JUDGMENT 1. In this suit the plaintiff states that on February 15, 1952 Ram Sankar Pandey since deceased sold to the defendant his right, title and interest in a business known as Ramadhar Pandey and Brothers for the sum of Rs.3,000/- at a gross undervalue and for further consideration hereinafter mentioned. 2. At the time of the sale it was agreed between Ram Sankar Pandey and the defendant that in further consideration of the sale the defendant would pay to Ramsankar maintenance at the rate of Rs.100/- p. m. during his life time and after his death to his widow who is the plaintiff in this suit at the rate of Rs.25/- p. m. Pursuant to this agreement and also in consideration of natural love and affection the defendant on February 16, 1952 executed a document whereby he obliged himself to pay maintenance to Ramsankar and thereafter to the plaintiff. Ramsankar was a cousin (father's brother's son) of the defendant. He died on the 29th March, 1956 leaving the plaintiff as his sole heiress and legal representative. In breach of this agreement the defendant failed to pay Ramsankar maintenance from September, 1953 and has not also paid any sum to the plaintiff. The plaintiff has claimed in this suit Rs.3,100/- being arrears of maintenance due to Ramsankar from September, 1953 to March, 1956 and a sum of Rs.150/- payable to her from April, 1956 to September, 1956 aggregating Rs.3,250/ -. 3. The defence, inter alia, is that the defendant was prevailed upon by Ramsankar by reason of his property to pay to him a sum of Rs.100/- p. m. for his maintenance and voluntarily executed a writing prepared at the instance of Ramsankar consenting to pay the said sum to him. The recital in the document that the business was sold for a trifling sum of Rs.3,000/-was not correct. The defendant did not realise the implication of this recital at the time of execution. The said amount of Rs.100 - p. m. was reduced to Rs.50/- p. m. from September, 1953 by consent of parties. 4. Ramsankar and the defendant were residing in the joint family property at No. 9 Protap Ghose Lane, in Calcutta. The defendant being moved by the pitiable condition of Ramsankar consented to pay at the rate of Rs.100/-p. m. for his maintenance during his natural life by way of charity. 4. Ramsankar and the defendant were residing in the joint family property at No. 9 Protap Ghose Lane, in Calcutta. The defendant being moved by the pitiable condition of Ramsankar consented to pay at the rate of Rs.100/-p. m. for his maintenance during his natural life by way of charity. Subsequently Ramsankar under the evil influence of the plaintiff and other designing persons made attempts forcibly to oust the defendant from the joint family dwelling house and filed a suit being suit No. 2402 of 1954 in the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta against the defendant for a decree for khas possession of the two rooms in the occupation of the defendant after evicting the defendant on the allegation that Ramsankar had allowed the defendant to live in the two rooms under a leave and license. The defendant contested the suit which was dismissed. In view of the ill treatment of Ramsankar and the plaintiff the defendant discontinued the payment of maintenance. In any event he was unable to do so by reason of financial difficulties. 5. In paragraph 5 of the Written Statement it has been alleged that during the hearing of the suit in the Court of Small Causes the defendant discovered to provide for payment of maintenance to the plaintiff at the rate of Rs.25/ - p. m. 6. The defendant states that there was no consideration for the document dated the 16th February, 1952 since the document had not been registered. It was not also legally enforceable. The defendant has stated further that he paid to Ramsankar maintenance for September, 1953. The following issues were raised: (1) Did Ramsankar Pandey sell the business to the defendant at an under-value and for further consideration as alleged in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the plaint? (2) Was there any agreement as alleged in paragraph 2 of the plaint? (3) Was the document dated the 16th of February, 1952 executed pursuant to the agreement? (4) Was the amount of maintenance reduced from Rs.100/-per month to Rs.50/- per month from September, 1958 as alleged in paragraph 2 of the written statement? (5) Did the defendant voluntarily execute the document as alleged in paragraph 2 of the written statement? (6) Was there no consideration for the document as alleged in paragraph 6 of the written statement? (7) To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? (5) Did the defendant voluntarily execute the document as alleged in paragraph 2 of the written statement? (6) Was there no consideration for the document as alleged in paragraph 6 of the written statement? (7) To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? The defendant in his evidence before me tried to prove that, (a) the shop was not sold at an under-value and the sum of Rs.3,000/- was an adequate price for it and (b) the agreement to pay maintenance was no made at the time of the sale but subsequent thereto. I am unable to accept the defendant's testimony on both the points. 7. Reading the defendant's answers particularly to questions 637-783 and 1056-1059 one is left with the impression that he is not a witness of truth so far as this aspect of the case is concerned. He says he executed the second document at the Howrah Station when he was in a hurry to entertain without going through the contents. He has not made this case either in the correspondence or in the written statement. Then he says that he agreed to pay if his business had thrived. This is, again not his case, either in the written statement or in the correspondence. 