Oinam Apabi Singh v. Imphal Municipal Board — 1961 DIGILAW 10 (GAU)

ORDER:- The petitioner who is a land-holder within the Imphal Municipal Area prays for a writ of mandamus against the Imphal Municipal Board (Respondent) to quash the two resolutions - Annexures-A and D passed by the said Municipal Board on 5-8-1960 and 20-12-1960 respectively. 2. Imphal Municipal Board was constituted in 1956 under the Assam Municipal Act 1923, which was extended to Manipur after it became a Union Territory. Subsequently the Assam Municipal Act 1956 (Assam Act XV of 1957 hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) was enacted in Assam and it was extended to Manipur by the Notification Annexure-I dated 12-2-1960. On 17-3-1960, the Chief Commissioner by another order Annexure-II extended the boundaries of the Imphal Municipality by including an area of 5 and odd sq. miles lying contiguous to the existing area within its limits. The term of office of the members of the existing Municipal Board was also extended by another notification Annexure-III upto 31-3-1961, so that the Electoral rolls for the newly extended area may be prepared and the election of the new Municipal Board may be held on the basis of the extended area to allow the inhabitants of that area to participate in the election. 3. On 19-7-1960, notice was issued by the Chairman for a meeting of the Municipal Board to take place on 5-8-1960 to consider certain subjects. We are only concerned with the 3rd subject which was "3. To consider the mode of assessment and census of the newly extended Municipal area" (Annexure-IV). Accordingly, the meeting took place and the following resolution on the subject was adopted unanimously as seen from Annexure-V (which is the same as Annexure-A): "In order to give privilege to the people living inside the extended Municipal area for being a voter in the next Municipal election under Assam Municipal Act, 1956, it is resolved that Municipal tax on holding at the flat rate of Rs.10/- per year per holding will be levied from the people of such area with effect from the October, 1960. Immediate action may be taken up for assessment of the said tax." Then notice was published in the local papers on 14-12-1960 signed by the Area Officer cum Inspector of Taxes, Imphal Municipality calling upon all the pattadars resident within the newly extended Municipal Area to pay the tax of Rs.10/- per holding in 4 quarterly instalments of Rs.2.50 each, the first instalment to be paid on or before 31st December, 1960 (Annexure-B). Personal notices were also served on the proposed assessees stating that the Imphal Municipal Board had resolved to levy a sum of Rs.10/- per annum as holding tax in respect of the assessees land under section 80 of the Act and calling upon him to pay the tax of Rs.2.50 for the first quarter beginning from 1st October, 1960 on or before the 31st December, 1960 (Annexure-C). 4. Then notice was given on 14-12-1960 by the Chairman for another meeting of the Municipal Board to be held on 20-12-1960 to consider certain subjects of which we are only concerned with the 5th subject namely "To consider the matter for taxation of shop sites in Singjamei Bazar" - (Annexure-7). This subject was subsequently amended by Annexure 8 to read "To consider the matter for taxation of Singjamei Bazar and others". At the meeting held on 20-12-1960 the following resolution was passed as seen from Annexure-IX which is the same as (Annexure-D): "(a) In partial modification of resolution No.3 dated 5-8-1960 and in exercise of the powers conferred upon the Board by section 80 of the Assam Municipal Act, 1956 as extended to Manipur the Board resolve to determine the percentage on the valuation of holdings payable by the owners of such holdings as follows: One percent on the annual value of holdings". 5. Thereafter a notice Annexure-F was published on 21-12-1960 by the Assessor of the Municipality calling upon all owners and occupiers of holdings to furnish returns of the annual value thereof. Similar individual notices were also sent. They were in supersession of the earlier notices Annexure-B and C. 6. The petitioner herein filed a writ petition on receipt of the notice annexure-C calling on him to pay the tax as per, resolution Annexure-V. He withdrew that application when the second resolution Annexure-IX (Annexure-D) in modification of the earlier resolution was passed and came forward with the present application. The petitioner herein filed a writ petition on receipt of the notice annexure-C calling on him to pay the tax as per, resolution Annexure-V. He withdrew that application when the second resolution Annexure-IX (Annexure-D) in modification of the earlier resolution was passed and came forward with the present application. His case is that when the resolution Annexure-V was passed, persons affected by it demanded its withdrawal pointing out its illegality and that thereupon the Board modified the said resolution by Annexure-I. He contends that the Commissioners of the Municipal Board were not elected from the newly extended Municipal area and that the resolutions were passed by the Board to defeat the voting right of the petitioner and the other citizens of the Municipality. His contention is that the said resolutions are in violation of Article 265 of the Constitution and opposed to the provisions of the Assam Municipal Act. He further contends that as section 68 of the Act does not place any limit on the rate of taxation, it will amount to an unconstitutional delegation of the power of taxation which is vested in the State. He therefore prays that the resolutions Annexures-V and IX (Annexures-A and D) may be quashed. 7. The respondent contends that the resolutions Annexures-V and IX (A and D) were passed, in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and that in any case there has been substantial compliance with the provisions of section 68 and section 80 of the Act and that the petitioner has no right to challenge the Boards Resolutions, but can only raise objection to the assessment as provided under sections 92 to 99 of the Act and not in any other proceedings. He also points out that the petition was not maintainable as no notice was served on the Board as required under section 326 of the Act and that the respondent was not given any opportunity to reconsider the matter before the writ petition was brought. He also contends that section 68 of the Act is not ultra vires the Constitution. 