Judgment Choudhary, J. 1. This application has been presented by the Management of the New Jamehari Khas Colliery for setting aside the decision of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad, dated 11th of October, 1958, passed in Bonus Appeal No. 3 of 1958, affirming the decision of the Regional Labour Commissioner, dated 31st of March, 1958 holding the strike launched by the workmen of the Colliery from 16th of September, 1957 to 23rd of September, 1957 to be legal for the purposes of the Coal Mines Bonus Scheme, 1948. 2. The short facts are these; There was an award of the All India Industrial Tribunal (Colliery , Disputes), commonly known, as the "Mazumdar Award", dated 26th of May, 1956. There was an appeal against that award, and the Labour Appellate Tribunal by its decision dated 29th of January, 1957 modified that award in several respects. Against the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, however, the employers of the collieries, represented by the Indian Mining Association, made an application in the Supreme Court of India under Article 136(1) of the Constitution for special leave to appeal, and also applied for the stay of the implementation of the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal pending disposal of that application. The Supreme Court, by its order, dated 11th of March, 1957, stayed the implementation of the decision of the Labour Appellate tribunal pending the hearing and final disposal of the application for stay. 3. Thereafter, there was a tripartite discussion held in New Delhi on 25th and 26th of June, 1957 between the representatives of the Government, the employers and the labour, and an agreement was reached according to which the selling price of coal was further increased by Rs. 1/8/0 per ton to cover the increased wages, and the employers agreed to pay the increased rates and wages and emoulments as decided by the labour Appellate Tribunal. It was further agreed that the appeal before the Supreme Court would be withdrawn by the Indian Mining Association. Most of the employers of the different collieries started, thereafter, paying the enhanced wages and other benefits as fixed under the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, but some of the employers, including the petitioner, failed to implement the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Most of the employers of the different collieries started, thereafter, paying the enhanced wages and other benefits as fixed under the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, but some of the employers, including the petitioner, failed to implement the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. In spite of the agreement reached at New Delhi, as aforesaid, the appeal filed by the employers before the Supreme Court was not withdrawn. 4. On 16th of September, 1957, about 340 workmen, out of the total strength of 398, employed at the petitioners colliery went on strike without giving any previous notice to the Management, and, on the next day, that is, 17th of September, 1957, a number of workers went to the Manager of the colliery and presented a list of demands in Hindi saying that, unless they were granted by the Management, they would not go back to work. Subsequently, on 20th of September, 1957, a list of 12 demands was presented in English on behalf of the striking workmen to the Conciliation Officer (Central), Raniganj. These demands are set out in annexure A to the petition, which runs as follows:- - "(I) Trammers, who have not been paid their wages for last four weeks, be paid their wages at the rate of ten and half annas per tub. This rate fails to satisfy the demands of guaranteed minimum wages as per L.A.T. Award. They should be paid the wages of workers of category IV according to L.A.T. Award. Due wages for last four weeks be paid at the above said rate of ten and half annas in the current week. OR Trammers be paid as the time-rated worker according to L.A.T. Award. (II) (a). G. P. miners, leaders and Wagon loaders, in case their earned wages fall short of minimum guaranteed wages, be paid by making up the loss according to L.A.T. Award. (b) Load and lift and empty tubs pushing allowance be paid as per L.A.T. Award. (III) (a) Wagon loaders attendance be recorded at the Coal Depot of the Colliery. (b) They should be paid minimum guaranteed wages whenever paid. (IV) Overmen who have been degraded to Mining Sirdar be put back to their own job and be given all facilities as per L.A.T. Award. (V) Clerical and other monthly paid staff be paid their wages after putting them into proper class as L.A.T. Award. (b) They should be paid minimum guaranteed wages whenever paid. (IV) Overmen who have been degraded to Mining Sirdar be put back to their own job and be given all facilities as per L.A.T. Award. (V) Clerical and other monthly paid staff be paid their wages after putting them into proper class as L.A.T. Award. (VI) L.A.T. Award should be applied to the workmen of the quarry Mine. (VII) Previous facilities of six pies for tub commission to C. P.s be continued. (VIII) Bonus for the quarter ending June 57 be paid before Puja Festival. (B) Paid festival holidays i.e. 26th January, 57, 15th and 16th August 57 be paid as per L.A.T. Award in current month. (IX) Narayan Ghosh and Suresh Bhar be reinstated. (X) Colliery creche should be opened and creche nurse and Aya be given their Job. (XI) A responsible representative of workmen, be allowed to see whether the payment was correctly made every week of payment. (XII) Days from 16th Sept. 57 be taken as days of leave without pay and no disciplinary action be taken against any one for this. We