J. M. SHELAT, J. ( 1 ) THE question that falls for determination is whether the appellants who were the defendants in the suit and who filed this appeal on 19/12/1959 that is after the new Act came into force are liable to pay Court-fees under the old Act or under the new Act? ( 2 ) THE preamble to the new Act recites that the Act was passed with the object of consolidating and amending the law relating to the fees except those falling under entries 77 and 96 of list I in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The principal difference between the old Act and the new Act is the new scale of fees provided in the ad valorem fees and the withdrawal of the maximum of Rs. 12 500 thereunder in the old Act and the substitution in its place of unlimited fees chargeable under the last sub-clause of clause (1) of Schedule I of the Act. It is not in dispute that the present memorandum of appeal is a document falling under clause (1) of the first schedule and if the new Act were to apply to it the fees chargeable of it would be Rs. 1240/according to the higher scale now provided. ( 3 ) SECTION 5 (1) creates a disability against a document on which proper fees are not paid for by providing that no document of any of the kinds specified as chargeable in the fact or second schedule to the Act annexed shall be filed exhibited or received in any Court of Justice. . . unless in respect of such document there has been paid a fee of an amount not less than that indicated by either of the said schedules as the proper fee for such document. The memorandum of appeal being a document falling under clause (1) of the first schedule it is liable to be charged with the ad valorem fees specified therein. It may be observed that section 5 falls under Chapter III which is headed Computation of Fees. Sub-clauses (2) and (3) provide for a machinery when a difference of opinion arises between a suitor or his pleader on the one hand and the officer whose duty it is to see that proper fees are paid under the Act on the other. Chapter VI then deals with the mode of levying fees. Sub-clauses (2) and (3) provide for a machinery when a difference of opinion arises between a suitor or his pleader on the one hand and the officer whose duty it is to see that proper fees are paid under the Act on the other. Chapter VI then deals with the mode of levying fees. Section 36 in Chapter VI provides that all fees shall be charged and collected under this Act at the rate in force on the date on which the document chargeable to court-fees is or was presented. The section thus provides that whenever a document is presented the fees which shall be charged and collected under this Act shall be at the rate in force on the date on which such document is or was presented. The inclusion of this provision in the Act seems to have been thought necessary in view of two other sections in the Act. Section 40 provides that no document which requires to bear a stamp under this Act shall be of any validity unless and until it is properly stamped. It also provides that if any such document is through mistake or inadvertence received filed or used in any court without being property stamped the presiding Judge may order such document to be stamped as directed by him and upon that being done the same shall be as valid as if it was properly stamped in the first instance. This section explains why in section 36 the words was presented occur. Thus if a document was presented but through mistake or inadvertence was not properly stamped at the rate in force on the date of its presentation the presiding Judge can call upon such document to be stamped at the rate in force when it was presented. Ordinarily when the Legislature had already provided in section 5 and the two schedules both the liability for payment of court-fees as also the extent of that liability there would no longer be any necessity of again laying down the rate of fees at which the chargeable documents are to be stamped. It became necessary however to insert section 36 because of section 46 being in the Act which enables the State Government to reduce or to remit from time to time all or any of the fees mentioned in the two schedules. It became necessary however to insert section 36 because of section 46 being in the Act which enables the State Government to reduce or to remit from time to time all or any of the fees mentioned in the two schedules. This powers to vary the rates though only by way of reduction or remission in whole or in part appears to have made the Legislature to enact in section 36 that the fees to be charged and collected under section 5 and the two schedules shall be at the rate in force on the date when the document chargeable thereunder is or was presented. In the light of these two sections section 36 cannot be regarded as argued by the learned Advocate General as a section simplicitor for the levying of court-fees under the new scale whenever a document is presented after the Act comes into force. The object of enacting section 36 was to lay down that court-fees shall be charged at the rate in force from time to time in accordance with section 5 the two schedules and also in accordance with such charges that may be