8. I shall first take up the contention whether the petition is not maintainable in view of the provisions of section 326 of the Act on account of the failure on the part of the petitioner to give a notice in writing to the respondent. He also contends that section 68 of the Act is not ultra vires the Constitution. 8. I shall first take up the contention whether the petition is not maintainable in view of the provisions of section 326 of the Act on account of the failure on the part of the petitioner to give a notice in writing to the respondent. Section 326 provides that no suit or other legal proceeding shall be brought against the Board for anything done under the Act, until the expiration of one month after a notice in writing has been delivered to it. The argument was that a writ under Article 226 is a legal proceeding and that when section 326 expressly provided that no such legal proceeding can be brought until after the expiration of one month from the date of notice, this writ is not maintainable, as the petitioner has failed to give the notice. It cannot be denied that a writ application brought under Article 226 of the Constitution is a legal proceeding. But at the same time, the power of the High Court under Article 226 to issue prerogative writs is an unqualified power which is not even subject to any other provision of the Constitution. Hence it cannot be made subject to the provisions of any Act of Parliament or of any State legislature. Hence, a person who applies for such a writ cannot be non-suited by a provision like section 326 which seeks to qualify this power of the High Court. We have to take it therefore that legal proceedings referred to in S.326, refer to legal proceedings other than a proceeding under Art.226. 9. Hence, a person who applies for such a writ cannot be non-suited by a provision like section 326 which seeks to qualify this power of the High Court. We have to take it therefore that legal proceedings referred to in S.326, refer to legal proceedings other than a proceeding under Art.226. 9. I may in this connection refer to the decision Soorajmull Nagarmull v. Assistant Collector of Customs, reported in AIR 1952 Cal 103 in which with respect to a similar provision in S.198 of the Sea Customs Act, Bose J. held that in so far as section 198 purports to impose any fetter or restriction on the exercise of the absolute and unqualified power of the High Court as contained in Article 226, it must be held to be void to the extent of the inconsistency or repugnancy, and that S.198 must be held to impose a bar or disability on a person who seeks to commence proceedings in a Court of law, but not to fetter or restrict the power of the High Court or affect the jurisdiction of the High Court in any way. Another decision on the same point is Mehar Singh v. Chairman, Municipality of Bally, reported in AIR 1954 Cal 131 , wherein Sinha J. has held that S.535 of the Bengal Municipal Act which provides that no suit or legal proceedings shall be brought against the Commissioners of the Municipality without giving them one months prior notice did not abrogate the powers of the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution. 10. In this particular case, the election to the Imphal Municipality has to be held before 61-3-1961 as the term of the present Commissioners would expire on that date and the resolutions passed by the Board will affect the franchise of the petitioner and others residing within the Municipality and he had therefore to take the necessary steps without any delay and therefore it cannot be said that he has any other equally efficacious remedy except to file this writ and this too without any delay. I have no doubt therefore that S.326 of the Act will not bar this application. The preliminary objection raised by the respondent has no force. 11. Next we come to the question whether S.68 of the Act is ultra vires the Constitution. I have no doubt therefore that S.326 of the Act will not bar this application. The preliminary objection raised by the respondent has no force. 11. Next we come to the question whether S.68 of the Act is ultra vires the Constitution. Section 68 gives the power to Municipal Board to convene a meeting expressly for the purpose after giving due notice and to impose within the limits of the Municipality - (a) tax on holdings, assessed on their annual value (b) water tax, (c) lighting tax, (d) latrine tax, (e) drainage tax, (f) tax on private markets and other licence fees, tolls etc Sections 69 to 99 deal with the details regarding the various taxes and with the restrictions regarding the imposition of the taxes. 12. We are only concerned with section 68(1)(a) in this application, namely a tax on holdings assessed on their annual value. Section 70 contains a prohibition on the said taxation where the aggregate annual value of all the holdings of an owner does not exceed six rupees. Sections 76 to 79 relate to the determination of the annual value of the holdings. Then comes section 80 which relates to the determination of the rate of tax on holdings. It states that subject to the provisions of the Act, the Municipal Board at a meeting to be held before the close of the year preceding the year to which the tax will apply shall determine the percentage on the valuation of the holdings at which any tax on the annual value of the holdings shall be levied and states that the percentage so fixed shall remain until the Board at a meeting shall determine some other percentage at which the tax shall be levied from the beginning of the next year. Then there are provisions for the preparation of the assessment register, revision of the valuation list and assessments register and other general provisions regarding the assessment. 13. Now the main argument for the petitioner is that section 68(1)(a) and section 80 leave it to the Municipal Boards to determine the rate of the tax, namely, the percentage of the annual value of the holdings. 13. Now the main argument for the petitioner is that section 68(1)(a) and section 80 leave it to the Municipal Boards to determine the rate of the tax, namely, the percentage of the annual value of the holdings. It was pointed out that this would even permit the Municipality to impose a tax of cent per cent of the annual value and that the Legislature has thereby given the Boards a vast power in the determination of the tax and that thereby the Legislature has abdicated its own functions under Article 245 of the Constitution to make laws and under Article 265 of the Constitution to levy taxes. It was urged that the power of taxation is a sovereign power vested in the Legislature tinder the Constitution and that such power should not be delegated to a subordinate authority. 