D. v. Nambudiripad VS S T A T — 1961 DIGILAW 101 (KER)

JUDGMENT C.A. Vaidialingam, J. 1. The common question that arises in all these three Original Petitions, is as to whether the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, functioning under section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, has got powers vested in it to remand the matter for fresh disposal to the subordinate authority. The question arises in all these matters in this way. 2. O.P Nos. 313 and 317/58 arise out of applications filed by the respective petitioners for the grant of permits regarding the route -- West Hill - Mankavu Ferry. Applicant No. 11 is the writ petitioner in O. P. 313/58 and applicant No. 3 is the writ petitioner in O. P. 317/58. The notification issued by the Regional Transport Authority was for the grant of two permits on this route in question. The R. T. A. granted the permits in favour of the two writ petitioners and there were appeals filed against that order by the disappointed applicants to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. The S. T. A. T. by its final order, has ultimately remanded the appeals filed by those parties for fresh disposal in the light of the various observations made in that order itself. 3. Again O. P. 314/58 is by applicant No. 4 in respect of another route namely, Calicut - Beypore. There also applicant No. 4 was issued a permit by the R. T. A. and that grant was set aside on appeal by the S. T. A. T., who has remanded the matter for fresh disposal by the R. T. A., on the basis of the various directions and observations contained in the judgment. 4. There are two grounds of attack against the orders of the S.T.A.T. raised by Mr. T. N. Subramania Iyer, learned counsel for the writ petitioners in O. P. Nos. 313 and 314/58 and by Mr. D. Narayanan Potti, learned counsel for the writ petitioner in O. P. 317/58. Those grounds of attack are that: (a) There is absolutely no jurisdiction vested in the S.T.A.T. to remand the proceedings for hearing to the subordinate authority. (b) Even assuming that there is such a jurisdiction, the order of remand in this particular case cannot be sustained. D. Narayanan Potti, learned counsel for the writ petitioner in O. P. 317/58. Those grounds of attack are that: (a) There is absolutely no jurisdiction vested in the S.T.A.T. to remand the proceedings for hearing to the subordinate authority. (b) Even assuming that there is such a jurisdiction, the order of remand in this particular case cannot be sustained. The entire materials were available before the appellate authority and the remanding of the matter to the subordinate authority practically amounts to an abdication by the appellate authority of the appellate functions vested in it under the statute. The second contention is really on the merits arising for consideration. 5. On the other hand, Mr. V. M. B. Menon, learned counsel for the contesting respondents in these three writ petitions, has supported the order of the Appellate Tribunal, According to the learned counsel, the power to remand, in such circumstances, is implicit in the power of the appellate court itself and both the learned counsel have drawn my attention to certain decisions which will have a bearing on this matter. I may also indicate at this stage that Mr. V. K. K. Menon, learned counsel for some of the respondents, has supported the stand taken by Mr. T. N. Subramania Iyer that the Appellate Tribunal functioning under the Motor Vehicles Act, has no jurisdiction to remand the matter to the original authority. 6. The learned Government Pleader, who appears for the authorities concerned, has also supported the order of the Appellate Tribunal on the ground that they have jurisdiction to remand, especially when they have been constituted and are functioning as appellate authorities under the provisions of the Act in question. 7. The various decisions referred to by the learned counsels on all sides, will be adverted to in due course. 8. Before I go into those decisions, it is desirable that I set out broadly the various sections in the enactment itself whereby powers of appeal have been conferred on certain authorities. I am able to find that there are at least 7 sections which provide for certain orders, passed by certain authorities mentioned therein, being challenged by way of appeal. Chapter II which deals with licensing of drivers of motor vehicles, provides for appeals under three sections, namely, sections 13(2), 15(3), and 16(2). I am able to find that there are at least 7 sections which provide for certain orders, passed by certain authorities mentioned therein, being challenged by way of appeal. Chapter II which deals with licensing of drivers of motor vehicles, provides for appeals under three sections, namely, sections 13(2), 15(3), and 16(2). I may also mention at this stage that there is also power given for framing rules for the purpose of that chapter under section 21 and in particular, sub-section (2) clauses (a) and (b) therein relate to the appointment, jurisdiction, control and functions of the authorities and also the conduct and hearing of appeals. 9. Again, in Chapter II-A dealing with licensing of conductors, there are two sections which provide for appeals. They are sub-section (2) of section 21-E and sub-section (4) of Section 21-F. The wording in those sub-sections is almost identical with the wording in section 13(2) of the Act. 10. Again, section 21-J provides for framing of rules under sub-section(2), clauses (a) and (g) regarding the appointment, jurisdiction control and functions as well as the conduct and hearing of those appeals. 11. In Chapter III dealing with registration of motor vehicles, there is one particular section which deals with right of appeal. That is contained in section ''35(2) of the Act. Again, there is the rule-making power given under section 41 and especially under sub-section (2) of section 41, clauses (a) and (b) regarding the appointment, jurisdiction, control, functions and the conduct and hearing of the appeals. 12. The particular provision with which I am now concerned, is section 64 which is in Chapter IV of the Act. Chapter IV deals with the control of transport vehicles and section 64, provides for an appeal being filed by an aggrieved party in respect of the various matters mentioned in the said section. Section 68, again in Chapter IV provides for rules being framed under sub-section (2), clauses (b) and (j) regarding the conduct and hearing of appeals and the authority to whom, the time within which and the manner in which those appeals can be based.No rules under section 68 have been brought to my notice in these proceedings. 13. There is one other section which has been brought in under the Amending Act 100 of 1956. 13. There is one other section which has been brought in under the Amending Act 100 of 1956. That is section 134 contained in Chapter X. In Chapter X the heading itself is 'miscellaneous matters' and section 134 gives a power to the appellate authority and revisional authority functioning under the Act, to stay the operation of the orders which are under attack. That also will be adverted to a little later. 