made by the State Government under the power conferred upon them by section 46 of the Act. From a reading of sections 5 36 and 46 it is thus clear that the court-fees payable under the Act of 1959 are those prescribed in the two schedules at the rate existing on the day when a document was presented depending upon whether there was any reduction thereunder or remission thereof at any particular time. Hence section 36 uses words at the rate in force on the date on which the document chargeable to court-fees is or was presented. But for section 46 there apparently was no necessity of section 36 in the Act. No doubt such a power to educe or remit was given to the appropriate Government under section 35 of the Act of 1870 But the Legislature had not then thought fit to incorporate a section similar to the present section 36 though there was section 25 in the earlier Act which said that all fees referred to in section 3 or chargeable under this Act (Italics are mine) shall be collected by stamps. ( 4 ) HAVING made so much of the ground clear I will now turn to section 49 of the new Act which has been the subject matter of controversy in this application. It is obvious that but for section 49 which is both a repealing and a saving section and in the absence of certain recognised principles laid down from time to time in respect of a repealed statute and the substitution in its place by another statute the general result would be that the new statute would came into force from the date specified for its application. Secondly a litigant would have to pay court-fees prescribed under the new Court Fees Act as from the date of its coming into force. The new Act provides a specific repealing and a saving section and therefore it would be that section which would govern the extent of repeal and also the saving of the repeated statute. ( 5 ) THE principles governing the rights of parties in relation to a repealed statute are so well settled as not to need any fresh inquiry. In Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh 1953 S. C. R. 987 the Supreme Court confirmed the principle laid down in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Irving (1905) A. C. 369 and held that the right of appeal was a matter of substantive right and not a procedure right and that this right becomes vested in a party when proceedings are first initiated in or before the decision is given by the inferior Court and such a right cannot be taken away restricted or impaired except by express enactment or necessary intendment. In the case before the Supreme Court the right of appeal was not taken away but an additional condition was imposed before that right could be exercised. Dealing with that condition the Supreme Court approving the observations made by the High Court of Calcutta in Nagendra Nath Bose v. Man Mohan Singha Ray (1930) 34 C. W. N. 1009 observed that the principle was the same whether the statute in question purposed to deprive the litigant of the right of appeal or to restrict or impair it. In that case a judgment-debtor applied to set aside a sale which was held in execution of a decree against him. In that case a judgment-debtor applied to set aside a sale which was held in execution of a decree against him. The application was dismissed and he preferred an appeal against that order of dismissal. But before he filed the appeal could be preferred the amount recoverable in execution of the decree had to be deposited. The High Court held that this amendment could not affect the right of the judgment-debtor to appeal under the old law as the application to set aside the sale was made before the amendment came into force. Two other decisions both of the High Court of Bombay; confirm the same principle. They are particularly relevant as both of them deal with the Court Fees Act. In the Reference under section 5 of the Court Fees Act 57 Bom. L. R. 180 the appeals and the cross-objections arose out of suits filed for partition. These suits were filed prior to 1/04/1954 when Bombay Act of 1945 came into force. When these suits were filed the Court-Fees paid were Rs. 18-12-0 and that was on the assumption that suits for partition by a coparcener when he was in constructive possession of the joint family property fell under schedule 11 art. 17 (vii) of the Court Fees Act. At one time the High Court had taken the view that suits for partition fell under section 7 (v) and therefore the Court-fees would be payable on an ad valorem basis. But in Shanker Maruti v. Bhagwant Gunaji 49 Bom. L. R. 72 a Full Bench of that High Court took a different view and after that decision the Court-fees ware payable on the basis that suits for partition where the plaintiff was in constructive possession of a joint family property fell under art. 17 (vii) of schedule II. Act XII of 1954 by section 6 added a new sub-clause to section 7 which was sub-clause (via ). That sub-clause dealt suits for partition and provided that in suits for partition and separate possession of a share of a joint family property or of joint property whether or not the plaintiff is in actual or constructive possession of the property of which he claims to be a co-parcener or a co-owner according to the value