JUDGMENT C.A. Vaidialingam, J. 1. All these writ petitions are directed against the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Ext. P-2, dated 25th February, 1961 granting one permit each in favour of applicants Nos. 1 to 5 and 17 on the route Vypin to Pallippuram. 2. It is a matter of regret that though these proceedings, regarding the grant of permits over this route appear to have started as early as 1958, still there is very keen controversy among the various applicants, as to who exactly is entitled to have a permit to run the stage carriages on the particular route in question. 3. In or about 1951 two permits appear to have been granted for the Vypin-Pallippuram route which covers an extent of about 15 miles in length and 1 ½ miles in breadth. The two permits in 1951 were granted in favour of applicant No. 5 and it is also stated both by the Regional Transport Authority, as well as the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, that later on applicant No. 17 formed a partnership along, with applicant No. 5 as Coastal Transports and they have been running the service on the route. 4. Again, in 1957 four more permits were granted by the R.T.A., one each to applicants Nos. 1, 3, 30 and 31. But ultimately it is seen that this order was altered on appeal by the S.T.A.T., who in turn granted permits in favour of applicants Nos. 1 to 4. 5. The present grant originated in a Notification dated 11th August 1958 by the R.T.A. That Notification was published in the State Gazette on 19th August 1958. It is a Notification under section 57 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act and the R.T.A., Ernakulam, invited applications for the grant of four stage carriage permits on the Vypeen-Pallippuram route. That Notification will be marked as Court Ext. I. 6. In response to this Notification, 86 applications were received and it is seen that one party made two applications and actually there were 85 applicants for grant of four permits for this route. 7. Under Ext. P-1, dated 30th November 1958, the R.T.A., granted one permit each in favour of applicants Nos. 23, 48, 64 and 77. I. 6. In response to this Notification, 86 applications were received and it is seen that one party made two applications and actually there were 85 applicants for grant of four permits for this route. 7. Under Ext. P-1, dated 30th November 1958, the R.T.A., granted one permit each in favour of applicants Nos. 23, 48, 64 and 77. There were appeals to the S.T.A.T. who was then situated at Trichur and by order, dated 2nd April 1959 the latter authority, while confirming the grant in favour of applicant Nos. 48 and 64, set The aside the grant in favour of Nos. 23 and 77 and in turn granted one permit each to applicants Nos. 4 and 31. That is, the position finally stood this way, namely, while the R.T.A. granted permits in favour of applicants Nos. 23, 48, 64 and 77, according to the order of the S.T.A.T. the permit-holders were Nos. 4, 31, 48 and 64. That is, applicants Nos. 23 and 77 who got a permit each at the hands of the R.T.A. were ousted by the S.T.A.T. 8. There were several writ petitions filed in this court challenging the order of the S.T.A.T. The main attack appears to have been that the S.T.A.T, and the R.T.A. while granting permits in these cases have ignored the relevant circumstances which have to be taken into account under section 47 of the Act and they have taken into account totally irrelevant circumstances and granted the permits, which were the subject of attack in the writ petitions. 9. Those writ petitions were heard by my Lord the Chief Justice, sitting with Mr. Justice Madhavan Nair and, their decision is reported in Vypeen Transport Corporation v. S.T.A.T. I.L.R. 1960 Kerala 1408 and was rendered on 12tn August 1960. I will have to advert to that judgment, a little later in order to deal with certain contentions raised by the learned counsel for the various writ petitioners in these proceedings. At present it is enough to say that the learned Judges were not satisfied that the relevant considerations which prevailed with the Transport Authorities in granting the permits in this case and in consequence the High Court set aside the order of the S.T.A.T. and remanded the matters for fresh disposal, according to law, in the light of the observations contained in that judgment. 10. 10. The matters were taken up by the S.T.A.T., Ernakulam and under Ext. P-2, dated 25th February 1961 the Appellate Tribunal set aside the grant made by the R.T.A. in favour of applicants Nos. 23, 48, 64 and 77 and instead granted one permit each to applicants Nos. 1 to 5 and 17. At this stage I may mention that though the notification issued under section 57(2) by the R.T.A., was only calling for applications for the grant of four stage carnage permits for this route, and the R.T.A., granted only four permits, the S.T.A.T. considered it necessary to grant two more permits and that is how ultimately there was a grant of six permits one each to applicants Nos. 1 to 5 and 17. 11. This order of the S.T.A.T. is again attacked by the various disappointed applicants in this batch of petitions. 12. The main attack on this order on behalf of learned counsel appearing in the other matters, has been led by Mr. V. M. B. Menon, learned counsel in O.P. No. 422 of 1961. 13. The attacks made on the order of the S.T.A.T. are twofold: (1) The Appellate Tribunal has no jurisdiction in law to grant additional permits and therefore the entire order is without jurisdiction. Alternatively it was contended that in any event even assuming the Appellate Tribunal has got powers to grant additional permits that discretion or power has been exercised arbitrarily and without regard to any of the matters provided in the statute itself. 