14. Now coming to section 64, the actual wording of that section, omitting , the unnecessary part of it, is: "Any person aggrieved may, within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the prescribed authority who shall give such person and the original authority an opportunity of being heard." Clauses (a) to (i) of section 64 refer to the person who may be aggrieved by the matters mentioned therein or being a local authority or police authority or an association or a person providing transport facilities who, having opposed the grant of a permit, is aggrieved by the grant thereof or by any condition attached thereto. It is not really necessary to go into the various clauses under which a particular person may feel himself aggrieved and will have a right of appeal under section 64 of the Act. The other sections governing the right of appeal are worded slightly differently and they may also be gone through. 15. Section 13 deals with orders refusing or revoking licences and also provides for appeals thereon. Under sub-section (2) of section 13 there is a provision for any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (1) filing an appeal to the prescribed authority within thirty days of the service on him of the order and the prescribed authority shall decide the appeal, after giving such person and the authority making the order an opportunity of being heard and it is also further stated that the decision of the appellate authority shall be binding on the authority making the order. 16. Sub-Section (3) of section 15 in the same chapter, again gives a right to a person aggrieved by an order made by a licensing authority under section 15, to appeal to the prescribed authority within thirty days of the receipt of the order. 16. Sub-Section (3) of section 15 in the same chapter, again gives a right to a person aggrieved by an order made by a licensing authority under section 15, to appeal to the prescribed authority within thirty days of the receipt of the order. It further provides that such appellate authority shall give notice to the licensing authority and hear either party if so required by that party, and may make such inquiry into the matter as it thinks fit. There is also a further p provision that an order made by any such appellate authority shall be final. 17. The last provision in that chapter which gives a right of appeal is, as I mentioned earlier, sub-section (2) of section 16. Section 16 deals with the power of the RTA. to disqualify and in sub-section (2) of section 16, a right is given to any person aggrieved by the order of the RTA made under sub-section (1) within thirty days of the receipt of intimation of such order, to file an appeal against the order to the prescribed authority. 18. Therefore, it will be seen that the sub-sections which deal with rights of appeal under certain circumstances are differently worded. Then we come to Chapter II-A. I have already indicated that the wording in sub-section (2) of section 21-E and sub-section (4) of section 21-F are identical with the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of section 13. Therefore, it is not necessary for me to refer to those sub-sections specifically. 19. In Chapter III which deals with registration of motor vehicles, section 35 deals with appeals. Sub-section (1) of section 35 is to the effect:- "Any owner of a motor vehicle aggrieved by an order of refusal under section 27 to register a motor vehicle or under sub-section (1) of section 38 to issue a certificate of fitness or by an order of suspension or cancellation made under section 33 or 34 or by an order or cancellation under sub-section (3) of section 38 may, within thirty days of the date on which he has received notice of such order, appeal against the order to the prescribed authority". Sub-section (2) of section 35 provides that the appellate authority shall give notice of the appeal to the original authority and after giving opportunity to the original authority and the appellant to be heard either personally or by pleader in the appeal, pass such orders as it thinks fit. There is again a change of phraseology in sub-section (2) of section 35. 20. The relevant part of section 64 I have already extracted earlier. There is one other provision which may also be touched upon namely, the powers of revision contained in section 64-A. Under that section, the State Transport Authority may, either on its own motion or on an application made to it, call for the record of any case in which an order has been made by a Regional Transport Authority and in which no appeal lies, and if it appears to the State Transport Authority that the order made by the Regional Transport Authority is improper or illegal, the State Transport Authority may pass such order in relation to the case as it deems fit. There are two provisos to section 64-A which are not necessary to be adverted to for the present purpose. The one thing that emerges from the various provisions regarding appeals, and that aspect has been emphasised by Mr. T. N. Subramania Iyer as well as Mr. V. K. K. Menon, is that the original authority, whose order is under attack before the appellate authority, shall also be given an opportunity of being heard. That means the original authority, after having passed the order, does not allow it to rest there, but is also entitled to appear in support of the order that is under attack. That is rather a procedure which is not generally adopted by the ordinary civil courts functioning under the C.P.C. 21. The decisions that have been referred to before me by the learned counsel, can be broadly divided into three groups namely, (a) Where under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, learned Judges have proceeded on the basis that the power to grant stay by an appellate authority is implicit in the power of appeal. (b) The second group of cases relates to the question of a remand indirectly being dealt with by the learned Judges when dealing with certain orders passed by an Appellate Tribunal under section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act. (b) The second group of cases relates to the question of a remand indirectly being dealt with by the learned Judges when dealing with certain orders passed by an Appellate Tribunal under section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act. (c) The third group of cases relates to instances where the appellate authorities functioning under the provisions of certain other enactments have been held not to have the power of remand. 