think the management is fully responsible for this all." On 22nd of September, 1957, a settlement was arrived at between the Management and the Colliery Mazdoor Congress (Devan Sens group), which was recognised by the Management and, on the next day, that is, 23rd of September, 1957, the management addressed a letter to the Conciliation Officer (Central), Raniganj incorporating the terms of the aforesaid settlement with some modifications, as desired by the striking workers. The strike was, thereupon, called off from the 24th of September, 1957. There could not, however, be any settlement with respect to one matter, namely, whether the period of strike from 16th of September to 23rd of September, 1957 should be treated as leave without pay, and a note was made at the end of the letter (annexure-C) to the following effect:- - The demand put by the labour to treat the period of strike from 16-9-57 till the end of strike as leave without pay may be placed before RIC (C) by the management for his decision." 5. The petitioner, therefore, filed an application in September, 1957 for a declaration that the strike which took place at the colliery from 16th of September, 1957, was illegal for the purposes of the Coal Mines Bonus Scheme, 1948 inasmuch as the strike was in contravention of Sec.23(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 . The Regional Labour Commissioner overruled the contention of the petitioner and held the strike to be legal. On appeal by the petitioner the Central Government Industrial Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Regional Labour Commissioner, and held the strike to be legal. The petitioner has, therefore, presented the present application for the relief stated above. 6. Sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 8 of the Coal Mines Bonus Scheme, 1948 lays down that: if an illegal strike takes place in a coal mine in any period or quarter, no bonus shall be payable in- respect of the period or quarter as the case may be, to all those who participated in such illegal strike. There are certain provisos which are not relevant for the present purposes. Sub-paragraph (2) of that paragraph states that, if any dispute arises whether a strike is legal or illegal for the purposes of this scheme, the employer or any employee may make an application to the Regional Labour Commissioner having jurisdiction in the area in which the coal mine is situated for decision whether the strike is legal or illegal. Sub-paragraph (4) of that paragraph provides for an appeal from the decision of the Regional Labour Commissioner to lie to the Industrial Tribunal at Dhanbad whose decision has to be final. The dispute, between the parties which could not be settled after the strike was, as already observed, whether the period during which the workers had resorted to the strike would be taken as days of leave without pay so as to entitle them to get the bonus for that period. If the strike was illegal, the period could not be taken as days of leave without pay, and the workers would be deprived of the bonus for that period under sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 8 of the above Scheme. It was obviously for this reason that the petitioner made an application to the Regional Labour Commissioner under the provision of sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 8 of the Scheme for a decision that the strike was illegal. It was obviously for this reason that the petitioner made an application to the Regional Labour Commissioner under the provision of sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 8 of the Scheme for a decision that the strike was illegal. The decision having gone against the petitioner, an appeal was preferred before the Industrial Tribunal, as provided under sub-paragraph (4) of that paragraph. The decision of the Industrial Tribunal also having gone against the petitioner, the matter has been brought to this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. 7. In support of the application, Mr. Bhattacharyya, appearing for the petitioner, has contended that most of the demands put forward by the workmen were covered by the Muzumdar Award which was in force during the period of the strike, and, as such, the strike was illegal under Sec.23(c), read with Sec.24, of the Industrial Disputes Act. Sec.23(c) states that no workman who is employed in any industrial establishment shall go on strike in breach, of contract and no employer of any such workman shall declare a lock-out during any period in which a settlement or award is in operation, in respect of any matters covered by the settlement or award. Sec.24 says, So far as is relevant for the present case, that a strike or a lock-out shall be illegal if it is commenced or declared in contravention of Sec.23 of the Act. It is, therefore, obvious that, if the demands that were made by the workmen were with respect to matters covered by the Mazumdar Award, then the strike was illegal. It has, therefore, to be seen, whether the demands referred to above were covered by the said award and that was in operation during the period of strike. 