P. N. BHAGWATI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner who is accused No. 1 was along with accused No. 2 charge-sheeted for offences under sections 408 and 477a of the Indian Penal Code in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class Lunawada. There were various items in respect of which accused No. 1 was alleged to have committed breach of trust and falsification of accounts. The offences being triable as warrant cases the learned Magistrate adopted the procedure set out in Chapter XXI of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned Magistrate after going through the procedure prescribed by sub-sections (1) (2) and (3) of section 251a framed charges against accused No. 1 for offences under sections 408 and 477 of the Indian Penal Code on 21st July 1960. The hearing of the case was thereafter adjourned from time to time on one ground or the other. On 22nd December 1960 which was the adjourned date of the hearing of the case the Police Prosecutor filed an application before the learned Magistrate stating that since there were eight other cases filed against the petitioner and accused No. 2 for offences under sections 409 467 and 477 of the Indian Penal Code and that those cases were exclusively triable by the Court of Session and the evidence and witnesses in those cases and in the present case were common and since the amount involved in the present case was more than Rs. 7 0 the learned Magistrate should instead of proceeding with the trial before himself commit the petitioner and accused No. 2 for trial to the Court of Session. The learned Magistrate for reasons which I may set out in his own words committed the petitioner and accused No. 2 to the Court of Session to stand their trial for the offences under sections 408 and 477a of the Indian Penal Code. The reasons were as follows:there are eight (8) other cases against the present two accused for the offence of forgery and criminal breach of trust in respect of the money of the same society. In those eight cases the offence of forgery punishable under section 467 of the Indian Penal Code is exclusively triable by the Court of Session. I decided to commit those eight cases to the Sessions Court of Panch Mahals Godhra. The present case and those eight cases are inter-related. In those eight cases the offence of forgery punishable under section 467 of the Indian Penal Code is exclusively triable by the Court of Session. I decided to commit those eight cases to the Sessions Court of Panch Mahals Godhra. The present case and those eight cases are inter-related. The witnesses and the evidence are mostly common. The record accounts and vouchers produced are also common in all cases. For the reasons it is desirable that the present case be tried by the Sessions Court in order to secure a fair trial of all the cases. Moreover in the present case there is a charge for the misappropriation of a big amount of Rs. 7 225 ( 2 ) THE petitioner being aggrieved by the order of committal passed by the learned Magistrate filed a Revision Application in the Court of the Sessions Judge Panch Mahals Godhra. The learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that of the two grounds given by the learned Magistrate the ground based on the allegation that the eight cases in which the petitioner was committed to the Court of Session were inter-related with the present case and that the evidence oral as well as documentary would be mostly common in all the cases was not a valid ground on the basis of which an order of committal could be made by the learned Magistrate under section 347 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned Sessions Judge however held that the second ground on which the learned Magistrate had made the order of committal was that in his opinion the offence was one which could not be adequately punished by him and that the learned Magistrate was therefore justified in making the order of committal against the petitioner. The learned Sessions Judge accordingly dismissed the Revision Application. The petitioner thereupon filed the present Revision Application before this Court. ( 3 ) MR. I. C. Bhatt learned advocate on behalf of the petitioner contended that the learned Sessions Judge was not right in observing that the ground on which the learned Magistrate had made the order of committal was that in his opinion the offence was one which could not be adequately punished by him. Mr. ( 3 ) MR. I. C. Bhatt learned advocate on behalf of the petitioner contended that the learned Sessions Judge was not right in observing that the ground on which the learned Magistrate had made the order of committal was that in his opinion the offence was one which could not be adequately punished by him. Mr. I. C Bhatt drew my attention to paragraph 18 of the judgment of the learned Magistrate which sets out the reasons which induced the learned Magistrate to make the order of committal. This paragraph contains as I have already pointed out above two grounds in support of the order of committal. The First ground is: ( 4 ) THE present case and those eight cases are inter-related. The witnesses and the evidence are mostly common. The record accounts and vouchers produced are also common in all cases. For