8. There is a clear admission in the document executed by him on the 16th February, 1952 that the sum of Rs.3,000/- was an inadequate price for the shop. Indeed the language used is that it was a trifling sum. But the defendant says that he did not appreciate the implication of this statement. When he was deposing before me I found that he had a fair knowledge of the English language and there could have been no difficulty on his part to understand or appreciate the meanings or implications of various expressions used in this document. Incidentally, it appears from Exhibit 4 that Ram Sankar in October, 1940 agreed to pay to Ramadhir Pandey, who had a half share in this shop, a sum of Rs.2000/- and Rs 25/- per month as allowance till Ramadhir's death. 9. Incidentally, it appears from Exhibit 4 that Ram Sankar in October, 1940 agreed to pay to Ramadhir Pandey, who had a half share in this shop, a sum of Rs.2000/- and Rs 25/- per month as allowance till Ramadhir's death. 9. Then in his written statement and his pleader's letter dated August 27, 1956 (Exhibit 'a', page 12) the defendant came out with the story of interpolations in the second document to defeat the plaintiff's claim at the rate of Rs.25/- per month but this plea was given up at the trial by learned counsel appearing for him. 10. In paragraph 1 of the plaint it is specifically alleged that the shop was sold for the sum of Rs.3,000/- at a gross under-value and for a further consideration. In paragraph 2 of the plaint it is more specifically alleged that at the time of the sale and transfer it was agreed by and between Ramsankar Pandey since deceased and the defendant that in further consideration of the sale the defendant would pay to Ramsankar maintenance at the rate of Rs.100/- per month during his life time and after his death to his widow the plaintiff herein at the rate of Rs.25/ - per month. These paragraphs in the plaint have been dealt with in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the written statement. In these paragraphs I do not find any indication of the defendant's case that the agreement to pay maintenance was not made at the time of sale and transfer but subsequent thereto. Reading these two paragraphs of the written statement one gets the impression that tine defendant admits that he agreed to pay maintenance at the time of the sale and transfer. The defendant in his written statement has challenged the document of February 16, 1952 on various grounds. He has, as I have mentioned, even gone to the extent of stating that there have been interpolations in this document. I do not appreciate what prevented him from stating, if his allegations be true, that the agreement recorded in the document dated February 16, 1952 was a subsequent and not a contemporaneous agreement. To my mind his story of subsequent agreement is an after thought. I do not appreciate what prevented him from stating, if his allegations be true, that the agreement recorded in the document dated February 16, 1952 was a subsequent and not a contemporaneous agreement. To my mind his story of subsequent agreement is an after thought. I should observe that in paragraph 5 of the written statement he has denied each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the plaint contrary to or inconsistent with what has been specifically admitted. The defendant admits in paragraph 2 of the written statement that he was prevailed upon by Ram Sankar Pandey by reason of his poverty to pay him a sum of Rs.100/- p. m. for his maintenance. This admission on his part in the opening sentence of the paragraph without stating that the agreement was made not at the time of sale but subsequently leads me to the conclusion that his oral evidence is wholly unacceptable. 11. Mr. Das, learned counsel for the defendant has urged the following points :- (1) The deed of sale is a complete document and no further consideration apart from what is stated therein is payable by the defendant. (2) Inadequacy of price is no ground for setting aside the document or demanding further consideration. (3) If Ramsankar was not entitled under the deed of sale to a further consideration the statement of inadequacy of price is no consideration for the second document. (4) The vendor did not suffer or forbear anything for the promise made by the purchaser in the second document. (5) Under the first document the defendant is entitled to the shop. In the second document therefore, the defendant receive thing. (6) The consideration in the second document is (a) natural love and devotion and (b) the sale of the business at a trifling sum of Rs.3000/- 12. In view of the provisions of sec. 25 (1) of the Contract Act the agreement based on the first consideration is not a contract. Having regard to the terms of the deed of sale the evidence with respect to the second consideration is inadmissible under sec. 92 of the Evidence Act. Considerable arguments were advanced before me on these points raised by Mr. Das and a large number of authorities were relied upon. No useful purpose would be served by referring to all these authorities in this judgment. 92 of the Evidence Act. Considerable arguments were advanced before me on these points raised by Mr. Das and a large number of authorities were relied upon. No useful purpose would be served by referring to all these authorities in this judgment. I shall deal only with some of them. After hearing the defendant on the witness box and carefully analyzing his written statement I have taken the view that the two agreements were contemporaneous. I agree with Mr. Das that as the second document has not been registered the agreement embodied in it on account of natural love and devotion is not a contract Vide sec. 25 (1), Contract Act. I have, therefore, to consider whether the second consideration specified in the document dated the 16th February, 1952 is admissible. In Subramaniam Chettiar v. Arunachalam (1) 29 I. A. 138 the Raja of Ramnad was the proprietor of a Zemindary. On July 4, 1895 he executed a reversionary lease of portions of his zemindary in favour of Ramaswamy Chettiar. The lease recited that there were subsisting leases affecting the properties demised some of which would not expire till 1911. The new lease was accordingly made to commence with the Fasli year 1339 corresponding to 1912; it was expressed to be perpetual, the annual rent was fixed its recovery as well as