JUDGMENT W. Broome, J. - Mam Chand, the applicant in this criminal revision, was convicted by a first class Magistrate of Saharanpur for an offence u/s 299 of the Municipalities Act and was fined Rs. 200. In appeal the Temporary Civil and Sessions Judge of Saharanpur altered the conviction into one under bye-law 11 of the bye-laws framed by the Saharanpur Municipal Board for the Regulation and Control of Power Driven Kolhus but maintained the fine. 2. The applicant is the proprietor of the Lakshmi Oil Mill and has set up a power driven oil-crusher in the premises of the mill. According to the prosecution, he has thereby infringed bye-law No. 6, which runs as follows: The premises in which any 'Kolhu' or Oil Crusher is installed shall be pucca in construction and strong enough to stand the forces of vibration of the mechanical powers used for running the machinary thereof, and shall not adjoin any premises used for residential purposes other than those occupied by the owner or the manager of the oil mill, unless a written consent of both the owner and the occupier of the adjoining premises has been previously obtained and filed with the application for licence. 3. The applicant's mill is surrounded on three sides by dwelling houses and the applicant has failed to obtain the written consent of the owners and occupiers of the adjoining premises before installing his oilcrusher, as required by the above quoted bye-law. 4. The first argument advanced on behalf of the applicant is that the word "premises" used in the bye law in question means only the particular room or enclosure in which the oil crusher is installed and does not include other parts of the building outside that particular room or enclosure. In the present instance the oil-crusher has been fitted up in an inner room which is surrounded by either rooms also belonging to the applicant; and it is argued that as these "premises" in which the oil crusher stands do not adjoin any premises other than those occupied by the owner or the manager of the mill there was no necessity to obtain any one's consent for the installation of the machine. I am not prepared, however, to accept this restricted interpretation of the word "premises" in the context in which it is used here the word obviously suggests something wider and more comprehensive than a there single room or enclosure and would normally be interpreted as referring to the entire building occupied by the accused applicant's oil mill. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines "premises" (in the sense with which we are concerned) as "a house or building with its grounds or other appurtenances"; and there can be no justification for restricting the meaning of the word in the manner suggested by the applicant. 5. Alternatively it is argued that if the word "premises" is given its usual comprehensive meaning, the bye law in question is void and unenforceable because it is unreasonable. 6. The legal position on this subject is not disputed. In Emp. v. Bal Kishan ILR 24 All 439 this Court has recognised the rule of English law that a bye law must be reasonable before it can be enforced; and Learned Counsel for the State concedes the correctness of this view. The same opinion has been expressed by a Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in the case of Municipal Committee, Khurai v. Firm Kaluram Hiralal and others AIR 1944 Nag. 73, in which it has been held that the tests to be applied to bye laws in order to determine whether they are enforceable or not are firstly whether they infringe the letter, spirit or policy of the Municipalities Act or the law of Contract; and secondly, even though they do not, whether they are unreasonable and unfair. Further more, since the bye-laws in question in the present case purport to regulate a trade or occupation, they will be void, under Article 13 of the Constitution, for repugnancy to Article 19, if they impose an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right to carry on an occupation, trade or business that is guar anteed by Article 19 of the Constitution. 7. The question remains however whether the particular bye law with which we are now concerned is actually unreasonable or amounts to an unreasonable restriction on the right of the applicant to carry on his trade or business. 7. The question remains however whether the particular bye law with which we are now concerned is actually unreasonable or amounts to an unreasonable restriction on the right of the applicant to carry on his trade or business. The rational basis for making the written consent of owners and occupiers of adjoining residential premises necessary before an oil crusher can be installed is of course the fact that the vibrations set up by this type of machine are liable to damage adjacent buildings or make life intolerable for the inmates of those buildings. But as the bye law is worded at present, it will apply to many cases in which there is not the remotest hance of any vibrations prejudically affecting the neighbours. If the word "premises" is taken to include not only buildings but also their appurtenant compounds, a person who wishes to install an oil crusher in a small building situated well inside an extensive plot of open land, will have to obtain the consent of the owners and occupiers of residential buildings standing in other plots which adjoin that land, even though the actual buildings in which they reside may be far away from the place where the oil crusher is to be set up. And even in the case of adjoining buildings without compounds it is not difficult to conceive of instances where the danger of damage from vibrations would be altogether non existent. For example, there might be an extensive building consisting of numerous rooms, with an oil crusher installed in a room at the extreme end of the building. In such a case a person residing in premises adjoining the other end of the building far removed from the oil crusher would be quite unaffected by vibrations but would nevertheless have to give his consent before the oil crusher could be operated. Conversely there may be instances in which the danger from vibrations is undeniably present and yet the person whose building is in danger will have no right of veto, because his premises do not directly adjoin the premises where the machine is installed. Conversely there may be instances in which the danger from vibrations is undeniably present and yet the person whose building is in danger will have no right of veto, because his premises do not directly adjoin the premises where the machine is installed. If for example even the narrowest lane intervenes between the building in which the oil crusher is installed and the next house, there would be no necessity for obtaining the consent of the owner or occupier of that house, because it would not be an adjoining house, even though it might be so near to the machine as to be in grave danger of damage from the vibrations. 8. In the present case it is doubtful whether there is any real danger of vibrations adversely affecting the adjoining residential premises for as already pointed out, the room in which the oil crusher has been set up is insulated from those adjoining premises by other rooms belonging to the applicant. 9. Learned Counsel for the State has attempted to defend the bye law on the ground that only those neighbours whose buildings are likely to be actually affected by the vibrations of a machine will object to its being installed. But I can see no guarantee that neighbours will necessarily act in this reasonable fashion. They may refuse to give their consent, even if they are unaffected by the vibrations, in order to extort money from the person who wishes to install the oil crusher or because they favour a rival concern or for some other oblique motive. 10. To my mind the requirement of the bye law making the consent of owners and occupiers of adjoining residential premises necessary before an oil crusher can be installed, irrespective of whether they are likely to be affected by the vibrations set up by the machine or not, is basically unfair and unreasonable. My conclusion therefore is that the portion of bye law No. 6 which lays down that "the premises in which any 'Kolhu' or oil crusher is installed ... My conclusion therefore is that the portion of bye law No. 6 which lays down that "the premises in which any 'Kolhu' or oil crusher is installed ... shall not adjoin any premises used for residential purposes other than those occupied by the owner or the manager of the oil mill, unless a written consent of both the owner and the occupier of the adjoining premises has been previously obtained and file which the application for licence" is void and unenforceable, and the applicant cannot be held criminally liable for infringing it. 11. This revision application is accordingly allowed, the conviction and sentence of the applicant being set aside.