Ganapatia Pillai, J.- This is a debtor’s Insolvency Petition under sections 10, 14 and 15 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act for adjudication of the applicant. When the proceeding originally came up before the Master he passed an order directing the matter to be placed before the Insolvency Judge since the question of jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the application was raised by the Official Assignee which is not settled by any authoritative decision of this Court. When the matter came up before the insolvency Judge (one of us) it was found that there was a conflict between the view taken by Ramaswami, J., in Thangiah v. Hanuman Bank1, following certain decisions of the Orissa High Court and the view taken by Ramachandra Iyer, J., in Shenoy v. Raghunath2, regarding the scope and effect of sections 45-A and 45-B of the Indian Banking Companies Act as amended in 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Thereupon at the instance of one of us this petition has been referred to this Bench. The petitioner was carrying on a business in Dindigul which failed and a creditor of the petitioner obtained a decree for money against the petitioner and got him arrested in execution of that decree. Thereupon the petitioner filed I.P. No. 5 of 1959 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Dindigul. One of the creditors of the petitioner is the Kannika Bank Limited, Dindigul, which is under liquidation by order of this Court. The Official Liquidator of the Kannika Bank raised an objection before the Subordinate Judge of Dindigul to the maintainability of the insolvency petition and the Subordinate Judge held that the insolvency proceeding could not be commenced without the leave of this Court which had charge of the winding up proceedings of the Kannika Bank and dismissed the insolvency petition. Thereupon the petitioner filed C.M.A. No. 45 of 1950 in the District Court, Madurai, against that order and that Court also dismissed the appeal relying upon the decision of Ramaswami, J. in Thangiah v. Hanuman Bank1. Against the order of the District Court a C.M.S.A. has been filed by the petitioner in this Court. He has also filed an application on the Original Side of this Court asking leave of the Company Judge to institute the insolvency proceedings in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Dindigul. Against the order of the District Court a C.M.S.A. has been filed by the petitioner in this Court. He has also filed an application on the Original Side of this Court asking leave of the Company Judge to institute the insolvency proceedings in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Dindigul. We are not now concerned with the application for leave for instituting the insolvency proceeding in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Dindigul, which will be heard and disposed of by the Company Judge. It was the Official Assignee who raised before the Master and before one of us sitting as Insolvency Judge the question whether the High Court on the Insolvency Side had Jurisdiction to entertain this application. It is common ground that but for the winding up of the Kannika Bank by an order of this Court the insolvency Court having jurisdiction to entertain this debtor’s petition would be the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Dindigul, where the insolvent was carrying on business and where most of his assets are located. Mr. Vasudevan for the petitioner contends that the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Dindigul has lost jurisdiction to entertain this application by reason of the provisions of sections 45-A and 45-B of the Act. Before we deal with the argument addressed to us which indeed covered a wide field it may be necessary to state that we are not called upon to decide in an abstract manner what all proceedings are covered by section 45-B which gives exclusive jurisdiction to the High Court as the Company Court to entertain and decide claims by and against a Banking Company in liquidation. The short question for our determination is whether by reason of the provisions of sections 45-A and 45-B of the Act the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge of Dindigul which would be the Insolvency Court having jurisdiction under the Provincial Insolvency Act, if it applied to this case, is taken away and such jurisdiction is vested in this Court. By the Amending Act of 1950 Part III-A containing sections 45-A to 45-H was first inserted in the Banking Companies Act, 1949. By the Amending Act of 1953 that Part was enlarged and re-cast and the present provisions of sections 45-A to 45-X were introduced into the Act. By the Amending Act of 1950 Part III-A containing sections 45-A to 45-H was first inserted in the Banking Companies Act, 1949. By the Amending Act of 1953 that Part was enlarged and re-cast and the present provisions of sections 45-A to 45-X were introduced into the Act. Sections 45-A and 45-B, as amended in 1953 read thus: “45-A. Part III-A to override other laws.-The provisions of this Part and the rules made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (I of 1956) or the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908) or the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898) or any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law ; but the provisions of any such law or instrument in so far as the same are not varied by, or inconsistent with, the provisions of this Part or rules made thereunder shall apply to all proceedings under this Part. "45-B Power of High Court to decide all claims in respect of banking companies.