JUDGMENT Mukerji, J. - This is an appeal by the Plaintiffs against the dismissal of their suit by the Additional Civil Judge of Kanpur. 2. The Plaintiffs filed a suit for the recovery of Rs. 13,600 including interest on the foot of two promissory notes which were alleged to have been executed by one Ram Kumar the father of the minor Respondent, in favour of Madan Lal who was the father of the first Plaintiff and the husband of the second Plaintiff. 3. The promissory notes on which reliance was placed by the Plaintiffs were executed, one, on the 25th July 1945 and the other on the 26th July 1945 for a sum of Rs. 5000 each. In the plaint, by inadvertence, the second promissory note was shown to have been executed on the 26th of July 1946. The original promissory note makes it perfectly clear that the year 1946 shown in the plaint in respect of the second promissory note was a mistake and that the year of the execution of the second promissory note was also 1945. 4. The defence was a denial of liability under either of the two promissory notes. In para 7 of the additional pleas it was clearly stated that the Plaintiffs' allegation that Ram Kumar executed any ruqqa or receipt in favour of the Plaintiff was not admitted. There was a denial of not only execution in the narrow sense of the word but there was also a denial of consideration. The Defendant contended that Ram Kumar was a person of loose morals having been given to women and wine and because of these activities he incurred debts which could not be binding on the minor son, the Defendant of the suit. It was contended by the Defendants that there was no necessity for the loan alleged to have been taken and alleged to have been evidenced by the two promissory notes in the suit. 5. On the pleadings of the parties the court below framed the following issues: 1. Whether Ram Kumar executed the pro-notes in suit for consideration ? 2. Whether the money was borrowed for illegal and immoral purposes ? 3. To what relief, if any, and on what terms, is the Plaintiff entitled ? 6. 5. On the pleadings of the parties the court below framed the following issues: 1. Whether Ram Kumar executed the pro-notes in suit for consideration ? 2. Whether the money was borrowed for illegal and immoral purposes ? 3. To what relief, if any, and on what terms, is the Plaintiff entitled ? 6. The court below tried issues 1 and 2 together and, in effect, came to the conclusion that Ram Kumar did not execute the promissory note, as such, in favour of Madan Lal and further that the promissory notes were not proved to have been executed for consideration. The trial court also found that Ram Kumar led an immoral life and that he spent money which he obtained by all kind of means to sustain his immoral activities in connection with prostitution and drinking. In appeal the Plaintiffs Appellants have traversed the entire controversy which ranged between the parties. In the first instance, it was contended by Mr. Seth on behalf of the Appellants that the Judge below was wrong in holding that the promissory notes in the instant case had not been executed by Ram Kumar and that these promissory notes were not for consideration. Mr. Seth contended in other words that the mere fact that Ram Kumar led an immoral life did not necessarily make the debts in suit immoral debts which could not be paid by or which could not be recovered from the surviving Defendants of the suit. 7. Mr. Gour on the other side contended that on the evidence led in the case there could be no other conclusion save that the two promissory notes, which had been exhibited in the case and on which the Plaintiffs relied primarily for recovery of the debt, had not been proved to have been executed as promissory notes, entailing a liability by Ram Kumar. Mr. Gour strenuously contended that the evidence on the record completely demolished the Plaintiffs' contention that the promissory notes were for consideration and that under the circumstances of the case the Plaintiffs were not entitled to recover anything from the surviving minor Defendant. 8. Mr. Gour strenuously contended that the evidence on the record completely demolished the Plaintiffs' contention that the promissory notes were for consideration and that under the circumstances of the case the Plaintiffs were not entitled to recover anything from the surviving minor Defendant. 8. On the respective contentions, the points that arose for our determination were, first, whether in law it could be said on the evidence that the execution of promissory notes as such, by Ram Kumar had been established, secondly, whether in order to find consideration, in case it was established that the promissory notes had been properly executed, the presumption available u/s 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act could be available to the Plaintiffs as against the answering Defendants; and whether under the circumstances of the case could it be held that the promissory notes were for consideration. The last question that fell for determination was whether, even if the promissory notes had been executed by Ram Kumar and even if Ram Kumar had actually received consideration for them, would the minor Defendant be liable for the debt if it was found that Ram Kumar led an immoral existence ? 