J. M. SHELAT, J. ( 1 ) * * * * ( 2 ) MR. Thakkar however contended that even though his case would not fall under the principles of natural justice the provisions of section 59 (The Bombay Police Act) themselves indicate that where a person in the position of the petitioner appears before the District Magistrate or the officer authorised by the District Magistrate he has a right of tendering oral arguments through his advocate before an order can be passed under section 56. Under section 56 the District Magistrate is authorised to pass the order if he is satisfied; (a) that the movements or acts of any person are causing or calculated to cause alarm danger or harm to person or property or (b) that there are reasonable grounds for believing either that such person is engaged or is about to be engaged in the commission of an offence set out therein or in the abetment of any such offence and that he is of the opinion that witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence in public by reason of apprehension on their part as regards the safety of their person or property. The power conferred upon the Magistrate under section 56 though conferred in abundant amplitude and affecting as it does the fundamental rights of a citizen has to be exercised in strict conformity with the provisions of section 59. The question therefore is whether under section 59 there is a right of an oral hearing in the sense of a right of tendering arguments before the officer passes this order in question as contended by Mr. Thakkar. ( 3 ) UNDER section 59 the power to pass an order under sections 55 56 and 57 is conferred upon a District Magistrate or an officer above the rank of an Inspector authorised by the Magistrate. The person against whom action is sought to be taken has a right to have information in writing as to the general nature of the material allegations made against him. He has also the right to have reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation. Since there is nothing in the section to show that such explanation need be in writing it can both be oral as well as in writing. That indicates that he has a right to appear personally for the purpose of tendering his explanation. He has also the right to have reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation. Since there is nothing in the section to show that such explanation need be in writing it can both be oral as well as in writing. That indicates that he has a right to appear personally for the purpose of tendering his explanation. If such a person were to apply for the examination of any witness produced by him such application has to be granted unless it is made either vexatiously or to cause delay. If such person desires to tender a written statement such written statement has to be filed with the record of the case. Finally section 59 confers a right upon such a person either to appear personally or by an advocate or an attorney for the purpose of tendering his explanation and examining the witnesses produced by him. It is thus clear that section 59 expressly grants the right to such a person to have the opportunity to tender explanation and for that purpose either to appear in person or through a representative either a lawyer or otherwise. Mr. Thakkar incidentally argued that the fact that the word `attorney has been used in juxtaposition with the word `advocate in sub-section (1) of section 59 would suggest that the word `attorney would mean an attorney-at-law. In our view that construction is not justified. The word attorney has been used in its ordinary dictionary meaning and would include any representative of the person against whom action is sought to be taken whether he is a solicitor or not. But the right to appear either in person or through an advocate or a representative as provided for in this sub-section is for the purpose of tendering explanation and examining witnesses which must presumably include the right of cross-examination of witnesses produced by the police. It must be remembered that a District Magistrate or a Commissioner in Greater Bombay who are the authorities entitled to pass the order under section 56 do not constitute judicial courts in the sense in which ordinary courts are and are not governed either by the rules of evidence or the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure or the Code of Criminal Procedure. There is no provision either in section 56 or section 59 which lays down any procedure under which a right to tender arguments after the evidence is recorded has been conferred upon the person against whom action is sought to be taken. Therefore so long as an adequate opportunity is afforded to such a person to tender his explanation and to adduce evidence in respect of the matters alleged against him such a person can have no grievance that there was either a breach of the principles of natural justice or that the provisions of sec. 59 were infringed unless the statute expressly provides the right or opportunity of argument. It was contended by Mr. Thakkar that inasmuch as under sub-section (1) of section 59 such a person is entitled to appear by an advocate or an attorney it would necessarily mean that a right of argument has been impliedly conferred upon such a person by this sub-section. We do not see any justification in that contention especially as the sub-section clearly says that such a person shall be entitled to appear by an advocate or attorney for the purpose of tendering his explanation and examining the witnesses produced by him. In accordance with the provisions of this sub-section the explanation tendered