JUDGMENT D. S. Mathur, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by Surendra Kumar for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated 16-1-1959 of the State Transport Authority Tribunal (to be referred hereinafter as the Tribunal), respondent No. 1, and also for the issue of a writ of mandamus to direct respondent No. 1 to remand the cases of the petitioner and of other appellants, disposed of under the impugned order, to the Tribunal (Mathur, J.) 269 Regional Transport Authority, Lucknow, respondent No. 2, for consideration on merits. 2. The facts of the case are not in dispute. The Regional Transport Authority, Lucknow, respondent No. 2, invited applications for the grant of six stage carriage parmits for the Lucknow-Hardoi route and 79 persons applied for the grant of stage carriage permits. The petitioner was one of the applicants and respondent Nos. 3 to 5 were the other three. These respondents are Smt. Zubeda Begum, M/s. Hindustan Transport Company, Unnao, and Mukhtar Ali. The Regional Transport Authority took the decision in the meeting held on the 1st and 14th of February, 1958, and stage carriage permits were granted to six applicants not including the present petitioner and respondent Nos. 3 to 5. Only eight respondent Nos. 3 to 5. The appeals were decided under order dated 16-1-1959 whereby the grant of permits to three persons was set aside and instead permits were granted to respondent Nos. 3 to 5. The order of the Tribunal is contained in Annexure C to the affidavit. 3. It is a settled preferred an appeal before the Tribunal including the petitioner and respondent law that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India High Courts do not usurp the functions of a court of appeal and for that reason do not interfere with the order of a subordinate authority or tribunal whose finding of fact is final unless it acted illegally or committed some error in the exercise of jurisdiction. In other words, it was for the Tribunal to decide the appeals on merits and grant stage carriage permits to such of the applicants as were in its opinion most fitted for running the transport service. In other words, it was for the Tribunal to decide the appeals on merits and grant stage carriage permits to such of the applicants as were in its opinion most fitted for running the transport service. To arrive at a decision it was, however, necessary for the Tribunal to act with in the law and not to be moved by extraneous considerations which did not come within the object or purpose of the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act (to be referred hereinafter as the Act). Where it appears that the Tribunal was moved by extraneous factors, which could not be taken into consideration while taking the decision on the grant of permits, it would be a case of an illegality committed in the exercise of jurisdiction and this Court would be justified in quashing the order of the Tribunal. At the same time it must be observed that the courts of law shall have to grant certain latitude to the Tribunal, all the more, in the circumstances of a case of the present nature. With regard to some of the applicants for the grant of permits the Tribunal can know, without any possibility of doubt, whether or not they are fitted for the purpose, that is, if they would be in a position to run the stage carriage in the interest of the public. There would be persons who already hold permits and are running transport service without any complaint; there would be others who cannot efficiently manage the transport business or who had been previously punished for committing breach of the provisions of the law. But most of the applicants will be new-corners who had no prior experience of running the transport business and with regard to such applicants the transport authority including the Tribunal shall not know whether in the end they would be able to run the service efficiently and to the benefit of the travelling public. While considering the applications falling in this latter category, the authority concerned shall have to prefer one and not the other. In other words, if it appears that the authority or the Tribunal had acted keeping the provisions of the Act in mind, this Court shall not interfere simply because in its opinion another applicant was more suited for the grant of a permit. 4. In other words, if it appears that the authority or the Tribunal had acted keeping the provisions of the Act in mind, this Court shall not interfere simply because in its opinion another applicant was more suited for the grant of a permit. 4. In the impugned order, Annexure C to the affidavit, the Tribunal has given cogent reasons for the grant of permits to M/s. Hindustan Transport Company, Unnao, and Mukhtar Ali, respondent Nos. 4 and 5, and the reasons given cannot be said to be extraneous in the sense that they are not connected with the object and scope of Section 47 of the Act. The present petition must fail as far as the grant of permits to these two respondents is concerned. 5. The Tribunal granted the third permit to Smt. Zubeda Begum, respondent No. 3, as she belonged to Lucknow and her husband was a political sufferer. At the same time it was observed that the permit shall be worked with interest and to the full satisfaction of the Transport Department and in view of the circumstances of the respondent's husband, it could be safely said that the permit would not be transferred and shall be used for honest operation on the route. Sec. 47 of the Act lays down the matters which the transport authority shall take into consideration while dealing with an application for a stage carriage permit. One of the matters to be taken into consideration is the interest of the public generally. The legislature rightly worded this clause `generally' so that the transport authority may have unrestricted power to grant permit to the most suitable person who would be able to run the transport service for the benefit of the public as a whole. To lay down what shall amount to `interest of the public' would have been difficult, if not impossible. A person with lot of funds at his disposal may be able to place well-equipped and efficient transport vehicles for service on the route but he may not be able to supervise the business with the result that the travelling public may feel considerably inconvenienced even though the best of vehicles were available on the route. A person with lot of funds at his disposal may be able to place well-equipped and efficient transport vehicles for service on the route but he may not be able to supervise the business with the result that the travelling public may feel considerably inconvenienced even though the best of vehicles were available on the route. Similarly, one who has the experience of running the transport service may be unsuitable for the grant of a fresh permit on the ground that he had not been efficiently running vehicles on other routes and may even be contravening the provisions of the law. It can also easily happen that the number of vacancies on the route may be less than the number of persons equally entitled to the grant of a permit and in such circumstances it shall be necessary for the transport authority to take other matters into consideration. In other words, what is necessary is that while granting or refusing a permit the transport authority including the Tribunal must be moved by considerations which are connected with the interest of