JUDGMENT : Mohapatra, J. - This second appeal is against the judgment and decree dated 28th October 1957 of Sri K.K. Bose, Subordinate Judge of Puri, reversing the judgment and decree of the trial Court arising out of a suit brought by the Plaintiff for declaration of title and for confirmation of possession in respect of the disputed land with, an area of 1.85 acres. The Plaintiff also prayed for damages. The suit property originally belonged to Madhab Rath and Binayak Rath. The present Plaintiff having obtained a money decree against Madhab and Binayak purchased the disputed property in execution sale held on 15th March 1943. Eventually the Plaintiff took delivery of possession on 26th May 1943. Again the Plaintiff had to file another Title Suit No. 64 of 1945 against the original owners, that is, Madhab and Binayak, and the present Defendants 1 and 2 for declaration of title and for possession. It is to he noted here, the other Defendants, that if Defendants 3 to 5 in the present suit, are the sons of Defendant No. 2. In the previous suit, the Plaintiff's title was declared and the suit was decreed. The Defendants went up in appeal: but the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court in favour of the Plaintiff were confirmed. Again the Plaintiff had to take delivery of possession on 16th December, 1950 Ext. 4. It is to be mentioned here, the present Defendant 1 and 2 contested in the previous suit (T.S. No. 64/1945) asserting that they are occupancy tenants in respect of the disputed land. The question regarding their occupancy rights was not determined. The present Defendants 1 and 2 filed a petition under the provisions of the Orissa Tenants Protection Act and 26th May 1951 which was disposed of against the Plaintiff on 3rd June 1952 and the Plaintiff was directed not to interfere with the possession of Defendants 1 and 2. The Plaintiff went up in appeal. The appellate order, however, which was passed by the Collector on 25th August 1952, was to the following effect: The case under the Orissa Tenants Protection Act, there fore, does not lie. The Appellant should seek redress in the Civil Court. In pursuance of this order passed by the Collector exercising jurisdiction under the O.T.P. Act, the Plaintiff has filed the present suit. 2. The Defendants have filed joint written statement. The Appellant should seek redress in the Civil Court. In pursuance of this order passed by the Collector exercising jurisdiction under the O.T.P. Act, the Plaintiff has filed the present suit. 2. The Defendants have filed joint written statement. As usual, they traversed most of the allegations in the plaint; but the substantial point of contest was the same as they hand put forth in the previous Title Suit No. 6 of 1945, that is, they are the settled raiyats of the village and they had acquired occupancy rights in respect of the disputed land for more than 40 years ago. Indeed, they had also taken up the plea that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit in accordance with the provisions of the O.T.P. Act. 3. The parties led evidence in respect of all points of controversy raised in the suit and the trial Court having framed quite a number of issues on a discussion of the entire evidence on record found the issues in favour of the Plaintiff whose suit was decreed, title declared and his possession confirmed. It was further found by the trial Court that the Defendants were mere trespassers and that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The trial Court further ordered that the Defendants should pay a sum of Rs. 185/- as damages accepting the Plaintiff's allegation that the Defendants had cut and removed the paddy grown by the Plaintiff. An appeal was filed by Defendant No. 1 before the lower appellate court who without deciding the merits of the case, allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court on the simple ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the present suit. In his judgment he simply relied upon the well known decision in Pandab Bissoi and Ors. v. Magiti Sasamal 22 C.L.T. 479. It is against the decision that the Plaintiff has come up in second appeal which was first heard by my learned brother Misra, J. who by his order dated 21st December, 1959 referred the matter to be heard by a Division Bench. 4. v. Magiti Sasamal 22 C.L.T. 479. It is against the decision that the Plaintiff has come up in second appeal which was first heard by my learned brother Misra, J. who by his order dated 21st December, 1959 referred the matter to be heard by a Division Bench. 4. I must observe at the outset that even on a careful perusal of the parties, particularly the written statement filed by the Defendants, it appears clear that the Defendants have been strongly esserting their defence on the basis of permanent right of occupancy for more than 40 years. They had also claimed the same rights in the previous suit (T.S. No. 64/1945). Even though just in a passing sentence it is stated that the case cannot be tried in the Civil Court in accordance with the provisions of the O.T.P. Act, the main defence throughout the whole of the written statement consisting of 12 paragraphs, is their claim of occupancy rights. It is significant they have not claimed any benefits under the O.T.P. Act. They had not assented even in the alternative that they were in possession as tenants prior to September 1947 the date fixed under the provisions of the O.T.P. Act and are entitled to the protection under the provisions of the same Act. The real matter of controversy is whether, as alleged by the Plaintiff, the Defendants are mere trespassers, or as claimed by the Defendants, they are occupancy raiyats. In this view the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts of law for determination of such a question is not ousted under the provisions of the O.T.P. Act. It is clear from the Act itself that it is an Act to provide for temporary protection to certain classes of tenants in the province of Orissa. Its preamble runs as follows: Whereas it is expedient to provide for the temporary protection of certain classes of tenants in the Province of Orissa in the manner hereinafter appearing; It is hereby enacted as follows: This Act manifestly is not intended for the tenants who have abiding or permanent interests under ordinary laws of the country, that is, under the Orissa Tenancy Act itself. The tenants who are not entitled to sufficient protection under the ordinary laws provided for in the Orissa Tenancy Act are intended to be temporarily protected under the provisions of this special Act which provides for special Tribunal to decide the disputes between the landlords and the temporary tenants who are not non-evictable and have no permanent rights under the ordinary law. This is quite elementary, it is only such disputes regarding temporary protection of such kinds of tenants which were meant to be enquired into by the Collector and in such cases only the Civil Courts' jurisdiction is ousted. But as in the present case the real nature of controversy is whether the Defendants are out and out trespassers or are occupancy tenants, it is clearly within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to determine such a dispute and is not covered by the provisions of this temporary Act and is not within the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal constituted by this special Act. This is clear by reference to Sections 7 and 8 of the O.T.P. Act which are quoted below: 7.