Judgement KRISHNAN, J. :- The appellant Radhakrishna son of Nandaji of village Ghinoda has been convicted under Section 302 IPC (for the murder by cutting the neck of Khemraj son of Nanuram Dhakad with a dhariya) sometime on the night of the 14th May 1960. He has been sentenced to imprisonment for life. Based solely on circumstantial evidence, the present case involves further interesting questions regarding the form and the effect of the statements legally admissible under Section 27 Evidence Act on account of direct connection with a discovery, and, also, on grounds of prudence, the sufficiency or otherwise of such a statement by itself for a conviction. 2. The village Ghinoda lies on a main road. By its side there are two or three 'hotels', small canteens about 10' square covered by corrugated tin sheeting at a height barely over 6'. Near them are also a number of platforms used for resting water drums, or constructed in the memory of this or that pious person. One Raghunath (P. W. 5) and one Laxminarayan (P. W. 7) own two of the hotels, while a third was being constructed at that place by Khemraj deceased whose house, however, is at a short distance. Khemraj had actually been working with some servants on the construction till some time through the night after which he went way. Laxminarayan who is a person of some local importance, had been away on the evening and returned at about 10-30 by which time his son Murlidas (P. W. 6) - about 15 years who was in charge of the shop, had slept away. When his father awakened him, Murlidas climbed upon the corrugated tin roof and began to sleep. This seems to be a favourite sleeping place for these villagers in the hot season. It was easy to climb up as the total height was just over 6', and there was a platform upto half the height. The crucial point is that when Murlidas climbed up to sleep, there was nobody else on the roof. 3. His sleep was disturbed some hours later, (according to him at about 3 a.m.) by some sticky liquid spurting or dripping over him. Waking up, he saw that it was blood, and that nearby on the same corrugated sheet somebody lying, whom he later recognized as Khemraj with blood on his face. 3. His sleep was disturbed some hours later, (according to him at about 3 a.m.) by some sticky liquid spurting or dripping over him. Waking up, he saw that it was blood, and that nearby on the same corrugated sheet somebody lying, whom he later recognized as Khemraj with blood on his face. At first the boy seems to have thought that the other (who must have come up to sleep on the same roof which by itself was not unusual), had been vomiting blood. Getting down, he called his father who had a look and discovered that the man's neck had been cut and he was quite dead. The villagers were roused, and information was sent to the dead man's uncle Dhanna and of his cousion Ramsukh who, however, was not immediately available. They sent a report to the thana through the Chowkidar Bhagwan (P. W. 3) who arrived at about 6-0 after walking a distance of about 5 miles and gave information against "unknown". "This morning at about 4-0 A.M. Raghunath son of Ramlal Kunbi hotelwala came to me to report that Khemraj Dhakad son of Nanuram Dhakad of Ghinoda had been murdered by somebody while sleeping on the corrugated sheet roof of the hotel of Laxminarayan Maharaj. I went and saw........and after informing the Sarpancha Nagulal, I have come as ordered by him to give this report." Working backwards, the time of reports suggested that the boy woke up at about 3 a.m. 4. The examination of the corpse and of the locality showed beyond doubt that the man had been killed after he had got upon the roof and had probably slept away. The time was certainly a few seconds or at the most a minute or two before Murlidas woke up, because he felt the fresh blood spurting on him. A third person could not have climbed on the roof without disturbing, either or both the sleepers; obviously Khemraj had been killed by somebody standing on the platform nearby and aiming a powerful single blow on his neck, nearly cutting the trachea as well as the arteries and veins. 5. In time three pieces of circumstantial evidence were adduced and have in their totality persuaded the learned Sessions Judge, of the appellant's guilt. 5. In time three pieces of circumstantial evidence were adduced and have in their totality persuaded the learned Sessions Judge, of the appellant's guilt. - (i) The first circumstance is that earlier on the night at about 11 O'Clock, Ramsukh (P. W. 10) was steeping in the open on a bullock cart a short distance from his house. He saw the appellant coming from the direction of the hotels and going towards his own house, and return after a short while; on the second occasion he had a dhariya which he did not have at first. (ii) The second is the statement by the appellant leading to the discovery of a dhariya concealed in a haystack; this was some time in the afternoon of the next day, that is, 16th May, when he was in police custody. (iii) The third circumstance, if it can be so called is the enmity between the appellant and Khemraj because of the latter's improper intentions towards the appellants' wife. Khemraj had been giving out that he had paid 150/- for the girl who later became the wife of the appellant and that he was going to take her for himself. 