-The High Court shall, save as otherwise expressly provided in section 45-C, have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and decide any claim made by or against a banking Company which is being wound up (including claims by or against any of its branches in India) or any application made under section 391 of the Companies Act 1956 (I of 1956) by or in respect of a banking company or any question of priorities or any other question whatsoever, whether of law or fact which may relate to or arise in the course of the winding up of a banking company, whether such claim or question has arisen or arises or such application has been made or is made before or after the date of the order or the winding up of the banking Company or before or after the commencement of the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1953. " It is unnecessary to refer to old sections 45-A and 45-B of the Amending Act of 1950 as the new sections 45-A and 45-B have taken their place and they alone apply to this case. " It is unnecessary to refer to old sections 45-A and 45-B of the Amending Act of 1950 as the new sections 45-A and 45-B have taken their place and they alone apply to this case. An analysis of the two sections yields the following result: exclusive jurisdiction is given to the High Court (the Court winding up the banking company to entertain and decide (a) any claim made by a banking company which is being wound up, (b) any claim against such a banking company, (c) any question of priorities arising in the course of winding up of such company, and (d) any other question of law or fact which may relate to or arise in the course of the winding up of such company. Mr. Vasudevan, counsel for the petitioner, confined his arguments to the last clause in the above analysis and contended that this proceeding, viz., the insolvency petition filed by the debtor though it did not arise in the course of the winding up of the banking company at least related to the winding up of such company. That is the narrow compass within which we have to decide the question arising in this case. Mr. Vasudevan referred to the history of the various amendments of the Act for pointing out the purpose for which the Amending Act of 1953 was enacted. He relied on the following passage in the Statement of Objects and Reasons: "Experience of the liquidation of a large number of banks that fell during the post-war and post-partition period disclosed that the procedure for the liquidation of joint stock companies was totally inadequate for the liquidation of banking companies in a manner satisfactory to the depositors. A bank has a far larger number of debtors than a joint stock company of a comparable size and the necessity to pursue legal proceedings against each debtor quite frequently in different Courts involved considerable expenditure and immense delay. In order to remove such difficulties the Banking Companies Act was amended in 1950. The law thus amended, however, did not go far enough and complaints continued to be received about the distress to the depositors. In order to remove such difficulties the Banking Companies Act was amended in 1950. The law thus amended, however, did not go far enough and complaints continued to be received about the distress to the depositors. The Committee was therefore appointed in July, 1950 to examine the difficulties and defects in the existing liquidation proceedings and to recommend changes in law, procedure and machinery in order to facilitate the speedy disposal of proceedings in liquidation." He stressed that the Amending Act of 1953 was therefore intended to prevent considerable expense and immense delay involved in the Official Liquidator being compelled to pursue legal proceedings against debtors of banking companies in various Courts and to facilitate speedy disposal of proceedings in liquidation. It is of course manifest that in giving exclusive jurisdiction to the High Court under section 45-B the object was not only speedy disposal of the liquidation proceeding but also to avoid recourse to a multiplicity of Courts. Giving due weight to these objects of the enactment we are not satisfied that in interpreting the language of section 45-B we are compelled to hold that an application for adjudication in insolvency by a debtor of a banking company in liquidation should come up before the liquidation Court. For our present purpose section 45-B may be condensed to read as follows: "The High Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and decide any claim which may relate to the winding up of a banking company". The claim to be adjudged insolvent by a debtor of a banking company Mr. Vasudevan argued, related to the winding up of the company because it affected the speedy realisation of the debt due to the banking company in liquidation and also the amount which may be realisable from that debtor. Mr. Vasudevan relied on some decisions which have interpreted the phrase. Vasudevan argued, related to the winding up of the company because it affected the speedy realisation of the debt due to the banking company in liquidation and also the amount which may be realisable from that debtor. Mr. Vasudevan relied on some decisions which have interpreted the phrase. "any other question whatever whether