(1) Any dispute between the tenant and the landlord as regards: (a) tenant's possession of the land on the 1st day of September, 1947, and his right to the benefits under this Act; or (b) misuse of the land by the tenant; or (c) failure of the tenant to cultivate the land properly; or (d) failure of the tenant to deliver to the landlord the rent accrued due within two months from the date on which it becomes payable; or (e) the quantity of the produce payable to the landlord as rent shall be decided by the Collector on the application of either of the parties. x x x x 8. (1) Subject to the provisions of Section 7, all disputes arising between a landlord and a tenant shall be cognizable by the Revenue Court and shall not be cognizable by a Civil Court. x x x x 8. (1) Subject to the provisions of Section 7, all disputes arising between a landlord and a tenant shall be cognizable by the Revenue Court and shall not be cognizable by a Civil Court. (2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as affecting the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to deal with the suits, proceedings in execution of decrees or orders and other proceedings that were pending in such Court at the date of the passing of this Act in accordance with the law which would have been applicable if this Act had not been passed, but subject always to the provisions of Sections 4 and 5. 5. We would now avail of this occasion to explain the position arising out of the decision in Pandab Bissoyi's case which, in my opinion, has caused a sort of judicial nervousness of the Courts below. I have found during the last several months that the Courts below as also the learned lower appellate court, against whose judgment the present appeal has been filed, do not take care to go through this decision and understand the implications behind the observations made by their Lordships. Simply when they find a single sentence in the written statement of the Defendant that he is entitled to protection under the O.T.P. Act, they shirk their responsibilities and jump to the conclusion that the case is outside the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The case before their Lordships was a peculiar case with special features arising from the pleadings. Their Lordships have in detail given all the allegations made in the written statement as would appear in paragraph 3 of the report. It appears quite clear to us, the only plea taken by the Defendant in that case was the protection under the provisions of the O.T.P. Act. It is in this back-ground that their Lordships in that case in several places observed that in that case the real dispute between the parties was whether the Defendants cultivated the land in dispute as tenants on the 1st September 1947, so that they would be entitled to the benefits of the O.T.P. Act. It is in this back-ground that their Lordships in that case in several places observed that in that case the real dispute between the parties was whether the Defendants cultivated the land in dispute as tenants on the 1st September 1947, so that they would be entitled to the benefits of the O.T.P. Act. In paragraph 10 appearing at page 684 of the Report, their Lordships observed: Hence if the plaint and the written statement are carefully scrutinised, there can be no doubt that the real dispute between the parties was as to whether the Defendants cultivated the lands, as tenants, on the 1st September 147, and whether they were entitled to the benefits under the Orissa Tenants Protection Act. They have again reiterated the same thing in other places of the judgment that it was absolutely clear from the pleadings in that case that was the real dispute between the parties. It was on this ground that their Lordships observed that the case was manifestly not within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court but was within the jurisdiction of the special tribunal constituted by the aforesaid Orissa Tenants Protection Act. It is clear from a persual of the judgment and we do entirely agree that the jurisdiction of the Court cannot be determined only by reference to the plaint. Their Lordships in more than one place have made strong observations that the Court should scrutinise very carefully both the plaint and the written statement to determine the jurisdiction of the Court. It is quite true, the form and the dexterity shown in the drafting of the pleadings will not suffice. If this is true in respect of the plaint, this is equally true in respect of the written statement also. So the duty of the Court is to determine the real nature of the dispute between the parties on a careful scrutiny of the pleadings if possible. But I must also observe at the same time, within the four corners of the decisions their Lordships have not laid down as a general proposition that in no case the Civil Court having for the time being seisin over the case will go into evidence to determine the real nature of the dispute and jurisdiction of the Court. But I must also observe at the same time, within the four corners of the decisions their Lordships have not laid down as a general proposition that in no case the Civil Court having for the time being seisin over the case will go into evidence to determine the real nature of the dispute and jurisdiction of the Court. In the case of this nature, as was before their Lordships, when it is manifest from the pleadings that the only dispute between the parties was to whether the Defendants were in cultivating possession of the land as tenants on 1st September 1947 and whether they were entitled to the benefits of the Act, as question of jurisdiction may be determined only by reference to the pleadings. But while their Lordships were emphasizing the position that the jurisdiction of the Court should not be confined to the statements averred in the plaint but should go into the case of the written statement, they had not made it a general proposition that it is the pleadings and pleadings alone which will serve as the only guide for determining the jurisdiction of the Court. It is the settled proposition that the Civil Court is always competent to determine whether the case is within its jurisdiction. If after having enquired and gone into the entire evidence the Court finds that the Defendants are mere trespassers and there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, then the Court is bound to give relief to the Plaintiff as prayed for. To take a different view would be lending a very useful weapon in the bands of the trespassers to delay the proceedings and to avoid the jurisdiction of the Courts established by ordinary laws of the country. 