Judgment Anant Singh, J. 1. The petitioner was convicted by Sri A.N. Jha, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Chapra, by his order dated the 9th July 1958, under Sec.379 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 51, in default, rigorous imprisonment for two months, which, on appeal, was reduced by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, second court, Chapra, by his order dated the 30th May 1959, to a fine of Rs. 5, in default, one weeks simple imprisonment. 2. The petitioner was a Municipal Commissioner of Chapra Municipality, and it was alleged that at about 5 p.m., on the 9th August, 1955, he went to the municipal office, and asked the complainant (P. W. 4), who was a municipal clerk, to show him the two letters, No. 902, dated 5-8-55, and 983, dated 6-8-55, which the petitioner had written to the Chairman, of the Chapra Municipality, and on, which the Chairman had passed certain orders. The complainant (P. W. 4) informed the petitioner that he had already shown him the two letters; but the petitioner insisted on seeing them again on the plea that he had forgotten the orders passed by the Chairman. On this, the complainant handed over the two letters to him when the petitioner left the place, taking away the two letters with him. On being asked by the complainant to return the letters, the petitioner told him that he was not going to return them. The petitioner proceeded towards the Sanitation office, and the complainant followed him asking the petitioner all the time to return the letters since they were official letters. On repeated request of the complainant, the petitioner told him that he would not return the letters," but was prepared to grant him a receipt for the same, and eventually, he granted a receipt, Ext. I, to the effect: "I took letter No. 902 dated 5-8-55, and 983G, dated 6-8-55, reg. Audit report of: July 55 from Shri Onkar Narayan Sinha clerk. He requested me to return the original letter. But I cannot give him." 3. After the petitioner took away the letters, the complainant reported the matter to the Chairman, and ultimately the present case was instituted. 4. The petitioner was originally charged by another Magistrate with offences under Sections 420, 406 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code. He requested me to return the original letter. But I cannot give him." 3. After the petitioner took away the letters, the complainant reported the matter to the Chairman, and ultimately the present case was instituted. 4. The petitioner was originally charged by another Magistrate with offences under Sections 420, 406 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner had pleaded, among other things, that he had returned the letters to the complainant and had been granted a receipt by him. The receipt bore the signature of the complainant, Ext. C. The previous trial court disbelieved the case of the petitioner and convicted him of the charge under sec. 379 of the Indian Penal Code only, acquitting-him of the other two charges. There was an appeal when the learned Sessions Judge remanded the case to afford an opportunity to the petitioner to prove the receipt alleged to have been granted by the complainant. On retrial, the receipt was found to have been interpolated, and the petitioner has been convicted and his appeal has been dismissed with the modification as stated above. The petitioner has, therefore, come up in revision. 5. The only point urged before me was that there could be no offence of theft, when the letters were not taken away by the petitioner without the consent of the complainant. On the contrary, he took them away after granting a receipt to the complainant. It was further said that there was no dishonest intention on the part of the petitioner in taking away the letters. I do not think that, on the facts of the case, an offence of theft has been made out. Theft is defined under Sec.378 of the Indian Penal Code as removing of any moveable property out of the possession of any person without that persons consent and with dishonest intention. In this case, there was no removal without the consent of the complainant, who was at the time, in possession of the two letters. The possession of the two letters was passed by the complainant to the petitioner on his asking, and later, when the complainant was not consenting to the taking away, of the letters, the petitioner granted the complainant a receipt duly executed and signed by him, and with this receipt, the complainant was satisfied. Thus, it is evident that the removal was not without the consent of the complainant. Thus, it is evident that the removal was not without the consent of the complainant. It may be that the complainant was coerced by the circumstances created by the petitioner in parting with the possession of the two letters, being satisfied with a receipt alone. But the fact remain that the removal was not without his consent. If the complainant did not like to part with the possession of the two letters, he should not have yielded to their taking away by the petitioner when, obviously enough, he did not apply any force. He could have raised an alarm, if he was not willing to let the petitioner take away the letters. The complainants action in taking the receipt as a proof of the removal of the two letters by the petitioner was a clear indication of his consent which, by no means, was obtained by any show of force, though it might be said that it was obtained by deceit. If consent was obtained by deceit, in which case the petitioner may be liable for any other offence but surely he could not be liable for an Offence of theft. In this view of the matter, the conviction of the petitioner for theft was bad, and must be set aside. 6. In the result, the application is allowed, and the conviction and sentence imposed upon the petitioner are set aside.