9. In the plaint Plaintiff Shyam Behari Lal, son of Madan Lal who had made the alleged advance on the two promissory notes, and Madan Lal's wife Smt. Bhaggo Devi, alleged that Ram Kumar took the loan payable on demand, or interest on 25th July 1945 and executed a ruqqa and a receipt for the satisfaction of the Plaintiff. Similarly, it was alleged in the plaint that Pt. Ram Kumar, father of Defendant No. l and husband of Defendant No. 2 (this Defendant died during the pendency of the case in the court below) later on took a loan on the 26th of July 1946 (it should be 1945) payable on demand, with interest, at a certain rate and "executed for the satisfaction of the Plaintiff a ruqqa and receipt which are attached to the plaint". The plaint as it was drawn up was not for the enforcement of a liability arising on a negotiable instrument. On the allegations of the plaint the liability which was attempted to be enforced against the Defendant was the liability that arose out of the borrowing and a reference appears to have been made to the two promissory notes in order to support the allegation that a loan had been taken. On the allegations of the plaint the liability which was attempted to be enforced against the Defendant was the liability that arose out of the borrowing and a reference appears to have been made to the two promissory notes in order to support the allegation that a loan had been taken. Some significance attaches to this distinction that has been noticed by us in the form and the drawing up of the plaint. The significance would be apparent when we consider, later, the question of the presumption which was pressed into service on behalf of the Plaintiff Appellants u/s 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 10. It is necessary at this stage to state some facts in order to see the background in which the alleged loan appears to have been taken by Ram Kumar's grandfather, Tulsi Ram, was a very rich man for he had made money in business at Kanpur. Tulsi Ram's son, Ram Nath, died in his life time with the result that Tulsi Ram had on his death left one brother of Ram Nath, named Ghannoo Lal , and Ram Nath's son Ram Kumar. Tulsi Rani died on the 27th of December 1944 having behind a large fortune in the hands of Channoo Lal and Ram Kumar. It appears that differences arose between the uncle and the nephew Ram Kumar, the allegation being that the difference arose because of the waywardness and the spend thrift habits which had been acquired by Ram Kumar because of his profligate tendencies. A partition was effected between the uncle and the nephew on the 25th of September 1945 so that after September 1945 Ram Kumar was left in sole possession of very large assets. The evidence also clearly indicated that Ram Kumar had, apart from the corpus which he inherited, quite a sizeable income out of the business contracts and business agencies. 11. The fact that Ram Kumar was a pro frigate cannot be seriously doubted on the evidence on record. That he was a spend thrift also can admit of little doubt. PW 2 Fatehchand admitted that Tulsi Ram, the grandfather of Ram Kumar, had distributed notices to the effect that Ram Kumar had become a man of loose character and that nobody should give him any loan. That he was a spend thrift also can admit of little doubt. PW 2 Fatehchand admitted that Tulsi Ram, the grandfather of Ram Kumar, had distributed notices to the effect that Ram Kumar had become a man of loose character and that nobody should give him any loan. In the statement of the Plaintiff, Shyam Behari Lal, there is in our opinion an implied admission that Ram Kumar was given to drinking for he did say in his cross examination this: "It is not a fact that he was heavily drunk on the day I reached there." 12. The Defendant's evidence on which the learned Judge below has relied clearly showed that Ram Kumar was given to drinking and prostitution and further that Shyam Behari Lal, the Plaintiff was also one of his companions in some of the drinking bouts and other immoral activities indulged in by Ram Kumar. 13. All the evidence which had been adduced in the case on behalf of either the Plaintiff or the Defendant has not been incorporated in this paper book so that we had to go through this evidence from the record. We could have refused to do so in view of an authority of this Court in Laiq Singh v. Jagdish Singh 1926 ALJ 918, but we thought that if we took that course we may have done injustice to the Appellant and therefore, we waded through the vernacular record to gather the entire evidence. * * * 14. The Plaintiff relied on Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for a presumption, that the negotiable Instruments in the case were made and drawn for consideration. The question that arises was whether the presumption permitted by Section 118 of the Negotiable Instrument Act could be drawn against a person who was not the executant of the document. Though the words of Section 118 were very wide and general, yet the intention does appear to have been that the presumption was intended to be made as between the parties to the instrument or those claiming under them. Though the words of Section 118 were very wide and general, yet the intention does appear to have been that the presumption was intended to be made as between the parties to the instrument or those claiming under them. In a case like the present one where a minor son is faced with the signature of his father on a promissory note and there is nothing more said in support of that signature as having