of law or fact which may relate to" a winding up of a banking company occurring in section 45-B. In Jadunath v. Bank of Calcutta1, a Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court had to consider the question whether a suit filed against a banking company under liquidation for partition of certain immovable properties could be proceeded against in the Court in which the suit had been originally instituted, or the High Court alone had jurisdiction to proceed further with that suit after the order for winding up of the company had been made. For that purpose the Court had to consider the language of section 11 of the Banking Companies Act of 1949 as it originally stood and which has now been replaced by section 45-C in Part III-A as introduced by the Amending Act of 1953. By reading section 11 along with sections 45-A and 45-B as they stood before the amendment in 1953 the Court posed the question for consideration thus: whether the proceeding in question has arisen out of or arises in the course of the winding up of the banking company. The Court assumed that the partition suit had not arisen out of the winding up but held that it arose in the course of the winding up. In coming to this conclusion the Court thought that the phrase “in the course of” means during the winding up. The reason given by the Court for holding that the partition suit must be deemed to have arisen in the course of the winding up was that it became necessary to make the liquidator a party to that proceeding. Following up this line of reasoning the Court laid down the test in such cases to be that if at any stage of a proceeding the liquidator becomes a party to it, it arises in the course of the winding up. Mr. Following up this line of reasoning the Court laid down the test in such cases to be that if at any stage of a proceeding the liquidator becomes a party to it, it arises in the course of the winding up. Mr. Vasudevan urged upon us that this test should be adopted in the present case also and since in the insolvency proceeding the liquidator should be made a party as one of the creditors of the insolvent, the proceeding should be deemed to arise in the course of the winding up, or at least should be deemed to relate to the winding up of the banking company. Before considering whether the test propounded by the Bench applies here we must make the comment that the authority of the ruling in the decision may not apply to this case because admittedly the insolvency proceeding here does not arise in the course of the liquidation proceeding. But, even granting that the test laid down in the above mentioned case would apply here, we have to see how far that test would be valid in the different context with which we are faced. The suit in the above decision was in respect of a property which was held by the bank as owner. Any claim made against that property in the hands of the bank under liquidation would be certainly a claim against the company. Obviously that would fall under the second class provided by section 45-B out of four classes of cases indicated in a prior portion of our judgment. On that ground alone the test propounded in the above decision cannot be held applicable to the present case. Ramachandra Iyer, J., had to deal with a similar question in a different context in Shenoy v. Raghunath1. Counsel who appeared in that case relied upon a number of decisions for the contention that proceedings unconnected with the winding up would still come within the ambit of the exclusive jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court under section 45-B and all these decisions have been relied on by Mr. Vasudevan in his argument before us. They are Dhirendra Chandra Pal v. Associated Bank of Tripura, Ltd.2; Shri Ram Narain v. The Simla Banking and Industrial Company, Ltd.3; Discount Bank of India v. Triloki Nath4, Gurbinder Singh v. Munshi Ram5. Vasudevan in his argument before us. They are Dhirendra Chandra Pal v. Associated Bank of Tripura, Ltd.2; Shri Ram Narain v. The Simla Banking and Industrial Company, Ltd.3; Discount Bank of India v. Triloki Nath4, Gurbinder Singh v. Munshi Ram5. As is pointed out by Ramachandra Iyer, J., Dhirendra Chandra Pal v. Associated Bank of Tripura, Ltd.2, related to a dispute between a person who was a tenant of the bank and the Official Liquidator and there the question which arose at the instance of the tenant of the bank was held to be a claim against the bank. That decision has therefore no application here. In Shri Ram Narain v. The Simla Banking and Industrial Co. Ltd.3, the Supreme Court had to deal with a claim against a bank in liquidation in respect of its liability. That also falls under the category of the rule in Dhirendra Chandra Pal v. Associated Bank of Tripura, Ltd. 2, and cannot apply to the facts of the present case. In Discount Bank of India v. Triloki Nath4, there was a claim by the bank against one of its constituents by way of a suit. As the suit related to realisation of a debt due to the bank the Court ruled that it related to the winding up or the bank and therefore the suit ought to be exclusively tried by the winding up Court What we said above with reference to the two Supreme Court cases equally applies here. But, in Gurbinder Singh v. Munshi Ram5, the question was whether a suit by an assignee of a mortgage from a bank on the mortgage against a third party would come under the provisions of section 45-B of the Act. The learned Judges in that