of the share in respect of which the suit is instituted. The effect of this amendment was to override the decision in Shanker Maruti v. Bhagwant Gunajis case and consequently if the amendment applied to the appeals and cross-objections filed then the court-fees would have to be paid on the basis laid down in the amendment and not in accordance with that decision. It was held that art. 17 clause (vii) of schedule II of the Court Fees Act 1870 levying enhanced court fees in suits for partition of joint family property had no retrospective effect. Therefore where a suit for partition of joint family property was filed before the amendment but an appeal was file alter the date of this amendment a memorandum of appeal or an application for cross-objections was not liable to enhanced court-fees. Following the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh it was held that a right of appeal was not a procedural right but a substantive right. It was a right vested in the litigant when he files a suit. An appeal was a continuation of the suit and when a litigant filed a suit he had the right to continue the suit upto the final Court of Appeal. That substantive or vested right cannot be taken away unless the Legislature expressly intends that it should be so taken away. It is not merely that a right of appeal cannot be taken away by a procedural enactment which is not made expressly retrospective but the right cannot be impaired or imperiled nor can new conditions be attached to the filing of the appeal nor can a condition already existing be made more onerous or more stringent. ( 6 ) IN Sawaldas Madhavdas v. Arti Cotton Mills Ltd. 57 Bom. L. R. 294 the suits from which the appeals arose were filed before 1/04/1954 In both the cases the appeals were filed by the defendants and the court-fees which the appellants paid were the court-fees regulated by the amendment to the Court Fees Act which came into force on 1/04/1954 On that day the whole system of charging court-fees in the High court of Bombay on the original side was altered and instead of a fixed fee payable so far on the plaint ad valorem fees became leviable as in the districts. The contention of the appellants was that at the date when the suits were filed the court-fees leviable was fixed fee. At the date they had a vested right of appeal and that vested right was impaired by a higher burden being thrown upon them for preferring an appeal to the High Court. It was urged that if they had paid court-fees on the basis payable when the suit was filed the amount would have been much less than what was payable on that day and therefore in increasing the burden the right of appeal had been impaired. It was therefore argued that the Court Fees Act should not be given retrospective effect and the amended Court Fees Act should only apply to appeal which are preferred in suit filed after 1/04/1954 Relying upon the earlier decision In the Reference under section 5 of the Court Fees Act the High Court held that there was no distinction between the case of a plaintiff and the case of a defendant that the right of appeal vested both in the plaintiff and the defendant at the date when the proceedings were initiated or the suit was filed. The State of Bombay went into appeal against the decision but the Supreme Court confirmed the decision and after reviewing the existing decisions held that there can be no doubt that the right of appeal has been affected by the given decision and in the absence of any express enactment this amendment cannot apply to proceedings pending at the date when the new amendment came into force. It is true that the appeal was filed after the Act came into force but that circumstance was immaterial for the date to be look into for this purpose was the date of the original proceeding which eventually culminated in the appeal. Earlier in Garikapatti Veeraya vs. N. Subbiah Choudhary 1957 S. C. R. 488 the Supreme Court had already laid down the principle in general terms and it was clear that the benefit of that principle must apply both to the plaintiffs and the defendants alike. Earlier in Garikapatti Veeraya vs. N. Subbiah Choudhary 1957 S. C. R. 488 the Supreme Court had already laid down the principle in general terms and it was clear that the benefit of that principle must apply both to the plaintiffs and the defendants alike. The Supreme Court also held that the vested right of appeal was a substantive right and although it could be exercised in case of an adverse decision it was governed by the law prevailing at the time of the commencement of the suit and comprised all successive rights of appeal from Court to Court which really constituted one proceeding. Such a right could be taken away only by a subsequent enactment either expressly or by necessary intendment. ( 7 ) THE principles emerging from these decision are :-1) that a litigant has a vested right of appeal and that such a right becomes vested in him from the date when proceedings are initiated. 