14. The second ground of attack made is really on the merits and the common ground of attack so far as this is concerned is that the S.T.A.T. has not independently and properly considered the relevant claims of these writ petitioners and practically it has proceeded on the basis that the observations contained in the High Court judgment conclude the grant in this matter. Therefore, without in any way applying its mind independently regarding the various principles laid down by the learned Judges in the decision in Vypeen Transport Corporation v. S.T.A.T. I.L.R. 1960 Kerala 1408 referred to earlier the grants have been made without any due consideration of their claims. 15. Therefore, without in any way applying its mind independently regarding the various principles laid down by the learned Judges in the decision in Vypeen Transport Corporation v. S.T.A.T. I.L.R. 1960 Kerala 1408 referred to earlier the grants have been made without any due consideration of their claims. 15. I will first take up the question of law that has been raised and then I will deal with the contention based upon the merits; because in considering the case on merits I will also have to consider the individual claims that have been urged by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the various writ petitioners in these proceedings. 16. Mr. V. M. B. Menon, learned counsel urged that the S.T.A.T. has no jurisdiction to grant the additional permits in question. The notification issued under section 57 (2) by the R.T.A. is quite clear, namely, that applications were invited only for the grant of four stage carriage permits over this route and therefore the Appellate Tribunal has no jurisdiction to grant beyond the number mentioned in the said notification. The learned counsel urged that, what, according to him is the scheme of the Act, would show that the Act does not contemplate the vesting of any such power in the Appellate Tribunal. In fact, Mr. V. M. B. Menon, learned counsel, was even prepared to go to the extent of saying that even the R.T.A. has no such power, when once it has issued the necessary notification under section 57 (2), giving also an indication as to the number of permits going to be granted. Before I consider the various sections which were adverted to by Mr. V. M. B. Menon, I considered it desirable to dear up one matter and to get some particulars from the R.T.A. as to the exact state of affairs in view of the provisions contained in sub-section 3 of section 47 to the effect A Regional Transport Authority may, having regard to the matters mentioned in sub-section (1), limit the number of stage carriages generally or of any specified type for which stage carriage permits may be granted in the region or in any specified area or on any specified route within the region. 17. I may state at this stage that sub-section 3 of section 47 was incorporated by Amending Act 100 of 1956. 17. I may state at this stage that sub-section 3 of section 47 was incorporated by Amending Act 100 of 1956. Formerly, as the Act originally stood, section 48 (a) was to the effect that the R. T. A. may, after consideration of the matters set forth in sub-section 1 of section 47 (a) limit the number of stage carriages or stage carriages of any specific type for which stage carriage permits may be granted in the region or in any specified area or of any specified route within the region, and it has, more or less been incorporated as sub-section (3) of section 47. The question as to whether in this case the R. T. A, has placed any limit regarding the number of stage carriages, by virtue of its powers under sub-section (3) of section 47 had to be clarified. Therefore, I directed the R.T.A. to file an affidavit regarding this aspect of the matter. 18. Accordingly, the learned Government Pleader appearing for the Tribunals, has filed an affidavit sworn to by the Secretary, R. T. A., Ernakulam. The material point to be considered is stated in paragraph 3 of the said affidavit. It is stated that on 5th November 1958 the first respondent took a decision under section 47 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act which runs as follows: "Under section 47 (3) this authority limit the number of stage, carriages on the existing routes in this region to the existing number of stage carriages plying on these routes and also such number of stage carriages for which applications have been invited." It is also stated that the said decision was published in the Kerala Gazette, dated 9th December 1958. 19. The full text of the decision or resolution referred to in paragraph 3 of the counter-affidavit of the Secretary, R.T.A., and published in the State Gazette on 9th December 1958 has been placed before me by Shri M. P. Menon, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner in O. P. No. 501 of 1961. The learned counsel appearing on all sides, have no objection to this copy being marked as Court Ext. II. The learned counsel appearing on all sides, have no objection to this copy being marked as Court Ext. II. The said notification runs as follows: "It is hereby notified for the information of the public that the Regional Transport Authority, Ernakulam, in its proceedings, dated 5th November 1958 has resolved under section 47 (3) of M. V. Act to limit the number of stage carriages in the existing routes in this region to be the existing number of stage carriages plying in these routes and also such number of stage carriages for which applications for pucca permits have been invited. No action will be taken under section 37 of M. V. Act on applications received without calling for such applications, under section 57 (2)." 