the reasons it is desirable that the present case be tried by the Sessions Court in order to secure a fair trial of all the cases. ( 5 ) THEN follows the second ground which is set out in the following words:moreover in the present case there is a charge for the misappropriation of a big amount of Rs. 7 225 ( 6 ) THESE two are the only grounds on the basis of which the learned Magistrate made the order of committal. The first ground was rejected by the learned Sessions Judge as a valid ground for making an order of committal. The second ground was construed by the learned Sessions Judge as meaning that in the opinion of the learned Magistrate the offence was one which could not be adequately punished by him. I do not think the learned Sessions Judge was right in so construing the second ground. The second ground was merely this namely that the present case involved the misappropriation of a big amount of Rs. 7 225 The learned Magistrate did not apply his mind to the question whether the offence was one which could or could not be adequately punished by him but what impressed the learned Magistrate was the largeness of the amount which was involved in the present case. That is clearly a ground which is not permissible for making an order of committal. That is clearly a ground which is not permissible for making an order of committal. Marten J. in Emperor v. Achaldas Jethamal (XXVIII Bombay Law Reporter 293) also took the same view as appears clearly from the following passage in the judgment in that case:similarly too as regards the large amount of rupees viz. Rs. 4 0 of which the accused are alleged to have cheated the complainant. that in itself is not in our opinion a ground for committing the case to the Sessions. . . ( 7 ) IT is no doubt true that in the application which was made by the Police Prosecutor for committing the petitioner and accused No. 2 to the Court of Session it was mentioned as a ground in support of the application that the offence was one which could not be adequately punished by the learned Magistrate but it is apparent from the judgment that the learned Magistrate did not accept that ground. There is not a single word in the judgment of the learned Magistrate which would suggest even remotely that the learned Magistrate took the view that the offence was one which could not be adequately punished by him. As a matter of fact I very much doubt whether the learned Magistrate could have taken that view for the learned Magistrate framed a charge against the petitioner and accused No. 2 under sub-section (3) of section 251a and the charge could not have been framed unless the learned Magistrate had come to the conclusion that the offence was one which could be adequately punished by him. Having taken the view that the offence was one which could be adequately punished by him and having framed a charge against the petitioner and accused No. 2 on the basis of such view I do not see how the learned Magistrate could have possibly come to the conclusion that the offence was one which could not be adequately punished by him unless some further materlal was brought to his notice which I do not find in the present case. I am therefore of the opinion that the learned Magistrate did not make the order of committal on the ground that the offence was in his opinion one which could not be adequately punished by him. I am therefore of the opinion that the learned Magistrate did not make the order of committal on the ground that the offence was in his opinion one which could not be adequately punished by him. The second ground given by the learned Magistrate related only to the largeness of the amount involved and as I have already held it did not form a valid ground for the exercise of the legal discretion vested in the learned Magistrate. ( 8 ) THE first ground having been rejected by the learned Sessions Judge and the second ground being found not to be a valid ground for making an order of committal the order of committal would be liable to be set aside. But argued Mr. A. D. Desai learned Assistant Government leader appearing on behalf of the State the first ground was a valid ground on which the order of committal could be sustained and the order of committal should not therefore be set aside. Though the learned Sessions Judge held against the State on this part of the case and came to the conclusion that the first ground did not form a valid ground for making an order of committal Mr. A. D. Desai was entitle: to support the final order made by the learned Sessions Judge on this ground which was decided against the State. The question which must therefore be considered is whether the first ground which found favour with the learned Magistrate but which was rejected by the learned Sessions Judge could be considered to be a valid ground for the exercise of the legal discretion to make the order of committal. Before however I consider this question I must referto one other contention urged by Mr. I. C. Bhatt on behalf of the petitioner and it is that the learned Magistrate having framed a charge against the petitioner and accused No. 2 under sub-section (3) of section 251a it was not open to the learned Magistrate to make an order of committal under section 347. There is