22. So far as I could see, the question as to whether an Appellate Tribunal functioning under section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, has power to remand a matter to the subordinate authority, does not appear to have been directly raised in any proceeding and a direct decision given on that point. No doubt, I am well aware that there are certain observations which will be considered by me, when discussing the contentions raised by the learned counsels on all sides. I may also mention at this stage that Mr. T. N. Subramania Iyer quite naturally relied upon a recent judgment rendered by me in O. P. 309/60 (since reported in 1961 KLJ 519 ) wherein I had to consider the question as to whether an appellate authority functioning under the provisions of Kerala Act 16 of 1959, has got jurisdiction to remand a proceeding to the subordinate authority. No doubt, I had to consider the exact scope of the provisions contained in section 18 of that enactment and I had also to consider some of the decisions which have been referred to by the learned counsel in this writ petition also. Ultimately, both on the wording of section 18 of that Act, as well as on general principles, I was inclined to take the view that the powers of authorities functioning under particular enactments will have to be found only within the four corners of that enactment itself. It was really this judgment of mine and the principles laid down therein that are largely relied upon by the learned counsel, Mr. T. N. Subramania Iyer in these proceedings also. 23. Before I advert to the decisions of the other High Courts, there are two decisions of this Court more or less dealing with the question of power to grant stay under section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, My learned brother Mr. T. N. Subramania Iyer in these proceedings also. 23. Before I advert to the decisions of the other High Courts, there are two decisions of this Court more or less dealing with the question of power to grant stay under section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, My learned brother Mr. Justice M. S. Menon had to consider one such question in the decision reported in S. T. Bus Transport Ltd. v R. T. O. Malabar ( 1957 KLT 516 = 1957 K LJ 521) and it is also seen that in a later decision rendered by my learned brother Mr. Justice Velu Pillai in Ramakrishnan v S. T. Appellate Tribunal ( 1960 KLT 136 = 1959 KLJ 1338 ) the learned Judge has approved the principles laid down by Mr. Justice M. S. Menon in the earlier decision. Strictly, it may not be really necessary now to consider as to whether a power to grant a stay is implicit in the appellate authority functioning under section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, in view of the special section that has been incorporated in the Act by the Amending Act 100 of 1956. I am having in mind section 134(1) of the Act to the effect that where an appeal has been preferred or an application for revision has been made against any order passed by an original authority under this Act, the appeal or the application for revision shall not operate as a stay of the order passed by the original authority and such order shall remain in force pending the disposal of the appeal or the application for revision, as the case may be, unless the prescribed appellate authority or revisional authority otherwise directs. I have extracted sub-section (1) of section 134 which is more or less identical to Order XLI, rule 5(1) of the Civil Procedure Code conferring a right to grant stay by an appellate court. 24. Sub-section (2) of section 134 is not necessary to be considered. I am only referring to this newly inserted section expressly granting a power on an appellate or revisional authority to grant stay, because in my view at any rate, the Legislature has proceeded on the basis that the power to grant stay is not implicit in the exercise of an appellate or revisional power. I am only referring to this newly inserted section expressly granting a power on an appellate or revisional authority to grant stay, because in my view at any rate, the Legislature has proceeded on the basis that the power to grant stay is not implicit in the exercise of an appellate or revisional power. That is why I stated that it may not really be necessary to consider the decisions of my learned brother Mr. Justice M. S. Menon or the other decision of my learned brother Mr. Justice S. Velu Pillai. But I have to refer to the decision of Mr. Justice M. S. Menon for this purpose because an attempt was made by Mr. V. M. B. Menon to show that the said principles laid down by the learned Judge, have been accepted on appeal by Mr. Justice Sankaran (as he then was) and Mr. Justice Raman Nayar in the decision reported in S. T. B. Transport v R. T. Officer ( 1957 KLT 1252 ). Mr. Justice M. S. Menon, in the decision reported in S. T. Bus Transport Ltd. v R. T. O. ( 1957 KLT 516 = 1957 KLJ 521 ) had to consider not the question directly as to whether an appellate authority functioning under section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, has got power to stay or not, but really another question as to whether an order of suspension, has lapsed because of the fact that it was stayed by an appellate authority. No doubt, in considering that question there is this observation made by the learned Judge at page 517 of the reports to the effect: "The power to stay is a necessary corollary to the power to entertain an appeal or revision." The learned Judge goes into the other aspects of the case and ultimately holds against the writ petitioner therein. No doubt, this decision was the subject of an appeal before Sankaran and Raman Nayar JJ. and that decision is reported at page 1252 of the same volume. There again, if I may say so with respect, the learned appellate Judges had no occasion to consider directly the question about the powers of an appellate tribunal, functioning under section 64 of the Act, to grant a stay. The learned Judges were really concerned about the attack made before them that the view of Mr. There again, if I may say so with respect, the learned appellate Judges had no occasion to consider directly the question about the powers of an appellate tribunal, functioning under section 64 of the Act, to grant a stay. The learned Judges were really concerned about the attack made before them that the view of Mr. Justice M. S. Menon that the order of suspension could not be considered to have been wiped out because of the order of stay is not correct. The learned Judges, after considering this aspect, ultimately agreed with the views expressed by the learned Judge. No doubt, the learned Judges quote the observations that I have extracted above. But that is more with a view to show that the stay granted by the Appellate Tribunal, will not automatically have the effect also of wiping out the order of suspension and that it only keeps it in abeyance for a limited purpose. Therefore I do not consider that these decisions had occasion to consider this question directly. 25. The decision of Mr. Justice Velu Pillai reported in Ramakrishnan v. S. T. Appellate Tribunal (I960 KLT 136 = 1959 KLJ 1338 ) need not detain me, because the question before the learned Judge was as to whether the appellate authority has got a power to grant an order of injunction. In considering this question the learned Judge, no doubt, observes at page 139 : "I grant, that a power to restrain the operator by an order of injunction from carrying on his activities would have a different effect, but then, such power must be expressly conferred, and cannot be left to he implied. A power of stay may perhaps, apart from section 134(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, be deemed to be inherent in an appellate authority as held in T. B. Trans port v R. T. Officer (AIR 1957 Kerala 142.................)" The decision in T. B. Transport v. R. T. Officer (AIR 1957 Kerala 142) referred to by the learned Judge, is the decision of my learned brother Mr. Justice M. S. Menon, to which I have already adverted. But the point to be noted is that the learned Judge was not prepared to vest in an appellate authority a power to grant an injunction. Justice M. S. Menon, to which I have already adverted. But the point to be noted is that the learned Judge was not prepared to vest in an appellate authority a power to grant an injunction. But the learned Judge was prepared to proceed on the basis that a power of 'stay may perhaps' be deemed to be inherent. Therefore, if may say so with respect, there again the learned Judge had no occasion to directly consider the question of the power of Appellate Tribunal to grant a stay. Infact, the learned Judge himself refers to section 134(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, which confers a power on an appellate or revisional authority to grant stay. As I have already indicated, my learned brother Mr. Justice M. S. Menon had no occasion to directly consider the question. Therefore, the reliance placed in support of the proposition laid down by the learned Judge will not carry the matters any further. 