20. It will be seen that the authority states that no action will be taken under section 57 of the M. V. Act on applications received without calling for such applications under section 57 (2). Earlier in the notification it will also be seen that the R.T.A. informs the public that by its proceedings, dated 5th November 1958 it has resolved under section 47 (3) of the Act to limit the number of stage carriages in the existing routes in this region to be the existing number of stage carriages plying in these routes and also such number of stage carriages for which applications have been invited for pucca permits. 21. This notification fixing a limit under section 47 (3) was in force when the R.T.A. took up this matter and granted the permit on 30th November 1958. 22. It is further stated in paragraph 3 of the counter-affidavit of the Secretary, R.T.A., that the notification published on 9th December 1958, was again reconsidered by the R. T. A. and on 29th July 1959 the R.T.A. passed another resolution to the effect A total prohibition of grant of fresh permit's for stage carriages in the existing routes is against public interest. The growing number of overload cases is an indication that the existing facilities are inadequate to meet the requirements of the travelling public. Representations from the public as well as local bodies are being received demanding increased transport facilities. Therefore, the continuance in force of the notification above mentioned is detrimental to public interest. Hence that notification will stand cancelled from the date on which this notification is published in the Govenment Gazette. Representations from the public as well as local bodies are being received demanding increased transport facilities. Therefore, the continuance in force of the notification above mentioned is detrimental to public interest. Hence that notification will stand cancelled from the date on which this notification is published in the Govenment Gazette. The R.T.A. further states that this notification was published in the Gazette on 18th August 1959. It will be seen that with effect from the date of publication of this resolution of 29th July 1959 on 18th August 1959, the limitation fixed already under the notification published on 9th December 1958 ceases to have any force. Therefore, on the date when the final grant was taken up and Authority made by the S. T. A. T. after the remand by the High Court on 25th February 1961 the position is that no limitation has been placed under section 47 (3) of the M. V. Act. 23. There are other matters which are mentioned regarding this particular route by the R.T.A. and one such is that even later than the present grant there has been a further grant in about March 1960 of six permits to operators on this route by the R.T.A. It is rather significant to note that though the notification under section 57 (2) in respect of that grant related only to the grant of two permits, nevertheless the R.T.A., at the time of the final grant decided to increase the number of permits to be granted and actually granted six permits. That is only an aspect I am adverting to show that even the R.T.A. considered that an increased grant is necessary in view of the particular circumstances. 24. It is not really necessary for me in this case, at any rate, to consider what will be the powers of either the R.T.A. or the S.T.A.T. when a notification under section 47 (3) is not in force, inasmuch as at the time when the order of the S.T.A.T. was passed there was no notification or limitation under section 47 (3) of the Act. Therefore a decision will have to be arrived at on the basis that no powers under section 47 (3) have been exercised in these matters. 25. Learned counsel Mr. Therefore a decision will have to be arrived at on the basis that no powers under section 47 (3) have been exercised in these matters. 25. Learned counsel Mr. V. M. B. Menon referred to section 42 of the Act to show that there is a prohibition imposed on the owner of a transport vehicle to use a vehicle in any public place except in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted or countersigned by the R.T.A. or the State Transport Commission authorising the use of the vehicle in that particular place in the manner in which the vehicle is being used. The contention is rather that the authorities who are authorised to grant a permit under section 42 (1) will take in only the R.T.A., the State Transport Authority or the Commission and the S.T.A.T. does not come in the picture at all. Authority I am not inclined to accept this contention of the learned counsel. No doubt, it may be that it is the R.T.A. who has to actually grant the permit. All parties are agreed that it is perfectly open and competent to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, as an Appellate Tribunal under section 64 of the Act, to set aside a grant of a permit that may have been made by the R.T.A. and grant a permit to a totally different applicant. In such a case, the permit is directed to be granted by the Appellate Tribunal. Ultimately in pursuance of the directions contained in the appellate order the R.T.A. as a subordinate authority, is bound to give effect to that order by granting a permit under section 42. Section 42 (1) places only a limitation on the right of any person to run a transport vehicle except under a permit. It will be putting a very narrow interpretation on section 42 to say that an appellate tribunal, when it grants a permit, does not find a place under section 42 (1) of the Act. 26. The next sections that were referred to by Mr. It will be putting a very narrow interpretation on section 42 to say that an appellate tribunal, when it grants a permit, does not find a place under section 42 (1) of the Act. 26. The next sections that were referred to by Mr. V. M. B. Menon are the various other sections contained in Chapter IV which deal with control of transport vehicles and his attempt was to show that it is really the R.T.A. who is charged with the duty of receiving applications, directing the publication of the same, receiving objections