by the petitioner was received and was filed with the record of the case. Witnesses were examined by the petitioners advocate and their evidence formed part of the record of the case. The petitioner was also informed in writing of the general nature of the material allegations against him. The petitioner knew the allegations which he had to reply or explain. It was after all these steps had been taken by the officer authorised by the District Magistrate that a report was made and the explanation tendered by or on behalf of the petitioner the evidence recorded by that officer and the other data were placed before the District Magistrate and the District Magistrate after considering all these matters passed the order in question. In our view no objection can legitimately be taken against the procedure adopted both by the officer and the District Magistrate and it cannot be urged that the petitioner had no adequate opportunity of explanation merely because the District Magistrate did not give a hearing either to him or to his advocate. ( 4 ) MR. In our view no objection can legitimately be taken against the procedure adopted both by the officer and the District Magistrate and it cannot be urged that the petitioner had no adequate opportunity of explanation merely because the District Magistrate did not give a hearing either to him or to his advocate. ( 4 ) MR. Thakkar relied upon sub-section (2) of section 59 but that subsection merely provides for a case where the authority or officer considers the presence of the person against whom action is sought to be taken necessary. It was argued that the fact that the power to pass an ex parte order under sub-section (2) has been conferred upon the authority or officer shows that no such ex parte order can be passed under sub-section (1) even if such a person were to omit to appear either in person or through a representative. It was submitted that this shows that where such a person appears either in person or through an advocate he has a right of argument conferred impliedly upon him by section 59. It is not possible to see any nexus between the right to appear and the power to pass an ex parte order where a person against whom action is sought to be taken fails to appear. Sub-section (1) confers the right to tender explanation and adduce evidence. If such a person were to fail either to tender explanation or to lead evidence inspite of an opportunity having been furnished to him there can be no doubt that the authority will have the right to pass an ex parte order. There is nothing in sub-section (1) of section 59 to warrant a conclusion that such an authority has not the right to proceed with the inquiry and pass an order on the data placed before him. Equally there is nothing in that sub-section to warrant a conclusion that by remaining absent in such an inquiry a person can render the authority or the officer helpless and prevent him from proceeding with the inquiry and passing an order under section 56. ( 5 ) SECTION 60 of the Act enables a person aggrieved by an order made under section 56 to file an appeal to the State Government within the time prescribed therein. ( 5 ) SECTION 60 of the Act enables a person aggrieved by an order made under section 56 to file an appeal to the State Government within the time prescribed therein. Sub-section (2) provides that such a person has to file a memorandum setting forth the grounds of objection to the order appealed against. These provisions indicate that so far as an appeal is concerned the right of being heard has been conferred upon the person aggrieved by the order. Sub-section (3) expressly provides that the State Government must give a reasonable opportunity to such an appellant to be heard either personally or by a pleader an advocate or an attorney. The right of being heard in appeal would naturally take the form of an argument presumbly on the explanation already given by him and the evidence led by-him as also the other data upon which the order is passed. That is because all the necessary data would be before the appellate authority. But from that it does not follow that there is a right of argument before the lower authority or that because an opportunity of argument was not given there was either an infringement of the principles of natural justice or the provisions of section 59. Therefore there is no substance in the contention of Mr. Thakkar that the impugned order was bad or illegal on account of any infringement of the principles of natural justice or the provisions of section 59. ( 6 ) THE learned advocate for the petitioner then argued that the order passed by the appellate authority was bad as it did not contain any reasons. It must however be observed that the proceedings contemplated under sections 56 59 and section 60 are proceedings before administrative tribunals who are not expected to deliver judgments in the sense in which courts of law deliver judgments. Though it would be desirable that reasons should at least be briefly given in such orders there is nothing in the provisions of this Act which would invalidate an order which does not contain reasons. So long as it is clear from the order that the authority in question applied its mind to the materials before it and so long as it is clear that the provisions of section 59 and 60 are followed there would be no justification to interfere with such orders. So long as it is clear from the order that the authority in question applied its mind to the materials before it and so long as it is clear that the provisions of section 59 and 60 are followed there would be no justification to