8. The existence of the Mazumdar Award is not in dispute. It is, however, contended on behalf of the respondents that, the said award having been modified by the Labour Appellate Tribunal, and the implementation of the decision of the said Tribunal having been stayed by the Supreme Court, the Mazumdar Award was not in operation, and, therefore, the strike could not be illegal. It is, however, contended on behalf of the respondents that, the said award having been modified by the Labour Appellate Tribunal, and the implementation of the decision of the said Tribunal having been stayed by the Supreme Court, the Mazumdar Award was not in operation, and, therefore, the strike could not be illegal. It is also contended oh behalf of the respondent that the demands referred to above were not covered by the Mazumdar Award inasmuch as that award on those points had been modified by the Labour Appellate Tribunal, and the Workmen had resorted to the strike for the purpose of implementation of the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, and, as such, the strike was not illegal. Out of the various demands made by the workmen, only seven were characterised on behalf of the petitioner before the Regional Labour Commissioner as well as the Industrial Tribunal us being in respect of matters covered by the Mazumdar Award. They are demands Nos. I, II(a), II(b), IV, VI, VII and VIII (b). In respect of all these items, except item No. II(b), the decision of the Regional Labour Commissioner as well as of the Industrial Tribunal is that they were modified by the Labour Appellate Tribunal, and as such, they were not covered by the Mazumdar Award. It was, therefore, held by them that the demand in respect of each of these matters was that the Labour Appellate Tribunals decision should be implemented, and, therefore, the strike, sp far as these matters are concerned, could not be said to be illegal. 9. Counsel for the petitioner, however, has contended that, the implementation of the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal having been stayed by the Supreme Court, the original Mazumdar Award continued to remain in operation even in respect of the matter referred to above, and, therefore, the strike was illegal. I am, how ever, unable to agree with this contention. It is an undisputed fact in this case that with respect to the above demands, except the demand covered by item II(b), the Mazumdar Award had been modified by the Labour Appellate Tribunal which had allowed to the workmen something in excess of the Mazumdar Award in respect of all these matters. Sec.15 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 (XLVIII of 1950) prescribes the period from which the decision of the Appellate Tribunal shall be enforceable. Sec.15 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 (XLVIII of 1950) prescribes the period from which the decision of the Appellate Tribunal shall be enforceable. Sec.16 of that Act lays down that, where on appeal from any award or decision of an industrial tribunal, the Appellate Tribunal modifies in any manner whatsoever that award or decision, the decision, of the Appellate Tribunal shall, when it becomes enforceable under Sec.15, be deemed to be substituted for that award or decision of the industrial tribunal and shall have effect for all purposes in the same manner and in accordance with the same law under which the award or decision of the industrial tribunal was made as if the industrial tribunal made the award or decision as modified by the decision of the Appellate Tribunal. Under this provision, therefore, on the modification of the Mazumdar Award on the points referred to above by the Labour Appellate Tribunal, the Mazumdar Award, would be deemed to have been made as modified by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. In other words, the Mazumdar Award, that could be in operation was an award as modified by the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Since, however, the, implementation of the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal was stayed by the Supreme Court, those portions of the modified Mazumdar Award could not in law be said to be in operation during the period of strike. Moreover, as the workmen were making demands in respect of those matters for implementation of the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal which had allowed something in excess of the Mazumdar Award, those demands could not be said in law to be covered by the Mazumdar Award, It is, therefore, obvious that the strike resorted to by the workmen for granting of the above demands could not be said to have been resorted to during the period in which, the award with respect to these matters was in operation, and, as such, it was not illegal under Sec.23(c), read with Sec.24, of the Industrial Disputes Act. I entirely agree with the view, taken by the Regional Labour Commissioner and the Industrial Tribunal with respect to the question at issue in respect of these matters. 10. The demand covered by item II(b), however, stands on a different footing. I entirely agree with the view, taken by the Regional Labour Commissioner and the Industrial Tribunal with respect to the question at issue in respect of these matters. 10. The demand covered by item II(b), however, stands on a different footing. The finding of the Regional Labour Commissioner as well as of the Industrial Tribunal is that the Labour Appellate Tribunal did not modify the Mazumdar Award with respect to this item, but only confirmed the same, and this is also obvious from paragraphs 191 to 194 of the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Those paragraphs run as follows:- - "191. The workmen appear to have canvassed before the Tribunal the following additional demands:- - (1) Lift may be payable also for carrying coal down a slope; (2) Lead and Lift may be admissible for wagon loaders also 192. The workmen say that the Tribunal has not adequately answered these two claims and they ask, us for a proper decision on these points. We have carefully considered the claims but regret that we cannot grant them. There is a good deal of difference between carrying coal down an incline and carrying coal up an incline, and the work of wagon loaders does not involve that amount of strain or effort for which Lead and Lift has been provided. 