14. Before I proceed to deal with the decision cited before me, it is necessary to mention that sections 68(1)(a), 70 and 80 of the Assam Municipal Act 1956 correspond to sections 59(1)(a), 60 and 72 respectively of the Assam Municipal Act of 1923. There is a proviso in section 72 which is not there in section 80. The proviso is that where the annual value of any holding exceeds Rs.7,500/-, the tax on the excess shall be leviable at only one-fourth of the percentage fixed under the section. But under both the sections the power to fix the percentage to be levied as tax has been left to be decided by the Municipality. 15. No decision under the old Assam Municipal Act, 1923 which was in force until the present Act came into force in 1956 has been brought to my notice which questioned the right of the Municipal Board to fix the percentage of tax under section 72 of the old Act. It has also to be mentioned that the taxes which the Boards have been allowed to levy are all taxes intended for the purpose of Local Self-Government. The Legislature has decided and limited the kind of taxes to be permitted to be levied. It is not possible for the Legislature to know when passing the Act the requirements of the various Municipalities within the State to meet their expenditure. It must necessarily vary from Board to Board. The Legislature has decided and limited the kind of taxes to be permitted to be levied. It is not possible for the Legislature to know when passing the Act the requirements of the various Municipalities within the State to meet their expenditure. It must necessarily vary from Board to Board. Naturally, the rate at which the taxes will be levied and even the decision whether the tax will be levied at all have been left to be taken by the Boards. 16. In that connection the decisions of the Supreme Court in Special Ret No.1 of 1951 reported in In re Art.143, Constitution of India and Delhi Laws Act (1912) etc., AIR 1951 SC 332 ; Harishankar Bagla v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 1954 SC 465 and the decisions Sarat Chandra Ghatak v. Corporation of Calcutta, reported in AIR 1959 Cal 36 ; Liberty Cinema v. Commissioner, Corporation of Calcutta, reported in AIR 1959 Cal 45 and Corporation of Calcutta v. Sarat Chandra Ghatak reported in AIR 1959 Cal 704 were relied on. For the respondent the decision Hirabhai Ashabhai Patel v. State of Bombay, reported in (S) AIR 1955 Bom 185 was cited in the same connection. 17. In Special Reference Case No.1 of 1951, in AIR 1951 SC 332 the question whether legislative power may be delegated at all and if so, to what extent it may be done has been exhaustively discussed. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that delegated legislation had become a present-day necessity owing to the complexity of modern administration and the expansion of the functions of the State to the economic and social sphere and that wide powers had to be given to various authorities in suitable occasions and that the legislature having now to make so many laws has no time to devote to all the legislative details, but could only set the broad principles and leave the details to be worked out by those who have to carry out the policy as it is not possible to foresee all the contingencies and envisage all the local requirements for which provisions have to be made. Their Lordships have laid down the two main checks on the power of the legislature to delegate as its good sense and the principle that it should not cross the line beyond which delegation would amount to abdication and self-effacement. Their Lordships have laid down the two main checks on the power of the legislature to delegate as its good sense and the principle that it should not cross the line beyond which delegation would amount to abdication and self-effacement. The essential legislative function consists in the determination and choosing of the legislative policy and of formally enacting the said policy into a binding rule of conduct. It is open to the legislature to formulate the policy as broadly and with as little or as much details as it thought proper and it may delegate the rest of the legislative work to a subordinate authority who will work out the details within the framework of that policy. The Court could interfere if no policy is discernible at all or the delegation is of such an indefinite character as to amount to abdication. But the discretion vests with the legislature in determining whether there is necessity for delegation or not and the exercise of such discretion is not to be disturbed except in clear cases of abuse. 18. The above decision of the Supreme Court was later considered in another decision "State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, reported in AIR 1951 SC 318 ". The question to be considered in that decision was whether the power given under section 52 of the Bombay Prohibition Act to the Government to grant licences in cases other than those specifically provided for under the provisions of the Act amounted to delegation of Legislative power. The Bombay High Court had held that it amounted to such delegation. That was overruled by the Supreme Court, Patanjali Sastri J. observed at page 327 of the said report: "This Court had to consider quite recently the question as to how far delegated legislation is permissible and a reference to its final conclusion will show that the delegation of the character which these sections involve cannot on any view be held to be invalid (See Special Reference No.1 of 1951, AIR 1951 SC 332 ). A legislature while legislating cannot foresee and provide for all future contingencies, and section 52 does no more than enable the duly authorized officer to meet contingencies and deal with various situations as they arise". A legislature while legislating cannot foresee and provide for all future contingencies, and section 52 does no more than enable the duly authorized officer to meet contingencies and deal with various situations as they arise". xx xxx xx The same position was reiterated in the decision reported in AIR 1954 SC 465 , wherein Mahajan C.J. stated that the legislature cannot delegate its formulation as a rule of conduct and it must formulation as a rule of conduct and it must declare the policy of the law and the legal principles which are, to control any given cases and must provide a standard to guide the officials or the body in power to execute the law. 19. In another decision of the Supreme Court Rajnarain Singh v. Chairman, Patna Administration Committee, reported in AIR 1954 SC 569 Bose J. observed: "An executive authority can be authorised to modify either existing or future laws but not in any essential feature. Exactly what constitutes an essential feature cannot be enunciated in general terms. But this much is clear that it cannot include a change of policy". 