6. Motive for an offence is a factor to be considered but it cannot be of much force. Quite a number of crimes are committed for motives that are unascertainable; conversely, a very large number of persons who may have motive to commit a crime or who may gain considerably by such crime, do not really commit it. In this case, disproportionate emphasis has been placed on this, the prosecution giving this as possible motive, and the defence tor one thing denying this, and for another pointing out that there were several others with whom the dead man had serious quarrels and that every one of them had a motive to get rid of him. Thus, motive though seriously discussed in the trial court, does not in this case lead us to anything definite. 7. The undoubted factual position is that some time after 10-30 P.M., and well before 3 A.M. Khemraj went to sleep on the corrugated tin roof of Laxminarayan's hotel. Already Laxminarayan's son Murlidas was there. Nobody, neither the boy nor his father saw Khemraj go there. It was not also his usual place of sleeping, which means that, his assailant must have searched, and ultimately found him here. Already Laxminarayan's son Murlidas was there. Nobody, neither the boy nor his father saw Khemraj go there. It was not also his usual place of sleeping, which means that, his assailant must have searched, and ultimately found him here. The evidence of Ramsukh P. W. 10, is far from impressive and even if accepted on its face value is not of much help in spotting the murderer. There is nothing unusual if a villager going to his field for keeping watch at night has armed himself with a dhariya. Actually, the appellant has stated that he was watching his field on that night. One sometimes doubts if on that night the witness Ramsukh had really seen the appellant moving about with a dhariya. At one place, Ramsukh asserts that the appellant usually went about with a dhariya. If so, what he saw on that night would not have attracted his special attention. If on the contrary, Ramsukh attached significance to it, at least after the murder, he must have mentioned it to the choukidar before he started for the thana. The absence of any reference to this in the first information report, and the delay in Ramsukh's telling the villagers themselves of his having seen the appellant going with a dhariya, affect the value of his evidence very considerably. This is particularly so because Ramsukh asserts that he knew that Khemraj and the appellant were on very bad terms and each was threatening the other with serious consequences. If at the time of the appellant going away from his house with a dhariya Ramsukh had thought of the possibility of an attack on his cousin, he must certainty have searched for and warned him. So, the first circumstance is worth very little indeed. 8. The appellant was formally arrested at 2 P.M. on the afternoon of the 16th but according to the defence, he had been sent for on the previous day that is, 15th itself, and asked to stay with the Police. This means that he was in police custody for a whole day; and yet he is supposed to have given his statement only after panchas were called. This means that he was in police custody for a whole day; and yet he is supposed to have given his statement only after panchas were called. The cross-examination of the Sub-Inspector could have been more to the point in this regard; but there is an indication that for a few hours, before the statement which the appellant gave to the police he was in the control of the police. There is no evidence of violence to the appellant, but some moral pressure was certainly possible. The point is that we have the statement of the Sub-Inspector and the panchas one of whom is the Sarpancha of the village, that the appellant gave a statement to the police in their presence and as a consequence of this statement he was taken to a haystack near a well belonging to him. "I have concealed my dhariya on the land near my well within a haystack and I shall take you there and give it to you." The party accordingly went to the haystack belonging to the appellant a short distance near his well and from some depth within the haystack, the appellant brought out a dhariya with some stains, which on analysis were found to be of human blood. The quantity was very slight. 9. The "discovery" is described by the defence as factually improbable; it is also sought to be made out that the most this statement can show is the knowledge of the appellant of the presence of the dhariya with blood marks and not necessarily that he had been in possession and he had concealed it. The place where it was found was open and it was also easy to make a plant. As the reported case law shows, two types of statements may be proved under section 27 Evidence Act. First, where the statement leading to the discovery is a bare expression of knowledge; for example, "There is a sword kept concealed at such and such place; if you go, you will find it," "I could come with you and show you". Secondly, where the person in custody imparts not only knowledge, but takes the responsibility for the earlier possession of the article, at are earlier stage : "I have concealed a sword at such and such place. Please come with me. Secondly, where the person in custody imparts not only knowledge, but takes the responsibility for the earlier possession of the article, at are earlier stage : "I have concealed a sword at such and such place. Please come with me. I shall pick it out and hand it over to you." If, where the former Kind of statement is made, the place of concealment of