in my opinion no substance in this contention and I shall immediately proceed to state my reasons for the same. ( 9 ) SECTION 347 occurs in Chapter XXIV which is headed General provisions as to inquiries and trials. This Chapter as the very heading indicates contains general provisions which apply to all inquiries and trials. There is in my opinion no substance in this contention and I shall immediately proceed to state my reasons for the same. ( 9 ) SECTION 347 occurs in Chapter XXIV which is headed General provisions as to inquiries and trials. This Chapter as the very heading indicates contains general provisions which apply to all inquiries and trials. Chapter XX to XXIII contain detailed provisions in regard to the different modes of trials. Chapter XX deals with the trial of summons-cases by Magistrates; Chapter XXI deals with the trial of warrant-cases by Magistrates; Chapter XXII deals with summary trials while Chapter XXIII deals with trials before High Courts and Courts of Session. Then comes Chapter XXIV which contains general provisions applicable to all inquiries and trials. Section 347 which is one of the sections in this Chapter provides that if in any inquiry before a Magistrate or in any trial before a Magistrate before signing judgment it appears to him at any stage of the proceedings that the case is one which ought to be tried by the Court of Sessions or High Court and if he is empowered to commit for trial he shall commit the accused under the provisions hereinbefore contained. The provisions hereinbefore contained are obviously the provisions of Chapter XVIII which provide for inquiry into cases triable by the Court of Session or High Court. The language of section 347 is clear and explicit and there is no reason either on principle or on authority for cutting down the plain and grammatical meaning of the words employed in the section. Section 347 says in clear and unambiguous terms that if in any inquiry or trial before a Magistrate it appears to him at any stage of the proceedings that the case is one which ought to be tried by the Court of Session or High Court he shall commit the accused provided of course he is empowered to commit for trial. It may appear to the Magistrate at any stage of the trial that the case is one which ought to be tried by the Court of Session or High Court and in that event he must commit the accused. It may appear to the Magistrate at any stage of the trial that the case is one which ought to be tried by the Court of Session or High Court and in that event he must commit the accused. The words at any stage of the proceedings are words of the widest amplitude and I do not see why the plain and natural meaning of these words should be restricted by reference to the provisions of sub-section (3) of sec 251a or section 254. These words could according to their plain and grammatical connotation include the stage reached after a charge is framed under sub-section (3) of section 251a or section 254 and even at that stage according to section 347 if it appears to the Magistrate that the case is one which ought to be tried by the Court of Session or High Court he can commit the accused for trial to the Court of Session or High Court as the case may be. This construction which I am inclined to place on section 347 is supported by a decision of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court reported in Rex v. Matoley (A. I. R. 1949 Allahabad 1 ). I am therefore of the opinion that even though the learned Magistrate had framed a charge against the petitioner and accused No. 2 under sub-section (3) of section 251a it was open to the learned Magistrate to make an order of committal under section 347 provided of course the other conditions specified in that section were satisfied. ( 10 ) THAT takes me to the second contention urged by Mr. I. C. Bhatt which turns on the construction of the words the case is one which ought to be tried by the Court of Session or High Court in section 347. Mr. I. C. Bhatt urged that these words cover only those cases which the Magistrate is not competent to try or which in the opinion of the Magistrate cannot be adequately punished by him and that the learned Magistrate was therefore not entitled to make an order of committal under section 347 unless it appeared to him that the case was one which he was not competent to try or which could not be adequately punished by him. Mr. Mr. I. C. Bhatt relied on sub-section (3) of section 251a and section 254 and contended that if section 347 was read with those sections the conclusion pressed by him was inevitable. The argument of Mr. I. C. Bhatt was that under sub-section (3) of section 251a and section 254 the Magistrate could frame a charge against the accused only if the offence was one which the Magistrate could try and which in his opinion could be adequately punished by him and that once the Magistrate came to the conclusion that he was competent to try the offence and that the offence could be adequately punished by him he was bound to frame a charge against the accused. Then contended Mr. I. C. Bhatt the learned Magistrate was bound to proceed with the trial and it was not open to the learned Magistrate to make an order of committal under section 