20. In Bhatnagars and Co., Ltd., Delhi v. The Union of India, reported in (S) AIR 1957 SC 478 , Gajendragadkar J. observed: "Where the legislature provides and lays down principles underlying the provisions of a particular statute and also affords guidance for the implementation or enforcement of the said principles, it is open to the legislature to leave the actual implementation or enforcement to its chosen delegate. The time when the provision should be implemented, the period during which it should be implemented, or the place where it should be applied can in appropriate cases be validly left by the legislature to its delegate. If the Court can find that a reasonably clear statement of policy under-lying the provisions of the Act either in the provisions of the Act or in the preamble, then any part of the Act cannot be attacked on the ground of delegated legislation by suggesting that questions of policy have been left to the delegate". 21. If the Court can find that a reasonably clear statement of policy under-lying the provisions of the Act either in the provisions of the Act or in the preamble, then any part of the Act cannot be attacked on the ground of delegated legislation by suggesting that questions of policy have been left to the delegate". 21. We are concerned in our present case with the question whether in allowing the Municipal Boards to decide the percentage of the annual value of the holdings in levying the tax under S.68(1)(a) and S.80 of the Assam Municipal Act, 1956, the legislature has abdicated its legislative power in favour of the subordinate authority and whether the legislature did not lay down the legislative policy regarding the tax. Having considered the whole question with reference to all the pronouncements of the Supreme Court most anxiously, I am of the opinion that the policy has been laid down by the legislature in the enactment and that what has been left to the Municipal Boards was only to work out that policy and that the fixation of the percentage of the tax was only a matter of detail. It is impossible for the legislature to fix a percentage for all the Municipal Boards as the requirement of each Municipal Board is bound to vary. A degree of flexibility is therefore necessary so as to permit adaptation to different conditions without the necessity of having to amend the law again and again as observed by Fazl Ali J. in AIR 1951 SC 332 . It would enable the delegated authority to consult the interests likely to be affected by a particular law, make experiments when necessary and utilise the result of the experiments in the best way possible. Thus, necessarily the laying down of the policy in such case has to be done in a broad manner leaving to the subordinate authority, the rest of the legislative work and to work out the details within the framework of the policy as pointed out by Mukherjea J. in the same decision. 22. In our present case the legislature has laid down the policy in S.68 as to what are the taxes, like the holdings tax, water tax, drainage tax, electricity tax etc. to be levied by the Municipal Boards. 22. In our present case the legislature has laid down the policy in S.68 as to what are the taxes, like the holdings tax, water tax, drainage tax, electricity tax etc. to be levied by the Municipal Boards. The various sections which follow upto S.99 lay down the manner of implementation and enforcement of the various taxes. We are however concerned only with the tax on holdings under S.68(1)(a). The tax is restricted to be assessed on their annual value. Section 80 allows the Municipal Boards to fix the percentage of tax on the annual value of the holdings. The question involved is whether in leaving the fixation of this percentage and in not fixing any maximum percentage beyond which the tax should not go the legislature was guilty of abdicating its legislative power. In other words, the question is whether the rate of taxation is such a matter of essential legislative policy which cannot be delegated to the delegate. 23. It is not denied that there are any number of enactments which have left the actual rate of tax to be decided by the subordinate authority. It is unnecessary to give many instances. The Bengal Excise Act is one such Act. The Matches (Excise Duty) Act, 1934, and the Sugar (Excise Duty) Act, 1934 are two other instances. I may here refer to the decision of the Bombay High Court reported in AIR 1955 Bom 185 . That case dealt with Ss.141 and 169 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act, 1888 under which the discretion was given to the Commissioner of the Corporation to charge for the water supply to premises by measurement at such rate as shall from time to time be prescribed by the Standing Committee in that behalf. It was urged in that case that the legislature was not competent to give the power of unlimited taxation to the Standing Committee and to the Commissioner and that it constituted a delegation of legislative function by the legislature to the Standing Committee or the Commissioner. It was held in that decision that the legislature was competent for the purpose of Local Self Government to confer that power upon the local authority instead of levying the tax itself. It was held in that decision that the legislature was competent for the purpose of Local Self Government to confer that power upon the local authority instead of levying the tax itself. It was also held that if the legislature was so competent to confer the power to tax, its competency cannot be affected, because the power that has been conferred was an unlimited power and that the fact that no limitation was imposed may lead to (the legislation being challenged on some other ground, but that it cannot be challenged on the ground of competence. This decision thus lays down that the legislature will not be abdicating its legislative power in allowing the rate of tax to be decided by the subordinate authority. 