Chhangani, J.—This is a plaintiffs revision against the appellate order of the District Judge, Jaipur City dated 18th December, 1959 rejecting their appeal and affirming the order of the Civil Judge, Jaipur City dated 27th November, 1959 refusing to grant a temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiffs 2. It will be very convenient to give a genealogy for a proper understanding of the facts of the case:— Harbux Mohrilal Champalal *Mst. Panchi (widow) (adoptive) Mst. Goranbai(deceased) Chetram alias Gopikishan *Mst Pokhli (died issueless) (widow) 3. Harbux who had considerable property in Jaipur died in Samwat year 1954 leaving his son Mohrilal and daughter Mst. Goran. Mohrilal died in Samwat year 1962 leaving his adoptive son Champalal. Champalal died in Samwat year 1974 leaving his widow Mst. Panchi, who is one of the opposite parties in this case. Chetram was adopted to Champalal in Samwat year 1978 and became the owner of the property originally belonging to Harbux. He died in the Samwat year 1983 leaving his widow Mst. Pokhali, who is also one of the opposite parties. 4. On 11th October, 1934, Mst. Pokhali widow of Chetram alias Gopikishan filed a suit against Mitt. Goran and Mst. Panchi for the possession of the entire property belonging to deceased Harbux, including a shop situated in Chandpole Bazar, Jaipur, more particularly described in para No. 2 of the plaint, to which the present litigation relates. The suit was decreed by the District & Sessions Judge, Jaipur State on 4th April, 1936. Mst. Panchi remained satisfied with the decree, but Mst. Goran challenged the decree by way of appeal in the Chief Court of Jaipur State and subsequently, before the Council of the former Jaipur State, but remained unsuccessful. 5. Subsequently, on 5th October, 1948, Mst. Pokhali created a trust in the name of Champalal Gopikishan Sabu Trust in respect of the entire property including the suit shop. To this Trust Panchi was a consenting party. In para 7 of the Trust Deed, provision was, however, made for the discharge of the debts that were outstanding against Mst. Pokhali herself and a debt of Rs. 1,000, outstanding against Mst. Panchi. The Trust Deed also provided that the two widows would be maintained out of the trust property, and each one of them will be entitled to Rs. 30/- per month for maintenance. It appears that under some mutual arrangements, Mst. Pokhali herself and a debt of Rs. 1,000, outstanding against Mst. Panchi. The Trust Deed also provided that the two widows would be maintained out of the trust property, and each one of them will be entitled to Rs. 30/- per month for maintenance. It appears that under some mutual arrangements, Mst. Panchi was permitted to appropriate the rental income of the shop in dispute, and it also appears that the rent notes in respect of the shop were also got executed in her favour. However, some time before 31st July, 1950, Mst. Goran took possession of the entire trust property including the shop in question and appears to have let out the shop to one Jhumarlal. The trustees filed a suit against Mst. Goran for possession of the properties on 31st July, 1950 in the court of the District Judge, Jaipur. During the pendency of that suit, Shri Gaffar Ali, Advocate, was appointed a Receiver in respect of the property in dispute. On the footing that Jhumarlal was a tenant of the shop in dispute on behalf of Mst. Goran, the Receiver filed a suit for ejectment against Jhumarlal, which was eventually decreed on 25th November, 1954. When the Receiver took proceedings for securing the possession of the shop in dispute, Mst. Panchi intervened and objected to the Receivers taking possession of the property in her own right. The objections of Mst. Panchi failed before the execution court. She, therefore, filed a declaratory suit praying that it should be declared that she was not liable to be ejected in execution of the decree passed in favour of Receiver Gaffar Ali and against Jhumarlal. Later on, during the pendency of the suit, she let out the shop in dispute to the present petitioners Hansraj and others on a rent of Rs. 35/- per month. In the suit filed by Mst. Panchi, a temporary injunction was issued in her favour on 11th February, 1958, and the same was affirmed by the appellate court on 9th May, 1958. Later on, some talks for compromise took place and ultimately, Mst. Panchis suit was dismissed on 25th November, 1958. It may be mentioned that Mst. Panchi thus remained bound by the decree passed against Jhumarlal. The suit filed by the trustees against Mst. Goran was ultimately decreed by the District Judge, Jaipur on 17th July, 1958 and. Later on, some talks for compromise took place and ultimately, Mst. Panchis suit was dismissed on 25th November, 1958. It may be mentioned that Mst. Panchi thus remained bound by the decree passed against Jhumarlal. The suit filed by the trustees against Mst. Goran was ultimately decreed by the District Judge, Jaipur on 17th July, 1958 and. in execution of that decree, the trustees who are defendants in the main suit and are opposite-parties, sought to dispossess the petitioners from the shop in dispute and one of the petitioner Banshidhar in that connection put