JUDGMENT V.R. Newaskar, J. This second appeal arises out of a suit filed by the plaintiff who is an endorsee of a Railway Receipt in respect of one bale of artificial silk despatched from Wadi Bunder Bombay to Bhopal via Central Railway on 13-3-1952. The goods was (sic) substantially damaged on 21-5-1952. The delivery of the goods in damaged condition was given and accepted on 8-6-1952 after the estimate of the damage of Rs. 1,937-14-0 was stated in the 'certificate of damage and shortage' issued by the Railway Authority at Bhopal Railway Station. The appellant-plaintiff gave notice under section 77 of the Railways Act on 12-5-1953 which was received by General Manager on 14-5-1953. The present suit was brought thereafter on 7-8-1953 claiming recovery of the afore-said estimated damage to his goods namely Rs. 1,937-14-0 plus usual margin of profit at 25 per cent. The total claim was for Rs. 2,422-5-6. The suit was mainly resisted on the ground of limitation. Both the Courts below held the claim to be beyond time in view of the provisions of Article 30 of the Limitation Act, which according to them applied to the claim in question. In this appeal Mr. Sanghi for the appellant contended that it is Article 31 which should be held applicable and not Article 30 of the Limitation Act. According to the learned counsel the plaintiff could not have known anything about the goods till 8-6-1952 when the delivery was given to him of the bale in damaged condition. The learned counsel relied upon the decisions reported in Jwala Datta v. Union of India AIR 1953 Pat 367 , Kisanrao v. Dominion of India 1953 NLJ 218 : AIR 1953 Nag 270, National Swadeshi Stores v. Governor-General AIR 1948 Sind 26 and Palanichani v. G.-G.-in-Council AIR 1946 Mad 133 , in support of his contention. In order to determine whether Article 30 or 31 of the Limitation Act should be applied in this case it will be material to consider the actual frame of the suit and the findings arrived at by the Court below regarding the damage or non-delivery. The plaintiff's case is that Motilal Mithulal despatched the disputed bale by R.R. No. P.W.B. 5950/85 dated 13-5-1952 and when the bale reached the Railway Station Bhopal on 8-6-1952 it was found to be damaged due to fire, the loss being estimated at Rs. 1,937-14-0. The plaintiff's case is that Motilal Mithulal despatched the disputed bale by R.R. No. P.W.B. 5950/85 dated 13-5-1952 and when the bale reached the Railway Station Bhopal on 8-6-1952 it was found to be damaged due to fire, the loss being estimated at Rs. 1,937-14-0. The plaintiff specifically averred that the loss in question occurred 'in consequence of negligence and misconduct of the Railway Administration or its servants'. It is also established at the trial by the evidence led by the defendant that the loss due to fire had occurred on 21-5-1952 and that the consignment had been received at the Bhopal Station on 21-5-1952. Here therefore is a claim specifically on the allegation that the defendant-Company was responsible for injuring goods by reason of the negligence or misconduct of its servants and there is evidence of Babulal Sharma, Asstt. Parcel Clerk, Bhopal Railway Station that the loss due to fire occurred on 21-5-1952. There is also the finding of the lower appellate Court that the bale in question was damaged by fire on 21-5-1952 causing the resultant loss. In face of the case as set out and the finding thus arrived at there is no doubt that the Article applicable would be Article 30 and not Article 31 of the Limitation Act. These Articles are:- Article. 30. Against a carrier for compensation for losing or injuring goods. One year. When the loss or injury occurs. Article 31. Against a carrier for compensation for non-delivery of, or delay in delivering, goods. One year. When the goods ought to be delivered. When a consignor despatches goods through a carrier if all goes well the goods is delivered at the expected time in the expected condition and no question of compensation arises. But some times after the goods is delivered to the carrier it may get damaged or lost either completely or partially or get delayed while still in the hands of the carrier and the goods does not reach destination either in the expected condition or at the expected time or both and the person entitled to the goods complains of loss. In such a situation two different kinds of suits are envisaged for the purpose of limitation as provided for Articles 30 and 31. In such a situation two different kinds of suits are envisaged for the purpose of limitation as provided for Articles 30 and 31. Article 30 deals with the case of a suit for compensation where the carrier either loses or injures the goods left at its charge; such a suit is to be filed within one year from the time when the loss or injury actually occurs. It is immaterial in such a case when the plaintiff comes to know of such loss or injury. It is no doubt true that ordinarily the burden of proving when the loss or injury occurs will lie, in such cases, upon the carrier as the person entitled to the goods may hardly have means to know the time and the circumstances of such a loss or injury to his goods. I said ordinarily because in certain cases the consignee may have known of the loss and when it occurred in that case the burden is no longer upon the carrier. Even in cases covered by Article 30 there may be non-delivery or delay in delivering. But this is special kind of non-delivery or delay in delivery. Article 31 on the other hand deals with the cases of a suit against a carrier for compensation for other cases of non-delivery or delay in delivering goods not covered by Article 30. In that sense it is a residuary Article and where a case is fully covered by Article 30 the following Article would be inapplicable. Present is a case of that description. Here the plaintiff accuses the Railway Company of causing loss to the goods by injuring it due to negligence or misconduct of its servants. It may be that the consignee came to know of the loss on 8-6-1952 when he took delivery