JUDGMENT H.R. Krishnan, J. This is a second appeal referred to a Divisional Bench, for reasons that will appear presently. The Appellant is the Plaintiff-landlord, seeking to evict the Defendant his tenant and to recover the arrears of rent in accordance with Section 4 (a) of the M. B. Accommodation Control Act, 1955, "the tenant having failed to make payment of the arrears of rent within one month of the service upon him of a written notice of demand from the landlord". Both the lower Courts have found that there were arrears, that there was "a notice of demand", and that the arrears had not been paid off within one month of the service of the said notice. On this basis the trial Court allowed the Plaintiff's suit decreeing eviction, and awarding as arrears the amount claimed. On the other hand, the first appellate Court found that the landlord had demanded Rs. 156 while, as found by it, only Rs. 76 were due, thus making a false and exaggerated claim the notice was not a proper one under Section 4 (a) of the Act and consequently, dismissed the suit for eviction and awarded the arrears actually found due. This was in accordance with the principles contained in the single Bench decision of Newaskar J. reported in Ramnarayan v. Benji 1959 MPLJ 3 , itself reaffirming an earlier single Bench decision of the M. B. High Court by Samvatsar J., in Wasudeo v. Narayan CSA No 104 of 1952 (Indore) decided on 18-9-1954. The only question before us is, whether these judgments call for reconsideration. It is of interest to note that another view has been taken in the Allahabad decisions in Lala Manoharlal v. Lala Bimal Kumar 1955 ALJ 435 and Rampratap v. Shri Pannalal 1956 ALJ 787. It would be proper to proceed on the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate Court. The Plaintiff-landlord issued a "demand notice", but he claimed arrears of rent of Rs. 156 whereas, on that date the arrears as found by that Court amounted to Rs. 76 only, the landlord not having given credit for the payment of Rs. 80. Very properly, it felt itself bound by the High Court decision. The Plaintiff-landlord issued a "demand notice", but he claimed arrears of rent of Rs. 156 whereas, on that date the arrears as found by that Court amounted to Rs. 76 only, the landlord not having given credit for the payment of Rs. 80. Very properly, it felt itself bound by the High Court decision. Accordingly, not only would it not allow the Plaintiff anything more than the amount that was really found due, which is obviously correct, but would impose on the Plaintiff the penalty of being unsuited in regard to the claim for eviction for his carelessness or dishonesty in making an exaggerated claim. Generally speaking, it is certainly advisable that Courts should disapprove of parties making such exaggerated claims. But such a litigant would, besides losing his case to that extent, be liable to costs, pro tanto, and even special costs in appropriate circumstances, if the Defendant makes out a case for it. If any additional disability is to be imposed on him, by refusing him, the relief of eviction which he would otherwise have been entitled to, there should be legislative sanction, which is not found in this section. It does not provide (on the analogy of other disabilities elsewhere in that enactment) that a landlord who makes an exaggerated claim in his demand notice under Section 4 (a) will be disentitled to claim the eviction of the tenant. The single Bench judgment itself does not impose this as a straight penalty for dishonesty. It interprets (as also does the earlier single Bench judgment in C. S. A. No. 104 of 1952) the word "demand" as it would be understood under the common law of England, as one for the precise amount due to the claimant at the time of the notice; whereas, in the Allahabad judgments already referred to, "notice of demand" which occurs in Section 3(1)(a) (ii) of the U. P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, has been interpreted in its general literal sense, without importing any ideas from the English common law. The M. B. Accommodation Control Act, like the U. P. Act already referred to, is designed for affording a measure of protection to tenants from eviction according to the whims of the landlord. But it is not one giving him every advantage, but actually aims at holding the scales even between the tenant and the landlord. The M. B. Accommodation Control Act, like the U. P. Act already referred to, is designed for affording a measure of protection to tenants from eviction according to the whims of the landlord. But it is not one giving him every advantage, but actually aims at holding the scales even between the tenant and the landlord. Thus, it expressly mentions the circumstances in which the landlord can ask the Court to evict the tenant, one of them being that "the tenant has failed to pay arrears of rent". At the same time, it does not want even an unbusiness like or apathetic tenant to be taken unawares, and provides for a caution. Certainly, he is expected