up an application requesting for one months time to enable him to make alternative arrangemerits. It was mentioned that the shop has been in possession of the petitioners for the last three years and that he has considerable outstandings against various persons, and that he will be put to serious loss in consequence of immediate dispossession. This application was allowed and one months time was given to the petitioners for the purpose of vacating the shop. 6. The petitioners however, instead of vacating the shop filed a suit in the court of the Civil Judge, Jaipur City on 8th October, 1959 for a declaration and injunction against the Trust and the trustees, Mst. Pokhali, Panchi, Gaffar Ali, Receiver etc. In the plaint, after referring to both the decrees passed in favour of Shri Gaffar Ali, the Receiver, and the trustees, it was pleaded that Mst. Panchi and the plaintiffs were not parties to these decrees and they were not binding upon them and Mst. Panchi. It was further alleged that Mst. Panchi was in possession of the shop as owner and that she did not obtain possession of the shop either through Mst. Goran or Jhumarlal and that she was not liable to be ejected in the execution of both the decrees and consequently, the plaintiffs who were let into possession as tenants by Mst. Panchi, could not be ejected. Various other grounds were taken and the plaintiffs prayed for a declaration that they should be declared as being in possession not on behalf of Jhumarlal or Mst. Goran, but in their capacity as tenants of Mst. Panchi and, therefore, not liable to be ejected. 7. Panchi, could not be ejected. Various other grounds were taken and the plaintiffs prayed for a declaration that they should be declared as being in possession not on behalf of Jhumarlal or Mst. Goran, but in their capacity as tenants of Mst. Panchi and, therefore, not liable to be ejected. 7. Along with the plaint, an application for temporary injunction, restraining the trustees, i.e. defendants No. 1 to 14, from dispossessing then in the execution of their decree No. 28/1958 against Mst. Goran, was made. This application was dismissed by the trial Judge on 27th November, 1959 on the ground that the plaintiffs have no prima facie case in their favour. An appeal by the plaintiffs was dismissed by the District Judge, Jaipur City on 18th December, 1959. The plaintiffs have consequently filed this revision. 8. Mr. Bhandari appearing for the petitioners very strenuously contended that the petitioners could not be treated as bound by the decree against Mst. Goran and that the courts below had not considered the correct meaning of the expression, "persons bound by the decree" and erred in dismissing their application for a temporary injunction. 9. On the other hand, it was contended with equal vehemence by the Advocate General appearing for the opposite-parties that the orders of the courts below are quite correct in law; the petitioners have not been able to make out any prima facie case in their plaint and that in view of the application of one of the plaintiffs himself seeking time, the discretionary relief by way of injunction was correctly refused and this Court should not, in the exercise of the discretionary revisional jurisdiction, interfere with the orders of the courts below. 10. The main question that calls for determination in this case is as to whether the petitioners can be considered as bound by the decree against Jhumarlal and Mst. Goran and this in terms depends upon the determination of the true meaning of the expression, "persons bound by the decree ". 11. Mr. Bhandari relied on Jiban Krishna Ghost vs. Simrikha Koer (1), Ibrahim vs. Konammal (2), Sailendra Nath Bhattacharjee vs. Bijanlal Chakravarty{3) and Gurushiddaswami vs. D.M.D. Jain Sabha (4). 12. Jiban Krishna Ghose vs. Simrikha Koer (1) is of no great assistance. 11. Mr. Bhandari relied on Jiban Krishna Ghost vs. Simrikha Koer (1), Ibrahim vs. Konammal (2), Sailendra Nath Bhattacharjee vs. Bijanlal Chakravarty{3) and Gurushiddaswami vs. D.M.D. Jain Sabha (4). 12. Jiban Krishna Ghose vs. Simrikha Koer (1) is of no great assistance. In that case, the objector claimed a right of residence in a portion of the property and objected to the delivery of possession to the decree-holders. The objection was allowed. It does not discuss the expression, "persons bound by the decree " and provides no principle for guidance. 13. In Ibrahim Sahib vs. Konammal (2), Mr. Bhandari has relied upon the following observations:— "That being the position of the appellant it is impossible to see how they can tie regarded as tenants, against whom there could be an order for delivery under O. 21 R. 35 or R. 36 at all. They are in fact, if the decree-holders view of their position is correct, simply persons who are claiming to enter on the forests so fat as the Jaghir is concerned without having any right legitimately derived from any competent person to do so. The appellants remedy will be either in criminal prosecution or in a suit for damage". This case (2) was mainly decided on the basis that cm earlier petitions by the decree-holder, there was a complete delivery of the property, the subject-matter of the decree and that no fresh applications were competent. In view of these facts, no great assistance can be derived from these general observations divorced from the facts of the case. Besides, the expression in question was not discussed. 