ORDER Anna Chandy, J. 1. The accused in Summary Trial No. 387 of 1959 of the First Class Magistrate's Court, Moovattupuzha was convicted under S.51-A of the Travancore Abkari Act IV of 1073 for having been in possession of illicit liquor and was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 50/- or in default of payment to undergo simple imprisonment for one and a half months. The learned Magistrate also ordered that the bottles and glasses recovered in the case will be confiscated and the liquor destroyed. Against this conviction the accused, evidently mindful of the provisions of S.414, Criminal Procedure Code which lays down that in summary trials no appeal will lie where the punishment is only a fine below Rs. 200/- filed a Criminal Revision Petition before the Ernakulam Sessions Court. When the petition was taken up for hearing the learned Public Prosecutor of that court raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the revision. His contention was that the confiscation of the glasses and bottles was also a punishment so that the actual punishment awarded to the accused was a combined one of fine and confiscation which circumstance removed the case from the purview of S.414 and brought it under S.415 which provides that an appeal will lie against a sentence awarding a fine combined with any other punishment. This argument found favour with the learned Sessions Judge who dismissed the revision as incompetent. It was also ordered that the disposal of the case on the merits will be considered if and when the accused filed an appeal. Thereupon the accused filed an appeal and was acquitted. 2. Later in Calendar Revision my learned brother Madhavan Nair, J., was not impressed with the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge that the confiscation was also a part of the punishment and felt that the learned Sessions Judge entertained the appeal without jurisdiction. Notice was therefore issued to the accused to show cause why the acquittal by the Sessions Judge should not be set aside. The State was also notified. 3. So now the question before me is whether the order of confiscation of property passed under the Abkari Act can be considered as a part of the sentence. Notice was therefore issued to the accused to show cause why the acquittal by the Sessions Judge should not be set aside. The State was also notified. 3. So now the question before me is whether the order of confiscation of property passed under the Abkari Act can be considered as a part of the sentence. As the Public Prosecutor in the Sessions Court was responsible for the conversion of the revision into an appeal, the learned Public Prosecutor here was not prepared to take a definite stand regarding the maintainability of the appeal while the learned counsel for the accused took up the position that it is a revision and not an appeal that would lie. 4. S.51-A of the Abkari Act under which the accused was convicted reads thus: "Whoever renders or attempts to render fit for human consumption any spirit, whether manufactured in Travancore or not, which has been denatured, or has in his possession any spirit in respect of which he knows or has reason to believe that any such attempt has been made, shall on conviction before a Magistrate be liable to imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months or to fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or both. For the purpose of this section it shall be presumed unless and until the contrary is proved that any spirit which is proved on chemical analysis to contain any quantity of any of the prescribed denaturants is or contains or has been derived from denatured spirit". It will be seen that the only forms of punishment which can be awarded under the section are imprisonment or fine or a combination of both. Confiscation of property finds no mention in the section. It is but elementary that an accused person cannot be awarded a punishment that is not prescribed for the offence he has committed. The only section in the Act which relates to confiscation and the one under which the Magistrate must have ordered the confiscation is S.61 which runs thus: "In any case in which an offence has been committed under this Regulation, the liquor, drug, materials, still, utensil, implement or apparatus in respect of which an offence has been committed shall be liable to confiscation. Any liquor or intoxicating drug lawfully imported, exported, transported, manufactured, had in possession, or sold, or toddy lawfully drawn, or tapped along with, or in addition to, any liquor, intoxicating drug, or toddy liable to confiscation under this section, and the receptacles, packages and coverings in which any such liquor, intoxicating drug, materials, still, utensil, implement or apparatus as aforesaid is or are found, and the other contents, if any, of the receptacles or packages in which the same is or are found, shall likewise be liable to confiscation." The wording of the section as well as the general scheme of the Act indicates that confiscation is not a part of the punishment for any offence under the Act but a mode of disposal of the property in respect of which an offence has been committed. S.61 of the Abkari Act is comparable with S.517 of the Criminal Procedure Code which provides: "When an inquiry or a trial in any Criminal Court is concluded, the court may make such order as it thinks fit for the disposal by destruction, confiscation, or delivery to any person claiming to be entitled to possession thereof or otherwise of any property or document produced before it or in its custody or regarding which any offence appears to have been committed, or which has been used for the commission of any offence". A comparison of these two sections strengthens the view that confiscation is not to be considered part of the sentence for an offence but is only one of the modes by which courts can dispose of property which comes before it in criminal trials. The decision reported in Aziz Khan v. State, AIR. 1954 Allahabad 642, on which the learned Sessions Judge relied for dismissing the revision has, I think, no application to the present case. In the Allahabad case the accused who was tried summarily and convicted under S.7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act (1946) read with Clause.3 of the Cotton Textile (Control of Movement) Order (1948) was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 25/- and to the forfeiture of certain quantity of cloth. The High Court held that two types of punishment viz., fine and forfeiture having been awarded S.414, Criminal Procedure Code had no application to the case and as such the revision filed by the accused in the Sessions Court was not maintainable. 25/- and to the forfeiture of certain quantity of cloth. The High Court held that two types of punishment viz., fine and forfeiture having been awarded S.414, Criminal Procedure Code had no application to the case and as such the revision filed by the accused in the Sessions Court was not maintainable. However unlike in the present case where the confiscation of property finds no mention in the section under which the accused is convicted, S.7 of the Essential Supplies [Temporary Powers] Act specifically provides for forfeiture in certain cases. According to that section: "If any person contravenes any order made under S.3, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine or with both, and if the order so provides, any Court trying such contravention may direct that any property in respect of which the Court is satisfied that the order has been contravened shall be forfeited to His Majesty: Provided that where the contravention is of an order relating to foodstuffs which contains an express provision in this behalf, the Court shall make such direction, unless for reasons to be recorded in writing it is of opinion that the direction should not be made in respect of the whole, or as the case may be, a part of the property". Further, forfeiture unlike confiscation is not a mode of disposal of property coming before courts in criminal trials but is an established form of punishment. It is recognised as such under S.53, I.P.C. which enumerates the different types of punishment that can be awarded under the Code. Hence to use the term 'confiscate' as synonymous with'forfeit' as has been done by the learned Sessions Judge, is, I think, not quite correct. 5. I therefore hold that the confiscation of bottles and glasses ordered by the learned Magistrate is not a part of the sentence awarded under S.51-A of the Abkari Act and as such the appeal filed before the Sessions Judge is incompetent. 6. As the matter has come up before the High Court and as the learned counsel for the accused argued for the acquittal for which his client is entitled I went through the evidence. The accused has only to be acquitted. Possession of 5 oz. 6. As the matter has come up before the High Court and as the learned counsel for the accused argued for the acquittal for which his client is entitled I went through the evidence. The accused has only to be acquitted. Possession of 5 oz. of arrack which is not proved to be illicit is not an offence under S.51-A of the Abkari Act and hence the acquittal of the accused by the learned judge is correct. With the observation that the entertainment of the appeal by the learned Sessions Judge was without jurisdiction I acquit the accused. The rule is discharged.