regarding the grant of permits and also provide for objections for grant of permits being made to the R.T.A. alone. All this, in my opinion, does not carry the matter any far. Those sections, by themselves, will not in any way limit the jurisdiction? if any, of the appellate tribunal to grant more number of permits than that referred to in the notification under section 57 (2) of the Act. Section 44 of the Act no doubt prescribes that the State Government shall constitute a State Transport Authority to exercise and discharge the powers and functions specified in sub-section (3) and shall in like manner constitute Regional Transport Authorities to exercise and discharge the functions and powers conferred under that Chapter. It is quite understandable because there must be a regional transport authority which has to deal with all those matters at a preliminary stage. Section 45 cannot be understood to limit the powers of the appellate tribunal at all. Sections 45 and 46 have to be read together. Section 45 is to the effect that every application for a permit is to be made to the RT.A. of the region in which it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles. The proviso to section 45 need not detain me in this connection. There must be an authority to whom an application for grant of permit has to be made and that is the original authority, namely, the R.T.A. and that power has been given to it under section 45. Again, section 46 only refers to the various matters that have to be referred to or mentioned by an applicant when he applies for a stage carriage permit. 27. Section 47 relates to the procedure of the R.T.A. in considering applications for stage carriage permits. Again, section 46 only refers to the various matters that have to be referred to or mentioned by an applicant when he applies for a stage carriage permit. 27. Section 47 relates to the procedure of the R.T.A. in considering applications for stage carriage permits. Under sub-section (1) of section 47 the R.T.A. is charged with the duty of taking into consideration the various matters mentioned therein in considering an application for a stage carriage permit and section 47 (3) gives power to the R.T.A. to limit the number of stage carriages having regard to these matters mentioned in sub-section 1 of section 47. Section 47 (2) gives the R.T.A. a right to refuse to grant a stage carriage permit, if it appears from any time table furnished, that the provisions of the Act relating to the speed at which vehicles may be driven are likely to be contravened. Section 48 deals with the grant of stage carriage permits and it is to the effect: Subject to the provisions of section 47, a Regional Transport Authority may, on an application made to it under section 46, grant a stage carriage permit in accordance with the application or with such modifications as it deems fit or refuse to grant such a permit. Therefore, jurisdiction in the first instance, no doubt, is given to the R.T.A. under section 48 either to grant a permit or to refuse to grant a permit. Sections 49 to 56 deal with applications for contract carriage permits or private carriers or public carriers permits. It is not necessary at all to consider that aspect. Section 50 deals with the procedure to be followed by the R.T.A. in considering applications for contract carriage permits. This, in my view, is rather a significant provision, inasmuch as it gives a specific right to the authorities or persons mentioned therein to make a representation to the effect that the number of contract carriages for which permits have already been granted is sufficient or in excess of the needs of the region or any area within the region. So far as I could see, I do not find any such specific section in dealing with the grant of applications for stage carriage permits giving any such right to any of the authorities or to the other persons who are entitled to place their objections or representations. 28. So far as I could see, I do not find any such specific section in dealing with the grant of applications for stage carriage permits giving any such right to any of the authorities or to the other persons who are entitled to place their objections or representations. 28. The other two sections that have to be noted are sections 57 and 64. Section 57 provides for the procedure in applying for the grant of permits. Under sub-section (1) an application for a contract carnage permit or a private carriers permit can be made at any time. But under sub-section (2) of section 57, so far as an application for a stage carriage permit or a public carriers permit is concerned, they have to be made in less than six weeks before the date on which it is desired that the permit shall take effect, or the Regional Transport Authority appoints dates for the receipt of such applications, on such dates. Sub-section (2) of section 57 deals with two different circumstances, namely, (1), when an application for a stage carriage or a public carriers permit is made suo motu by an intending operator, and (2) when the R.T.A. decides to call for applications for such purpose and appoints dates for receipt of such applications. The notification under section 57 (2) for this route, which has been marked as Court Ext. I, has been issued by the R.T.A. under section 57 (2) of the Act. 29. Sub-section (3) of section 57 makes it obligatory in the part of the R.T.A. to make the application available for inspection at the office of the Authority and also publish the application or the substance thereof in the prescribed manner together with a notice of the date before which representations in connection therewith may be submitted, and the date, not being less than thirty days from such publication, on which, and the time and place at which, the application and any representations received will be considered. This applies to both an application filed suo motu by an intending operator and also to applications sent in response to notification calling for such applications issued by the R.T.A. under section 57. This applies to both an application filed suo motu by an intending operator and also to applications sent in response to notification calling for such applications issued by the R.T.A. under section 57. In either circumstance, there is an obligation on the part of the R.T.A. to make the application available for making representations and also to consider that along with the representations in respect of which the time and place will have to be fixed. 