that of road-cess and other charges, was provided for, and the rights and obligations of both parties defined. A counterpart of the lease was executed and both the lease and counterpart were registered. During the negotiations for the lease it was agreed between the raja and Ramaswamy that in consideration of his obtaining the lease Ramaswamy should pay to the Raja a sum of Rs.500/- a month for a period of 10 years from July 1895. On July 9, 1895 that is five days after the execution of the lease the arrangement with regard to the payment of Rs.500/- a month was put in writing in the form of a letter addressed by Ramaswamy to the Raja. On July 12, 1895 the Raja executed a deed of trust for the benefit of his heir-apparent of his zemindary subject to subsisting debts charges incumbrances, and leases. On July 12, 1895 the Raja executed a deed of trust for the benefit of his heir-apparent of his zemindary subject to subsisting debts charges incumbrances, and leases. No payments having been made by Ramaswamy in respect of his agreement to pay Rs.500/- a month, the Raja on December 9, 1895, assigned the agreement for value to Ramanadhan Chettiar; and notice of this assignment was at once given to Ramaswamy. On the 21st September, 1897 Ramanadhan and his son Subramaniam filed a suit for the recovery of 26 monthly instalments at the rate of Rs.500/- a month with interest. Ramanadhan has died when the matter came up before the Judicial Committee. His son Subramaniam was therefore the only appellant. One of the contentions of this respondents was that the original agreement for payment of Rs.500/- a month was void in law as not being in writing registered and the plaintiffs were not entitled in law to prove the existence of such oral agreement. Sir Arthur Wilson has considered the provisions of sec. 92 of the Evidence Act, sec. 17 of the Registration Act and secs. 105 and 107 of the Transfer of Property Act and observes at page 146 as follows: "the agreement for the payment of Rs.500/- a month for ten years from July, 1895 is in no way inconsistent with the lease of the 4th of that month. Its provisions form no part of the terms of the holding under the lease their effect will be exhausted some years before the lease takes effect. The payment bargained for is no charge on the property it is not rent for being recoverable as rent but a mere personal obligation collateral to the lease. Their Lordships are of opinion that the agreement is not affected by sec. 92 of the Evidence act and that there is nothing in the Registration Act or in the Transfer of Property Act which requires that it should be registered as part of the lease. " 13. Strong reliance was placed by Mr. Dutt for the plaintiff on this decision of the Judicial Committee. In the instant case also it appears that the defendant's promise to pay maintenance to Ramsankar and thereafter to his widow is a mere personal obligation collateral to the sale of the shop. The agreement for maintenance is not therefore affected by sec. 92 of the Evidence Act. 14. Dutt for the plaintiff on this decision of the Judicial Committee. In the instant case also it appears that the defendant's promise to pay maintenance to Ramsankar and thereafter to his widow is a mere personal obligation collateral to the sale of the shop. The agreement for maintenance is not therefore affected by sec. 92 of the Evidence Act. 14. In Sara Veeraswami v. Telluri, (2) 75 I. A. 252, cited by Mr. Dutt, there was a registered deed of sale of properties and an oral agreement to reconvey. The respondents contended that the only agreement concerning the properties was that manifested by the sale deed. The oral agreement, was, however, established, and it was held that the appellant was not precluded from availing of the agreement by sec. 92 of the Evidence Act. That agreement did not 'contradict', vary or subtract from the terms of the sale deed within the meaning of sec. 92 of the Evidence Act, but on the contrary left these terms and the interest passing there under to the purchaser unaffected. Nor did the agreement 'add' to the terms of the sale deed-to add a stipulation which is quite unconnected with the terms of the sale is not an addition of the kind struck at by the section. The defendant's agreement in the instant case, to pay maintenance to Ramsankar and thereafter to his widow does not contradict, vary, subtract from or add to the terms of the deed of sale dated the 15th February, 1952. The interest that passed to the defendant Ramlal Pandey under this deed remained entirely unaffected by the agreement for payment of maintenance. The stipulation for maintenance is unconnected with the terms of the sale. Ramlall Pandey became the full and absolute owner of the shop and the business under the deed of sale. The shop has now been closed down the business no longer exists; but the defendant's obligation to pay maintenance continues till the widow is dead. 15. The point may further be considered from another point of view. In Turner v. Forwood and anr. (3) (1951) 1a. E. R. 746 the plaintiff until 1942 was employed by C. Q. Limited as Sales Manager under a Service Agreement dated June 29. 1931, for a period of which in 1942 there were two years unexpired. 15. The point may further be considered from another point of view. In Turner v. Forwood and anr. (3) (1951) 1a. E. R. 746 the plaintiff until 1942 was employed by C. Q. Limited as Sales Manager under a Service Agreement dated June 29. 