347. Sub-section (3) of section 351a and section 254 could according to Mr. I. C Bhatt be reconciled with section 347 by taking the view that it is only when the case is one which the Magistrate is not competent to try or which in his opinion cannot be adequately punished by him that it can be said to be one which ought to be tried by the Court of Session or High Court It is by this process of reasoning that Mr. I. C. Bhatt tried to limit and confine the meaning of the words the case is one which ought to be tried by the Court of Session or High Court to a case which the Magistrate is not competent to try or which in the opinion of the Magistrate cannot be adequately punished by him. Of course if this contention of Mr. I. C. Bhatt is sound the petitioner must succeed because in that event the first ground relied upon by Mr. A. D. Desai would not be within the scope and ambit of sec. 347. I am however of the opinion that this contention of Mr. I. C. Bhatt cannot be accepted. ( 11 ) THIS contention urged by Mr. I. C. Bhatt is really based on a Supposed antithesis between sub-section (3) of sec. 251a and sec. 254 on the one hand and section 347 on the other and Mr. 347. I am however of the opinion that this contention of Mr. I. C. Bhatt cannot be accepted. ( 11 ) THIS contention urged by Mr. I. C. Bhatt is really based on a Supposed antithesis between sub-section (3) of sec. 251a and sec. 254 on the one hand and section 347 on the other and Mr. I. C. Bhatt wants this antithesis to be resolved by placing a limited construction on the words the case is one which ought to be tried by the Court of Session or High Court in sec. 347. There is however really no antithesis between these sections. Section 347 is really in the nature of a supplementary provision and it operates as its very language indicates at any stage of the trial whenever it appears to the Magistrate that the case is one which ought to be tried by the Court of Session or High Court. It is not correct to state that once a charge is framed against the accused under sub-section (3) of sec. 251a or sec. 254 sec. 347 cannot apply. As I have already pointed out in the preceding paragraph of this judgment section 347 can apply also to a stage subsequent to the framing of the charge under sub-section (3) of section 251a or section 254. The learned Magistrate may have reached the opinion that he is competent to try the offence and that the offence is one which can be adequately punished by him and he may therefore have frame a charge against the accused under subsection (3) of section 251a or section 254 but thereafter it may appear to him that notwithstanding that the offence is one which he is competent to try and which in his opinion can be adequately punished by him the case is one which ought to be tried by the Court of Session or High Court. I do not see any reason why in such an event the Magistrate cannot commit the accused for trial under sec. 347. If the operation of section 347 in relation to warrant cases was confined to the stage before the framing of a charge under subsection (3) of sec. 251a or sec. 254 there would have been considerable force in the argument of Mr. I. C. Bhatt for then Mr. 347. If the operation of section 347 in relation to warrant cases was confined to the stage before the framing of a charge under subsection (3) of sec. 251a or sec. 254 there would have been considerable force in the argument of Mr. I. C. Bhatt for then Mr. I. C. Bhatt could have contended that if the Magistrate finds that he is competent to try the offence and the offence is in his opinion one that can be adequately punished by him the Magistrate must frame a charge against the accused under sub-section (3) of sec. 251a or sec. 254 and that he can commit the accused under section 347 only if he finds that he is not competent to try the offence or that the offence is one which though he is competent to try he cannot adequately punish and the words the case is one which ought to be tried by the Court of Session or High Court in section 347 should therefore be limited to a case which either the learned Magistrate is not competent to try or is such as cannot be adequately punished by him Any other construction in such a case would have led to a conflict between sub-section (3) of section 251a and section 254 on the one hand and sec. 347 on the other. This foundation for the contention of Mr. I. C. Bhatt is however wanting. If section 347 applies at any stage of the trial-and I have already held that it does so apply-no conflict can obviously arise by giving to these words their plain and natural meaning and not confining their scope and ambit to cases which either the Magistrate is not competent to try or are such as cannot be adequately punished by him. I am therefore of the opinion that on a true construction of the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 251a and sec. 254 and sec. I am therefore of the opinion that on a true construction of the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 251a and sec. 254 and sec. 347 the power of the Magistrate to commit the accused under section 347 is not confined only to those cases which the Magistrate is not competent to try or which in his opinion cannot be adequately punished