26. Mr. V. M. B. Menon learned counsel, drew my attention to an unreported decision of Mr. Justice Sankaran (as he then was) and Mr. Justice M. S. Menon in O. P. 322/58. According to Mr. V. M. B. Menon, it must be considered that the learned Judges, at any rate, impliedly recognised a power of remand in an appellate tribunal functioning under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. After going through the judgment, I am not inclined to accept this interpretation sought to be placed upon the said judgment. It will be seen that an order of remand passed by an Appellate Tribunal was challenged before the learned Judges and the learned Judges disposed of the matter in the following words: "The matter has not become final. The impugned order is only an order of remand and if the final order happens to be against the petitioner, he can have an appeal or may even seek the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227. As it stands, this petition is unsustainable. It is accordingly dismissed." The result of this order is that the learned Judges were not inclined to interfere with an order of remand passed by the Appellate Tribunal and which was sought to be challenged in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. 27. As it stands, this petition is unsustainable. It is accordingly dismissed." The result of this order is that the learned Judges were not inclined to interfere with an order of remand passed by the Appellate Tribunal and which was sought to be challenged in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. 27. The learned Judges had no occasion to consider the question that arises before me now namely, as to whether the Appellate Tribunal has got the power and jurisdiction to order a remand. Whether that question was at all raised or not, it is not possible for me to say. But the order does not give any indication that such a question was raised and the learned Judges have accepted that position as correct. Therefore, this judgment, relied upon by Mr. V. M. B. Menon, will not also assist him in the contention that he has taken before me. 28. The other group of cases that deal with the question of remand, will now be dealt with by me. The earliest decision that has been placed before me, is the decision of Chandra Reddy J. reported in Narayanan v Central Road Traffic Board (1953-1 MLJ (SN) 10). The full report is not available. But, from the short notes it will be seen that the decision is to the effect that the Central Road Traffic Board's powers in the matter of remand are untrammelled by any of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and they can limit the scope of the order of remand. Here again, it is not possible to know as to whether the learned Judge had occasion to consider the powers of the Central Road Traffic Board to pass an order of remand. 29. The next decision is the one reported in Ram Prashad v. Chief Commissioner (AIR 1956 Ajmer 41). That, no doubt, arose under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, but so far as this particular aspect is concerned, it is dealt with at page 45 of the reports. It appears to have been urged before the learned Judge that the order of the Chief Commissioner in that matter remanding the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act, was without jurisdiction. It appears to have been urged before the learned Judge that the order of the Chief Commissioner in that matter remanding the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act, was without jurisdiction. It was also urged that the Motor Vehicles Act being a self contained Code and inasmuch as it does not contain any provision for a reconsideration or remand, the Chief Commissioner's order should not be sustained. In meeting with this contention the learned Judge observes at page 45 as follows: "I am unable to see any substance in this contention. In my opinion, the power of remand is inherent in the very constitution of an Appellate Court. An Appellate Court has the right to set as:de the order of the trial court. When it does so, it may go, further and substitute its own order for the order appealed against or it may not go so far and may merely quash the order appealed against and automatically require the subordinate authority to restore the original cause and to decide it afresh. In my opinion, the absence of a power of remand would limit and to some extent negative the completeness of the power of the appellate authority and I am, therefore, of opinion that whether there is a specific provision or not, the power to order a remand must be taken to be inherent in every appellate court in its very constitution as an appellate authority." No doubt, prima facie these observations of the learned Judge may appear to support the contentions of Mr. V. M. B. Menon that an appellate court, when discharging the functions of an appellate court has got the right to pass an order of remand. If I may say so with respect, the basis on which this conclusion has been arrived at by the learned Judge, has not been indicated in the Judgment. The learned Judge proceeds on the basis, if I may say so with respect, that it is an established fact that an appellate authority in law has got the power as laid down by the learned Judge. Certainly, there cannot be any quarrel with the proposition that an appellate authority is entitled to substitute its own order for the order appealed against. Certainly, there cannot be any quarrel with the proposition that an appellate authority is entitled to substitute its own order for the order appealed against. But the question as to whether it has got also a power to remand, in my opinion, is not free from doubt and that aspect, if I may say so with respect, has been dealt with as if on the basis that there cannot be any controversy about the legal position as such. 30. The next decision that has to be referred to, is the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court of Satyanarayana Raju and Basi Reddy JJ. reported in Swarajyalakshmi v. State of A. P. ( AIR 1959 AP 321 ). The question that arose before the learned Judges was as to whether a revisional authority under section 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act, has got the power to pass an order of remand. In considering the powers of the revisional authority under section 