Judgment Kanhaiya Singh, J. 1. This is a plaintiffs second appeal arising out of a suit brought by him to recover from the Union of India damages for breach of contract. The facts are these. 2. On the morning of 28-9-1954, the appellant purchased three third-class tickets one for himself and two for the ladies of his family, for journey by train from Patna to Calcutta and got three seats, bearing Nos. 43, 44 and 45, reserved in the Down Janta Express which during the relevant period used to leave Patna Junction station at 19.58 hours and reach Hovvrah next morning at 7.02 hours. When he came to the Patna Junction station at about 19.00 hours to occupy the seats reserved for himself and the two ladies, he found two of the reserved seats, bearing Nos. 43 and 44, occupied by two passengers named Sheonandan Prasad and A. Latif, respectively, on the basis of reservation made on the same day. The Railway authorities failed to provide for him accommodation in the Janta Express, though asked for. Accordingly, at 20.30 hours he recorded his complaint in the Complaint Book. He was obliged to travel in the Intermediate class by the Punjab Mail which left Patna Junction station at 23.37 hours and reached Howrah the next morning at 9.55 hours. It is alleged that the plaintiff who is an Advocate of this Court had fixed a legal consultation at Calcutta at 9.00 hours on 29-9-1954, and due to breach of the contract to carry him by the Down Janta Express, he missed this engagement and suffered thereby damages. On these allegations, he claimed as damages : (1) Rs. 23/4/-, on account of the difference between the railway fares for Intermediate and third class compartments in respect of three tickets. (2) annas -/12/-, on account of reservation of the seats. (3) Re. 1/-, oil account of rickshaw hire paid for going to station to book tickets and obtain reservation. (4) Rs. 4/8/-, on account of cost of three meals in the morning of 29-9-1954. (5) Rs. 30/8/-, on account of cost of notice under Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act and Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and (6) Rs. 100/-, on account of general damages, including loss of fee. 3. (4) Rs. 4/8/-, on account of cost of three meals in the morning of 29-9-1954. (5) Rs. 30/8/-, on account of cost of notice under Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act and Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and (6) Rs. 100/-, on account of general damages, including loss of fee. 3. The Union of India, as owner of the Eastern Railway Administration, admitted that the plaintiff had booked three tickets and got reserved three seats in the Down Janta Express on 28-9-1954. It was further admitted that two of the said seats were reserved for two other passengers. It denied, however, that the plaintiff had incurred any loss or damage. 4. The learned Munsif allowed only annas -/12/- on account of the amount paid for reservation and a nominal damage of Rs. 5/- only. He disallowed the other items of claim. 5. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge allowed the plaintiff in addition Re. 1/- on account of the rickshaw hire and Rs. 16/- on account of the cost of notice. In other respects, he affirmed the findings of the learned Munsif. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed in part and the decree of the learned Munsif was modified. 6. It is obvious that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover any damage on account of his travelling in the Intermediate class by the Punjab Mail. He cannot urge by virtue of his position and status that he was entitled to travel in the Intermediate class. As a matter of fact, he himself had booked railway tickets to travel in the third class. There is no evidence that in the Punjab Mail, by which he travelled on the relevant date, no accommodation in the third class was available. It is not a case where for want of accommodation the plaintiff was compelled to travel in a higher class. Therefore, the damage on account of his travelling in the Intermediate class in the Punjab Mail has been rightly disallowed. 7. Similarly, the plaintiff is not entitled to damages on account of the three meals which he and the two ladies would have taken in any case. Therefore, this item was rightly disallowed. 8. As regards the cost of notice, the plaintiff had claimed Rs. 30/8/-. The appellate Court has allowed only Rs. 16/. 7. Similarly, the plaintiff is not entitled to damages on account of the three meals which he and the two ladies would have taken in any case. Therefore, this item was rightly disallowed. 8. As regards the cost of notice, the plaintiff had claimed Rs. 30/8/-. The appellate Court has allowed only Rs. 16/. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant contended that this part of the judgment of the appellate Court was arbitrary, and there was no evidence to show that the plaintiff had incurred only Rs. 16 on account of the notice. As a matter of fact, there is no evidence on behalf of the plaintiff that he had incurred a cost of Rs. 30/8/, on account of the service of notice under Section 77: of the Railways Act and Section 80 of the Code. The learned Munsiff had disallowed it. In view of the evidence, it was not a case of enhancement but of total disallowance of this item of damage. Since, however, there was no cross-appeal on behalf of the Union of India, the order of the appellate Court has to be maintained. The appellant is, therefore, lucky in obtaining from the appellate Court a decree for Rs. 16. This contention, therefore, has got to be overruled. 