and found that substantial portion of the bale had been damaged by fire. If none had led evidence, since the burden was upon the carrier it would have been held that the loss or injury to goods occurred at the point of time most favourable to the consignee having regards to the circumstances of the case namely 8-6-1952. But in this case the defendant-Company had led evidence. It is held satisfactorily established that the fire which caused injury to the bale in question had broken out at Bhopal on 21-5-1952. But in this case the defendant-Company had led evidence. It is held satisfactorily established that the fire which caused injury to the bale in question had broken out at Bhopal on 21-5-1952. In this state the finding of the lower Courts, the suit filed on 7-8-1953 is clearly barred by time even giving benefit to the plaintiff of the period of notice, namely, two months and three days to which he is entitled under section 15(2) of the Limitation Act. As regards the authorities upon which the learned counsel relied, the one which is pertinent is that reported in Jwala Datta v. Union of India AIR 1953 Pat 367 . The facts of that case were that certain consignment consisting of 700 tins of groundnut oil was despatched from Ankapalle Railway Station on the M.S.M. Railway on 6-10-1942 to be delivered at Ranchi. On the date of delivery i.e., on 28-10-1942 one hundred and seventy-five tins of ground-nut oil were found damaged and empty. The plaintiff engaged in correspondence and ultimately on 21-9-1943 his claim was rejected by the Railway Authorities. He filed a suit on 19-1-1944. The question was whether the suit was within limitation. Article 30 was applied in this case. Sinha J. in para. 6 of the report expressed the opinion that the plaintiff need not have waited to be told that the contents of 175 tins had been lost and that the lose must have been prior to the time of delivery of the tins i.e. prior to 28-10-1942. It was then observed:- If that were so, then in my judgment, the time for a Suit for compensation for the loss started running latest on 28-10-1842. Relying upon these observations Mr. Sanghi contends that the time starts running from the date the bale in the present case was delivered i.e. from 8-6-1952. I am unable to construe the aforesaid observation as any way holding that even where the actual loss had occurred earlier the time would begin running when the plaintiff comes to know of it at the time of taking delivery. As the wording of Article 30 goes, the period of limitation begins running from the date the loss or injury occurs and not when the plaintiff comes to know of it. As the wording of Article 30 goes, the period of limitation begins running from the date the loss or injury occurs and not when the plaintiff comes to know of it. Since the burden in such cases is upon the carrier, if there is no evidence on record as to when the loss or injury occurred then the Courts have given the benefit to the plaintiff by holding that in that case the loss or injury would be taken to be when the plaintiff was offered delivery of goods in damaged or injured condition. But that result follows because of the rule of evidence and not because the expression 'when the loss or injury occurs' is given an interpretation at variance with its natural meaning. The decision in Kisanrao v. Dominion of India 1953 NLJ 218 : AIR 1953 Nag 270 has no application. That was a case of non-delivery of goods on the case set up by either side and Article 31 was held applicable. The learned Judge there had to consider the expression 'ought to have been delivered'. According to Sen J. who delivered that judgment there were two views expressed in decided cases about the aforesaid expression. One was the literal and the other liberal. He was prepared to accept the liberal view provided the facts in that case justified. The literal view was 'when the goods should have been delivered having regard to either the terms of agreement or in its absence according to common course of events'. While the liberal view was 'when the Railway Authorities finally inform their inability to give delivery'. It is unnecessary for the purpose of the present case to consider which of the two views is correct because present is a case to which Article 31 is inapplicable. But even on the view expressed by Padhye J., in the case referred to in Kisanrao v. Dominion of India 1953 NLJ 218 : AIR 1953 Nag 270, the claim would be barred by time. The third case relied upon is National Swadeshi Stores v. Governor-General AIR 1948 Sind 26, In that case it was held that Article 31 applies to any suit against a carrier for compensation for non-delivery or delay in delivering goods irrespective of the causes of non-delivery. The third case relied upon is National Swadeshi Stores v. Governor-General AIR 1948 Sind 26, In that case it was held that Article 31 applies to any suit against a carrier for compensation for non-delivery or delay in delivering goods irrespective of the causes of non-delivery. It was further observed:- I consider that the correct view is that Articles 30 and 31 overlap, and that, in any case in which the carrier has failed to fulfil his obligation under the terms of the contract to deliver the goods, the party aggrieved is entitled to sue for non-delivery, and that such a case comes within Article 31. Reliance in that case was placed by the learned Judge upon the following observations of Richardson J. in AIR 1923 Cal 397:- I will assume that the word 'loss' in this section means loss by the Railway Administration. The argument is that goods not delivered or short delivered are not 'lost' and reliance was placed on the judgment of Jwala Prasad J. in A.I.R. 1922 Pat. 106. The learned Judge referred to the distinction which appears in Articles 30 and 31 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act between claims against a carrier on the one hand for compensation for losing or injuring goods and on the other for compensation for non-delivery of or delay in delivering goods. In the first case limitation