to know, whether or not, and to what extent he is in arrears; but even so, he should get a demand notice and one month's period of grace, so that he can, in his own interest, remove the justification for his eviction. Section 4 (a) does not say anything more than a "notice of demand" which incidentally is the phrase used in the U. P. Act also. The words "notice of demand" have not been defined in this statute which has been enacted to meet a special situation; so, it would not be, in our opinion, proper to import the highly specialised connotation in the English common law. All that it means is that the landlord should remind him of the arrears and call upon him to pay it up within one month. The landlord may make a blank demand without mentioning how much is outstanding; in that event, the tenant will have to tender what he believes to be due. The landlord may mention an amount which again may be identical with what the tenant admits or may be in excess or even short. In case of correct or short demand, there would be no difficulty. If, by mistake, or inadvertency or sheer dishonesty, the landlord claims a larger amount than is actually due, the tenant obviously is not bound to pay the excess; but he should certainly pay up what he himself admits as due. Whatever the amount demanded, the tenant is responsible for the arrears that are really due and in the event of a difference, the parties will have to abide by the Court's decision. Whatever the amount demanded, the tenant is responsible for the arrears that are really due and in the event of a difference, the parties will have to abide by the Court's decision. The single Bench judgment enables the tenant to be in arrears, and fail to pay up on demand, and still escape being evicted. He may be, even admittedly-as in the present case-in arrears though to a smaller tune than what the landlord mentions and still continue undisturbed. After all, the existence and the measure of the arrears is an objective fact ascertainable, and in case of dispute, to be ascertained by the Court, on the evidence independently of whether the landlord mentions the precise amount or an exaggerated amount or no amount, in his notice. In effect, this imposes an additional penalty on the landlord, which may be even commendable on moral grounds, but for which there is no legislative sanction. In the Allahabad ruling in Lala Manoharlal v. Lala Bimal Kumar 1055 ALJ 436, this question has been considered at some length: It is not necessary for the validity of a notice of demand under Section 3(1)(a) of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act that the amount of arrears of rent mentioned in it should be the extract amount found due by the Court in case of contest on behalf of the Defendant. The tenant is called upon to pay the arrears of rent which in the first instance, means the amount mentioned in the notice. If he does not admit the correctness of that amount, there seems to be no reason why he should not pay at least such amount as he considers to be due. If he makes such a payment, he safeguards his interest and the fault would be entirely the landlord's if he goes to the Court seeking eviction of the tenant. He will fail in his suit if the tenant succeeds in satisfying the Court that he has paid up the arrears of rent due even though the demand was for a larger amount..........There seems to be no good reason why the simple expression "notice of demand" whose main purpose must be to warn the tenant that he has overlooked paying rent and should pay it, should be interpreted so strictly as the term "demand" is interpreted under the common law of England.......... If the Legislature intended the notice of demand to be so precise and any defect in it to be so vital to the interests of the landlords, it could have very easily used clearer language to indicate its intention. The principles of this judgment have been followed in the latter judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Rampratap v. Sri Pannalal 1956 ALJ 787. In the single Bench judgment of this Court, these have been noticed and dissented from, on the reasoning that the phrase "notice of demand" should be understood in the sense in which common law Courts in England understand it. With all respect, we are of the view that the phrase "notice of demand" in Section 4 (a) of the M. B. Accommodation Control Act should be understood in the same sense as that phrase has been understood in the two Allahabad judgments. Section 4 (a) of the Madhya Bharat Act requires nothing more than (i) the tenant should be in arrears; (ii) he should have got one warning with a period of grace of one month; and (iii) he should in time pay up the arrears as he himself calculates it, subject to the risk that in the event of the Court finding that he is still in arrears, he would be liable to eviction. On this view, we would, overruling the single Bench decision in Rama-narayan v. Benji (3), allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court and restore those of the