the article is accessible to others, and is not in the exclusive possession or control of the accused, it can be plausibly urged that he had somehow learnt of the existence of the article there and has no more connection with it. In the second type, the position is basically different. The place may be ascessible to others; but the man says - "I have Kept it", and therefore at one stage he had the article in possession. If it is an incriminating article, he is on explanation. A man may not be called upon to explain under threat of punishment, how he came to know that an incriminating article has been concealed in a place, not in his exclusive control; but he is certainly on explanation, if he has been in physical possession of the article at some stage. This has been well brought out in the case Pershadi v. State of U. P., (S) AIR 1957 SC 211 ; while the general principles have been discussed at some length in the Supreme Court rulings Ramkishan v. State of Bombay, (S) AIR 1955 SC 104 and Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra, (S) AIR 1956 SC 217 , and from another view-point in the recent ruling in State of U. P. v. Deoman Upadhaya, AIR 1960 SC 1125 . 10. It has been pointed out on behalf of the accused that a statement of the second kind would really be relevant under Section 8 of the Evidence Act and not Section 27. Really the two sections are not mutually exclusive. Actually, the word "relevant" on the one hand, and the words "admissible" and "may be proved" on the other, have distinct connotation though they are often used indiscriminately. Without entering on a lengthy discussion, it may be noted that "relevancy" is a logical connection between two sets of facts of that degree of closeness as to make one probable, if the other is established. Without entering on a lengthy discussion, it may be noted that "relevancy" is a logical connection between two sets of facts of that degree of closeness as to make one probable, if the other is established. But whan we say "admissible" or "may be proved", we mean that besides being "relevant" in the sense just noted, the fact is not excluded by any law. Section 8 is one of those that speak of a fact being "relevant" as conduct of a party, while Section 27 provides, that a statement that should of course be relevant in this sense, could be also proved in certain circumstances, as exception to the rules of exclusion contained in the earlier sections. A statement which is not relevant in the sense we have set out, cannot in any event be proved because there is no logical connection of that nature already set out. But every statement that is relevant in this sense is not necessarily admissible; in other words, cannot always be proved as there might be express rules of exclusion. Thus, we can say that a statement of the type noted is admissible under section 27 and also relevant under section 8 as conduct. It shows that the person has been in possession of the incriminating article. 11. In the instant case, the status of the punchas and the circumstances of the discovery show that there was no mistake or intentional device in this regard, we have no doubt that the accused person did make the statement which led to the discovery of the dhariya concealed in his haystack near his well. Since he had himself placed it, the fact of that place being accessible to others is of no consequence. His own statement in the Sessions court only confirms this view. He did give the weapon; but he says he did so under pressure. 12. That weapon had marks - (though very slight marks) of blood which on analysis and serological examination turned out to be human blood. In view of delay and the very small quantity, group test was not possible, we can safely assume in all these cases that the tests applied by the chemical analyst and the serologist are so fine that for all practical purposes a mistake is excluded. On the other hand, the fact remains that the blood mark was a trace and not a patch. 13. On the other hand, the fact remains that the blood mark was a trace and not a patch. 13. Summing up the evidence, which is all circumstantial, we attach no significance to the motive which works both ways. We doubt the recollection of Ramsukh; even if it is correct, this man might have been carrying a dhariya a few hours before the murder with an innocent purpose. This leaves the statement made which led to the discovery of the dhariya with a small stain of human blood. It is an incriminating circumstance no doubt and there is no explanation given on the record. The learned Sessions Judge was of the opinion that this, along with the motive to which as already noted, he has attached disproportionate weight, and Ramsukh's evidence, was sufficient to justify the conviction. In principle there is no objection to basing a conviction, on a single incriminating circumstance. But the incriminating circumstances should be so conclusive as to exclude the possibility of innocence. That would depend upon the facts of the particular case. In this case the single incriminating circumstance is not in our opinion sufficient by itself to justify the conviction. Reasonable doubt is likely and it would be quite unsafe to convict a person solely on that material. We, therefore, hold that it is a case for the benefit of doubt, allow the appeal, and set aside the conviction and sentence. The appellant should be released immediately unless wanted in some other case. 14. S. B. SEN, J. :- I agree.