64A, no doubt, the learned Judges referred also to the provisions of Section 64 of the Act. At page 322, Mr. Justice Satyanarayana Raju, who delivered the leading judgment on behalf of the Bench observes : "There is thus no essential distinction between a remedy by way of appeal and revision. If so much is conceded, the question is what are the powers of an Appellate Tribunal under section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act. That section merely says that a person aggrieved by the orders specified therein may, within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner appeal to the prescribed authority who shall give to such person and the original authority an opportunity of being heard." Having referred to the provisions of section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the learned Judge further observes at page 323 : "It is axiomatic that a power to entertain an appeal must comprise within its ambit the power to dispose of the appeal in the manner known to law. An Appellate Tribunal has a right to set aside an order under appeal and substitute its own order. An Appellate Tribunal has a right to set aside an order under appeal and substitute its own order. It may not go so far and may merely quash the order appealed against and automatically require the subordinate authority to restore the original proceeding and to decide it afresh." If I may say so with respect, evidently, the learned Judge has in his mind the observations made by the learned Judge in the decision to which I have already referred namely, Ram Prashad v Chief Commissioner (AIR 1956 Ajmer 41). The learned Judge if I may say so with respect, again proceeds on the basis that the powers of an appellate authority and the revisional authority are practically almost the same. On that assumption the learned Judge further proceeds to observe that an appellate authority has not a right to set aside the order and substitute its own view. If I may say so with respect, there can be absolutely no quarrel with this principle. But the learned Judge says that it may not go so far and may merely quash the order appealed against and automatically require the subordinate authority to restore the original proceeding and to decide it afresh. But the matter did not rest there. It is seen from the latter part of the judgment that the provisions of section 107, C. P. C. defining powers of an appellate court, were referred to by the learned Judges. The learned Judges advert to the provisions of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 107, C.P.C. 31. Section 107 of the CPC. runs as follows :-- "Powers of appellate court -- (1) Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, an appellate court shall have power (a) to determine a case finally; (b) to remand a case; (c) to frame issues and refer them for trial; (d) to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken (2) Subject as aforesaid, the appellate court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by this Code on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein." It will be seen that sub-section (1) of section 107, CPC. specifically confers on the appellate court a power (a) to determine a case finally ; (b) to remand a case; (c) to frame issues and refer them for trail; and (d) to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken. It will also be remembered that all these matters are dealt with more elaborately in the CPC itself. But the point to be noted is this: After quoting this section which is referred to by the learned Judges and after also referring to the contention based upon it to the effect that no such analogous provision like section 107 of the CPC is contained in the Motor Vehicles Act and also further noting the contention that therefore, there is no jurisdiction for the application of the principles of section 107 of the Code to Tribunals functioning under the Motor Vehicles Act as it would mean applying those provisions when they are not made applicable, if I may say so with respect, the learned Judges did not indicate their views on this particular aspect of the matter. 32. The learned Judges, if I may say so with respect, have merely stated that sub-section (2) of section 107 CPC is based on the general principle that an appellate court has the same power as the original court could have done. The learned Judges also say that sub-section (1) specifies the powers conferred on the appellate court in order to enable it to dispose of a case effectively and completely. That is only setting out the contents of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 107 CPC. The learned Judges do not at all give any indication as to what their view is regarding the circumstance that there is no provision in the Motor Vehicles Act analogous or corresponding to the provisions of section 107 of the CPC which expressly defines the powers of an appellate court. 33. No doubt, the learned Government Pleader urged that the view of the learned Judges is to be seen in the later part of the Judgment, that is, at page 324. The learned Judges observe at p. 324 : "Every Tribunal invested with a power to determine a controversy has inherent jurisdiction to pass such orders in relation to the subject matter of the controversy as would meet the ends of justice although there might be no direct statutory provision therefor. The learned Judges observe at p. 324 : "Every Tribunal invested with a power to determine a controversy has inherent jurisdiction to pass such orders in relation to the subject matter of the controversy as would meet the ends of justice although there might be no direct statutory provision therefor. Similarly every authority empowered to entertain an appeal must necessarily have the power to review the order of the original authority and pass such orders in relation thereto which the justice of the case requires, though this is, of course not to say that the appellate authority is invested with an arbitrary power. To hold otherwise would render infructuous the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction vested in the State Transport Authority under section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act." I am not inclined to accept the contention of the learned Government Pleader that the passage extracted above, indicated the learned Judges' view regarding the absence of a provision like section 107 CPC in the Motor Vehicles Act. The observations extracted above, if I may say so with respect, correctly set out the functions and jurisdiction of an appellate court. There the learned Judges do not say that along with the powers of appeal, the appellate authority functioning under section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, has got also implicit powers to order a remand. Therefore, the contention that was directly raised before the learned Judges regarding the absence of a provision like section 107 CPC in the Motor Vehicles Act, is, in my opinion, left unsolved and therefore, if I may say so with respect, it is not possible for me to accept the contention of the learned Government Pleader based upon this decision that this is an authority for the proposition that the power to order a remand is implicit in the powers of an appellate tribunal under what whatever statute it may be functioning. 