2) that such a vested right of appeal is governed by the law as it stood at the commencement of the proceedings and 3) that though the Legislature is competent to lay down restrictive condition to such a right it being a substantive right the Legislature can do so only by express words or by necessary intendment. ( 8 ) THE contention of the appellants was that the suit against them having been filed before 1/08/1959 when the new Act came into force they had a vested right of appeal and that right could not be restricted or impaired by a demand for higher court-fees. They also contended that sec. 49 of the Act did not contain any language indicating that the Legislature while enacting it wanted to give it retrospective effect. The section therefore not being retrospective the appellants were liable only to court-fees on the earlier scale and not on the new scale. Any demand for higher court-fees was a restriction or an impairment to the vested right of appeal of the appellants. In view of the settled principles emerging from the aforesaid decision no exception can be taken to these contentions if the learned Advocates for the appellants were to be right that section 49 of the 1959 Act is not retrospective. Any demand for higher court-fees was a restriction or an impairment to the vested right of appeal of the appellants. In view of the settled principles emerging from the aforesaid decision no exception can be taken to these contentions if the learned Advocates for the appellants were to be right that section 49 of the 1959 Act is not retrospective. ( 9 ) SUB-SECTION (1) of section 49 with which I am concerned in this application falls into three parts :-The first part deals with the repeal of the laws specified in column 3 of schedule IV annexed to the Act. Since the suit in this case was filed in the Court at Morbi Saurashtra the Act repealed by sub-section (1) of section 49 is the Court Fees Act of 1870 as applied in that area by the State of Saurashtra (Application of Central and Bombay Acts) Ordinance 1948 The effect of sub-section (1) is clearly to repeal that entire Act. The sub-section is then followed by two provisos the first one being clearly a saving clause. That proviso runs as follows:-"provided that such repeal shall not affect the previous operation of any of the laws so repealed and anything done or any action taken (including any appointment notification order rule form application reference notice report or certificate made or issued under any such law shall in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provision of this Act be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provision of this Act and shall continue to be in force accordingly unless and until superseded by anything done or any action taken under this Act. " ( 10 ) IT was argued by the learned Advocate General that the Legislature had deliberately used only the words previous operation of any of the laws so repealed and had not repeated the language used in section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act 1904 while enacting this saving clause. Thus whereas section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act while dealing with the effect of repeal of a statute provides that unless a different intention appears the repeal shall not amongst other things affect the previous operation of any enactment that is repealed or affect any right privilege obligation etc. Thus whereas section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act while dealing with the effect of repeal of a statute provides that unless a different intention appears the repeal shall not amongst other things affect the previous operation of any enactment that is repealed or affect any right privilege obligation etc. accrued or incurred in any enactment the present section is content by saving only the previous operation of the laws repealed. He argued that therefore the words previous operation do not save the vested right of a litigant for if the Legislature had wanted to save them it would have used the same language in this proviso as in section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act. It was also contended by him and rightly that section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act did not apply in this case in as much as the Legislature was at pains to insert a specific proviso so as to indicate its intention of how much and no more it wanted to save. ( 11 ) THE learned Advocate General argued that the first proviso to section 49 clearly indicated that the only thing saved thereby was the previous operation of the Act repealed but not the rights accrued to the parties thereunder and therefore this in itself was an indication that the new Act was retrospective. He next argued that this position was made clear by the second proviso which lays down as follows:-"provided further that all the fees shall be charged and collected under this Act at the rate in force on the date on which the document chargeable to court-fees is or was presented. " ( 12 ) ACCORDING to the construction suggested by the learned Advocate General the second proviso would mean that even though the previous operation of the repealed Act was saved under the first proviso the court-fees shall be charged at the rate in force on the date of the presentation of a document. There again he argued the Legislature had shown its intention not to respect any vested right accrued