trial Court. Costa and pleader's fee throughout payable by the Defendant-Respondent to the Plaintiff-landlord according to rules. P.V. Dixit, C.J. I am also of the opinion that a notice of demand under Section 4 (a) does not become bad merely because the landlord has not stated therein any particular amount as arrears of rent or has made a demand in excess of the amount which the Court ultimately finds really due from the tenant. P.V. Dixit, C.J. I am also of the opinion that a notice of demand under Section 4 (a) does not become bad merely because the landlord has not stated therein any particular amount as arrears of rent or has made a demand in excess of the amount which the Court ultimately finds really due from the tenant. The view of my learned brother Nevaskar J., expressed in Ramnarayan v. Benji 1959 MPLJ 3 that the landlord's demand ought to be confined to what he was entitled to claim and that if he makes a false, excessive and inflated demand in the notice of demand under Section 4, then the notice is bad, is based more on a consideration of the policy underlying the provisions of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1955, and on the concept of "notice of demand" as understood in English law. But to me it appears that the question whether the landlord is required to state the precise amount of the arrears of rent in the notice of demand and whether if he makes an exaggerated demand for arrears in the notice, it becomes bad for that reason, has to be decided with reference to the language and the object of Section 4 (a) alone and not on a general consideration that the object of the Accommodation Control Act is to give protection to the tenant against ejectment. Now, the object of Section 4 (a) is clearly to give protection to a tenant against ejectment so long as he is not in default in the payment of arrears of rent. But the tenant loses that protection if he fails to pay the amount of arrears of rent within one month of the service of the notice given to him by the landlord calling upon him to pay the arrears. Section 4 (a), as it is worded, makes the default in the payment of the arrears of rent within one month of the service of notice a ground for ejectment. Now, it is obvious that the question whether a tenant was or was not in arrears of rent and whether any default was made by him in the payment of arrears of rent within one month of the notice contemplated by Section 4 (a) is one to be determined by the Court itself. Now, it is obvious that the question whether a tenant was or was not in arrears of rent and whether any default was made by him in the payment of arrears of rent within one month of the notice contemplated by Section 4 (a) is one to be determined by the Court itself. The question as to the amount of the arrears of rent and the default, if any, on the part of the tenant to pay the amount has to be determined after taking into consideration the rent payable, the amount due, the due date of payment, and the act of the tenant resulting in his failure to pay the amount in whole or in part. The matter is not one to be determined merely on the averment of any one party and there is nothing in Section 4 (a) to show that the arrears of rent demanded by the landlord must correspond to the amount actually found on investigation by the Court. The provision does not even contemplate the mention of any specific amount as arrears of rent in the notice of demand. All that is necessary is that the landlord should give a notice to the tenant calling upon him to pay the arrears of rent. If the tenant thinks that he is not in arrears, he can keep quiet or inform the landlord that he is not in default. If, on the other hand, he thinks that he is in arrears of any amount then he should tender to the landlord such amount as he thinks is due from him. The tenant is in no way prejudiced if the landlord accepts the amount as the correct amount of arrears or if he refuses saying that much more amount is due to him. For, if it is ultimately found that the amount tendered by the tenant was the correct amount then the tenant could not be said to be in default if he had tendered the amount to the landlord and if the landlord refused to accept the same thinking that much more was due to him. In my view, the decision in Ramanarayan v. Benji 1959 MPLJ 3 does not lay down the correct law as to the requirements of a notice of demand under Section 4 (a) of the Act. In my view, the decision in Ramanarayan v. Benji 1959 MPLJ 3 does not lay down the correct law as to the requirements of a notice of demand under Section 4 (a) of the Act. The view taken by us is supported by the decision of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Rampratap v. Pannalal 1956 ALJ 787. For these reasons, I agree with my learned brother Kriahnan J. that this appeal should be allowed, the decision of the Additional District Judge, Indore, be set aside, and the judgment and decree of the trial Court be restored. The Appellant shall have his costs throughout. Appeal allowed