24. In the decision Banarsi Das Bhanot v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 1958 SC 909 , Venkatarama Aiyar J. observed that the authorities were clear that it was not unconstitutional for the legislature to leave it to the executive to determine details relating to the working of taxation laws, such as the selection of persons on whom the tax is to be laid, the rate at which it is to be charged in respect of different classes of goods and the like. Thus, the said decision is authority for the position that the rate at which a tax is to be charged does not involve a change of policy nor any essential features of the policy and that it is only a power to determine the details relating to the working out of the policy. 25. The decisions considered above except the Bombay decision, AIR 1955 Bom 185 did not deal with the delegation of power to Municipal Boards for the purpose of local Government. The Bombay decision dealt with a case where the power to fix the rate of tax was given to the Standing Committee or the Commissioner. But in our present case the power to fix the rate has been given to the Municipal Boards as such. 26. The Bombay decision dealt with a case where the power to fix the rate of tax was given to the Standing Committee or the Commissioner. But in our present case the power to fix the rate has been given to the Municipal Boards as such. 26. In a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in AIR 1959 Cal 36 which dealt with S.229 of the Calcutta Municipal Act of 1951, wherein a licence fee on advertisements displayed to public view was allowed to be levied by the Corporation with the approval of the Government at such rate as the Corporation may prescribe by rules, D.N. Sinha J. held that though it was called a license fee, it amounted to a tax and that the delegation of the power to fix the rate was not within permissible limits of subordinate legislation and that it involved a matter of policy. But in that case it was not merely the rate of tax that was involved, but the manner in which the tax should be levied and the persons or classes of persons upon whom it should be imposed. The said decision was taken in appeal and the decision in appeal is reported in AIR 1959 Cal 704 . Of the two Judges who constituted the appellate Bench, Das Gupta C.J. agreed with D.N. Sinha J. and held that the most important question of policy which the legislature has to determine in a taxing statute was the question of the rate of tax and that to leave the determination of his matter to any other authority without indicating clearly the principles for determination cannot be considered as permissible delegation. But Bachawat J. the other Judge, disagreed with Das Gupta C.J. and held that such delegation of power to a Municipal Corporation was constitutionally permissible. I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed by Bachawat J. in the said decision for the reasons already given by me and for the further reasons which I am giving below. 27. In India we are governed by the written Constitution unlike the British Parliament with its unwritten Constitution. We have therefore to-be guided by the provisions of the Constitution in this matter. Article 265 of the Constitution provides that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. 27. In India we are governed by the written Constitution unlike the British Parliament with its unwritten Constitution. We have therefore to-be guided by the provisions of the Constitution in this matter. Article 265 of the Constitution provides that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. The authority of law referred to therein means in the context an Act of the legislature. Article 245 provides that it is the parliament which has to make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India and the legislature of a State for the whole or any part of the State. The Assam Municipal Act 1956 is a. law, which has-been enacted under the power given under Art.245 Article 246(3) gives the power to the legislature-of a State to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II of the seventh Schedule known as the State List. Item 5 of the State List is "Local Government, that is to say, the constitution and powers of municipal corporations and other local authorities for the purpose of Local Self-Government". Thus, section 246(3) read with item 5 of the State List authorised the legislature to enact laws giving power to local authorities for the purpose of local self-government. Item 5 is very comprehensive in its terms and allows the legislature to confer powers provided that the power is for the purpose of local self-government. Thus, where it is sought by an Act to give the power to levy a tax to a local authority like the Municipal Boards, the wide power in item 5 of the State List would authorise the legislature to allow the local authority to fix the rate of tax where the policy of taxation is laid down in the Act itself. 28. In our case, the legislature has laid down that the tax is of holdings and it is to be assessed on the annual value. The manner of calculating the annual value has also been laid down. Only the percentage is left to the Municipal boards to be decided in accordance with their needs. 29. 28. In our case, the legislature has laid down that the tax is of holdings and it is to be assessed on the annual value. The manner of calculating the annual value has also been laid down. Only the percentage is left to the Municipal boards to be decided in accordance with their needs. 29. Now when we turn to Article 110 of the Constitution which relates to Parliament and read it along with Art.199 which relates to the State Legislature, we find it mentioned in clause (2) of both the Articles that a Bill shall not be deemed to be a Money Bill by reason only that it provides for the imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or regulation of any tax by any local authority or body for local purposes. Article 199(2) has to be read along with item 5 of the State List and if so lead it will mean, that a Bill can provide for the imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or regulation of any tax by any local authority for local purposes. This provision and particularly the words "imposition" and "alteration" will certainly include the power for a local authority to fix the rate of tax when once the power to levy the tax is given in the Act. It will show that in allowing the fixing of the rate of tax by the local authority the legislature is not abdicating its functions, as the Constitution itself recognises that the power of imposition and alteration of tax can be given to a local authority. We have to remember that the Municipal boards are constituted for the purpose of local self-government and are elected bodies to whom the direction to fix the rate of tax can be safely given without fear of abuse, as in the case of executive functionaries or officials. The boards in their limited sphere will be answerable to their electorate as the Legislature is. That is why the Constitution has permitted the delegation of the power of taxation to local authorities. 30. In the same connection, I may also refer to Article 277 of the Constitution. It refers to taxes being lawfully levied by a local authority for the purposes of the local area prior to the Constitution and provides that they may continue to be levied and applied to the same purpose until provision to the contrary is made. 30. In the same connection, I may also refer to Article 277 of the Constitution. It refers to taxes being lawfully levied by a local authority for the purposes of the local area prior to the Constitution and provides that they may continue to be levied and applied to the same purpose until provision to the contrary is made. Though, the Article deals with cases of taxes which were levied prior to the Constitution, which happened to be taxes mentioned in the Union Lists in the Constitution, we are concerned with the wording of the Article which refers to the taxes being levied by local authority for the local area which clearly shows that local authority can be clothed with the power to levy the tax which includes the power to fix the rate of tax or to alter the tax as mentioned in Art.199 in the words "imposition or alteration" of tax. 31. It is clear therefore that the Constitution would not make it an unauthorised delegation of power on the part of a legislature to allow the rate of tax to be fixed by a local authority when once it has laid down in the enactment the policy and the manner of implementation and enforcement of that policy. Section 68(1)(a) and S.80 of the Assam Municipal Act are therefore intra vires the Constitution. 32. This finding will not however dispose of this writ. I took up this question first, because if S.68(1)(a) and S.80 are ultra vires the Constitution the petitioner has to succeed in any case even if the respondent has acted within the four corners of the Assam Municipal Act in levying the tax. As I have held the section to be intra vires, the question will now arise whether the respondent in passing the resolutions Annexures - A and D have observed the provisions of sections 68(1)(a) and S.80. As it is a law relating to taxation, it is necessary that the subordinate authority to whom the power to fix the rate and to implement and enforce the tax has been given should strictly abide by the provisions of the law. 33. As it is a law relating to taxation, it is necessary that the subordinate authority to whom the power to fix the rate and to implement and enforce the tax has been given should strictly abide by the provisions of the law. 33. I shall first take up the resolution Annexure-A. Before I proceed, however, to deal with Annexure-A, it is necessary to mention that the Imphal Municipal Board has not imposed any tax on holdings under S.59(a) and S.72 of the old Assam Municipal Act 1923, after the constitution of the said Board under the said Act in 1956. Thus no holding within the Municipal limits paid any tax on the percentage of annual value. It was on 17-3-1960 that certain new areas of 5 and odd square miles were included within the Municipal limits. The resolution Annexure-A was thus being passed with the intention of imposing for the first time a tax on holdings within the Municipal limits. 34. Under S.68, a meeting has to be convened expressly for the purpose of imposing the tax. Annexure-4 which was the Agenda for the meeting held on 5-8-1960 shows that one of the subjects, namely, subject No.3 was "to consider the mode of assessment and census of the newly extended Municipal area". It was, under that subject that the resolution Annexure-A was passed. This is not in accordance with the provision of S.68. Under S.68 the meeting has to be convened expressly to decide whether the particular tax should be imposed or not. There is nothing in subject No.3 to show that it was to decide the question, of imposition of the tax on holdings. The mode of assessment of the newly extended Municipal area is a subject quite different from the imposition of tax on, holdings. It will mean the manner of assessment and it does not say what particular tax or fee or tolls were to be imposed. Further along with that subject, the question of census of the extended Municipal area was also tacked on which had nothing to do with the imposition of tax on holdings. Thirdly, the subject related only to the newly extended area. There is nothing in S.68 which would permit the Municipality to impose a tax on certain areas alone leaving other areas to be free of such tax. Thirdly, the subject related only to the newly extended area. There is nothing in S.68 which would permit the Municipality to impose a tax on certain areas alone leaving other areas to be free of such tax. I have already said that in the original Municipal Area there was no such tax on holdings. If the legislature wanted to permit the Municipal Boards to impose such tax in certain areas alone and to exempt other areas, that power must be specifically given and the power of exemption has also to be. specifically given. Otherwise a Municipal Board cannot impose such taxes only in certain specified areas. Thus, the subject which was considered at the meeting on 5-8-1960 was not in accordance with S.68. 