9. The disputed item, however, is the item of Rs. 100 on account of general damage, including loss of fee. Learned counsel strenuously argued that the plaintiff had an engagement in Calcutta at 9-00 hours on 29-9-1954, and due to the cancellation of his reservation, he missed this engagement and thereby suffered damages. Both the Courts have allowed only a nominal damage and have disallowed the legal fee of Rs. 100, because, in their opinion, this was not in the contemplation of the parties. The fact that he had an engagement in Calcutta at 9-00 hours on 29-9-1954, and missed it is not denied by the Union of India. Learned counsel contended that when the plaintiff missed the engagement and lost the fee by travelling by the Punjab Mail due to the cancellation of the reservation, he was entitled to damages representing the fee which he would have earned, namely, the sum of Rs. 100. In support of his contention, he cited several English decisions. I do not propose to consider the English decisions in view of the specific provisions in that behalf in the Indian Contract Act itself. 100. In support of his contention, he cited several English decisions. I do not propose to consider the English decisions in view of the specific provisions in that behalf in the Indian Contract Act itself. Reference may in this connection be made to Section 73 of the said Act, which provides as follows: "Compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract: When a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive, from the party who has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby, which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach, or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it. Such compensation is not to be given for any remote and indirect loss or damage sustained by reason of the breach. Compensation for failure to discharge obligation resembling those created by contract: When an obligation resembling those created by contract has been incurred and has not been discharged, any person injured by the failure to discharge it is entitled to receive the same compensation from the party in default, as if such person had contracted to discharge it and had broken his contract. Explanation: In estimating the loss or damage-arising from a breach of contract, the means which existed of remedying the inconvenience caused by the non-performance of the contract must be taken into account." 10. Learned counsel for the Union of India assumed for the purpose of this case that there was a breach of contract but contended that the damage on account of his missing the engagement at Calcutta cannot be regarded as proper compensation for loss within the meaning of Section 73 of the Act, It will be seen that under Section 73 two conditions must be fulfilled before a person is held entitled to compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract: (1) the loss or damage must arise naturally in the usual course of things from the breach alleged, or (2) the loss or damage must be such as the parties knew when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it. I may mention here that the provisions of this Section are based upon the decision of the Court of Exchequer in the leading case of Hadley V/s. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Ex 341 at p. 354. The following observations of the Court amply bring about the essential ingredients of Section 73 of the Contract Act: "Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract itself, or such as may, fairly and reasonably be considered arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may, reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract as the probable result of the breach of it. Now, if the special circumstances under which the contract was actually made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus known to both parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such a contract, which they would reasonably con- template, would be the amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under these special circumstances so known and communicated. But on the other hand, if these special circumstances were wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at the most, could only be supposed to have had in his contemplation the amount of injury which would arise generally, and in the great multitude of cases not affected by any special circumstances, from such a breach of contract. For had the special circumstances been known, the parties might have specially provided for the breach of contract by special terms as to the damages in that case; and of this advantage it would be very unjust to deprive them." Applying the principles underlying the enactment of Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, it is manifest that the plaintiff is not entitled to any damage on account of his missing an engagement at Calcutta on the morning of 29-9-1954. It cannot be fairly and reasonably regarded as having arisen naturally, that is to say, according to the usual course of things, from the breach of the contract. All that the railway had contracted with the plaintiff was to carry him by the Janata Express from