been a conscious act of the father in respect of the drawing up of a negotiable instrument and when the father lived a life of immorality, could it be said that the law could have intended that a presumption could have been drawn on words of Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act or should the presumption be drawn in the circumstances narrated above. We find it a little hard to raise the presumption for We think that the legislature never intended the presumption to be made in a case of this nature and we feel heartened to find that a similar view had been taken in Anumolu Narayatia Rao v. Vinkatapiyya AIR 1937 Mad. 182 by a Bench consisting of Varadachariar and Mockett, JJ. Mr. Justice Varadachariar, who delivered the judgment of the Bench, stated this: S. 118. Cl (a), Negotiable Instruments Act, provides that every negotiable instrument shall be presumed to have been made & endorsed for consideration; and according to Cl. (g), the holder of a negotiable instrument shall be presumed to be a holder in due course. Though this section is not, like Ss. 119 to 122 limited in terms to a "suit upon the instrument", it seems only reasonable to hold that the "special rules of evidence" laid down in Section 118 must have been intended to apply only as between the parties to the instrument or those claiming under them. In other cases, the presumption can only be in the terms enacted in Section 114, Evidence Act: vide. III (c) which by the use of the expression 'may presume' leaves it to the Court to apply the presumption or not according to circumstances. In other cases, the presumption can only be in the terms enacted in Section 114, Evidence Act: vide. III (c) which by the use of the expression 'may presume' leaves it to the Court to apply the presumption or not according to circumstances. The learned Judge went on to say thereafter this: When a suit like the present is instituted against the undivided sons of a Hindu promisor governed by the Mitakshara law, the suit cannot be regarded as one against the heirs or representatives of the promisor, because it only seeks to enforce the Hindu law theory of pious obligation in respect of property which the sons have taken by survivorship. The pious obligation can arise only on the assumption of the existence of a debt due by the father; and this way of stating the position would prima facie throw on the creditor the onus of proving the existence of a debt. The learned Judges in the aforementioned case held that the onus of proving the existence of a debt must prima facie be laid on the creditor who can of course, they said, call up a presumption permissible under the law of evidence, namely u/s 114 of the Evidence Act. 15. Mockett, J., in the aforementioned case pointed out this: An examination of the Indian case law shows the complications which have arisen in suits apparently founded on promissory notes brought against members of the joint Hindu family, have been matters really of pleading and joinder of parties and causes of action. He further said this: It is natural that from Indian case law should guidance be sought when a relic of the law Merchant as to burden of proof is intermingled with the doctrine of family necessity. Mockeu, J., pointed out that when the suit was not against the maker of the negotiable instrument the essential features of the liability under the negotiable instrument was absent. Reliance was placed by him for this observation on the decision of the Privy Council in Sadsuk Janki Das v. Sri Krishen Pershad ILR 44 Cal. 663. Mockeu, J., pointed out that when the suit was not against the maker of the negotiable instrument the essential features of the liability under the negotiable instrument was absent. Reliance was placed by him for this observation on the decision of the Privy Council in Sadsuk Janki Das v. Sri Krishen Pershad ILR 44 Cal. 663. The suit in this case, as we pointed out earlier, was not in essence on the basis of the promissory notes, but was one on the basis of the loan, and, as Mockett, J., pointed out, when once this distinction is borne in the mind, namely the distinction between the suit being either on the promissory note or on the loan, little difficulty presented itself in regard to the obligation of the promisor provided for u/s 118 Negotiable Instruments Act. 16. From what has been said above we are of the opinion that on the frame of the suit the presumption u/s 118 was not really available to the Plaintiff and even if any presumption was available for service by the Plaintiff even then that presumption was more than rebutted by the circumstance that Ram Kumar who was the alleged borrower under the promissory notes was a very young man who had just come of age and who had fallen a victim to the influence of wine and women, for this circumstance in itself was enough to counter the presumption and leave the parties to prove their cases on the evidence led by them. In this connection it is appropriate in our view to notice the decision of this Court in Kadher Mal v. Kunwar Sheo Narain 1942 AWR (H.C.) 403 where the facts were as follows: S executed a promissory note in favour of K when he had just attained majority. S. on his means, apparently stood in no need of any money K. was a senior man and he indulged in drinking and Nautch parties. He got S a young and inexperienced man, in his control and initiated S into the mysteries of wine and women. In