14. In Sailendranath Bhattacharjee vs. Bijanlal Chakravarty (3), Mukherjea, J. as he was then, reviewed the earlier Calcutta cases and also referred to a Bombay decision. It will be useful to refer to Sheikh Yusuf vs. Jyotish Chandra Banerjee (5), where the expression was considered and certain guiding principles were laid down.. In that case, it was contended in the first instance that the words "any person bound by the decree" are synonymous with "judgment-debtor". It will be useful to refer to Sheikh Yusuf vs. Jyotish Chandra Banerjee (5), where the expression was considered and certain guiding principles were laid down.. In that case, it was contended in the first instance that the words "any person bound by the decree" are synonymous with "judgment-debtor". After referring to the definition of the word "judgment-debtor" and the use of the description clause in Order 21 R. 35 C.P.C., the learned Judges repelled the contention and held that the words "any person bound by the decree" include the judgment-debtor as well as any person who may be held under the law as bound by the decree." On an alternative contention that the expression is used to include a transferee pendente lite, it was observed that provision for a transferee pendente lite has been made in Rule 102 and, therefore, the expression should not be confined to that. The conclusion was then summed up in these words, "It may include a person who may have come into possession after the institution of the suit and the legal representative of the judgment-debtor, but need not be confined to such persons only." 15. Then referring to the Bombay case, the learned Judges made the following observations to further elucidate the meaning of the expression, " person bound by the decree":— "Now, it is a settled principle of law that a judgment inter parties can bind only those who are parties or privies to it. In the Law of Estoppel, as Bigello points out, one person can become a privy to another (1) by succeeding to the position of that Other as regards the subject of the estoppel, and (2) by holding in subordination to that other. The ground of privity is property and not personal relation. To make a man privy to an action, he must have acquired an interest in the subject-matter of the action by inheritance, succession or purchase from a party subsequent to the action or he must hold the property subordinated (vide Bigello on Estoppel, Edn. 6, pp. 158 and 159).. Thus, a man cannot be privy to a judgment by succession unless he has acquired the property to which the judgment relates by way of inheritance, purchase, etc., subsequent to the institution of the suit. 6, pp. 158 and 159).. Thus, a man cannot be privy to a judgment by succession unless he has acquired the property to which the judgment relates by way of inheritance, purchase, etc., subsequent to the institution of the suit. Nobody can represent an interest which he has already parted with and consequently a transferee prior to the institution of the suit cannot be privy or to bound by a judgment obtained against the transferor; but the position may be different in the case of the subordinate holder, e.g. when a sub-lessee holds under a lessee. If the interest of the subordinate holder is of such a character that it is entirely dependent on that of the superior holder and automatically comes to an end as soon as the superior interest is extinguished, the subordinate holder would be a privy to the judgment obtained against the superior holder even though he was not a party to the action. If the interest of the lessee, therefore, is determined in such a way that the interest of the sub-lessee is extinguished along with it, a lawful judgment against the lessee which gives effect to the determination of the lessees rights must of necessity extinguish the subordinate rights of the under-tenant." 16. These observations have my respectful concurrence. 17. This case(3) was referred to with approval in Gurushiddaswami vs. D.M.D. Jain Sabha (4), where the leading judgment was delivered by the same great Judge then sitting in the Supreme Court. 18. On a review of the case law, the conclusion that must be reached is that the expression, "any person bound by the decree" is not synonymous with judgment-debtor" and has a wider connotation and is an elastic expression and the answer to the question whether a person can be bound by the decree must be given on a consideration of the facts and circumstances of each case, and on a consideration of the general law, including the provisions of Sec. 52 T.P. Act and O. 21 R. 102 C.P.C. governing the rights and liabilities of the persons sought to be bound. Without any claim to thoroughness, I may attempt the following broad enumeration of persons who can be held bound by the decree : (1) a person getting into possession of the property by succession subsequent to the institution of the suit which results in a decree for possession, (2) a person getting into possession on transfer under sale or mortgage subsequent to the institution of the suit, etc., and (3) a person in subordinate position, which expression includes under-lessees, licensees and other persons getting into or let into possession by the judgment-debtor or any person bound by the decree otherwise than in their own right and title. (a) in any case, if they get into possession subsequent to the suit, and (b) if they get into possession prior to the institution of the suit, provided their interest becomes extinguished on the passing of a decree for possession. 