the public generally, except where more than one person are equally placed. If any matter not connected with the interest of the public is made the basis of the grant or refusal of permit, the action of the authority would be arbitrary and shall have to be quashed by this Court. At this stage it may further be observed that the public in general whose interest are to be considered by the transport authority are the travelling public, that is, persons likely to visit the area in which the transport facility is being provided or and of persons residing in that area. 6. From the above, it will appear that Smt. Zubeda Begum was granted the permit on two grounds - firstly, be cause she was a resident of Lucknow and secondly, her husband was a political sufferer. The other observations made by the Tribunal are more by way of opinion than on the claims of Smt. Zubeda Begum. Residence of Lucknow cannot be the main criterion for the grant or refusal of permit for a route connecting Lucknow with other cities or towns. It may be taken as a ground for showing preference when the claims of many applicants are balanced. Residence of Lucknow cannot be the main criterion for the grant or refusal of permit for a route connecting Lucknow with other cities or towns. It may be taken as a ground for showing preference when the claims of many applicants are balanced. The other ground which influenced the Tribunal in granting the permit to Smt. Zubeda Begum was that her husband was a political sufferer. A political sufferer is one who has suffered in the cause of the country, may be, by being confined in jail. A political sufferer can be one who had never undertaken any kind of business and who may be unsuited for running transport service efficiently. Consequently, a person who is a mere political sufferer with no other qualification for the grant of the permit should not be granted a permit simply because he had suffered in the cause of the country. The Tribunal will, however, not be acting illegally if a political sufferer or a displaced person is given preference among those who are similarly placed keeping in mind the object of Section 47 of the Act. In such a case, the permit shall not be granted simply because the applicant is a political sufferer: he would be given preference on account of his suffering in the cause of the country but the main ground for the grant of permit shall be that he would be able to run the transport service efficiently to the interest of the public generally. 7. In the present case, however, the Tribunal was chiefly moved by the factor that the husband of Smt. Zubeda Begum was a political sufferer. As this was the main ground for the grant of permit, it was an extraneous circumstance unconnected with the object of Section 47, that is, the interest of the public generally. 8. The Tribunal nowhere says that Smt. Zubeda Begum or her husband shall be able to run the transport service efficiently and to the interest of the public generally. What the Tribunal has observed is that the applicant shall be able to work with interest and to the full satisfaction of the Transport Department. It was the interest of the public generally and not the Transport Department which could be a criterion for the grant of a permit. What the Tribunal has observed is that the applicant shall be able to work with interest and to the full satisfaction of the Transport Department. It was the interest of the public generally and not the Transport Department which could be a criterion for the grant of a permit. To lay down that persons belonging to one category or group are honest and the others are not, will be most unfair. It is a matter of common knowledge that all the people similarly placed are not necessarily honest. Even among the group of persons generally dishonest there are many scrupulously honest people. 9. In Onkarmal Mistri v. The Regional Transport Authority, Darjeeling, AIR 1956 Calcutta 490, the grant of permits by showing preference to refugees, political sufferers, scheduled tribes or backward hillmen was considered to be unconnected with the object of the Act, that is, the interest of the travelling public in general. Similarly, in M/s. Satya Narayan Transport Co., Ltd. v. Secretary, State Transport Authority, AIR 1957 Calcutta 638 the order of the State Transport Authority was quashed on account of its taking extraneous circumstance into consideration. The learned counsel for Smt. Zubeda Begum relies upon the case of Nav Hind Finance and Transport (Pvt.) Ltd., Delhi v. Chief Commissioner, Delhi, A.I.R. 1959 Punj. 473 but this case can easily be distinguished oh, facts. Therein the Chief Commissioner was considering the claims of two competing co-operative societies for the grant of a stage carriage permit and the permit was granted to Delhi Ex-Servicemen Society not only because during the year 1948 the State Government had given an assurance that the Society shall be granted certain benefits but also because the Delhi Ex-Servicemen Society was similarly placed as Nav Hind Finance and Transport (Pvt.) Ltd. At one place it was observed that the Chief Commissioner considered the comparative financial position and experience and came to the conclusion that Delhi Ex-Servicemen Society was better qualified. At another place it was observed that, in any case, if the ground given for showing preference to the Delhi Ex-Servicemen Society was ignored, the view of the Commissioner was that both the Co-operative Societies were equally efficient and equally qualified. In such circumstances, the giving of preference to the society of ex-soldiers was not held to be improper. At another place it was observed that, in any case, if the ground given for showing preference to the Delhi Ex-Servicemen Society was ignored, the view of the Commissioner was that both the Co-operative Societies were equally efficient and equally qualified. In such circumstances, the giving of preference to the society of ex-soldiers was not held to be improper. The Chief Commissioner had to grant permit to one of the two societies equally placed and one which deserved some consideration on account of past services could be given preference over the other. It will thus be found that the fact that the Society was of ex-soldiers was not the main criterion for the grant of permit. It was merely a ground for showing preference among two societies similarly placed. 10. As the Tribunal was moved by extraneous considerations unconnected with the object of Section 47, namely, the interest, of the travelling public generally, its order must be quashed in so far as it granted a permit to Smt. Zubeda Begum. The permit granted to her shall also have to be cancelled and it shall be open to the Tribunal to grant permit to a most suitable person, may be the petitioner or Smt. Zubeda Begum, respondent No. 3, or any other person. This Court is intentionally refraining from making any observation on the comparative claims of the two parties to the proceeding so that none of them may be prejudiced in putting forward their claim before the Tribunal. 11. The petition is partly allowed and partly dismissed. The impugned order of the State Transport Authority Tribunal is quashed to the extent it granted a stage carriage permit to Smt. Zubeda Begum. The appeals preferred before the Tribunal shall be deemed to be still pending, and the Tribunal should now pass orders with regard to the grant of a permit in the above vacancy. Costs on parties.