a suit on the basis of a promissory note executed by S in favour of K, S denied consideration. He got S a young and inexperienced man, in his control and initiated S into the mysteries of wine and women. In a suit on the basis of a promissory note executed by S in favour of K, S denied consideration. It was under the aforementioned circumstances held: That the presumption laid down by Section 118(sic) undoubtedly applied in favour of K but that presumption was considerably weakened by the circumstances enumerated above and when there was a clear denial on the part of S, the circumstances shifted the burden on to K and although K was not a money-lender and could not produce his books because be kept none the burden none the less lay on him. We are in respectful agreement with the view in the aforementioned case. Reference may also be made to a Bombay decision reported in Moti Gulab Chand v. Mahomed Mehdi Tharaia Topan ILR 20 Bom. 367. The Bombay case arose out of a suit brought by the Plaintiff to recover a certain amount of money on three promissory notes of Rs. 1,500. The defence was that the Defendant only received a part of the consideration of the promissory notes and that part of the consideration was immoral. Their Lordships in this case pointed out that the Defendant when he executed the notes sued upon, was a young man who had attained his majority nine months previously and when he appeared to be of an extravagant and reckless character, then the onus of proof in such a case lay on creditor. Their Lordships also pointed out that the ordinary presumption that a negotiable instrument had been executed for value was much weakened when the allegation was that full consideration had not been received and the allegation was in respect of a young man of the character mentioned above. This Bombay decision, we may point out, was relied upon by the learned Judges of this Court in Kadher Mal's case 1942 AWR (H.C.) 403. We may here refer to the proposition of law enunciated in Anumolu Narayana Rao's case AIR 1937 Mad. 182, cited earlier, by Varadachariar, J. The principle to which we wish now to refer to and rely on was stated thus: Where evidence has been adduced on both sides, the question of onus is a material or deciding factor only in exceptional circumstances. 182, cited earlier, by Varadachariar, J. The principle to which we wish now to refer to and rely on was stated thus: Where evidence has been adduced on both sides, the question of onus is a material or deciding factor only in exceptional circumstances. The Court can, not only base its conclusion on the effect of evidence taken as a whole, but, it may also draw an adverse inference against party who being in a position to adduce better evidence deliberately abstains from doing so. 17. In this particular case evidence had been led by both, the Plaintiff and the Defendant, on the question of consideration. There was, as noticed earlier, the evidence of the Plaintiff and Fateh Chand. There was a denial of consideration, and there were certain circumstances which undoubtedly appeared on the evidence on record and which made it very doubtful that consideration of the promissory notes did in fact pass. The evidence of Shyam Behari Lal (PW 1) and Fateh Chand (PW 2) was not of such an order as compelled acceptance. The trial court which had the advantage of seeing these witnesses in the witness box did not accept their statement, and we in appeal have seen no adequate reason to take a view different from that taken by the court below of their probative value. The circumstances which in our opinion made the passing of consideration doubtful were these: (1) that the creditor and the debtor were companions at drinking bouts, (2) that the debtor was a foolish young man who bad apparently more love for wine and women than for money, and (3) that there was atleast one promissory note produced in the case which was signed in blank by Ram Kumar and which, according to the testimony of Shambhu Narain (DW 2) had been given to him by the creditor Shyam Behari for being sold in the market. In our opinion, therefore, the totality of the circumstances and the weight of evidence was against our coming to the conclusion that the promissory notes which were relied upon by the Plaintiff for proving the debt alleged to have been incurred by Ram Kumar were for consideration. 18. In our opinion, therefore, the totality of the circumstances and the weight of evidence was against our coming to the conclusion that the promissory notes which were relied upon by the Plaintiff for proving the debt alleged to have been incurred by Ram Kumar were for consideration. 18. After we came to the conclusion that the promissory notes were not for consideration the question whether the money had been borrowed for immoral purposes or not becomes immaterial and we do not think we need enter into that question at any length but it should be sufficient for us to say that the evidence did not indicate that the money, if it had been borrowed, was specifically borrowed to be spent for immoral purposes though there were circumstances which raised a very great suspicion in our minds that the money if it had been taken must have been taken for finding funds for wine and women. 19. For the reasons given above, we have seen no reason to interfere with the decision of the court below. We accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs.