in revision urging that the judgments of the lower Courts have been vitiated by a number of irregularities and has prayed that the conviction and sentence should be set aside. The facts found by the lower Courts are that some time on the evening of 28th August 1959, the applicant was at or near a paan-shop run by Kallu in a village called Badi Gwal Toli on the outskirts of the city of Indore. Two Chowkidare, who were on patrol duty, arrested him as they suspected, from the smell, that a motor-wheel tube taken by him on his cycle carrier, was full of illicit distilled liquor. They marched him to the police station and a case was started. The tube contained the large quantity of forty bottles of illicit liquor. But the defence, as ultimately given in the examination under Section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, was that the cycle was not in the hands of the accused, but was stood on the ground a few paces away from where he was at the moment of his arrest. Thus he was not in possession of the liquor and in fact did Dot know what the tube contained. The learned Magistrate accepted the evidence of chowkidars that the cycle was of the applicant, and he was actually holding it when he was arrested by them. This is a plain finding of fact. The first objection raised by the applicant is that the learned Magistrate has wrongly held that the applicant admitted the cycle to be his. Whether the applicant admitted or not, the finding is based on the evidence of chowkidars. But as a fact, the applicant did admit in his examination under Section 342, Criminal Procedure Code. Answer - "It is false to Bay that there was liquor in ray hands. If somebody had kept liquor on my cycle, I did not see it. So I am not guilty. But as a fact, the applicant did admit in his examination under Section 342, Criminal Procedure Code. Answer - "It is false to Bay that there was liquor in ray hands. If somebody had kept liquor on my cycle, I did not see it. So I am not guilty. The next alleged irregularity is the question under Section 242, Criminal Procedure Code, where the date of offence given is 29-8-1959 whereas the real date was 28-0-1959. Question - "The witnesses Bhagirath and Deogiraingh state that on 29-8-1959 at 7 or 8 P. M., you were standing at the shop of Kallu near the Bam Mandir and on the back of your cycle was tied a motor tube which was found to contain forty bottles of illicit distilled liquor." Answer - "Yes, this is correct. The cycle was four paces away from me and I was eating paan. Now this incident took place on 28-9-1959 and not on 29-8-1959. So, whatever may be the correctness and propriety of the other question, the date given by the Magistrate is a mistake. But I am not prepared to infer from this that the accused was prejudiced in the least. There was only one such incident and the accused himself perfectly understood, what was being referred to. The position would have been different if there were two incidents, one on the 28th and the other on the 29th, and while the trial was for the incident of the 28th, the Magistrate referred to the incident of the 29th. That was not the position. So this is only a ease of simple wrong dating of the only incident about which the case was proceeding; there is no prejudice. The third allegation is that in regard to one defence witness called Hukumchand (D. W. 2), "the learned Magistrate imported extraneous facts and acted on a wrong presumption" which has vitiated his findings. After the prosecution closed its case based on the evidence of the two chowkidars and of the formal witnesses, the applicant entered into defence and called two witnesses of his own. The first witness Hullu was in any event of little use to either party, because he claims to have come at a stage when the chowkidars had already taken charge of the cycle. D. W. 2 Hukumchand, however, stated that when he came, he saw the cycle four paces away from the applicant. The first witness Hullu was in any event of little use to either party, because he claims to have come at a stage when the chowkidars had already taken charge of the cycle. D. W. 2 Hukumchand, however, stated that when he came, he saw the cycle four paces away from the applicant. It depends upon the stage at which the witness happened to see the incident. The learned Magistrate took note of the fact that at that time Hukumchand himself was on trial before him for the offence of transporting illicit distilled liquor, an offence quite similar to the one alleged against the applicant. We do not know if Hukumchand has since been convicted; but the case against him was still pending when the present applicant was on trial. The fact of a person being on trial for an offence is not evidence of bad character. But in principle, there is nothing wrong in the Magistrate taking judicial notice of the bare fact. Nor was there anything wrong in holding that, human nature being what it is, a man on trial for an offence will be sympathetic with another on trial at the same moment, for a similar offence. This is really what the learned Magistrate has done, but in paragraph 5 of his judgment, he states that the accused and the witness were both interested in the same trade of transporting illicit liquor and it was natural for the latter to appear in order to help the former. This certainly is not a happy way of expressing oneself; but the fact remains that there was a good reason why this witness may not have been believed. Thus there has been no prejudice in this either. Finally, it has been pointed out that the learned Magistrate has expressed an opinion about Kallu, the paan-shopkeeper, which is not supported by any evidence. As already noted, the applicant was arrested in front of a paan-shop, where, he says, he was eating paan; the owner of the shop was Kallu though it is not clear whether at that moment he was present. Any way, the suggestion seems to have been that Kallu not having been examined by the prosecution, its evidence was to that extent defective. Any way, the suggestion seems to have been that Kallu not having been examined by the prosecution, its evidence was to that extent defective. I do not agree, as there may be many reasons why a person, who has actually seen a happening, does not want to get mixed up in a case in Court whether on the side of the prosecution or the defence. This is sufficient answer to the question regarding Kallu's non-examination; but one of the chowkidars was asked about it in cross-examination; he replied that "Kallu himself sells illicit liquor and he (i. e. the chowkidar) was on the look out to catch him and bring him to book". His own impression was that the liquor in the motor tube had been brought for sale, at Kallu's shop. It is from this that the learned Magistrate states that "Kallu carries on the business of selling illicit liquor". Though this is indicated in the chowkidar's evidence, it was really unnecessary in the present case to say anything about Kallu who is neither a witness nor an accused person. But I fail to see how it has affected the applicant, who has been convicted on the strength of the evidence actually adduced. All things considered, both the prosecution and the defence accounts were clear and none of the alleged errors has affected the decision. It is perfectly easy to examine the judgment of a Magistrate and to find out a microscopic error or irregularity here or there. But that cannot affect the decision unless the errors are material, have caused confusion, or are otherwise relatable to the decision which, but for them, might have been different. That is not the position here. Regarding the sentence, I am bound to remark that six months was the proper one, considering the largeness of the quantity, the novel way of taking it about, and the possibility that it was for sale for profit. A stiff fine was also indicated. The reduction to three months rigorous imprisonment has made the sentence feeble indeed.