35. When we come to the resolution Annexure-A, we find that it is also not in accordance with the power given to the Municipality under S.68. It is stated in the resolution that the purpose of imposing the tax in the newly extended area was to give privilege to the people living inside that area for being voters in the ensuing Municipal Election. Taxation is not intended for the purpose of giving franchise to People. The purpose of taxation is to meet the commitments of the Municipal Board. No holding within a Municipality can be subjected to a tax for the sole purpose of giving the owner of the holding a right to vote in the Municipal Election. Thus the very purpose of the taxation is not ill accordance with the Act. 36. Under S.68(1)(a), the Board has first of all to decide whether they would impose a tax on holdings assessed on their annual value. After that Ss.76 to 79 provide for the determination of the annual value of the holdings. An Assessor who has to be appointed as provided in S.86 has to prepare the valuation list. Details as to how the valuation is to be arrived at are given in the said sections. Then follows S.80 which is to the effect that the Board at a meeting to be held before the close of the year preceding the year in which the tax will apply shall determine the percentage on the valuation of the holdings at which any tax on the annual value of the holdings shall be levied. Then follows S.80 which is to the effect that the Board at a meeting to be held before the close of the year preceding the year in which the tax will apply shall determine the percentage on the valuation of the holdings at which any tax on the annual value of the holdings shall be levied. S.3(11) of the Act shows that the financial year for the Board would commence on the first day of April unless the Chief Commissioner, by notification, appoints any other day. It was stated at the bar that no other day has been fixed by the Chief Commissioner. Thus, the meeting under S.80 must be held before the first of April if the tax is to apply in the succeeding financial year. 37. When we take the resolution Annexure A, was find that the Board has acted against section 68(1)(a) and also against S.80. The Board has in that resolution fixed on 5-8-1960 a flat rate of Rs.10/- per year per holding to be levied from the people of the newly extended Municipal area with effect from October, 1960. The Board had at first to decide under S.68(1)(a) at a meeting whether they would impose a tax at all on holdings before they hold another meeting to fix the rate of tax under S.80. Such a meeting has not been held. In our present case, there was only one meeting and at that meeting the Board decided not only to impose the tax on holdings but decided further that it shall be at a flat rate of Rs.10/- and that it shall apply only to the newly extended area and further that it shall take effect from the 1st October 1960. Thus, in not holding two separate meetings, in imposing a flat rate instead of a percentage of the annual value and in making the tax applicable from the middle of a financial year, the resolution was dead against the provisions of S.68 and S.80. 38. Thus, in not holding two separate meetings, in imposing a flat rate instead of a percentage of the annual value and in making the tax applicable from the middle of a financial year, the resolution was dead against the provisions of S.68 and S.80. 38. The Board itself appears to have realised that the resolution was not in accordance with Ss.68 and 80 as seen from what happened subsequently by their holding a second meeting on 20-12-1960 and modifying the resolution Annexure-A by another resolution Annexure-D. What one would have expected the Board to do when they found that the resolution Annexure-A was not in accordance with the statutory provisions was to cancel the said resolution and proceed to act in accordance with the statutory provisions. But that was not what the respondent did in the present case. 39. The Agenda for the meeting held on 20-12-1960, namely, Annexures-VII and VIII showed that subject No.5 was "to consider the matter for taxation of Singjamei Bazar and others". What one would expect the respondent to do was to put as the subject for the meeting the question of cancellation of the earlier resolution Annexure-A and the passing of a fresh resolution in accordance with the provisions of S.68(1)(a). How even the modification of Annexure-A could be considered under the subject "to consider the matter for taxation of shopsites in Singjamei Bazar" I am unable to understand. However this Municipal Board did so and passed the resolution Annexure-D under the said subject. 40. Annexure-D reads that in partial modification of resolution 3 date 5-8-1960 and in exercise of the powers conferred by S.80, the Board resolved to impose the tax at the rate of one percent on the annual value of the holdings. Such a resolution can never be passed under S.80, unless a prior resolution deciding to impose the tax had been passed under S.68(1)(a) at a meeting specially convened for the purpose. I have already shown that no such resolution was passed under S.68(1)(a). Annexure-A cannot be treated as such a resolution for reasons already pointed out. It is clear that a resolution like Annexure-D fixing the rate of tax cannot be passed tinder S.80 in partial modification of the totally invalid resolution Annexure-A. 41. Further, there was no such subject as modification of Annexure-A in the agenda for the meeting. Annexure-A cannot be treated as such a resolution for reasons already pointed out. It is clear that a resolution like Annexure-D fixing the rate of tax cannot be passed tinder S.80 in partial modification of the totally invalid resolution Annexure-A. 41. Further, there was no such subject as modification of Annexure-A in the agenda for the meeting. Annexure-D was passed in consideration of a subject "Taxation of Singjamei Bazar and others" which had nothing to do with the modification of Annexure-A. Singjamei Bazar was only a small part of the newly extended area. Thus whatever way we look at the matter. Annexure-D is a thoroughly invalid resolution opposed to S.68(1)(a), S.80 and even the rules of business for Municipal meetings. 