JUDGMENT T.C. Shrivastava, J. 1. The suit out of which this second appeal arises was filed by the respondents in the Court of 2nd Additional Munsiff-Magistrate, Rewa, for possession of some fields and a sum of Rs. 360/- as damages for use and occupation. The claim was decreed by the trial Court for possession and damages to the extent of Rs. 260/- only. In appeal, the claim for damages was disallowed as also for possession of one of the plots. The rest of the decree passed by the trial Court was confirmed. The defendant has, therefore, filed this second appeal. 2. The respondents (plaintiffs) formed members of a joint Hindu family. They claimed that the lands in suit belonged to them and that they had obtained a patta in respect thereof in the last Settlement. They alleged that the appellant (defendant) started disputes regarding possession over the property and therefore proceedings under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, were initiated against both the parties. That dispute was compromised and the proceedings were filed. The plaintiffs alleged that the appellant-defendant obtained an order fraudulently from the criminal Court for possession over the lands. 3. The defendant stated that the lands originally belonged to his forefathers and had been mortgaged with possession with the plaintiffs' ancestors. They had fraudulently obtained a patta at the time of the Settlement, Disputes about redemption of the lands arose and the matter was referred to arbitration. The arbitrators assessed the debt at Rs. 232/8/- and directed that one field, valued at Rs. 276/-, be delivered to the plaintiff on their paying Rs. 44/- back to the defendant. The rest of the fields were released in favour of the defendant. The award is on record as Ex. D-1 The plaintiffs accordingly took one of the fields on payment of Rs. 44/- and releaed the rest of the fields from the mortgage under document Ex. D-2. In the proceedings under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, the parties filed an application stating that the dispute had been amicably settled and the Court therefore terminated the proceedings directing the lands in suit to be placed in possession of the defendant. Accordingly, the defendant continues in possession. 4. The Courts below held that as the patta was issued in the names of the plaintiffs' ancestors, the lands belonged to them. They further held that the award (Ex. Accordingly, the defendant continues in possession. 4. The Courts below held that as the patta was issued in the names of the plaintiffs' ancestors, the lands belonged to them. They further held that the award (Ex. D-1) and the release deed (Ex. D-2) were not admissible in evidence for want of registration and therefore the defendant was precluded from proving anything on their basis. The trial Court decreed the whole claim on the basis of the title of the respondents; but the lower appellate Court held that possession of the appellant over the lands was by virtue of an order passed by the criminal Court and was not therefore illegal. Accordingly, the claim for damages was disallowed. 5. The documents, Ex. D-1 and Ex. D-2, have been duly proved by the statement of Ram Sunder (D. W. 1) and Brij Sen (D.W. 2). All the respondents, except Jokhu, were signatories to the reference to arbitration, and it is significant that none of them has appeared to deny the award or the release deed (Ex. D-2). The plaintiffs have examined Jokhu, who states that he has no personal knowledge about the two documents. When the documents had been filed by the defendant, it was the duty of the plaintiffs to appear in the witness-box and deny their execution or to explain the circumstances under which they were executed. 6. The next question is whether the documents cannot be admitted in evidence for want of registration. Ex. D. 1 does not, by itself, purport to transfer title in the fields from one party to the other. It only determines the amount which was due under the mortgage and directs that one of the fields may be sold to the respondents and on this being done, the rest of the fields may be released to the appellant. If the document is read as a whole, it is clear that the intention is to have a conveyance executed in accordance with law later and to have it registered. The award does not, therefore, require registration under Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act. In Lahore Central Co-op Bank vs. Qader Bakhash AIR 1947 P.C 117 the question whether an award between a mortgagor and mortgagee, under similar circumstances, required registration was considered. The award does not, therefore, require registration under Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act. In Lahore Central Co-op Bank vs. Qader Bakhash AIR 1947 P.C 117 the question whether an award between a mortgagor and mortgagee, under similar circumstances, required registration was considered. In that case, the arbitrators had determined the amount due and had directed that on default of two instalments, the amount may be realised through Civil Court by sale of the mortgaged property. It was held that this direction only indicated that action in accordance with law could be taken later and the deed was not therefore compulsorily registrable. Similarly, Ex. D-1 in the instant case merely directs the parties to complete the conveyance by a formal deed duly registered and does not itself purport to transfer any interest from one party to the other. It is, therefore, admissible in evidence. Ex. D-2 recites that the plaintiffs received one field and refunded Rs. 44/- to the defendant after adjusting Rs. 232/8/- towards the debt in full satisfaction and that the remaining fields were released to the defendant. This recital operates as extinction of the mortgage debt and also as transfer of the title in the fields from one party to the other. Accordingly, the deed requires registration. All the same, it is admissible for a collateral purpose to show how the possession of the appellant-defendant on the lands originated. The respondents-plaintiffs have themselves placed the appellant-defendant is possession after the award. It appears to me that the respondents cannot claim possession of the lands from the appellant under these circumstances. An application was field before the criminal Court by both the parties stating that the dispute had been compromised Out of Court and the proceedings may be filed. On 2-12-1954, an order was passed by the Criminal Court in which the Addl. Munsiff-Magistrate recorded that by virtue of the compromise the application was dismissed. An express order was also passed directing the lands to be placed in possession of Ram Sunder. It is pertinent to observe that on this date the plaintiffs were present before the Court as is apparent from the copy of the proceedings. It is, therefore, too much for the plaintiffs to contend that the order for delivery of possession to the appellant Ram Sunder was obtained fraudulently from the Criminal Court. It is pertinent to observe that on this date the plaintiffs were present before the Court as is apparent from the copy of the proceedings. It is, therefore, too much for the plaintiffs to contend that the order for delivery of possession to the appellant Ram Sunder was obtained fraudulently from the Criminal Court. It was with their full knowledge and consent and obviously it was in pursuance of the settlement following the award between the parties. 7. Shrl R.K. Tankha for the respondents next contends that as the award was not followed up by proceedings under Section 14 of the Indian Arbitration Act, it cannot be relied upon by the appellant. The question was considered by me in Prahlad singh and others vs. Shyam Singh Second Appeal No. 711 of 1956 decided on 20-4-1959. In that case, I have held that Section 32 of the Indian Arbitration Act only bars a suit on the basis of an award, but does not debar a defendant from raising a defence on the basis of an award. I have preferred the view taken in Pamudurthi Suryanarayan Reddy and others vs. Pamudurthi Venkata Reddi and others AIR 1948 Mad. 469 to the contrary view taken in Kishori Kunwar vs. Bhaivi Nandan Sinha AIR 1953 Pat. 42 accordingly, I hold that the defendant can set up the award as a defence to the claim by the respondents for possession over the lands. 8. It has been held in Nathulal vs. Behari lal ILR 1951 Nag. 883 that once an award has been given settling the dispute, it is not open to any of the parties to bring a suit on the basis of the original cause of action. In this view, the existence of the award (Ex. D-1) precluded the plaintiffs from suing on the basis of the disputed title which existed prior to the award. 9. Accordingly, the claim of the respondents for possession of the suit lands was liable to be dismissed. I allow the appeal and set aside the decree of the lower appellate Court. Instead, I direct that the suit be dismissed with costs. The respondents shall pay the costs of the appellant in all the three Courts. Appeal dismissed