193. At the hearing of the appeals before us it was urged by a section of workmen that Lead end Lift should be treated separately from the normal basic wages of a worker for the purpose of Dearness Allowance. This does not appear to have been raised in the Memorandum of appeal of any of the Unions arid we do not see any justification for it. We are unable to allow the claim. 194. The miners have been allowed a consolidated payment of one anna for every 100 ft. or part thereof in excess of the first 100 ft. for pushing empty tubs. The workmen claim that, this should be treated as basic wage for the purpose of Dearness Allowance and other benefits. We are unable to allow the claim. 194. The miners have been allowed a consolidated payment of one anna for every 100 ft. or part thereof in excess of the first 100 ft. for pushing empty tubs. The workmen claim that, this should be treated as basic wage for the purpose of Dearness Allowance and other benefits. We are unable to accede to this claim." The Regional Labour Commissioner, however, has observed with respect to the above demand that it is very often true that some of the demands made by Unions mean nothing on proper examination, and, in course of settlement over such demands, they are not pressed by the workers, and that while this was often due to the ignorance and inability of the workers to formulate their demands properly, such demands are also sometimes made as a stunt to secure certain other concessions. The Industrial Tribunal agreed with the view taken by the Regional Labour Commissioner, and further observed that it was satisfied that, when this demand No. II(b) was made by the workmen, they were under the impression that the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal had given them better rates of payment for lead and lift and pushing empty tubs than were fixed by the Mazumdar Tribunal, and that labour very often is not aware of its own rights, and demands are made out of ignorance. He has further observed that the workmen believed that they had got something more by the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in respect of lead and lift and pushing of empty tubs, and their demand, there fore, was that they should get payment on that basis. 11. In my opinion, both the Regional Labour Commissioner and the Industrial Tribunals were wrong in law in holding the strike to be legal in respect of the demand covered by item No. II(b). The Labour Appellate Tribunals decision not having touched the Mazumdar Award with respect to this item, the Mazumdar Award was in operation during the period of strike so far as the point covered by this item is concerned and therefore, the strike was obviously illegal under Section 23 (c), read with Sec.24, of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour Appellate Tribunals decision not having touched the Mazumdar Award with respect to this item, the Mazumdar Award was in operation during the period of strike so far as the point covered by this item is concerned and therefore, the strike was obviously illegal under Section 23 (c), read with Sec.24, of the Industrial Disputes Act. Counsel for the respondents, however, has urged that, when the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal modified the Mazumdar Award in respect of some matters, the whole award most be deemed, as being one award to have been modified, and, therefore, the demand covered by item No. II(b) was also for the implementation of the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, and the Mazumdar Award was not in operation even in respect of this matter during the period of strike. I am unable to agree with this contention. The award may be in respect of many matters; but an appeal under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act does not lie with, respect to all those matters. Section 7 of that Act provides for an appeal from an award to the Appellate Tribunal only in respect of certain matters, and not in respect of all the matters. The award in respect of non-appealable matters, thus, remains unmodified even though there is modification of the same with regard to appealable matters by the Appellate Tribunal. It is, therefore, obvious that legally only such portions of the original award stand modified as have easily been modified by the Appellate Tribunal, and the rest of the award remains operative as it was originally made. In that view of the matter, there is no doubt that the demand relating to item No. II (b) was covered by the Mazumdar Award and the strike in that respect was for the implementation of the Mazumdar Award, which was obviously illegal within the meaning of Sec.23(c), read with Sec.24, of the Industrial" Disputes Act. My concluded opinion, therefore, is that, so far as item No. II(b) is concerned, the strike for the implementation of the same was illegal. 12. The position, therefore, comes to this, that the strike resorted to for the implementation of the demand covered by item No. II(b) was illegal, though it was perfectly legal for the implementation of the other demands. 