interfere with such orders. There is no dispute that the petitioner was heard by the appellate authority and that all the materials which were before the District Magistrate and the Assistant Superintendent of Police were placed before the appellate authority. The appellate authority must be presumed to have applied its mind to all the matters which formed part of the record of the case including the explanation tendered by the petitioner and the evidence led by him. There is nothing in section 60 which would justify a conclusion that the order passed by the appellate authority would be rendered invalid if it does not contain reasons in the manner in which a judgment of a court of law contains reasons. There is thus no substance in this contention of Mr. Thakkar. ( 7 ) THERE is however considerable force in Mr. Thakkars contention that that part of the order passed by the District Magistrate which directs the petitioners externment from districts contiguous to the district of Rajkot is bad inasmuch as neither the District Magistrate nor the appellate authority seems to have applied his mind on the question whether it was necessary to remove the petitioner from areas other than the district of Rajkot. As we have pointed out under section 56 the District Magistrate has the power to remove or extern the petitioner not only from the district within which the Magistrate has jurisdiction but also from districts continuous to his own district. The object of externment as provided for under section 56 is to remove the externee from his own district where he has been carrying on his criminal activities so as to uproot him from his own surroundings and to sever him from his associates thereby reducing the degree and the extent of his activities. The object of externment as provided for under section 56 is to remove the externee from his own district where he has been carrying on his criminal activities so as to uproot him from his own surroundings and to sever him from his associates thereby reducing the degree and the extent of his activities. But if the Magistrate has reasonable grounds to believe from the data before him that the removal of an externee from his own district would not be sufficient and would not prevent the externee from continuing his criminal activities or from being a menace to the members of the public or to public safety then he has the power to extern him from contiguous districts as well. It is however clear from the provisions of section 56 itself that such a belief though it might be a subjective one must be arrived at from materials and data before the authority viz. whether without removing such a person from contiguous districts as well the danger envisaged by section 56 cannot be averted. Therefore there must be some indication either by way of reasons or otherwise in the order itself that the authority had reasonable ground to believe that it was necessary to remove such a person from a wider area than his own district. It was contended by Mr. Thakkar that no reasons are given in the order nor is there any indication in the order that there were reasonable grounds for the Magistrate to believe that it was necessary to remove the petitioner not only from the district of Rajkot but also from the entire Saurashtra except Kutch. Under section 56 it must appear to the authority from matters before him either that the movements or acts of such a person are causing or calculated to cause alarm danger or harm to person or property or that there are reasonable grounds for believing that such a person is either engaged or is about to be engaged in the commission of an offence set out therein or in the abetment of such offence or that he is of the opinion that witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence in public against such person by reason of apprehension on their part as regards the safety of their person or property. If one turns to the order of the District Magistrate it is clear that not only no reasons are given in the order but there is also no indication in the order as to how and why he came to the conclusion that it was necessary to extern the petitioner from districts contiguous to the district of Rajkot and indeed from the entire Saurashtra except Kutch. Para 1 of the order recites the fact that a notice was given to the petitioner and that the Assistant Superintendent of Police was authorised by him to make a report to him. Para 2 of the order sets out the contents of the notice served upon the petitioner. Para 3 of the order sets out the defence of the petitioner. Thereafter the only thing stated by the District Magistrate is that he was satisfied that the petitioners movements and acts caused or were calculated to cause alarm danger and harm to person and property and that he was of the opinion on the basis of the material before him that witnesses were not willing to come forward to give evidence against him for fear of safety of their person and property. These observations if they were to be treated as reasons for the order could as well be reasons for an order of externment from the district of Rajkot alone but as we have observed there is no indication in the order at all as to why the District Magistrate considered it necessary to direct that the petitioner should be removed also from districts contigu ous to the district of Rajkot. Tile learned Assistant Government Pleader pointed out that though no such indication was furnished in the order itself the District Magistrate has stated in para 5 of his affidavit in reply that the petitioner after the first order of externment against him and while