and any other relevant or proper ground on the basis of which it can be said that the case is one which ought to be tried by the Court of Session or High Court can be a valid ground for the making of an order of committal under section 347. ( 12 ) SO much on principle. I will now turn to the authorities which have been cited before me on the construction of section 347. The construction which I am inclined to place on section 347 has commended itself to various High Courts. The Madras High Court in The Crown Prosecutor v. Bhagavathi (I. L. R. 42 Madras 83) the Allahabad High Court in Rex v. Matoley (supra) the Rangoon High Court in crown Prosecutor v. Bhagavathi (I. L. R. 42 Madras 83) rex v. Matoley (A. I. R. 1949 Allahabad 1) emperor v. Achaldas Jethamal (XXVIII Bombay Law Reporter 293) king Emperor v. Ishahat (I. L. R. 3 Rangoon 42) and the Lahore High Court in Ujagar Singh v. Emperor (1939 Lahore 356) have taken the same view as regards the construction of section 347. These High Courts have held that the reasons for which a Magistrate who is otherwise competent may commit a case to the Court of Session are not in any way limited either to a case which he cannot try or to a case in which he cannot adequately punish the accused. The decisions of the High Court of Bombay on this point are however conflicting. The decisions of the High Court of Bombay on this point are however conflicting. There is a decision of a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay reported in King Emperor v. Pema Ranchhod (IV B. L. R. 85 where the view has been taken that the words the case is one which ought to be tried by the Court of Session or High Court in section 347 must be read with section 254 and that a case which ought to be tried by a Court of Session or High Court is one which the Magistrate is not competent to try or is one in which in his opinion adequate punishment cannot be inflicted by him. This decision was strongly relied upon by Mr. I. C. Bhatt in support of his contention. If there were no other decision of the High Court of Bombay which has taken a contrary view I would have been bound to follow this decision even though my own view on the construction of section 347 were otherwise for this decision being a decision of a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay would have been binding on me. My attention was however drawn by Mr. A. D. Desai to two subsequent decisions of the High Court of Bombay which have taken a view contrary to that taken in King Emperor v. Pema Ranchhod (Supra ). Both these decisions are decisions of Division Benches of the High Court of Bombay and it is settled law that if there are two conflicting decisions of Division Benches of the High Court it is open to a single Judge to choose between the two and to follow the one which commends itself to him. I shall therefore now proceed to examine these two decisions. The first decision is a decision of a Division Bench consisting of Heaton and Shah J.) in Emperor v. Bhimaji Venkaji (I. L. R. XLII Bombay 172 ). In that case the accused was charged with the offences of harbouring an offender and taking a bribe from him. The learned Magistrate before whom the accused was charge-sheeted committed the case to the Court of Session relying on a Government Resolution and yielding to the wishes of the parties. The learned Sessions Judge referred the case to the High Court as he was of the opinion that the commitment was illegal. The learned Magistrate before whom the accused was charge-sheeted committed the case to the Court of Session relying on a Government Resolution and yielding to the wishes of the parties. The learned Sessions Judge referred the case to the High Court as he was of the opinion that the commitment was illegal. It was contended on behalf of the accused that the learned Magistrate was not competent to commit the case to the Court of Session solely by the wish of the parties and the terms of a Government Resolution and that these grounds were not valid grounds for making an order of committal. Dealing with this contention Heaton J. observed as follows:. . IT appears to me that when a Magistrate comes to consider whether he shall or shall not commit a case he has to consider the gravity of the offence; the punishment with which in his opinion it ought to Be met and the section under which he charges the accused person. He may no doubt properly consider any special difficulties in the case or that it is a matter of some peculiar public importance and no doubt other matters also might enter into his consideration such as the wish of the parties. But a Magistrate must not determine this important matter whether he is to commit the case or to try it himself solely by the wish of the parties and the terms of a Government Resolution. . . . . ( 13 ) THIS passage clearly shows that according to the learned Judge the grounds on which an order of committal might be made by a Magistrate were not confined either to a case which the Magistrate is not competent to try or to a case in which the Magistrate cannot adequately punish the accused. Other considerations could legitimately enter into the decision whether or not to commit the accused. Other considerations could legitimately enter into the