34. The ultimate decision of the learned Judges of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the decision adverted to earlier, is regarding the powers of the revisional authority functioning under section 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act. The wording of section 64A is quite different from the wording of section 64 of the Act. Therefore, it is not really necessary for me to consider the scope of section 64A in these proceedings. 35. The wording of section 64A is quite different from the wording of section 64 of the Act. Therefore, it is not really necessary for me to consider the scope of section 64A in these proceedings. 35. The next decision that has to be considered, is that of the Assam High Court reported in Narendra Kumar v. Appellate Board (AIR 1960 Assam 100). That is a decision given by Deka and Mehrotra JJ. and no doubt, the learned Judges make some observations regarding the powers of an Appellate Board. At page 107 of the reports the learned Judges observe: "It cannot be doubted that the power to entertain an appeal must comprise within its ambit the power to dispose of the appeal in the manner known to law. An Appellate Board has no doubt a right to set aside an order under appeal and substitute its own order. It may merely quash the order appealed against and require the subordinate authority to restore the original proceeding and to decide it afresh. The appellate authority may have power while disposing of an appeal under section 64 of the Act to remand, such a power being ancillary and Identical to the power to dispose of an appeal. But the Board has no power to direct the Regional Transport Authority to start afresh with re-notifying the route and inviting fresh applications." The order that was the subject of attack before the learned Judges, it must be remembered, was passed by an Appellate Board which had confirmed the grant of permit in certain cases and had remanded the matter regarding other applicants for being disposed of after re-notifying the route and inviting fresh applications. The learned Judges had to consider the correctness of those directions. 36. It cannot certainly be accepted as contended by Mr. V. M. B. Menon and the learned Government Pleader that this decision categorically lays down that an appellate authority has got power while disposing of an appeal under section 64 of the Act, to remand. The learned Judges themselves, if i may say so with respect, use a very cautious expression to this effect: "The Appellate Authority may have power" 37. The other decision that has to be adverted to so far as this aspect is concerned, is the decision of Mr. The learned Judges themselves, if i may say so with respect, use a very cautious expression to this effect: "The Appellate Authority may have power" 37. The other decision that has to be adverted to so far as this aspect is concerned, is the decision of Mr. Justice Ramachandra Iyer of the Madras High Court reported in Jawarilal Jamad v. S. T. A. Tribunal, Madras (1960-II MLJ (Supplement) SN 18). The full text of the report is not available and from the Short Notes given in the said report, it is seen that the learned Judge seems to have held: "The power of remand of the Appellate Tribunal is incidental to and consequent upon its setting aside the order under appeal. Unless an order of the State Transport Authority is held to be wrong and is set aside the Appellate Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to remand the case." The later observations of the learned Judge give an impression that the contention that appears to have been raised before the learned Judge was not regarding the jurisdiction of an appellate tribunal to remand or not, but as to whether the particular order of remand before the learned Judge was justified in the circumstances. There is no indication in the Short Note report to show that the actual question of jurisdiction of an appellate tribunal functioning under the Motor Vehicles Act under section 64 was a point that was agitated before the learned Judge. These are the decisions bearing on this aspect. 38. The other group of cases are those which deal with the powers of an appellate tribunal functioning under other enactments. There are two decisions of the Madras High Court on that point, namely, the decision of the learned Chief Justice Mr. Gentle and Mr. Justice Govindarajachari reported in Segu Abdul Khadir v. A. K. Murthy (AIR 1948 Mad. 235), which has also been accepted and reiterated in the later decision of the learned Officiating Chief Justice Mr. Rajamannar (as he then was) and Mr. Justice Satyanarayana Rao in Devichand Moolchand v. Dhanraj Kantilal (AIR 1949 Mad. 53). 39. Before I advert to these decisions, I will refer to another decision of the Patna High Court of Das and Ramaswami JJ., which has been placed before me namely, the decision in Ram Swarup v Inderdeo Narayan ( AIR 1952 Pat. 458 ). Justice Satyanarayana Rao in Devichand Moolchand v. Dhanraj Kantilal (AIR 1949 Mad. 53). 39. Before I advert to these decisions, I will refer to another decision of the Patna High Court of Das and Ramaswami JJ., which has been placed before me namely, the decision in Ram Swarup v Inderdeo Narayan ( AIR 1952 Pat. 458 ). The question that arose before the Patna High Court was as to whether an order of remand passed by the Commissioner who was the appellate authority under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act -- Act III of 1947, was justified or not. After referring to the provisions of section 18 of that Act regarding the powers of an appellate authority, the learned Judges observe at page 461 as follows :-- "It is true that sub-section (2) does not in express terms give the power of remand. Learned counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to section 107, Code of Civil Procedure, which expressly gives the appellate court a power to remand a case. Learned counsel has also referred us to various rules in Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. His contention is that, in the absence of express provisions, sub-section (2) of section 18 of the Act must be construed as excluding the power of remand." Dealing with this contention, the learned Judges observe in the same page : "The words of sub-seciion (2) must, I think, be construed in their ordinary grammatical sense, in consonance with reason and commonsense. Sub-section (2) states that the Commissioner shall, after examining the record and, if necessary, after making such further enquiry as he thinks fit, either personally or through the Controller, decide the appeal......................I do not understand why it should be inferred from the words of sub-section (2) of section 18 that an order of remand is not one of the ways of deciding an appeal and why the Commissioner should be restricted to two kinds of orders only, namely, only allowing the appeal or dismissing the appeal." The learned Judges' view appears to be that making an order of remand is one way of deciding the appeal as contemplated under section 18 of the Act before the learned Judges. This again, I am not inclined to accept as a direct authority for the proposition that an appellate authority functioning under a particular statute, will have all the powers of a civil court governed by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. 