12. The position, therefore, comes to this, that the strike resorted to for the implementation of the demand covered by item No. II(b) was illegal, though it was perfectly legal for the implementation of the other demands. (It is, however, submitted that even if one of the items if the demands, for the implementation of which the strike was resorted to is in contravention of Sec.28(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the whole strike is illegal. It is contended that a large number of workmen had resorted to the strike, and it was not possible to ascertain which particular demand prompted a particular workman to resort to it. It is further urged that it is not possible to attempt to resolve the mixed grounds into their component parts and then to cast away that ground so as to leave the other grounds as good grounds for resorting to the strike. There is no direct authority on the question at issue, but the above argument appears to me to be well founded, and must be accepted as correct. It is not possible to know the mind of the workmen who went on strike as to which of the several demands actually prompted them to resort to it and to continue the same till its implementation. All the demands were made collectively, and if one of them was a demand which contravened the provision of Sec.23 (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act the strike was obviously illegal as laid down in Sec.24 of that Act. 13. The above view gains support from the decision in Sadler V/s. Sheffield Corporation ((1924) 1 Chancery 483). In that case, the notices of dismissal to the plaintiff teacher were based partly on educational grounds and partly on financial grounds. Sec.29(2) (b) of the Education Act, 1921, however, requires the dismissal to be based on educational grounds. It was, therefore, contended in that case that the notices of dismissal based partly on financial grounds were invalid and inoperative, and that contention was accepted. In the course of the judgment Lawrence, J. made the following observation:- - "Mixed financial and educational grounds, in my judgment, are not educational grounds within the meaning of Sub-section 2(a). It was, therefore, contended in that case that the notices of dismissal based partly on financial grounds were invalid and inoperative, and that contention was accepted. In the course of the judgment Lawrence, J. made the following observation:- - "Mixed financial and educational grounds, in my judgment, are not educational grounds within the meaning of Sub-section 2(a). In my opinion it would not be right (even if it were possible to attempt to resolve the mixed grounds into their component parts, and then to cast away the financial grounds so as to leave the educational grounds as the undiluted and sole grounds for the dismissal. It seems to me (on the assumption that I have made as to the existence, in fact, of some educational grounds) that here the financial grounds and educational grounds were inextricably mixed, and must stand or fall together, all the more so, as, on the uncontradicted evidence, the Education Committee would never have attempted, but for the existence of urgent financial reasons, to exercise the powers conferred by Sub-section 2(a) at all." The above observation was, quoted with approval In Sukhnandan V/s. State, ILR 35 Pat 1: ((S) AIR 1957 Pat 617 ). In that case, the petitioner, who was holding the post of a Supply Inspector in the Supply and Price Control Department, was discharged from his service because a further reduction in the inspectorate staff was necessary in view of the abandonment of monopoly purchase, abolition of district embargoes and consequent reduction in departmental work; and, as such, the entire cadre of District Supply Inspector was abolished with certain exceptions and the incumbents were to be offered the post of Supply Inspector in case such post was acceptable to them. The required number of staff was retained in order of seniority, on the basis of their service records and for their being political sufferers members of scheduled tribes and schedules castes and displaced persons, even though they were junior in service. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the preference shown to the political sufferers and displaced persons violated the guarantee of equality of opportunity under article 16(1) of the Constitution. It was contended on behalf of the State that preference to the political sufferers and displaced persons was to be given only when all the candidates were equally efficient otherwise. It was contended on behalf of the State that preference to the political sufferers and displaced persons was to be given only when all the candidates were equally efficient otherwise. On the term of the Government Circular, however, this interpretation was not accepted. It was held in that case that the Government Circular was illegal because the appointing authority addressed itself both to irrelevant and relevant consideration. 14. The principle of law enunciated in the above cases, in my opinion, is applicable on all fours to the facts of the present case, and the illegal demand covered by item, No. II(b) is so inextricably mixed with the other demands that it is not possible to resolve them into their component parts and then to cast away the offending demand so as to leave the other demands as good demands entitling the workmen to resort to strike. My definite opinion, therefore, is that the strike resorted to from the 16th of September, to 23rd of September, 1957, was illegal, and the decisions of the Regional Labour Commissioner and the Industrial Tribunal to the contrary are wrong in law. 15. The result, therefore, is that, in the exercise of the powers conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, I allow the application and set aside the decisions of the Regional Labour Commissioner and the Industrial Tribunal, referred to above, and hold and declare that the strike in question was illegal. In the circumstances of the case, however, the parties will bear their own costs. V.Ramaswami, J. 16 I agree.