decision whether or not to commit the accused. Of course the decision in King Emperor v. Pema Ranchhod (supra) does not appear to have been cited before the Division Bench in this case and there is no reference to that decision either in the judgment of Heaton J. or in the judgment of Shah J. That however cannot detract from the fact that there is in this case a direct authority for the proposition that other reasons or grounds may exist on the basis of which the Magistrate may come to the conclusion that the case is one which ought to be tried by the Court of Session or High Court. The other decision in Emperor v. Krishnaji Khadilkar (XXXI Bombay Law Reporter 602) specifically refers to the decision in King Emperor v. Pema Ranchhod (supra ). In that case the accused was being tried before the Chief Presidency Magistrate for an offence under sec. 124a of the Indian Penal Code in respect of an article which appeared in the issue of the Nava Kal a paper edited by the accused. The accused applied to the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate that his case may be inquired into on the footing of its eventual committal by the Magistrate to the High Court Criminal Sessions. The Crown objected and the application was thereupon refused by the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate on two grounds namely (1) that there was congestion of work in the High Court Criminal Sessions; and (2) that the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate himself was competent adequately to deal with the case. The accused thereupon applied to the High Court under section 561 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The decision in King Emperor v. Pema Ranchhod (supra) was cited and on the strength of this decision it was contended on behalf of the Crown that since the offence was one which the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate was competent to try and which in the opinion of the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate could be adequately punished by him the case could not be said to be one which ought to be tried by the High Court and that the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate was therefore right in refusing to make the order of committal. This contention of the Crown was negatived by the Division Bench consisting of Mirza and Patkar JJ. This contention of the Crown was negatived by the Division Bench consisting of Mirza and Patkar JJ. Mirza J. distinguished the decision in King Emperor v. Pema Ranchhod (supra) on the ground that in that case the offence was exclusively triable by the Magistrate and there was no question of the Court of Session having an alternative jurisdiction to try that case. The learned Judge also distinguished on the same ground the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Queen Empress v. Kayemullah Mandal (I. L. R. 24 Calcutta 429 which has taken the same view as the decision in King Emperor v. Pema Ranchhod (supra ). The learned Judge then referred to the observations of Heaton J. in the judgment in Emperor v Bhimaji Venkaji (supra) which I have reproduced above and quoted the same with approval. The learned Judge also relied on the decision of the Madras High Court of Sadasiva Ayyar J. in The Crown Prosecutor v. Bhagavathi (supra) and the decision of the Rangoon High Court in King Emperor v. Ishahat (supra ). Following these decisions the learned Judge held that the grounds on which an order of committal could be made by a Magistrate were not restricted to want of jurisdiction in himself or to his inability in his own opinion to sentence the accused adequately. Patkar J. who delivered a separate judgment found it difficult to distinguish the decision in King Emperor v. Pema Ranchhod (supra) from the decision in Emperor v. Bhimaji Venkaji (supra) and frankly stated that there is thus a conflict between the decision in Emperor v. Bhimaji Venkaji and the decision in King Emperor v. Pema as to whether a Magistrates powers of committal are confined to cases where he considers that he cannot give adequate punishment or whether he may take into consideration other grounds such as the gravity of the offence the punishment the section under which the accused is charged the special difficulties in the case the peculiar public importance of the case and other matters. ( 14 ) AFTER refereeing to the Madras and Rangoon cases mentioned above the learned Judge observed that 6 the trend of opinion as disclosed in the later decisions is in the direction of not unduly restricting the discretion of the Magistrate in committing a case to the Court of Session. ( 14 ) AFTER refereeing to the Madras and Rangoon cases mentioned above the learned Judge observed that 6 the trend of opinion as disclosed in the later decisions is in the direction of not unduly restricting the discretion of the Magistrate in committing a case to the Court of Session. The learned Judge then proceeded to consider the two grounds on which the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate had acted and observed with regard to the second ground namely the ability of the Chief Presidency Magistrate to impose an adequate punishment as follows:the ability to impose an adequate punishment is no doubt a