he was at Porbandar during that period was convicted of an offence under section 332 read with section 34 of the Penal Code. It is also stated that the District Magistrate considered the fact of his having committed that offence and his conviction therefore as a ground for extending the area of externment. In our view a ground given in an affidavit in reply cannot be accepted as a reason or an indication for the order passed by the District Magistrate. It is also stated that the District Magistrate considered the fact of his having committed that offence and his conviction therefore as a ground for extending the area of externment. In our view a ground given in an affidavit in reply cannot be accepted as a reason or an indication for the order passed by the District Magistrate. What is necessary under sections 56 and 59 is the application of mind by the authority at the time when the impugned order is made and not at some subsequent time. But even assuming that we are entitled to look at the reason given by the District Magistrate in his affidavit in reply the fact that the petitioner committed an offence and it must be conceded an isolated offence during the period of his first externment at Porbandar cannot afford a ground for a belief that the movements or the acts of the petitioner were causing or calculated to cause alarm danger or harm to person or property or that there were reasonable grounds for believing that either he was engaged or was about to be engaged in the commission of an offence or in the abetment of such offence or that in his opinion witnesses were not willing to come forward to give evidence. The criterion for passing such an order is provided for in section 56 and there must be some indication about its existence in the order itself. In other words there must be some indication in the order itself of the existence of circumstances which would lead to the satisfaction of the authority that it was necessary not only to extern the petitioner from the district of Rajkot but also from the districts contiguous to Rajkot district. Such circumstances must be qua every area or region from which the petitioner is directed to be externed and there must be some material or indication of such material in the impugned order. This becomes necessary especially as the notice served upon the petitioner mostly narrates instances alleged to have taken place within the limits of Rajkot. That would show that the area where the petitioner was said to have indulged in criminal and other undesirable activities was limited at most to the district of Rajkot. This becomes necessary especially as the notice served upon the petitioner mostly narrates instances alleged to have taken place within the limits of Rajkot. That would show that the area where the petitioner was said to have indulged in criminal and other undesirable activities was limited at most to the district of Rajkot. That being the position there had to be some material before the authority that mere externment of the petitioner from the district of Rajkot would not be adequate in order to achieve the purpose for which such orders of externment are made justifiable under section 56 of the Act. ( 8 ) THE mere fact that the petitioner was convicted of an offence committed by him in Porbandar during the period of his first externment is not enough to justify an order under section 56. There must also be reasons to believe that he was likely to engage in criminal activities or that his acts were causing or calculated to cause alarm danger or harm to person or property and that in the opinion of the authority witnesses were not willing to come forward to give evidence against him for fear of safety of their person or property. In our view there is considerable justification in the contention that so for as the impugned order pertaining to districts contiguous to the district of Rajkot is concerned the authority did not apply its mind to that part of the order and therefore that part of the order at any rate is bad in law and contrary to the provisions of section 56 of the Act. Mr. Thakkar argued that the order passed by the District Magistrate was one integral order and that it was not possible to treat it as severable. It is is not possible to agree with that contention. Under sec. 56 three things have to be ascertained by the District Magistrate: (1) Whether there is data to justify the application of section 56 (2) Whether on such data an order of externment can be made and if so whether from the entire district or a part of it and (3) Whether the area of externment should include contiguous districts. 56 three things have to be ascertained by the District Magistrate: (1) Whether there is data to justify the application of section 56 (2) Whether on such data an order of externment can be made and if so whether from the entire district or a part of it and (3) Whether the area of externment should include contiguous districts. It is obvious that an order of externment not only from the district in which the District Magistrate passing the order has jurisdiction but also from other districts contiguous thereto is a severable order and without affecting the valid part of it that part of the order which is bad in law can be safely separated. In our view that part of the order which refers to the externment of the petitioner from districts contiguous to the district of Rajkot is invalid for the reasons we have already set out but the order of externment directing the petitioner to remove himself from the district of Rajkot was valid and enforceable by the authorities. Application partly allowed. .