under the repealed Act. ( 13 ) IN order to appreciate these contentions it is necessary to remember some of the well established principles of construction. There again he argued the Legislature had shown its intention not to respect any vested right accrued under the repealed Act. ( 13 ) IN order to appreciate these contentions it is necessary to remember some of the well established principles of construction. In Mullins v. Surrey Treasurer 1880 52 Q. B. D. 170 Lush J. said that when one finds a proviso to a section the natural presumption is that but for the proviso the intended part of the section would have included the subject matter of the proviso. In other words the effect of a proviso according to the ordinary rules of construction is to except out of the earlier part of the section something which but for the proviso would be within it. In Fryer v. Morland (1876)3. Ch. D. 675 Jessel M. R. dealing with the construction of an exception observed in construing an Act of Parliament when we find provisions put in by way of precaution not absolutely required it is by no means necessary to infer that because these provisions are put in therefore everything not included in the exception is to be included in the general proviso which we find in the Act of Parliament and which by itself would not include the thing excepted. Similarly in Mclaughlin v. West Gath (1906) 94 L. T. 831 it was held that in the construction of a statute it is not to be assumed that all persons not specifically included in a protecting clause are for that reason excluded from the protection of the section. In Garikupatti v. N. Subbiah Choudhary 1957 S. C. R. 488 the Supreme Court at page 515 approvingly cited the observations made in Hough v. Widdus (1884) 12 Q. B. D. 224 at 237 that statutes should be interpreted if possible so as to respect vested rights. ( 14 ) THE question then is what is exactly that the Legislature has saved by the first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 49 As I have said the enacted part of sub-section (1) of section 49 repeals amongst other Acts the Court Fees Act 1870 as applied to Saurashtra. Having repealed that Act entirely the Legislature by the first proviso desired to carve out an exception. That intention must be given full effect to. Having repealed that Act entirely the Legislature by the first proviso desired to carve out an exception. That intention must be given full effect to. The first proviso is a composite one for it contains both a saving clause and a legal fiction. By the first it saves the previous operation of the Act repealed and by the second it enacts that anything done or any action taken etc. under the repealed Acts shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provision of this Act. What is then meant by the words previous operation of the repealed Act In their plain meaning the words previous operation would mean the operation of the Court Fees Act of 1870 prior to 1/08/1959 when that Act was repealed and ceased to have any effect. Until then its operation created certain consequences which must be taken to be part and parcel of that operation and this must mean and include rights of litigants arising from and accrued due as a result of its operation. It is obvious that part of the operation of the Act meant that a suitor shall pay court-fees at B certain rate which would mean that a suitor had a right of carrying through his litigation in all the successive stages on payment of court-fees prescribed under that Act and no more. I cannot think of any other meaning and none has been suggested to me by the learned Advocate General which can be given in the present context to the words `previous operation. In my view therefore these words must be construed as including vested rights that accrued to the litigants by reason of the previous operation of the repealed Act. The mere fact that sec. 49 of the Act did not incorporate the entire language of sec. 7 of the General Clauses Act does not in the present case mean that the Legislature wished to deprive the suitors of the rights which had accrued to them under the repealed Act. As against this construction the learned Advocate General relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Indira Sohanlal vs. Custodian of Evacuee Property Delhi and others 1956 S. C. R. 77. As against this construction the learned Advocate General relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Indira Sohanlal vs. Custodian of Evacuee Property Delhi and others 1956 S. C. R. 77. The Supreme Court in that decision was concerned with the construction of section 58 of the Administration of the Evacuee Property Act 1950 (Act XXXI of 1950) which came into force on 17/04/1950 The appellant there was a displaced person from Lahore and was the owner of a house known as 5 Danepur Road. Malik Sir Firoz Khan Noon of West Pakistan owned a large tract of agricultural land in Punjab Khore within the State of Delhi. On 10/10/1947 there was an oral exchange between them in pursuance of which the appellant took certain agricultural lands in place of the house and was put in possession of these lands. Under section 5-A of the East Punjab Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act 