1931, for a period of which in 1942 there were two years unexpired. The first defendant was at all material times the Managing Director of the company the second defendant, in which he held the majority of the shares. In 1942, owing to the war the company was in financial difficulties and wan being pressed by creditors. The first defendant arranged with one Reiter to make advances to the company but Reiter would do so only it the company were (so far as he was concerned) relieved of certain liability, especially debts to employees, and if the plaintiff's service agreement were terminated. The company at that time owed some 1215 to the plaintiff, and the first defendant wrote to Reiter that he would indemnify Reiter and the company against any claim made by the plaintiff in respect of the debt and he further agreed that within one month he would pro-by the plaintiff and the first determine his service agreement without compensation being payable to him by the company. Reiter's solicitors prepared two documents: (i) a deed, which was executed on March 14, 1942, by the plaintiff and the first defendant, and (ii) a form of notice of resignation addressed to the company which was signed by the plaintiff. The deed recited that the company was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of 1215 in respect of accrued salary under his service agreement "which agreement has been determined as from March 16, 1942", and that the company was not in a position to meet his liability, but at the request of the first defendant the plaintiff had agreed to assign to him the debt due from the company. The deed continued: "now this deed witnesseth that in consideration of the sum of 10s. paid by the said (first defendant) to the said (plaintiff) the said (plaintiff) doth hereby assign and transfer to the said (first defendant) the whole of the debt. The deed continued: "now this deed witnesseth that in consideration of the sum of 10s. paid by the said (first defendant) to the said (plaintiff) the said (plaintiff) doth hereby assign and transfer to the said (first defendant) the whole of the debt. " The second document reads: "with reference to my service agreement with you under which you appointed me Sales Manager, I hereby tender my resignation as such Sales Manager and agree that the contract now subsisting between you and myself shall stand determined as from today's date. I hereby admit that I do not make any claim against you by reason of the determination of such agreement," 16. In an action in which the plaintiff claimed 1215 from the first defendant he alleged (1) that his signature to the document was induced by the oral promise of the first defendant that he himself would pay to the plaintiff the amount of the debt, and (ii) that he (the plaintiff) agreed to assign the debt and to cancel his service agreement on the first defendant's oral agreement to make such payments to him. Alternatively, the plaintiff claimed 1215 from the defendant company for services rendered under the agreement of June 29, 1942. Donovan, J. gave judgment for the plaintiff against the first defendant, with costs, and for the company against the plaintiff, with costs. It was held by the Court of Appeal that where the consideration was stated in a deed, parol evidence to prove a larger consideration did not contradict the deed and was admissible. 17. Lord Goddard, C. J. after stating the facts observes at page 747 as follows :- "the first and most interesting argument which has been advanced by counsel for the first defendant is that, as the deed recited that the consideration was 10 s., it was not open to the plaintiff to say that the true agreement was that the consideration for the assignment should be the payment of the whole debt by the first defendant to the plaintiff. He submitted, and at first sight I confess I was greatly taken by the submission, that, as the deed states the consideration to be 10s., it is inconsistent with the deed to say that the consideration was 1215, and evidence of the agreement relied on by the plaintiff ought not to have been received by the learned Judge. He submitted, and at first sight I confess I was greatly taken by the submission, that, as the deed states the consideration to be 10s., it is inconsistent with the deed to say that the consideration was 1215, and evidence of the agreement relied on by the plaintiff ought not to have been received by the learned Judge. " "a case on the subject has not been before the courts for many years. One of the cases cited to us was Clifford v. Turrell (4) (1845) 14 L. J. Ch. 390, which was heard in the court of first instance by Sir James Knight Bruce, V. C., and affirmed on appeal by Lord Lyndhurst, L. C. That case was afterwards approved by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Frith v. Frith (5) (1906) A C. 254. Clifford v. Turrel (4) appears to lay down in the clearest possible terms that, at any rate, where there is a nominal consideration-and I am not satisfied that it is confined to cases of nominal consideration-evidence is always admissible to show that the true consideration was something more than the consideration stated in the written agreement, be it under hand or under seal. Lord Lyndhurst, L. C. said [14 L. J. Ch. 397 (4)]: "the settled rule of law is, that you may prove a further consideration which is consistent with the consideration stated on the face of the deed. You can not be allowed to prove a consideration inconsistent with it, but you may prove another which stands with it. " "in that case a deed had stated the nominal consideration of 10s. and an action for specific performance was brought in which it was alleged by the plaintiff that, in fact, there had been a further consideration for his execution of the deed, namely, a promise by the defendant to pay him an annuity of 40 a year and to give him a house worth 10 a year. The point was taken that evidence of that agreement was not admissible because it would be inconsistent with the terms of the deed which stated the consideration to be 10s. The point was taken that evidence of that agreement was not admissible because it would be inconsistent with the terms of the deed which stated the consideration to be 10s. "in Frith v. Frith (5) Lord Atkinson, who delivered the advice of the Board, referred to Clifford v. Turrell (4) and said in (1906) A. C. 250: "Parol evidence was admitted to prove that additional consideration was in fact given for the deed by which the plaintiff was induced to execute it, namely, an agreement by the defendant that he would pay to the plaintiff an annuity of 40 per annum during his life and give to him a house worth 10 a year to live in. Specific performance of that parol agreement was decreed. The vice Chancellor in delivering judgment in the case lays down, in the opinion of their Lordships correctly, the rule of law upon this subject. He said. . . . Rules of law may exclude parol evidence where written instrument stands in competition with it, but it has long been settled that it is not within any rule of this nature to adduce evidence of a consideration additional to what is stated in a written instrument. ' And then adds: 'the Rule is that where there is one consideration stated in the deed, you may prove any other consideration which existed, not in contradiction to the instrument and it is not in contradiction to the instrument to prove a larger consideration than that which is stated. " "their Lordships think the present case comes within that Rule, that the evidence proposed to be given did not contradict the deed, and that the appellant's first contention is well founded. " "that is a perfectly clear statement by the Judicial Committee approving the Vice Chancellor that it is not a contradiction of an instrument to prove a larger consideration than that which is stated in it. For myself, can see no difference between saying, where the consideration is stated to be 10s, that it was, in fact, 1215-as was done in this case-and saying as was done in Clifford v. Turrel (4)-that, while the consideration stated in the deed was 10s., the true consideration was a payment of 40 a year for life and a house worth 10 a year. It seems to me, therefore, that on the authorities the evidence was admissible. It seems to me, therefore, that on the authorities the evidence was admissible. "it is unnecessary to go back to the original of the Rule which no doubt, had its inception in matters to do with conveyances and the Statute of Uses. Practically every bill of exchange which was ever drawn was for value received. When it is an accommodation bill, of course no value has been received ad, as between the parties who sue on it where the bill is not in the hands of a holder in due course it is always open to the acceptor to say that no consideration ever passed for the bill, and that gives him a good defence. I do not see that there is any real difference in principle between the present case and one of a contradiction of the statement which appears on a bill "for value received". It always has been held that one can contradict that statement and show that no consideration has passed and similarly to show that, whereas the consideration is stated to be nominal the true consideration was a promise to pay a much larger sum. I think the authorities are perfectly clear on the subject and therefore in my opinion the learned Judge was right in accepting the evidence". 18. To my mind, applying the above principles to the present case, the agreement recorded in the second document dated the 18th February, 1952 that in consideration of Ramsankar selling to the defendant the business of Messrs. Ramadhar Pandey and Brothers for a trifling sum of Rs.3,000/- the defendant had promised to pay to him a further sum of Rs.100/- per month as his maintenance till his death and after his demise to his wife till death at the rate of Rs.25/-p. m. is admissible. The consideration stated in the second document is not inconsistent with the consideration of Rs.3,000/-mentioned in the deed of sale dated the 15th February 1952, and stands with it. The statement in the second document that the sum of Rs.3,000/-was a trifling sum does not in my opinion make it inconsistent and in support of this view I rely on the decisions in Clifford v. Turrrl (4) and Turner v. Forewood and anr. (3). These were cases in which a much smaller consideration was stated in the document but parol evidence of a larger consideration was accepted. (3). These were cases in which a much smaller consideration was stated in the document but parol evidence of a larger consideration was accepted. In the present case however what could have been parol evidence has been placed on record by the defendant in the document which he executed on the 16th February, 1952. Mr. Das, learned counsel for the defendant, has stated with reference to Turner v. Forewood and anr., (3) that when a document is silent on a particular point extrinsic evidence of it may be admissible. But he has urged that Turner v. Forewood and anr., (3) should be considered in the context of the English Law of Evidence In India no evidence in contravention of sec. 92 of the Evidence Act is permissible. The provisions of sec. 92 are well known. In deference to the argument of Mr. Das I may quote Taylor on Evidence, 12th Edition Volume II, Articles 1132 and 1133 which are as follows:- "1132 the first general Rule which it will be necessary to notice respecting the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to affect what is in writing is, that parol testimony cannot be received to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from, the terms of a valid written instrument. This Rule of the Common Law which may be traced back to a remote antiquity, is founded on the obvious inconvenience and injustice. that would result if matters in writing made by advice, and on consideration and intended finally to embody the entire agreement between the parties, were liable to be controlled by what Lord Coke expressly calls the uncertain testimony of slippery memory". When the parties had deliberately put their mutual engagements into writing, in such language as imports a legal obligation, or, in other words, a complete contract, it is only reasonable to presume that they have introduced into the written instrument every material term Consequently, all parol testimony of conversations held between the parties, or of declarations made by either of them, whether before, or after, or at the lime of, the completion of the contract, will be rejected, because such evidence while deserving for less credit than the writing it self would inevitably tend, in many instances, to substitute a new and different contract for the one really agreed upon, and would thus, without any corresponding benefit, work infinite mischief and wrong. 19. 1133. 19. 1133. Independently of all considerations of conveniences the Legislature has, by positive enactment, adopted the same rule in several cases as an arbitrary and absolute one, and, by requiring certain dispositions of property and other transactions to be evidenced by writing-as, for instance wills contracts within the Statute of Frauds and the like- has rigidly excluded all parol testimony tending to vary the terms contained in the written instrument. The statutory rule will perhaps be more strictly enforced than that which rests on the common law alone, because in the former case, to relax, the rule in any degree is to the like extent to repeal the particular Act which renders the writing necessary. The term 'written instrument', as used in the rule, includes not only records, deeds, wills and other instruments required by the statute or common law to be in writing, but every document which contains the terms of a contract between different parties, and is designed to be the repository and evidence of their final intentions. " 20. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Volume II Articles 646 and 653 at pages 396 and 402 are as follows :- "646.-When the intention of the parties has been reduced to writing it is, in general, not permissible to adduce extrinsic evidence, whether oral or contained in writing such as instructions, drafts, articles, conditions of sale or preliminary agreement, either to show that intention, or to contradict, vary, or add to the terms of the document. This principle applies to words, arbitrator's awards, bills of exchange and promissory notes, bills of lading and charter-parties, description of boundaries, guarantees, leases, contracts for the sale of goods, and wills. Verbal statements made by an auctioneer may or may not be part of the contract of sale Extrinsic evidence can not be received in order to prove the object with which a document was executed or that the intention of the parties was other than that appearing on the face of the instrument. 653.-Parol evidence is admissible to show that the transaction is affected by fraud, immorality or illegality, duress or mistake; to show the true consideration, or the existence of consideration or of a consideration in addition to that stated; to show the nature of the transaction or the true relationship of the parties. 653.-Parol evidence is admissible to show that the transaction is affected by fraud, immorality or illegality, duress or mistake; to show the true consideration, or the existence of consideration or of a consideration in addition to that stated; to show the nature of the transaction or the true relationship of the parties. " It appears therefore that the acceptance of the principles laid down in Turner v. Forwood and anr. (3) is not precluded by the provisions of sec. 92 of the Indian Evidence Act This principle is that where there is one consideration stated in the document evidence of any other consideration not in contradiction to that instrument is admissible and it is not in contradiction to the consideration in the instrument to prove a consideration larger than that which is mentioned. 21. Mr. Das, learned counsel for the defendant strongly relied on the judgment of the Patna High Court in Kanak Sunder v. Ram Lakshman, (6) A. I. R. 1955 Patna 458. In this case it is observed that where in a deed of gift itself it is stated that the property is transferred to the done in consideration of her obedience and submission to the donor, when any extraneous evidence to prove that the gift made to her is not only in lieu of obedience and submission but also in lieu of her accepting two liabilities, namely, that of paying all the debts to the creditors of the donor and of maintaining him till his life time, is bound to result, firstly, in adding to the term of consideration and, secondly, in contradicting it. Hence, such extraneous evidence to prove that the deed of gift is not what it purports to be cannot be admitted in view of sec. 92 of the Evidence Act, 22. The Patna High Court held in this case that natural love and affection or obedience and submission by way of respect or love may at best be a meritorious or gratuitous consideration and in no casa can be a good or valuable consideration. The gift therefore was a transfer without consideration and to say that there were considerations like paying of debts to the creditors of the donor or of maintaining him till his death was to contradict or add to the terms of the deed of gift. The gift therefore was a transfer without consideration and to say that there were considerations like paying of debts to the creditors of the donor or of maintaining him till his death was to contradict or add to the terms of the deed of gift. The principles enunciated in this case do not it Seems apply to the facts of the ' case before me. Learned counsel for the defendant referred me to Ramchandra v. Kalu Raju (7) 2 Bombay 362. Here an agreement was executed by a client to his Vakil after the latter had accepted a Vakalatnama to act for the former in a certain suit, whereby the client bound himself to pay to the Vakil in the event of his conducting the suit to a successful termination, a certain sum in addition to the Vakil's full fees. It was held that a suit founded upon this agreement was unsustainable. 23. The reason for this decision given by Westropp C. J., is that the plaintiff having accepted a Vakalatnama was already bound to render his best services as a pleader to the defendants and there was no fresh consideration proceeding from the" plaintiff when he obtained the subsequent agreement by the defendants to pay a sum of money in addition to his usual fees if the suit came to a successful termination. The decision has therefore no relevance to the facts of the instant ease. 24. Mr. Das also placed before me the decision in Tenjarla v. Prabhala (8) A. I. R. 1918 Madras 504 (1). In this case an agreement by which a litigant bound himself to pay remuneration to his Vakil's clerk for giving special attention to a case entrusted by him to his Vakil was held to be void and unenforceable as being contrary to public policy. This decision also is not relevant for the purposes of the present dispute. Upon consideration of the pleadings in this suit, the evidence on record and the authorities on this subject I hold therefore that Ramsankar Pandey sold the business to the defendant at an undervalue and for further consideration stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the plaint. I hold further that the document dated the 16th February, 1952 was executed pursuant to this agreement. In the premises, my answers to issues nos. 5 and 6 are in the negative. 25. I hold further that the document dated the 16th February, 1952 was executed pursuant to this agreement. In the premises, my answers to issues nos. 5 and 6 are in the negative. 25. The only other issue is whether the amount of maintenance was reduced from Rs.100/- p. m. to Rs, 50/-p. m. from September, 1953 as alleged in paragraph 2 of the written statement. Mr. Dutt, for the plaintiff, has contended that the case of reduction of the question of maintenance was never suggested by the defendant in the correspondence. It was for the first time made in the written statement Mr. Dutt has referred to page 8 of Ext. 'a' which is a copy of a letter of the plaintiff's solicitor to the defendant demanding arrears of maintenance at the fate of Rs, 100/- p. m. payable to Ramsankar and Rs.25/- p. m. payable to his widow, A copy of the reply to this letter is at page 12 of Ext. 'a' by the defendant's pleader dated August 27, 1956. The case of reduction has not been made in this letter. In questions 825 and 826 the defendant has admitted that he did not tell his pleader that the amount of maintenance was reduced by agreement as alleged in paragraph 2 of the written statement Then again in this paragraph it is stated that the reduction was from the month of September, 1953 but in questions 795 to 798 Ramlal Pandey has stated that he represented to Ramsankar in the first or second week of August, 1953 that his business was not going on well and it was gradually becoming very difficult to keep the shop running. Moreover it appears from Ext. 6' that up to July, 1953 Ramsankar received maintenance at the rate of Rs.100/- p. m. This fact is also admitted by Ramlal in questions 792 to 984 as well as in questions 802 to 811. The contradiction between the written statement and the oral and documentary evidence, according to Mr. Dutt, indicates that the defendant's case should not be accepted. 26. In this connection it is necessary to consider two Exts. viz., Exts. 'd' and 6. The official translation of Ext. 6' is as follows:- "i am Ramsankar, son of Ramadhar Pandey. The contradiction between the written statement and the oral and documentary evidence, according to Mr. Dutt, indicates that the defendant's case should not be accepted. 26. In this connection it is necessary to consider two Exts. viz., Exts. 'd' and 6. The official translation of Ext. 6' is as follows:- "i am Ramsankar, son of Ramadhar Pandey. I have received regularly the instalments which had been fixed in respect of the shop up to the month of August at the rate of Rs.50/-from Ramlal Pandey. Therefore, I am executing this receipt so that there may be document and it may be of use in time of need. Sd/ -. Shri Ramsankar Pandey. 21-10-53. " Ramlal has stated in question 806 that this receipt is for the month of August, 1953 only. The official translation of Ext. 'd' runs thus:- "i, Ramsankar Pandey, son of Ramratan Pandey Mauja Sumerpur have received on account of the shop for the month of September Rs. 50/- from P. Ramlal Pandey and have executed the receipt so that there may be (a) document and it may be of use in time of need. Sd/- Ram Sankar Pandey. 31-10-53. " With these two documents may be compared Ext. 10 the official translation whereof reads thus:- "i, Ramsankar Pandey, execute this receipt that I have received in full Rs.100/- (Hundred Rupees) from Pt. Ramlal Pandey, on account of monthly expenses from 15-5-52 to 15-6-52. Sd/- Ramsankar Pandey. 16-5-52. " 27. The terms of these three receipts lend considerable support to the defendant's case of reduction of the quantum of maintenance by mutual agreement. The defendant says in Qs. 79 to 106 that up to July 1953 he paid to Ramsankar maintenance @ Rs, 100/- per month from August 1953 it was reduced to Rs.50/- per month by mutual arrangement and he paid at this rate for two months namely for August and September, 1958, It is not correct according to the defendant that Ramsankar lost all his faculties and power of understanding from March 1953. The receipt dated the 21st October 1953 (Ex. 6) was written out by one Jagadish Sukla, a friend of Ramsankar and has been signed by Ramsankar. Jagadish carried out the instructions of Ramsankar who put his signature on the document after going through its contents. He gives the same evidence with regard to Exhibit 'd'. 28. The receipt dated the 21st October 1953 (Ex. 6) was written out by one Jagadish Sukla, a friend of Ramsankar and has been signed by Ramsankar. Jagadish carried out the instructions of Ramsankar who put his signature on the document after going through its contents. He gives the same evidence with regard to Exhibit 'd'. 28. On behalf of the plaintiff, has been produced what is said to be a certified copy of a receipt filed in the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta granted by Ramsankar on the 31st October, 1953. This document has been marked as Exhibit 'e' and its official translation is as follows :-I, Ramsankar Pandey, son of Ramratan Pandey (of) Mouza Sumerpur have received from lal Pandey Rs.50/- being the rent of the shop room for September and have written out this receipt so that it might be recorded and come into use when occasion would arise. SSSS/d- Ramsankar Pandey 31-10-53. " According to the plaintiff's witness Ramchandra Exhibit 'e' is the certified copy of Exhibit 'd' as it was filed in thee Court of Small Causes. Exhibit 'd/ contained the word 'karaya' before the word 'September' which meant 'rent'. The document has been interpolated subsequently and the word 'karaya' has been replaced by the word 'kisti' which means 'installment'. The defendant has stated in q. 107 that the disputed word is neither 'karaya' nor 'kisti' but 'mahina' and appearing as it does before the word 'september', it means that, the amount in question was paid for the month of September 29. Ramchandra Pandey, brother of the defendant who is inimical to him, has deposed on behalf of the plaintiff in this suit He says in his evidence that the rent of the shop was Es. 50/-per month (q.15). After an attack of paralysis in the month of March 1953, Ramsankar was not in full possession of his senses. In September 1953 he was not in a position to understand the meaning of a document. He had other ailments thereafter and ultimately he died in March 1956 (qs. 87 to 41). After March 1952 only a paltry sum of Rs.50/- or so was paid by way of maintenance by the defendant to Ramsankar on one or two occasions (q. 48). It is significant that in this question the witness admits that these payments of Rs 50/- each were towards maintenance. 87 to 41). After March 1952 only a paltry sum of Rs.50/- or so was paid by way of maintenance by the defendant to Ramsankar on one or two occasions (q. 48). It is significant that in this question the witness admits that these payments of Rs 50/- each were towards maintenance. The witness goes on to say that the defendant was at Delhi and the rent of the shop was paid by Ramsankar on behalf of the defendant (q. 56). The word 'karaya' in Exhibit 'd' has been changed into 'kist' (q. 63). The rent of the shop was paid @ Rs.50/- per month from time to time (q. 69). 30. In qs. 76 to 119 Ramchandra was cross-examined on payment of rent by the defendant to Ramsankar. He has no personal knowledge of these payments excepting that he had heard from Ramsankar. Rents were paid to the agents of the landlady, a European lady, who was not in India. Ram Chandra does not know the agent. He ultimately admits that rent was payable to the Administrator General and Official Trustee of West Bengal. He never had any occasion to look at any rent receipt. He was confronted with a large number of rent receipts collectively marked as an exhibit wherefrom it appears that there was a shoproom and a godown and the rents thereof respectively were Rs.74/4/- per month sand Rs.18/9/- per month. These were rent receipts from 1949 to 1954. Ramchandra did not want to admit the signatures on the receipts or the correctness thereof. He wanted to see the receipts for 1945 or 1948, The witness was cross-examined further on rent receipts in qs 139 to 156 and being embarrassed by the questions put to him he started pointing out various defects in the receipts with regard to the name of the business and the address which are of no substance whatsoever. In Qs. 160 to 190 he again tried to say that the word 'karayal has been changed into 'kisti' in Exhibit 'd'. He would not admit that the word is 'mahina'. 31. I have no hesitation in rejecting the evidence of Ramchandra Pandey on this issue. In Qs. 160 to 190 he again tried to say that the word 'karayal has been changed into 'kisti' in Exhibit 'd'. He would not admit that the word is 'mahina'. 31. I have no hesitation in rejecting the evidence of Ramchandra Pandey on this issue. He has miserably failed in his cross-examination to support his case that the rent of the shop was Rs.50/- per month and that the defendant paid rents through Ramsankar and the Exhibit, 'd' is a receipt granted by Ramsankar in respect of rent. I do not accept his case of interpolation. I accept the evidence of Ramlal Pandey, the defendant that the rents of the two rooms were Rs.74/4/- and Rs.18/9/- respectively (Qs. 446 to 448) He is supported by Bishnupada Roy, an employee in the office of the administrator-General. I also accept his evidence that the word which is alleged to have been changed in Exhibit 'd' is neither 'karaya' nor 'kisti' but 'manilla' and there has been no interpolation in or tampering with this document: Vide Qs. 866 to 908. There are a number of alterations in this document and considering the evidence of Ramchandra and Ramlal it seems to me that these alterations were made by the writer and not by only one else. I may also mention that it is not the plaintiff's case that there has been any interpolations in Exhibit 6'. This document does rot state that any amount was being paid to Ramsankar as rent. 32. It is true that in paragraph 2 of the written statement the allegation is that maintenance of Rs.100/- per month was reduced to Rs.50/- per month from September 1953 by consent of parties. After hearing the evidence of Ramlal my impression is that this statement has been inadvertently made. I hold in the premises that the amount of maintenance was reduced from Rs.100/- per month to Rs.50/-per month from August 1953. 33. In paragraph 7 of the plaint a sum of Rs 3,250/- has been claimed, particulars where of are as follows: (i) Arrears of maintenance due to Ram Sankar Pandey from September 1958 to March 1956 at the rate of Rs.100/- per month; Rs. 3,100/- (ii) Arrears of maintenance due to plaintiff from April 1956 to September 1956 at the rate of Rs.25/- per month: Rs. 150/-Total Rs 3,250/- 34. 3,100/- (ii) Arrears of maintenance due to plaintiff from April 1956 to September 1956 at the rate of Rs.25/- per month: Rs. 150/-Total Rs 3,250/- 34. In view of my decision on issue No. 4 Ramsankar was entitled to maintenance not at the rate of Rs.100/- but at the rate of Rs.50/- per month from August 1953. He had received his maintenance up to September 1953. The first item of the particulars, therefore, would have to be reduced to Rs.1500/- and the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for Rs.1650/ -. Since the plaintiff has failed to establish her principal claim in respect of arrears of maintenance payable to Ramsankar to the fullest extent, I propose to deprive her of one half of costs of this suit. In the result, therefore, there will be a decree for Rs.1,650/ -. The plaintiff is entitled to one-half of the taxed costs of the suit.