decision held that in regard to pleas raised in that suit wherein the bank was impleaded as a party the claim amounted to a claim against the bank and the suit was therefore triable only by the High Court., viz., the Court which was in charge of the winding up proceedings of the Bank. That principle falls outside the scope of the controversy now before us. None of these decisions, therefore help Mr. Vasudevan in sustaining his argument that the insolvency proceeding now before us either arises in the course of the winding up proceedings of the Kannika Bank. Mr. That principle falls outside the scope of the controversy now before us. None of these decisions, therefore help Mr. Vasudevan in sustaining his argument that the insolvency proceeding now before us either arises in the course of the winding up proceedings of the Kannika Bank. Mr. Vasudevan laid particular stress on the judgment of Ramaswami, J., in Tharigia v. Hanuman Bank1, where that learned Judge had to deal with the question of interpretation of section 45-B and, in so doing, he accepted as correct two decisions of the Orissa High Court in H. Naik v. Jitendranath Das2, and H. Naik v. Kanhu Charan.3As was observed by Ramachandra Iyer, J., in Shenoy v. Raghunath4, the facts of the decision in Thangia v. Hanuman Bank1, probably justified the view taken by the learned Judge (Ramaswami, J.) as it could be contended that the properties in respect of which pattas were claimed by the ryots in that litigation were properties owned by the Hanuman Bank in liquidation. It is however, not clear from that decision whether such properties were acquired by the bank during the course of the winding up or even before the winding up order was made. Any way, the claim made by the ryots for patta would come under the category of a claim against the bank in respect of its assets. But, in construing section 45-B Ramaswami, J., approved of the two decisions of the Orissa High Court as laying down the correct rule. We will therefore straightaway address ourselves to those decisions. But before we do so we may point out that one of the reasons which impelled Ramaswami, J., to take the view which he did was that the term “claim” occurring in section 45-B was a word of very extensive signification embracing every species of legal demand. According to the learned Judge, it was one of the largest words of law and included “demand” and “debt” and also signified a demand made up of a right or supposed right, a calling of another to pay something due or supposed to be due, as a claim for wages or services. In our opinion, the wide significance of that term ought not to be given undue importance in interpreting the language of section 45-B by reference to the object of the legislation. In our opinion, the wide significance of that term ought not to be given undue importance in interpreting the language of section 45-B by reference to the object of the legislation. It is an accepted principle of interpretation that every general term occurring in a statute should be construed with reference to its context. In our opinion the word “claim” should therefore be construed in a restricted sense with reference to the context in which it occurs in section 45-B. We shall now examine the reasoning of the learned Judge (Narasimham, J., as he then was) in H. Naik v. Jitendranath Das2. There a judgment-debtor of a banking company in liquidation filed a petition before the District Judge of Mayurbhanj for being adjudged insolvent. He also filed an application before the Orissa High Court for granting him permission to proceed with that insolvency petition. The question for consideration was, where a banking company under liquidation was a decreeholder, whether its judgment-debtor was entitled to prosecute his petition for insolvency before the District Court with the permission of the High Court, or whether the High Court alone had jurisdiction to entertain such a petition. After noticing that the provisions of the Provincial Insolvency Act must give way before the provisions of the Banking Companies Act the learned Judge held that the proposed insolvency petition before the District Court was a proceeding which related to the winding up of the banking company and consequently the High Court alone had exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the insolvency petition. The learned Judge relied upon Jadunath v. Bank of Calcutta5, for holding that the insolvency proceeding related to the winding up of the bank. We have already examined that decision and pointed out that the facts of that case do not justify the inference that the rule laid down therein applied to a case where exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on the High Court merely by reason of the proceeding in question being related to the winding up of the banking company. On the other hand, that decision laid down that the proceeding in question there arose “in the course of”or during the winding up proceeding. It is true the expression “relating to the winding up” is much wider and more extensive than the expression “arising out of the winding up”. On the other hand, that decision laid down that the proceeding in question there arose “in the course of”or during the winding up proceeding. It is true the expression “relating to the winding up” is much wider and more extensive than the expression “arising out of the winding up”. But even so one has to examine whether a claim for adjudication as an