1947 as applied to the State of Delhi such a transaction required confirmation by the Custodian. On 23/02/1948 the appellant made an application to the Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property Delhi for confirmation of the above transaction of exchange and of the consequent transfer to her of the agricultural lands. The application was for one reason or the other not disposed of by the Additional Custodian until 20/03/1952 After the order confirming the exchange was passed by the Additional Custodian the appellant filed an application on 5/05/1952 asking to be placed in possession and for a warrant of delivery of possession to be issued against certain attottees and tenants of the land. At this stage a notice under section 27 of the Central Act XXXI of 1950 was issued by the Custodian General to show cause why the order dated 20/03/1952 of the Additional Custodian in her favour confirming the exchange and the other consequential and incidental orders should not be set aside. On 20/05/1953 the Custodian General set aside the order of confirmation and directed the Custodian to decide the case after giving notice to all those who might be affected by the confirmation of this transaction. It will be observed that before the order of confirmation was passed Act XXXI of 1950 has been enacted under which the appointment of the Custodian General with powers of appeal and revision as against the orders of Provincial Custodians was provided for. It will be observed that before the order of confirmation was passed Act XXXI of 1950 has been enacted under which the appointment of the Custodian General with powers of appeal and revision as against the orders of Provincial Custodians was provided for. Sections 5 and 6 of Act XXXI of 1950 amongst other things authorized the Central Government to appoint a Custodian General of Evacuee Property. The Act also provided an appeal to the Custodian General where the order had been passed by a Custodian or an Additional Custodian or an authorized Deputy Custodian. There was no doubt that the transaction of exchange required confirmation. By section 58 of Act XXXI of 1950 the Administration of the Evacuee Property Ordinance 1949 was repealed. Sub-section (3) of section 58 upon which the learned Advocate General has relied upon ran as follows:-" (3) The repeal by this Act of an Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance 1949 (XXXII of 1949 ). . shall not affect the previous operation thereof and subject thereto anything done or any action taken in the exercise of any power conferred or under that Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken in the exercise of the powers conferred by or under this Act as if this Act was in force on the day on which such thing was done or action was taken. " ( 15 ) ON a construction of this sub-section the Supreme Court held that this sub-section indicated the effect of the repeal both in negative and in positive terms. The negative portion of it relating to the previous operation of the prior Ordinance appears to have been taken from section 6 (b) of the General Clauses Act while the positive portion a deeming provision was quite contrary to what is contemplated under that section. Under the General Clauses Act the position in respect of matters covered by it would have to be determined as if the repealing Act had not been passed while in respect of section 58 of the Central Act XXXI of 1950 the position so far as the positive portion is concerned has to be judged as if the repealing Act were in force at the earlier relevant date. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act cannot therefore be called in aid in cases governed by section 58 (3) of the Act XXXI of 1950. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act cannot therefore be called in aid in cases governed by section 58 (3) of the Act XXXI of 1950. Regarding the effect of the enactment of Act XXXI of 1950 Their Lordships held that where an application under section 5-A of the East Punjab Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act 1947 for the confirmation of transfer of evacuee property was still pending on the date when the Central Act XXXI of 1950 came into force it had to be deal with and disposed of under the latter Act and the order of confirmation passed thereon in 1952 would clearly be subject to the revisional power of the Custodian General under section 27 of the said Act. On behalf of the appellant however it was urged that on the filing of the application in 1948 the appeal got a vested right to have it determined under section 5-A with the attribute of finality and conclusiveness under section 5-B of the East Punjab Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act 1947 attaching to such determination. It was urged that this followed from the previous operation of the original law and was in consonance with the principles laid down by the Privy Council in (1905) A. C. 369. This contention was negatived by the Supreme Court on the ground that the decision in (1905) A. C. 369 related to the case of a right of appeal against an order passed or to be passed in a pending action; that such a right was an existing right at