19. judging the present case in the light of the above principles, I have no doubt whatsoever that the present petitioners must be considered as bound by the decree both against Jhumarlal and Mst. Goran. Obviously, the shop in dispute is a part of the trust property and Mst. Panchi has no title to it, because as early as 1936, a decree in respect of the entire trust property, including the shop was passed in favour of Mst. Pokhali in a suit in which Mst. Panchi was one of the defendants. 20. Whatever may have been the controversy about the nature of the possession of Mst. Panchi before 31st July, 1950, the position does not admit of any doubt whatsoever that the shop came into possession of Mst. Goran some time before 31st July, 1950 and that she let out the shop to Jhumarlal. It can be only on that assumption that a suit by Shri Gaffar Ali, Receiver and other trustees against Mst. Goran and a decree in his favour could be contemplated. Jhumarlal, therefore, having got derivative interest from Mst. Goran must be bound by the decree against Mst. Goran. In connection with the execution of the decree against Jhumarlal, Mst. Panchi intervened and objected to the delivery of possession. Her objections and her suit having failed, Mst Panchi must be considered liable to be ejected in a decree against Jhumarlal and consequently bound by that decree and Jhumarlal having been held bound by the decree against Mst. Goran. In connection with the execution of the decree against Jhumarlal, Mst. Panchi intervened and objected to the delivery of possession. Her objections and her suit having failed, Mst Panchi must be considered liable to be ejected in a decree against Jhumarlal and consequently bound by that decree and Jhumarlal having been held bound by the decree against Mst. Goran, it follows as a necessary conclusion that Mst. Panchi stepping into the shoes of Jhumarlal must be bound by that decree. The plaintiffs derived their possession from Mst. Panchi during the pendency of the suit by the trustees against Mst. Goran and during the pendency of a declaratory suit by Mst. Panchi against Shri Gaffar Ali and therefore, it is not open for them to contend that they could not be treated as bound by the decree passed against Mst. Goran and Jhumarlal. 21. These being the facts, the conclusion is irresistible that the plaintiff-petitioners must be treated as bound by both the decrees. 22. Mr. Bhandari contended that whatever may be the position with regard to the decree against Jhumarlal, in view of the failure of objections and suit by Mst. Panchi. Mst. Panchi cannot be treated as bound by the decree against Mst. Goran. I do not agree with his contention. However, even on an assumption that his contention is correct, the petitioners case is not advanced in any manner. In the suit, a declaration has been sought in respect of both the decrees and even on the basis that the decree against Jhumarlal is binding upon the plaintiff-petitioners, the trustees, for whose benefit the decree against Jhumarlal and in favour of Gaffar Ali, the Receiver, must enure, are entitled to be put in possession of the shop in dispute and the plaintiff-petitioners can have no justification to remain in possession. They have absolutely no case to remain in possession either in their own right or as tenants of Mst. Panchi. 23. The learned Advocate General during the course of arguments laid a great emphasis upon the following facts : — (1) That, the petitioners do not assert any independent title in themselves and they come forward only on the basis of the tenancy rights which should be treated as a very subordinate interest. (2) That, the petitioners themselves at ode stage acquiesced in the proceedings for dispossession and simply sought a months time. (2) That, the petitioners themselves at ode stage acquiesced in the proceedings for dispossession and simply sought a months time. Their subsequent conduct in resiling from the stand and in filing the suit is not bona fide. (3) That, the grant of an injunction is a discretionary relief and further the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction is also entirely discretionary. 24. These facts also, in my opinion, lend considerable support to me in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff-petitioners are bound by the decrees against Jhumarlal and Mst. Goran, and they have no prima facie case to remain in possession of the shop and to object to their being dispossessed in execution of the decrees. The decisions given by the courts below are, in these circumstances, quite correct and need no interference 25. The revision application consequently fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.