Patna to Calcutta. It cannot be fairly and reasonably regarded as having arisen naturally, that is to say, according to the usual course of things, from the breach of the contract. All that the railway had contracted with the plaintiff was to carry him by the Janata Express from Patna to Calcutta. There was no contract to take him to Calcutta for a particular object. It is well to remember that the punctuality of the train is not guaranteed, and assume that on the relevant date the Down Janata Express reached Calcutta very late, say, after 9-00 hours. By the lateness of the train also the plaintiff might have missed the engagement. Can it be reasonably urged that the plaintiff would be entitled to damages on account of his missing the engagement because the train reached late? This circumstance is sufficient to show in bold relief that the damage, on account of his missing his engagement cannot be said to be a natural consequence of the breach of contract by the Union of India. 11. The plaintiff would also be entitled to damages if the Railway Administration knew at the time of the reservation of the seats that the plaintiff had an engagement in Calcutta at 9-00 hours on 29-9-1954, and that he had booked the tickets and reserved the seats in order to go there to fulfil the engagement. Unfortunately, there is no evidence on this point. There is nothing to show that the plaintiff told the Railway authorities that he was booking the tickets and reserving the seats for an engagement in Calcutta at 9-00 hours on 29-9-1954. In my opinion, on the plain wording of Section 73 a person can only be held to be responsible for such consequences as may be reasonably supposed to be in the contemplation of the parties at the time of making the contract. It follows that the consequences flowing from the breach of the contract in this case are neither natural and probable, nor the parties in fact contemplated or would as reasonable men contemplate. It was something unforeseeable, and, therefore, nobody should be held responsible for any consequence which arose neither directly nor naturally in the usual course of things, nor was it known to the parties when the contract was made to be the likely result of the breach of the contract. It was something unforeseeable, and, therefore, nobody should be held responsible for any consequence which arose neither directly nor naturally in the usual course of things, nor was it known to the parties when the contract was made to be the likely result of the breach of the contract. This position is made sufficiently clear by the illustrations to Section 73 which bring out clearly the true and correct significance of the provisions of the said section. Illustration (r) may particularly be seen. In that case a ship-owner failed to carry B from Calcutta to Sydney in time, with the result that B was forced to proceed to Sydney in another vessel, and in consequence, arrived too late in Sydney and lost a sum of money. The ship-owner is liable to repay to B his deposit, with interest, and the expense to which he is put by his detention in Calcutta, and the excess, if any, of the passage money paid for the second ship over that agreed upon for the first, but not the sum of money which B lost by arriving in Sydney too late. In this Illustration it is assumed that the ship-owner was not aware of Bs particular reason for wanting to be at Sydney by a certain date. It is manifest that in the circumstances of the present case the plaintiff is not entitled to any damage for loss of engagement in Calcutta. He is only entitled to a nominal damage, as allowed by the Courts below. 12. Furthermore, under the Explanation to Section 73 of the Contract Act, in estimating the loss of damage arising from a breach of contract, the means which existed of remedying the inconvenience caused by the non-performance of the contract must be taken into account. In other words, the plaintiff will not be entitled to any damage if by reasonable effort he could have mitigated the damage. In this case, the plaintiff no doubt had engagement in Calcutta at 9-00 hours on 29-9-1954. There is, however, no evidence that the time of engagement had been unalterably fixed and that it could not have been advanced by a few hours. That being so the plaintiff cannot recover any damage. He could have easily got the time of engagement altered by sending a telegram or by a Trunk Call. There is, however, no evidence that the time of engagement had been unalterably fixed and that it could not have been advanced by a few hours. That being so the plaintiff cannot recover any damage. He could have easily got the time of engagement altered by sending a telegram or by a Trunk Call. In that case, he would have been entitled to the expenses incurred over the telegram or the Trunk Call, but not for the loss of fee. Thus, here the plaintiff had means to remedy the inconvenience caused to him by the non-performance of the contract and he did not avail himself of those means, and, therefore, in all fairness he cannot be allowed damage on account of loss of fee. This is the additional reason disentitling him to the damage claimed in respect of this item. 13. Thus, taking any view of the matter, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the damage of Rs. 100 representing the loss of his fee. 14. For the reasons aforesaid, this appeal is dismissed with costs.