legal ground for refusing to commit the case to the Court of Session. But in my opinion according to the view of Heaton J. in Emperor v. Bhimaji Venkaji that would not be the sole ground for coming to a decision on the question. ( 15 ) THIS decision therefore clearly takes a different view from that taken in King Emperor v. Pema Ranchhod and as between the decisions in King Emperor v. Pema Ranchhod and Emperor v. Bhimaji Venkaji prefers the latter decision to the former. There are also certain observations of Parsons J. in Queen Empress v. Abdul Rahiman (I. L. R. 16 Bombay 580) which lend support to the view taken in these later decisions:it is only a qualified jurisdiction which is conferred by section 28 on a Magistrate to try an offence which is shown in the eighth column of the second schedule to be triable by him. Section 207 lays down the procedure to be adopted not only where the case is triable exclusively by a Court of Session or High Court but also where the case in the opinion of the Magistrate ought to be tried by such Court. Section 254 is still more restrictive for it provides that the Magistrate shall try an accused person only for an offence which in his opinion can be adequately punished by him. . . . . . ( 16 ) THE result therefore is that the decision of the High Court of Bombay in King Emperor v. Pema Ranchhod and the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Queen Empress v. Kayemullah Mandal support the view con tended for by Mr. . . . . . ( 16 ) THE result therefore is that the decision of the High Court of Bombay in King Emperor v. Pema Ranchhod and the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Queen Empress v. Kayemullah Mandal support the view con tended for by Mr. I. C. Bhatt whereas the decisions of the High Court of Bombay in Emperor v. Bhimaji Venkaji Emperor v. Krishnaji Khadilkar and Queen Empress v. Abdul Rahiman and the decisions in the Crown Prosecutor v. Bhagavathi Rex v. Matoley King Emperor v. Ishahat and Ujagar Singh v. Emperor take the contrary view. I have already discussed the question of construction on principle and as I have already indicated above on principle I am inclined to take the view contrary to that urged by Mr. I. C. Bhatt. In this I am supported by the decisions of the Madras High Court the Allahabad High Court the Rangoon High Court and the Lahore High Court and the later decisions of the High Court of Bombay. I therefore prefer to follow the latter decisions of the High Court of Bombay and following those decisions I am of the opinion that the grounds on which a case can be said to be one which ought to be tried by the Court of Session or High Court within the meaning of section 347 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are not limited to a case which the Magistrate is not competent to try or which in the opinion of the Magistrate cannot be adequately punished by him. Other considerations can be taken into account for the purpose of determining whether the case is one which ought to be tried by the Court of Session or High Court. Whether the considerations in any particular case are valid considerations or not for the purpose of exercise of the legal discretion vested in the Magistrate to make an order of committal must depend upon the facts of each case and no hard and fast rule can be laid down to guide the discretion of the Magistrate. The question which the Magistrate must consider in each case is whether on the facts and circumstances the case is one which ought to be tried by the Court of Session or High Court. ( 17 ) THIS being in my opinion the true construction of sec. The question which the Magistrate must consider in each case is whether on the facts and circumstances the case is one which ought to be tried by the Court of Session or High Court. ( 17 ) THIS being in my opinion the true construction of sec. 347 I must decide whether the first ground for making the order of committal which found favour with the learned Magistrate but which did not appeal to the learned Sessions Judge can be said to be a valid ground on the basis of which an order of committal could be made by the learned Magistrate. The ground is that the present case and the other eight cases which are exclusively triable by the Court of Session are inter-related; that the witnesses and the evidence are mostly common and that the record accounts and vouchers produced are also common in all the cases. Assuming this ground is true can it be said that having regard to this ground the present case is one which ought to be tried by the Court of Session? I do not think that the present case can be said to be one which ought to be tried by the Court of Session merely because it is inter-related with the other eight cases in the sense that the witnesses and the evidence would be mostly common and the record accounts and vouchers would also be common. The petitioner is charged in the present case with criminal breach of trust and falsification of accounts in respect of certain items. The charges against the petitioner in the other eight cases which are triable exclusively by the Court of Session are admittedly in respect of other items. It may be that the evidence oral and documentary. is for the most part common; but that