insolvent by a debtor of the banking company would relate to the winding up proceeding. At the highest it can be said that there is a distant connection between the insolvent proceeding and the winding up proceeding since the adjudication of the debtor as an insolvent might affect the prospect of early realisation of the debt due to the banking company from its debtor. Even this statement must be a qualified statement because it is common knowledge that even without a person being adjudged insolvent he may not have sufficient resources to pay up the entire debt due by him to the banking company under liquidation and consequently early collection of debt due by him to the banking company would be a problematical affair. It will be pertinent for us in this connection to examine the scope of a proceeding by a debtor for being adjudged insolvent. The social object or purpose of bankruptcy law is not to enable creditors to realise their debts due by insolvent debtors. It object is as much the promotion of trade and the protection of the community against the continued activities of citizens who are insolvent by borrowing moneys even after they become insolvent as the protection of the insolvent himself and his rehabilitation. As an ancillary to the carrying out of these objects various provisions are found in the bankruptcy law prohibiting undischarged insolvents from borrowing moneys and for the realisation of the assets of the insolvents and distribution of the proceeds among the creditors. Incidentally we may notice that the bankruptcy law affects the status of the insolvent who is deprived of many of the legal rights possessed by the citizens of the country in the matter of ability to enter into contracts, for dealing with his properties and for borrowing moneys on his being adjudged insolvent. To view the bankruptcy law as a device for the realisation of the assets of insolvent debtors and distribution of the proceeds among their creditors is, in our opinion, an erroneous assumption. To view the bankruptcy law as a device for the realisation of the assets of insolvent debtors and distribution of the proceeds among their creditors is, in our opinion, an erroneous assumption. Indeed, it is within our experience that in some insolvency cases though the person who is adjudged insolvent is not able to meet his liabilities as and when they fall due, on his estate being administered by the Receiver in bankruptcy sufficient money is realised and the entire debt due by him to the creditor gets paid up. The notion, therefore, that the adjudication of a person as an insolvent necessarily affects the rights which his creditors have in getting paid the entire money due to them by the insolvent may not be correct. It is true such adjudication alters the ordinary remedy which the creditors have in recovering their debts from the insolvent or from his estate. In that sense the banking company in liquidation could not pursue its ordinary remedy for recovering the debt from the insolvent debtor but must apply to the Receiver in insolvency for payment of the debt. True there may be some delay in the realisation of the assets of the insolvent and the creditors being paid dividends. This aspect has been stressed by the learned Judge (Narasimham, J.), as one of the main reasons why an application for adjudication of a debtor of a banking company in liquidation should be held to relate to the winding up of the company. With all respect to the learned Judge we are unable to see how this purpose behind the legislation (section 45-B of the Banking Companies Act) could affect the interpretation of the language of the enactment. As was pointed out by Ramachandra Iyer, J., in Shenoy v. Raghunath1, the interest which a banking company has over a security in the shape of a mortgage of immoveable property belonging to one of its debtors is in the nature of a commercial interest. No higher could be the interest of a bank in the question whether one of its debtors should be adjudged insolvent or not. No higher could be the interest of a bank in the question whether one of its debtors should be adjudged insolvent or not. The facts of the case show that in respect of the property for which partition was sought in the application before the learned Judge (Ramachandra Iyer, J.) the banking company held a mortgage from the manager of the joint family to which the applicants belonged and it had no interest at all in the property except in its character as a mortgagee. The banking company itself was not the owner of the property and consequently, as was pointed out by Ramachandra Iyer, J. it could not be said that the claim for partition of that property was a claim against the bank. We are in respectful agreement with the view of Ramachandra Iyer, J. and, it follows, that the mere possibility of the debt due to a banking company in liquidation being reduced by the adjudication of the debtor as an insolvent would not render the proceeding for adjudication of the debtor a claim against the bank, or a claim relating to the winding up of the bank. Even this, as we have pointed out earlier, is only a qualified possibility since in certain contingencies it may cease to exist when the Receiver in bankruptcy is able to pay all the debts in full from out of the assets realised by him. We may also contemplate another contingency in which the insolvency of a debtor of a banking company in liquidation may have no relation at all to the winding up of