40. Coming to the Madras decisions, the earlier decision is that of the learned Chief Justice Mr. Gentle and Mr. Justice Govindarajachari in Segu Abdul Khadir v. A. K. Murthy (AIR 1948 Mad. 235). The question that arose before the learned Judges was as to whether an appellate authority functioning under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1946, had jurisdiction to set aside an ex parte order that has been passed by him. The appellate authority appears to have ordered the application for restoration on the ground that he has jurisdiction to allow the same. That order was sought to be challenged before the High Court and the learned Chief Justice delivering the judgment on behalf of the Bench, observes at page 237 as follows : "I cannot see how the appellate authority under the Control Act can exercise jurisdiction which, had the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code been made applicable, could have been exercised." These observations were made by the learned Chief Justice in dealing with the contention before the learned Judges that though the provisions of the CPC have not been applied as such, still the appellate authority functioning, no doubt, under a particular statute, should have applied the principles contained in the CPC. Again, the learned Chief Justice observes at page 238 as follows: "In my opinion, since the rules of procedure made under the Act have been followed and service which those rules require was effected and as was held by the learned Judge to have been effected, he had no jurisdiction to set aside his order because he was later impressed and accepted that the respondent did not know of the date or of the fact of the hearing of the appeal. If the material provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure had been made applicable to proceedings under the Control Act, or if there had been a rule corresponding to O.9, R.13, or O.41, R.21 contained in the Control Act Rules then the learned Chief Judge would have had jurisdiction and authority to set aside his order. If the material provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure had been made applicable to proceedings under the Control Act, or if there had been a rule corresponding to O.9, R.13, or O.41, R.21 contained in the Control Act Rules then the learned Chief Judge would have had jurisdiction and authority to set aside his order. I have already expressed the view that in the absence of incorporation of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in the Rules of Procedure for the tribunals under the Control Act, there is no justification for the application of the principles of those provisions; otherwise it would mean applying those provisions when they are not made applicable. In my opinion, the learned Judge acted without authority or jurisdiction when he purported to set aside his previous order." This decision has been followed by the Madras High Court in the later decision of the learned Officiating Chief Justice Mr. Rajamannar (as he then was) and Mr. Justice Satyanarayana Rao reported in Devichand Moolchand v Dhanraj Kantilal (AIR 1949 Mad. 53). The question there arose as to whether an application for eviction under the same enactment can be continued by the son of the deceased original petitioner. That is, the question arose as to whether there can be a bringing on record of the legal representative in proceedings under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act -- Act XV of 1946. The learned Chief Justice again delivering the judgment on behalf of the Bench, follows the previous observations of the learned Chief Justice in the earlier decision in Segu Abdul Khadir v. A. K. Murthy (AIR 1948 Mad. 235), which have been already referred to. 41. Regarding the fact that the provisions of the CPC have not been made applicable to the proceedings under the Act in question, the learned Judges were of the view that the appellate authority functioning under that particular statute, cannot have all the powers of a Civil Court having the powers under the Civil Procedure Code. 42. There is one other decision to which it is necessary to advert and that is the decision of the learned Chief Justice Mr. Rajamannar and Mr. Justice Raghava Rao reported in Rangaswami Naidu v. Second Judge, Small Causes Court, Madras (62 LW (SN) 35). 42. There is one other decision to which it is necessary to advert and that is the decision of the learned Chief Justice Mr. Rajamannar and Mr. Justice Raghava Rao reported in Rangaswami Naidu v. Second Judge, Small Causes Court, Madras (62 LW (SN) 35). The question there was as to whether an appellate authority functioning under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, had the power to remand. The learned Judges were of the view that such an appellate authority functioning under the Madras Act XV of 1946 has not got all the ordinary powers of the appellate Civil Court of the land and ultimately the learned Judges say that the appellate authority cannot remand the case for fresh disposal by the Rent Controller. This exhausts practically the case law on the point that has been brought to my notice. 43. On a consideration of the various decisions that have been adverted to by the learned counsel on both sides, in my opinion, the contention of Mr. T. N. Subramania Iyer, learned counsel for the petitioners that the order of the appellate tribunal directing a remand is totally without jurisdiction, has to be accepted. In my view, as I observed in my previous decision in OP 309 of 1960 (since reported in 1961 KLJ 519 ): "It must not be forgotten that the appellate authority is functioning in proceedings under this Act not as a court, but as a personal designata. In my opinion, if that is so, the powers of that authority whatever, it may be either as an appellate authority or a Rent Control Authority, must be found only in the provisions creating that Authority, by the very statute itself, or if there are any rules governing that, they can also be considered to find out what exactly their powers are." As I observed in that case, the learned counsel has not been able to place any provision in the Act or the Rules which was under consideration in that Original Petition in support of the contention that an appellate authority has got jurisdiction to remand a case. In these proceedings also, neither the learned Government Pleader, nor Mr. In these proceedings also, neither the learned Government Pleader, nor Mr. V. M. B. Menon, learned counsel for the contesting respondents, has been able to draw my attention to any particular provision in the Act or the Rules in support of his contention that the order directing a remand is perfectly within the competence and jurisdiction of the appellate tribunal. 44. No doubt, Mr. V. M. B. Menon attempted to find some sort of support in the different phraseology used in the various sections dealing with appeals to which I have already made a reference. That is, the contention of the learned counsel was that in cases where an original authority is an inferior authority and an appeal is preferred to the Regional Transport Authority, the Legislature has taken care to use a particular phraseology; whereas when the R. T. A. is the original authority and the tribunal is the appellate authority, excepting conferring powers of appeal, the Act has been silent because the appellate authority is clothed with all the powers that an appellate authority can exercise in such circumstances. 