cannot form any valid consideration for the trial of all the cases by the same Judge or Magistrate. The items in respect of which the charge is leveled in the present case are different from the items in respect of which the charges are leveled in the other eight cases and it may be that the petitioner is guilty of the offences charged in the other eight cases and is not guilty of the offence charged in the present case. Apart from this consideration the present case will have to be decided on the evidence recorded in it while the other eight cases will have to be decided on the evidence recorded in those cases. It is obvious that nothing that transpires in those eight cases can possibly be taken into account in deciding the present case. The present case is a case which the learned Magistrate is competent to try and unless there is an overriding reason I do not see why the present case should be committed to the Court of Session. Mere convenience can never be such an overriding reason as to make the case one of which it can be said that it ought to be tried by the Court of Session. I am fortified in this view by a decision of the High Court of Bombay reported in Emperor v. Asha Bhati (XV Bombay Law Reporter 998 ). In that case a Magistrate of the First Class drew up in a case of theft a charge against the accused but instead of pursuing the trial himself committed the accused for trial to the Court of Session on the ground that the case was connected with another case in which he felt bound by law to commit. A Division Bench of the High Court consisting of Batchelor and Shah JJ. rejected this ground as a valid ground for making an order of committal and observed ( 18 ) IT appears however that the connection between these two cases is not of such a character as to embarrass or prejudice the accused if the course prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code is followed. We think that the reason which the learned Magistrate gave for committing is not good in law or in fact. . . ( 19 ) WE must therefore quash this commitment and direct the Magistrate to conclude the trial himself. In so doing we take occasion to observe that it is for many reasons undesirable in practice that our already over-burdened Courts of Session should be still further burdened with the weight of cases committed to them by Magistrates where such Magistrates are themselves competent to decide the cases and no overriding reasons exist for committal to the higher Court. In so doing we take occasion to observe that it is for many reasons undesirable in practice that our already over-burdened Courts of Session should be still further burdened with the weight of cases committed to them by Magistrates where such Magistrates are themselves competent to decide the cases and no overriding reasons exist for committal to the higher Court. ( 20 ) THIS passage shows that merely because the case which the Magistrate is competent to try and which he can adequately punish is connected with another case which is exclusively triable by the Court of Session that is no ground for committing the former case to the Court of Session unless of course the connection between the two cases is of such a character as to embarrass or prejudice the accused in which event it can be legitimately said that the case is one which ought to be tried by the Court of Session. That is however admittedly not the position in the present case. Mr. I. C. Bhatt also drew my attention to a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in In re Pulla Reddi (A. I. R. 1956 Andhra 17 ). A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court consisting of Subba Rao C. J as he then was and Satyanarayana Raju J. held in that case that it is not competent to a Magistrate under sec 347 to commit to the Court of Session a case which he is competent to try and which he can adequately punish on the ground that the counter case against the accused has been committed to the Court of Session. The reasons which have been given in that case for negativing the exercise of power under section 347 on the ground that a cross case against theaccused has been committed to the Court of Session apply with equal force when an attempt is made to exercise the power on the ground that connected cases have been committed to the Court of Session. The reasons commend themselves to me and I wholly accept the same. The reasons commend themselves to me and I wholly accept the same. I therefore hold that the ground that the other eight cases which are committed to the Court of Session are inter-related with the present case and that most of the evidence oral and documentary would be common in all the cases is not a valid ground for saying that the case is one which ought to be tried by the Court of Session and the learned Magistrate was not entitled to make an order of committal on such ground under section 347. . ( 21 ) THE result is that the Revision Application is allowed and the rule is made absolute. The order of committal is set aside and the learned Magistrate is directed to proceed with the case against the petitioner and accused No. 2 under Chapter XXI of the Code of Criminal Procedure from the stage at which he made the order of committal. Revision allowed. .