the date of the repeal of the previous statute and that therefore the suitor could not be retrospectively deprived of it except by express words or by necessary implication. Their Lordships also held that by the very terms of section 5-B of the East Punjab Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act XIV of 1947 finality attached to it on the making of the order and that even if there be in law any such right at all as the right to a determination with the attribute of finality it can in no sense be a vested or accused right. In any event it would not until determination was in fact made when alone the right to finality would become an existing right. In any event it would not until determination was in fact made when alone the right to finality would become an existing right. They also held that such an alleged right could not be brought under the ambit of the phrase previous operation of the repealed law for the contention on behalf of the appellant meant no previous operation of the repealed law but the further operation of the previous law. Therefore there was no justification for such a construction. Now I fail to see how the decision in this case can possibly be invoked by the learned Advocate General in support of the construction proposed by him. What the Supreme Court in this decision held was that suitor had no vested right in having a finality to a decision made under a provincial statutes when the Central Act was enacted and came into force while the proceeding was still pending. Besides the language used in section 58 of the Central Act XXXI of 1950 relied upon by the learned Advocate General is considerably different from the language used in the first proviso to section 49 (1) of the present Act. In my view this decision is not applicable to the facts of this case and therefore cannot avail the learned Advocate General. ( 16 ) IN constructing a section of a statute and endeavour should be made to give a meaning as far as possible which brings about harmony and consistency to all its component parts. The scheme of sub-section (1) of section 49 is that its first part the enacting part repeals the Acts specified therein. The first proviso is a saving section making exception to certain things from a general repeal and then follows the second proviso. It was argued as I have already mentioned by the learned Advocate General that the second proviso by necessary intendment takes away the vested right of a litigant to file an appeal on payment only of court-fees which he was liable to pay at the date when the proceedings were initiated that is to say such court-fees as he was liable to pay under the earlier Act. But if the construction of the second proviso as suggested by the learned Advocate General were to be accepted it would bring about contrary to all rules of construction an inconsistency between the two provisos a result which as far as possible must be avoided. The first proviso saves the previous operation of the repealed Act which as I have held must include rights already accrued thereunder in consequence of and as flowing from the operation of that act. Having saved those rights the Legislature surely cannot be attributed the intention of saving these rights by one hand and taking them away by the other. ( 17 ) THE Legislature by sec. 36 already provided that all documents shall be charged at the rates prevailing at the date of their presentation. Having done that it was no longer necessary for it to provide the very same thing by the second proviso to section 49 (1 ). Obviously it included the second proviso ex-majori cautela though it was strictly speaking not necessary to do so. The second proviso therefore cannot be construed as an exception to the first proviso which in itself is an exception to the first part of sub-section. The meaning suggested by the learned Advocate General that it is an exception to an exception would in my view create an inconsistency between the first and the second proviso rendering the first proviso nugatory. That surely cannot be the intention of the draftsman who framed the section. The interpretation that I seek to put on sub-section (1) of section 49 and the two provisos contained in it makes all its component parts consistent with each other all forming into one complete enactment on the subject of the liability of a litigant to-pay court-fees. This view of the section makes it clear that a party to a proceeding which was initiated before 1/08/1959 when the new Act came into force has a vested right to carry through that litigation in all its successive stages on payment of court-fees which were payable at the date of the commencement of such proceeding. In my view that right has not been taken away by section 49 nor can that section be construed to have retrospective effect by express words or by necessary intendment. ( 18 ) IN this view the order passed by the Taxing Officer must be set aside. In my view that right has not been taken away by section 49 nor can that section be construed to have retrospective effect by express words or by necessary intendment. ( 18 ) IN this view the order passed by the Taxing Officer must be set aside. No order as to costs. Order set aside. .