45. I am not impressed with this contention of the learned counsel. No doubt, admittedly the various sections to which reference has been made, dealing with the powers of appeal, are differently worded. But from that difference in phraseology alone it is not possible for me to hold that the Legislature intended that the powers of appeal conferred on these various officers under those sections, are in any way, considered to be totally different from the powers conferred under section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act. If really the contention, that an appellate authority functioning under particular enactments, will have a power of remand as being implicit in the exercise of the power of appeal is accepted, in my opinion, it will lead to this position namely, that those authorities notwithstanding that the provisions of the CPC have not been made applicable, will actually have and enjoy all those powers which ordinary civil courts have under the provisions of CPC. That, in my opinion, is rather difficult to accept in the absence of any clear intention expressed by the Legislature either in the enactment itself or any of the rules framed in pursuance of the rule-making powers conferred on the appropriate authorities. 46. As I have already indicated earlier and as pointed out by Mr. That, in my opinion, is rather difficult to accept in the absence of any clear intention expressed by the Legislature either in the enactment itself or any of the rules framed in pursuance of the rule-making powers conferred on the appropriate authorities. 46. As I have already indicated earlier and as pointed out by Mr. T. N. Subramania Iyer, the CPC specifically defines the powers of an appellate court. Section 107 of the CPC has already been adverted to. 47. A right also is given to a party to challenge the orders of remand that may be made by the civil courts and there is also provision made in sub-section (2) of section 105 CPC to the effect that if any party is aggrieved by an order of 5 remand from which an appeal lies, but no appeal has been filed, he shall be precluded from disputing its correctness. The power of a civil court to act in a particular manner is also made subject to correction by the appellate courts. 48. In this connection, reference may also be made to the provisions contained in the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 -- Act XLVIII of 1950. In particular, section 9(1) of the Act which deals with powers and procedure of the Appellate Tribunal, runs as follows: "The Appellate Tribunal shall have the same powers, as are vested in a civil court, when hearing an appeal, under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 -- Act V of 1908." This wording has been relied upon by Mr. V. K. K. Menon, learned counsel to show that if the Legislature did want an appellate tribunal created under a particular statute to have all the powers of a civil court under the CPC, the Legislature could have deliberately used the expression that 'the appellate tribunal will have all the powers of the civil court'. No doubt, I am aware of the contention of Mr. V. M. B. Menon that in considering or construing the particular enactment in question namely, section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, it is not advisable or proper to consider the phraseology used by the Legislature in other enactments. No doubt, I am aware of the contention of Mr. V. M. B. Menon that in considering or construing the particular enactment in question namely, section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, it is not advisable or proper to consider the phraseology used by the Legislature in other enactments. But I am only referring to that section to show that if the provisions of the CPC were to be attracted, the Legislature could have certainly used the words to that effect, clothing the appellate tribunal with all the powers of a civil court that the latter enjoys under the CPC. There is no such indication either in the Act or in the rules that the provisions of the CPC are made applicable to the proceedings before those tribunals. On the other hand, those tribunals, being the creatures of the statute and functioning under the provisions of the statute, in my view, their powers are also to be found only within the four corners of the statute. 49. The learned Government Pleader referred me to certain passages contained in Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition. I am not satisfied that those passages in any way, help in resolving the point in controversy before me. 50. Having due consideration to all the contentions raised before me and in view of what I have stated above, in my opinion, the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal functioning under section 64 as an appellate authority, directing a remand of the proceedings to the R. T. A., is not justified and is one passed without jurisdiction and as such, it has to be quashed. 51. As mentioned earlier at the beginning of this judgment, there is an alternative contention raised by Mr. T. N. Subramania Iyer. That is even on the basis that the appellate tribunal has got jurisdiction to remand in this case, the order of remand is absolutely improper and is not justified. Without in any away, going into the merits or otherwise of the various directions and observations made by the appellate tribunal in its order of remand, I am satisfied that the order of remand in the circumstances of this case, is absolutely unnecessary. Without in any away, going into the merits or otherwise of the various directions and observations made by the appellate tribunal in its order of remand, I am satisfied that the order of remand in the circumstances of this case, is absolutely unnecessary. The entire materials were available before the appellate tribunal and the appellate tribunal could have certainly, on those materials, come to a conclusion either agreeing with or differing from the conclusions arrived at by the R. T. A. The remand in this case, in my opinion, is really an abduction by the appellate authority of its proper and legitimate duty under section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Even on this view, the order of the appellate tribunal will have to be set aside. 52. Under Article 227 of the Constitution, I further direct that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam, to whom these appeals will have now to be transferred, will take up all the appeals and dispose of them as expeditiously as possible according to law and after giving an opportunity to all the parties concerned. 53. In the result, the Original Petitions are allowed and under Article 227 of the Constitution, I further direct that all the appeals which were filed before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Trichur in respect of the two routes in question will be taken up afresh and disposed of by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam, according to law and after giving full opportunity to all parties concerned. There will be no order as to costs.