6. It is to be noted here that the present case is one where the Plaintiff had been thrown from post to piller and from piller to post even though he happens to be a purchaser ever since the year 1943 and there has been no finality to the litigations. The proceedings under the Orissa Tenants Protection Act were taken; the Collector gave a definite opinion that the proceedings were not maintainable under the Act and so referred the parties to seek redress in the Civil Court. Accordingly the present suit was filed. The proceedings under the Orissa Tenants Protection Act were taken; the Collector gave a definite opinion that the proceedings were not maintainable under the Act and so referred the parties to seek redress in the Civil Court. Accordingly the present suit was filed. The trial Court was perfectly justified to allow the parties to adduce all evidence available to them and to deal with points of controversy arising in the case exhaustively. The lower appellate Court however, shirked his responsibilities simply as soon as the case of Pandab Bissoyi was cited before him. 7. On the proposition that the Civil Court is always competent to determine whether it has jurisdiction to decide the case or not we are supported by a very best authority. It is not only binding on us but is binding on all High Courts in India. In this connexion we will refer to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Bhatia Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. Vs. D.C. Patel. The dictum laid down there is whether the Civil Court has inherent power to decide the question of its own jurisdiction, although, as a result of its enquiry, it may turn out that it has no jurisdiction over the suit. This was a case under Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rent Control Act, 1947. Section 4 of the Act provides that the Act shall not apply to any premises belonging to Government or a local authority. The two main issues raised in that case were whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction and whether the Bombay Act applied to the premises of the suit. Section 4 of the Act provides that the Act shall not apply to any premises belonging to Government or a local authority. The two main issues raised in that case were whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction and whether the Bombay Act applied to the premises of the suit. It would be worth while to quote paragraph 8 of the Report from the judgment of S.R. Das, J. (as he then was): Learned counsel for the Respondent took a preliminary objection, founded on the provisions of Section 28 of the Bombay Act, that the City Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, for that section clearly states that in Greater Bombay the Court of Small Causes alone shall have jurisdiction to entertain and try any suit between a landlord and a tenant relating to the recovery of a rent or possession of any premises to which any of the provisions of that part of the Act applied and to decide any application made under the Act and to deal with any claim or question arising out of the Act and no other Court should have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding or to deal with such claim or question. If, as contended for by the Appellant, the Act does not apply to the premises, then Section 28 which is an integral part of the Act and takes away the jurisdiction of all Courts other than the Small Causes Court in Greater Bombay cannot obviously be invoked by the Respondent. The crucial point, therefore, in order to determine the question of the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court to entertain the suit, is to ascertain whether, in view of Section 4 of the Act, the Act applies to the premises at all. If it does, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction but if it does not then it has such jurisdiction. The question atonce arises as to who is to decide this point in controversy. It is well settled that a Civil Court has inherent power to decide the question of its own jurisdiction, although, as a result of its enquiry, it may turn out that it has no jurisdiction over the suit. Accordingly we think, in agreement with the High Court, that this preliminary objection is not well founded in principle or on authority and should be rejected. Accordingly we think, in agreement with the High Court, that this preliminary objection is not well founded in principle or on authority and should be rejected. In our view, therefore, in consonance with the dictum laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, it is within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to enquire as to the question of its jurisdiction and whether it is a case where the Civil Court's jurisdiction is ousted on account of the special provisions of the Orissa Tenants Protection Act. The Civil Court is entitled to take evidence of the parties during the course of a regular trial and determine the question of jurisdiction. It need not always confine itself to the scrutiny of the pleadings only; but where the position is absolutely clear from the pleadings, as in the case of Pandab Bissoi, as to the real point of controversy, it need not take evidence from the parties in respect of this clear point. In all other cases, if on scanning the evidence and circumstances transpiring in the case the Civil Court finds that the Defendants are mere trespassers, it must exercise its jurisdiction and give relief to the Plaintiff; and if it finds that the Defendant have occupancy right, it will dismiss the suit. But if it finds that the Defendants have no occupancy rights but nevertheless are temporary tenants and were possessing the property in dispute on the date as provided in the Orissa Tenants Protection Act, it is bound to find that the case is not within its competency to give relief to the Plaintiff as it is within the jurisdiction of the special tribunal constituted under the O.T.P. Act. 8. In conclusion therefore, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside. But as the lower appellate Court has not decided the points of controversy between the parties, the case is remanded to the lower appellate Court for disposal in accordance with law. Costs will abide the result. Barman, J. 9. I agree. Final Result : Allowed