that company. It is well-known that under the provisions of the winding up of companies the liquidator is given power with the sanction of the Court to sell outstandings due to the company outright instead of instituting proceedings for the recover) ‘of those outstandings. When such sale takes place and money is realised by the liquidator from the purchaser, the banking company ceases to have any interest in the concerned outstanding. The result would be that on such sale taking place by the liquidator the bank will have no more interest in the solvency or otherwise of its debtor. If we accept Mr. When such sale takes place and money is realised by the liquidator from the purchaser, the banking company ceases to have any interest in the concerned outstanding. The result would be that on such sale taking place by the liquidator the bank will have no more interest in the solvency or otherwise of its debtor. If we accept Mr. Vasudevan’s argument and hold that the High Court alone has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain this insolvency petition and after the insolvency petition is entertained by the High Court the liquidator happens to sell outright the outstanding due to the bank by the petitioner in the insolvency proceeding, what would happen to the pending insolvency proceedings? According to Mr. Vasudevan, after such outstanding is sold outright by the liquidator to a third party the Company Court could transfer the insolvency proceeding to the Subordinate Judge of Dindigul who would have had jurisdiction to entertain the insolvency petition but for the provision of section 45-B of the Act. The Official Assignee contested this position and argued that if the Subordinate Judge of Dindigul had no initial jurisdiction to entertain the insolvency application he would acquire no such jurisdiction merely because the debt due to the bank had ceased to be a debt of that character. It is not necessary to investigate the question further to find out if such transfer of a proceeding is permissible under the Companies Act in the case of a banking company under liquidation because the language of section 45-B does not lend any support to the view that the vesting of exclusive jurisdiction in the High Court is conditional or could be displaced subsequently by the happening of any event like the one mentioned by us above. The learned Judge (Narasimham, J.) thought that the question whether a debtor of a banking company should be adjudged insolvent and should get the protection of the insolvency law was a matter relating to the winding up of a banking company both because of the object of section 45-B of the Act and of the repercussions which the adjudication of a debtor of a banking company as an insolvent would have upon the remedies which the liquidator of the banking company would otherwise have had in collecting the debts due to the banking company. In our opinion, these two reasons do not touch the crux of the question for our consideration, viz., the true interpretation of section 45-B of the Act. The literal interpretation of the language of section 45-B might afford some support to the argument of Mr. Vasudevan. But in our opinion, this rule of interpretation of statutes is subject to a well-known exception. In Alangavaram v. Municipal Council, Pollachi1, Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., has referred to this matter. And, he has extracted the observations of Pollack, C.B. in Waugh v. Middleton1, and of Lord Selbome in Caledonian Railway v. North British Railway Co.2. We reproduce the observations of the learned Judges extracted in that decision: “However plain the apparent grammatical construction of a sentence, may be, if it be perfectly clear from the contents of the same document that the apparent grammatical construction cannot be the true one, then that which, upon the whole, is the true meaning shall prevail, in spite of the grammatical construction of a particular part of it (Pollock, G.B. in Waugh v. Middleton1)”. Lord Selborne said: “The mere literal construction of a statute ought not to prevail, if it is opposed to the intention of the Legislature, as apparent by the statute; and, if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction by which that intention can be better effectuated.” Having this rule in mind we shall now examine the language of section 45-B. The object of the legislature in enacting this provision was to confer exclusive jurisdiction upon the High Court engaged in the winding up of the banking company in respect of certain proceedings which but for such provision could not be entertained by this Court. In indicating the class of such proceedings the Legislature adopted the method of a classification into four categories. The first two categories come under claims made by or against a banking company which is being wound up. The third category relates to cases of priority arising during the winding up proceeding. Such question may be as between the banking company in its capacity as a creditor and a third party. The last category relates to questions whether of law or fact, which relate to or arise in the course of a winding up of a banking company. The third category relates to cases of priority arising during the winding up proceeding. Such question may be as between the banking company in its capacity as a creditor and a third party. The last category relates to questions whether of law or fact, which relate to or arise in the