JUDGMENT S.B. Sen, J. This second appeal arises out of execution proceedings. A decree for partition was passed between the parties who are brothers. We are not concerned with all the properties excepting some agricultural lands in villages Palasia, Chaprya and Berlay. As the lands were revenue paying lands the decree was Bent to the Collector for execution u/s 54 of the C. P. Code. The Collector held that on partition the total acreage in each village would be leas than 15 a ores and, therefore, would be against the provisions of Section 69 (3) of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. He, therefore, refused to partition the property. An application was presented thereupon by Onkar respondent stating that the order of the Collector was illegal and that he had put wrong interpretation of section 69 (3) of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. The trial Court came to the conclusion that the total acreage would not be less than the minimum and directed the Collector to divide the property. The appellant thereupon filed an appeal against the order of the trial Court. The appellate Court concurred with the view taken by the trial Court and held that the Collector was wrong in sending the case back. Before entering into discussions I may mention here that it was a mistake of both the appellate as well as the trial Court to say that it was a total acreage 75.07 that was to be divided. The total area to be divided as will appear from the body of the order of the trial Court is 45.03 acres. This was an arithmetical error. However nothing turns on this figure as the partition is only between two brothers and it will not reduce the acreage less than the minimum in any case. The contention of the appellant before me is two-fold. First, that the minimum 15 acres that is allowed to be kept with the person must be in one particular village and if the total of all the holdings in different villages is more than 15 acres but the holding in each is less than 15 then the protection u/s 69 (3) mast be given. In short according to him the partition of the fields would render each parcel to less than 15 acres, therefore, the Collector was right in returning the decree for partition. In short according to him the partition of the fields would render each parcel to less than 15 acres, therefore, the Collector was right in returning the decree for partition. The second contention is that the civil Court had no jurisdiction once the decree has been sent for partition to the Collector to sit as if in appeal against the order of the Collector. As regards the first point, section 69 (3) of the Act may be quoted here:- No partition of pakka tenant's holding shall be effected by any civil or revenue Court unless such pakka tenant is left with at least 16 acres holding on pakka tenure. The learned counsel argues that the word 'holding' means a holding in one village. He refers me that definition of the holding given in section 54 (5) which reads as under :- Holding means a parcel or parcela of land forming part of a village which is held under one lease or grant. The definition is clear that it must be either parcel or parcels of lands forming part of a village. The question is whether parcel or parcels forming parts of different villages can also be included in the holding. u/s 13(2) of the General Clauses Act singular includes the plural and there is no special meaning given to the word 'holding'. The only criterion for a holding is that it must be held under one lease or grant. It does not matter whether parcel or parcels are from different villages or from one village. A different meaning would lead to absurdity. Even the very land in which the partition has been Bought would indicate that the parcels are in different villages. In Palasia the acreage is 3.55, in Chapri 25.98 and in Barlay 14.00. Section 69 (3) of the St. 6. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act has been enacted to avoid small holdings and to allow a tenant to have a substantial area of land on which he can earn his livelihood. If it meant that 15 acres could be in different villages then looking to the small area of each village it would be absurd to say that each tenant must have 15 acres of land. If it meant that 15 acres could be in different villages then looking to the small area of each village it would be absurd to say that each tenant must have 15 acres of land. The learned counsel brought to my notice sections 70 (3) and 72 (1) of the said Act in order to show that if the Legislature meant to have 15 acres in all then they would have used the word as have been used in that section. They must have used the language similar to that mentioned therein. I think the contention is not correct. On the other hand it supports the view I am taking that the sum total of the areas should be 15 acres wherever the lands situated. u/s 70 (3) of the Act the permission to sell could be granted by the Subha if at least 5 acres of irrigated land or 15 acres of non-irrigated land are still left in the possession of the pukka tenant for the maintenance of himself and his family. Section 72 (1) allows a tenant to mortgage his rights in the whole or any part of his holding provided an area of at least 15 acres on pakka tenure is left with him in his possession free of any encumbrance or charge of any kind. It will thus be clear that 15 acres have been taken as a unit for the maintenance of an agriculturist family. If such is the condition for effecting a sale or mortgage, I do not understand why a different standard would be observed at the time of partition. Reference to sections 70 (3) (a) and 71 (2) of the Act has also been made by the learned counsel to point out that wherever necessary they have used the words 'holdings' and, therefore, if they meant the holding would be in all 15 acres, in section 69 (3), they would have specifically used the plural. This argument also does not stand. A perusal of section 71 (2) would also show that 15 acres have been taken as a standard for an agriculturist family but simply because they have used the plural in some sections it cannot mean that when the singular is used plural cannot be read. This argument also does not stand. A perusal of section 71 (2) would also show that 15 acres have been taken as a standard for an agriculturist family but simply because they have used the plural in some sections it cannot mean that when the singular is used plural cannot be read. One of the ordinal rules of interpretation is that there should be a consistency throughout the Act and sections have to be interpreted in order to bring it in conformity with other provisions of the Act of course without making any violence to the language. I do not find in section 69 (3) anything to say that holding must be minimum area of 15 acres and should be restricted only to one village. Next it was urged by the learned counsel for the appellant regarding the jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain an application after the Collector has refused the partition. There is very little doubt that the civil Court cannot sit up in appeal. Section 54, CPC under which the civil Court sent the decree for partition to the Collector enjoin that the Collector Should do it "in accordance with law" if any for the time being in force relating to the partition. The Collector took up the matter of partition and wanted to bring it in conformity with the provisions of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. According to him, however, section 69 (3) would be a bar for such partition. He, therefore, refused to do it. The parties could have gone up in appeal which is provided in Chapter 4 of the Act. But the parties did not choose to do it. Instead an application was filed. But here the ease is that the Collector has returned the papers by not effecting the partition. The civil Court which passed the decree is also not partitioning the property. It is true that normally the partition of the suit property is to be effected by the Collector, as they are revenue paying lands. But it cannot be said that the Court is entirely deprived of controlling the action taken by the Collector. If the Collector contravenes the decretal order or refuses to execute the decree, it is open for the civil Court to say that it should be executed. The manner and mode of execution is a matter within the jurisdiction of the Collector. If the Collector contravenes the decretal order or refuses to execute the decree, it is open for the civil Court to say that it should be executed. The manner and mode of execution is a matter within the jurisdiction of the Collector. But the Collector cannot challenge that a particular property cannot be partitioned. If once the civil Court has asked him to partition he has got to do it. If there was a bar for partition of those lands because a division would reduce it to less than 15 acres then the decree for partition could not have been passed. According to me, therefore, the Collector has gone beyond his jurisdiction in refusing to effect the partition and sending the execution case back to the civil Court. The Collector has only said that he cannot effect the partition because it would be against section 69 (3) of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. The civil Court, therefore, could direct the Collector that it did not come in the mischief. If the Collector refuses to carry out the decree the civil Court itself can effect partition. In Seimkrame Chunni Lal 1951 NLJ 40 : AIR 1951 Nag. 359 : 1 LB 1951 Nag. 558 Mudholkar J. was of the view that civil Court can order partition even of revenue paying property when the Collector refused to make such a partition. In Ramohandra v. Krishnaji AIR 1916 Bom. 279 the partition was not in accordance with the decree, it was re-opened and corrected and papers were sent back again, to the Collector for execution because the partition was not in accordance with the direction of the decree. Therefore, according to me there is nothing wrong for the civil Court to send back the papers to the Collector for effecting partition, as it found that there is no bar to it u/s 69 (3) of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. The result is the appeal is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee according to scale, if certified. Final Result : Dismissed