42. The matter does not end there. The resolution Annexure-D would read as if it would extend not only to Singjamei Bazar and not only to the newly extended area, but to the entire town of Imphal. The General Notice - Annexure-F published by the Assessor in pursuance of the resolution would however show that it was intended to apply to the newly extended area and not to Singjamei Bazar alone and not to the whole Municipal area. The petitioner before me is a resident of Nongmeibung which is not within the Singjamei Bazar, but in the newly extended area and the notice Annexure-G, has been issued to him calling upon him to give returns of his holdings and the annual value realised from the same. But since Annexure-D is only a modification of Annexure-A, that portion of the resolution Annexure-A that the tax will be levied from the persons in the newly extended area with effect from October, 1960 will stand. This is certainly not in accordance with S.80. According to S.80, any tax levied under S.80 can apply only from the next succeeding financial year, which would begin only from the first April, 1961. In that respect also resolution Annexure-D read with resolution Annexure-A offend the provisions of S.80 of the Act. 43. To sum up, the resolution Annexure-D fixing the percentage of the annual value to be levied as the tax under S.80, was passed by the Municipal Board, before it had convened a meeting as contemplated under S.38 of the Act, and decided that they would impose a tax on holdings. 43. To sum up, the resolution Annexure-D fixing the percentage of the annual value to be levied as the tax under S.80, was passed by the Municipal Board, before it had convened a meeting as contemplated under S.38 of the Act, and decided that they would impose a tax on holdings. Without holding such a meeting and deciding to impose the tax they cannot at one and the same meeting decide to impose the tax as well as fix the percentage of the tax. Secondly there is nothing in S.68 and S.80 which would permit the Board to impose the tax in specified areas within the Municipality, while exempting other areas from the tax. Thirdly, the tax is to be levied from October, 1960 as that part of the resolution Annexure-A had not been modified by Annexure-D, and hence this offends the specific provision in S.80. 44. Thus it is clear beyond any doubt that the resolutions Annexure-A and Annexure-D have not been passed in compliance of statutory provisions and hence they cannot be allowed to stand as they would seriously affect the legal rights of the petitioner and other residents in the Municipal areas by saddling them with the liability for taxation imposed on them in contravention of statutory provisions. 45. It was however contended for the respondent that there has been substantial compliance of the provisions of the Act and hence this Court should not interfere. It was pointed cut that the resolution Annexure-A, though modified by the subsequent resolution Annexure-D may be treated as the resolution contemplated under S.68 deciding to impose the tax on holdings and that the second resolution Annexure-D may be treated as the one passed under S.80 of the Act and that if the two resolutions are taken together there has been substantial compliance of the provisions. I am however unable to agree with this contention. I have already pointed out earlier that there has been no substantial compliance at all and that Annexures-A and D can never be considered as resolutions passed under S.68 and S.80 respectively. 46. Even if there has been substantial compliance, it is well-settled that in cases of delegated power of taxation, it is not enough if there is substantial compliance. Such a taxing statute must be strictly followed. 46. Even if there has been substantial compliance, it is well-settled that in cases of delegated power of taxation, it is not enough if there is substantial compliance. Such a taxing statute must be strictly followed. Where a statute requires that a power must be exercised in a certain form, the neglect of that form renders the exercise of the powers ultra vires. Again, when the statute prescribes a particular procedure for the exercise of the power, the exercise of the power becomes ultra vires if that procedure is not followed. Further, if the statute prescribes that the power may be exercised only, if certain prescribed conditions have been fulfilled, e.g. On giving notices, the non-fulfilment of the conditions makes the exercise of the power ultra vires : vide Basus Commentary on the Constitution of India 3rd Edition, page 109. 47. The decision Ramphal Singh v. Govt. of the State of Bihar, reported in AIR 1954 Pat 235 holds that when a statute directs that a power is to be exercised in a certain manner, that power should be exercised in that particular manner and in no other manner and if it is exercised in any other manner a writ of mandamus would issue directing the authority to act in accordance with law. That was a case where S.9 of the Bengal Ferries Act authorised the Magistrate of the District to lease the ferry by public auction, but allowed him the discretion to accept or not accept the highest bid, for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing. The Magistrate held the public auction and did not accept the highest bid, but gave the lease by a private settlement. It waste that connection that their Lordships of the Patna High Court issued a writ of mandamus setting aside the order of the Magistrate giving the lease and directing him to follow the provisions of S.9 of the Bengal Ferries Act. When it is a case of statute giving power of taxation, the provisions of the statute must be scrupulously followed. 48. There is no doubt therefore that these two resolutions Annexures-A and D have not been passed by the Municipal Board in accordance with the procedure prescribed by statute and that the power exercised by the Board has not been in the form provided by the statute and that the conditions prescribed in the statute have not been fulfilled. 48. There is no doubt therefore that these two resolutions Annexures-A and D have not been passed by the Municipal Board in accordance with the procedure prescribed by statute and that the power exercised by the Board has not been in the form provided by the statute and that the conditions prescribed in the statute have not been fulfilled. Such irregular exercise of the power by the Board has certainly affected of the rights of the petitioner and other residents of the Municipality who have got holdings in the newly extended area. A writ of mandamus has, therefore, got to issue cancelling the resolutions and directing the respondent to proceed in accordance with the law. The petition is, therefore allowed and a writ will issue setting aside the two resolutions and directing the respondent to follow the provisions of the statute in the matter of taxation of holdings. The respondent will pay the costs of the petitioner. Advocates fee Rs.100/-. Petition allowed.