runs from the time when the loss or injury occurs and in the second case from the time when the goods ought to be delivered. In my opinion with respect these two Articles of the Limitation Act throw little, if any, light on the construction of section 77, Railways Act. There may be reasons for the presence of both Articles in the limitation Act but they may still be overlapping. Where there is an agreement by a carrier to deliver goods at a fixed time or within a reasonable time, a claim for goods lost may be drawn as a claim for their non-delivery. The reasoning of the learned Judge then proceeds on the assumption-mistaken as I venture to think-that a claim for non-delivery necessarily imports that the Railway Company are consciously and deliberately withholding goods in their possession, which they might deliver if they choose to do so. The reasoning of the learned Judge then proceeds on the assumption-mistaken as I venture to think-that a claim for non-delivery necessarily imports that the Railway Company are consciously and deliberately withholding goods in their possession, which they might deliver if they choose to do so. As it seems to me, a claim for non-delivery without more, merely asserts that the goods were not delivered at the agreed time or within a reasonable time. Such a claim asserts nothing as to the cause of the non-delivery. Even accepting the last paragraph of the above quoted observations of Richardson J., it is clear that in this case the claim of the plaintiff is specifically made for loss of goods due to negligence or misconduct of the Railway Company or its servants. It is therefore immaterial to consider whether the plaintiff could have succeeded in bringing his claim within limitation had he merely sued for non-delivery relying upon the date of actual delivery on 8-6-1952 as the date on which the goods ought to have been delivered. In Palanichand v. G.-G.-in-Council AIR 1946 Mad 133 the goods remained undelivered for a long time. The Railway Authorities at first offered to make inquiry about the position with respect to the goods but finally informed that the goods were not traceable. It was held that Article 31 applied and the time begins to run on definite refusal. This was evidently a case of non-delivery and laid before the Court as such. Article 31 was therefore applicable. The case which to my mind is applicable is one reported in Secretary of State v. Messrs Niaz Ali AIR 1935 All 407. In that case the consignee by his letter dated 5-8-1931 admitted the loss of the goods consigned. He sued for compensation for the loss on 15-10-1932. It was held that the suit was barred by time. The decision of Bose J., in Firm Sitaram Bindraban v. G.I.P. Railway 1947 NLJ 540 : AIR 1947 Nag 224 : ILR 1947 Nag 726, also suggests that the proper Article applicable in the case of loss or injury to goods in transit, is Article 30 and the time runs from the date when the loss or injury occurs. The decision of Bose J., in Firm Sitaram Bindraban v. G.I.P. Railway 1947 NLJ 540 : AIR 1947 Nag 224 : ILR 1947 Nag 726, also suggests that the proper Article applicable in the case of loss or injury to goods in transit, is Article 30 and the time runs from the date when the loss or injury occurs. It no doubt lays down that burden is upon the carrier to establish when the loss or injury occurs that being within its special knowledge and in the absence of any proof by the carrier the benefit would go to the consignee, and the date of loss would be taken to be when the consignee was offered delivery or part of the goods in damaged condition. On the whole as the goods have been proved to have been injured and lost on 21-5-1952 at the Railway Station Bhopal the suit brought on 7-8-1953 is barred by time even making allowance of two months and three days for the notice under section 77 of the Railways Act. There is one more point in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant which deserves to be noticed. It was contended by Mr. Sanghi, for the appellant, that even assuming that the goods were damaged on 21-5-1952 and Article 30 of the Limitation Act applied still the claim would be within limitation as an officer of the Railway concerned has issued a certificate of damage and shortage on 8-6-1952 accepting the extent of such damage to be Rs. 1,937-14-0. The document, it is said, is signed by the person authorised to sign on behalf of the defendant-Company and would be tantamount to acknowledgment within the meaning of section 19 of the Limitation Act. This argument cannot be accepted. In the first place the plaintiff in his plaint does not seek to extension of the period of limitation by reason of the aforesaid document. The question whether the claim as laid by the plaintiff is not barred by limitation by reason of certain acknowledgment is a question which rests on allegations of fact. Where those allegations are not made in the Courts below the question cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in second appeal which is not concerned with question of fact. Where those allegations are not made in the Courts below the question cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in second appeal which is not concerned with question of fact. In the second place the document to which a reference is made by the learned counsel for the appellant only mentions the extent of the damage but does not say that the Railway Company is liable for that damage. For the application of section 19 of the Limitation Act there should be an unconditional acknowledgment of the liability by the party against whom the claim is made. The document relied upon is not of that description. It only mentions the extent of the damage without saying anything whether the Railway Company is liable or not. It is difficult to construe this document to involve an unconditional acknowledgment of the liability. For both these reasons the contention is untenable. The decision of the Court below is therefore right and the appeal deserves to be dismissed with costs. Ordered accordingly. Appeal dismissed