course of a winding up of a banking company. In our view the only permissible course of construction of the last class is to read in juxtaposition with the three other preceding classes of cases. Though the expression “question of law or fact which may relate to the winding up of a banking company” is very wide in its signification, it must be understood with reference to its local colour or context. Read in this manner, the question of law or fact which could be said to relate to the winding up of a banking company must be a question in the nature of a claim made by a bank or against a bank or in the nature of a priority arising during the course of winding up or related to the winding up proceeding as affecting any of the assets held by the banking company in liquidation. Viewed in this manner the only conclusion possible seems to be that a question relating to the insolvency of a debtor of a banking company in liquidation does not relate to the winding up of that company. The learned Judge (Narasimham, J.,) in the next decision in H. Naik v. Kanhu Charan3, had to consider the question whether the claim of a banking company under liquidation for payment of its dues out of the compensation money due to one of its debtors under the Orissa Estates Abolition Act (I of 1952) was a claim which fell within the ambit of section 45-B of the Act. In answering this question in the affirmative the learned Judge observed that the question whether the amount due to the banking company should be realised in one lump sum or in instalments was a question of fact relating to the winding up of the banking company and would be thus within the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court, and, consequently section 37(3) of the Orissa Act which provided for payment of the compensation in instalments should give way before the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 45-B of the Act and the High Court would have power to ignore the former provisions. We can only say with respect to the learned Judge that the proposition thus stated appears to be too wide and not warranted by the language of section 45-B. Nothing which we have said so far should affect the question, or we should be deemed to have impliedly decided the question whether the leave of the company Judge would be necessary for prosecuting the insolvency proceeding before the Subordinate Judge, Dindigul. With respect, we dissent from the construction of section 45-B accepted by Ramaswami, J., following the two decisions of the Orissa High Court mentioned above, and we agree with Ramachandra Iyer, J., in the interpretation placed upon it by him in Shenoy v. Raghunath1. The only other decision that remains to be noticed is that of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Vijaya Commercial Bank v. Sivaramakrishnayya2. In that case Satyanarayana Raju, J., considered the very point which arises for our determination now. The learned Judge accepted the view of Ramaswami, J., in Thangia v. Hanuman Bank3, and in support of that view he has referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court and the various High Courts which have been already noticed by us and distinguished. We do not find any other reason advanced by the learned Judge which requires special notice except the following observation of Ramachandra Iyer, J., in Shenoy v. Raghunath1, quoted and relied on by him. We do not find any other reason advanced by the learned Judge which requires special notice except the following observation of Ramachandra Iyer, J., in Shenoy v. Raghunath1, quoted and relied on by him. “It is only those matters which will facilitate the winding up of the banking company, viz., the realisation of its assets and their distribution amongst the various persons entitled to them, that can properly be the subject-matter of an enquiry under section 45-B.” Commenting on this quotation the learned Judge Satyanarayana Raju, J., observed: “For the purpose of this case, it is not necessary to consider the soundness of this view. The matter arising in this application is one relating to the liquidation of the banking company, viz., the realisation of its assets and their distribution among the various persons entitled to them which, the aforesaid decision itself points out, can be the subject-matter of an enquiry under section 45-B.” With respect to the learned Judge we consider that the observation of Ramachandra Iyer, J., quoted by him does not bear the meaning which has been attributed to it by him. Even otherwise, we have already pointed out that the adjudication of a debtor of a banking company as insolvent does not affect the realisation of the assets of the banking company except by providing that instead of the liquidator filing a suit for realisation of the debt or getting an order of the Company Judge for payment of the debt he would have to apply to the Receiver in bankruptcy for payment of the debt or the dividend due upon that debt. In our opinion, by reason of this effect of adjudication of a debtor of a banking company that proceeding could not be said to be related intrinsically to the realisation of the assets of the banking company. We are, therefore, of the opinion that this Court, as having seizin of the winding up proceeding of the banking company, would have no jurisdiction to entertain the insolvency petition of the petitioner. The matter will now go before the Insolvency Judge for disposal. V.S. ----- Orders accordingly,