30. Under proviso to section 57 (3) a power is given to the R.T.A. to summarily refuse an application without following the procedure laid down in the sub-section in the circumstances mentioned therein, namely, where the grant of any permit in accordance with the application or with modifications would have the effect of increasing the number of vehicles operating in the region, or in any area or on any route within that region, under the class of permits to which the application relates, beyond the limit fixed in that behalf under sub-section (3) of section 47 of sub-section (2) of section 55, as the case may be. 31. I have already referred to the notification issued by the R.T.A. under section 47 (3) marked as Court Ext. II. There is a specific clause in that notification to the effect that no action will be taken under section 57 of the M. V. Act on applications received without calling for applications under section 57 (2). That means, the authorities indicate that they will exercise their power of summary refusal of those applications inasmuch as a limit has been fixed already under section 47 (3) of the Act. Authority 32. The only other section that has to be adverted to is sub-section 7 of section 57. The earlier clauses deal with the representations that can be filed and the representations that may be taken into consideration by the R.T.A. as also to the disposal of the applications at a public hearing in respect of which the applicant and the person making the representation have to be given an opportunity of being heard. 33. Sub-section (7) of section 57 provides that when a Regional Transport Authority refuses an application for permit of any kind, it shall give the applicant in writing its reasons for the refusal. 33. Sub-section (7) of section 57 provides that when a Regional Transport Authority refuses an application for permit of any kind, it shall give the applicant in writing its reasons for the refusal. I have already stated that under section 48 power is given to the R.T.A., subject to the provisions of section 47, to grant a stage carriage permit on an application made under section 46 in accordance with the application or in such modification as it deems fit or refuse to grant such a permit. Section 57 (7) is really ancillary to the powers of refusal that may be exercised under section 48. Section 57 (7) makes it obligatory on the part of the R.T.A. who refuses an application for a permit to give to the applicant in writing its reasons for the refusal. 34. Then comes section 64 of the Act which gives a right of appeal to the various persons who may feel themselves aggrieved under clases (a) to (i) of that section. It is not really necessary for me to go into the various clauses referred to therein except refer to clause (a) of section 64 which provides: Any person aggrieved by the refusal of the State or Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit, or by any condition attached to a permit granted to him may, within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the prescribed authority who shall give such person and the original authority an opportunity of being heard." The prescribed authority is the S.T.A.T. in this case and there is no controversy about that matter. The point to be noted is that any person who is aggrieved by the refusal of the State or a Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit has got a right of appeal regarding the refusal to grant a permit to the S.T.A.T. under section 64(a). There are certain other rights given to other types of persons also. Under section 64 (f) right is given to the local authority or police authority or an association or a person providing transport facilities, who having opposed the grant of a permit, is aggrieved by the grant thereof or by any condition attached thereto to appeal to the prescribed authority. 35. Under section 64 (f) right is given to the local authority or police authority or an association or a person providing transport facilities, who having opposed the grant of a permit, is aggrieved by the grant thereof or by any condition attached thereto to appeal to the prescribed authority. 35. In my view the various sections referred to above, excepting prescribing the R.T.A. as an original authority, who has to do various matters, do not in any way limit the powers of the S.T.A.T. functioning as an appellate authority under section 64 of the Act. Various circumstances have been urged by learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners, namely, if a permit is allowed to be granted for the first time by the S.T.A.T. which is the appellate authority, the aggrieved person has no right of further appeal, whereas a specific right of appeal is provided under section 64 for persons whose request for the grant of a permit has been negatived by the R.T.A. But this problem that is posed can be solved within no time. Admittedly, counsel are agreed that it is open to the Appellate Tribunal to set aside a grant made by the R.T.A. to A, B or C and in turn given the permit in favour of X, Y or Z. In this case it certainly cannot be stated that the grant by the S.T.A.T. is without jurisdiction. What about the right of appeal to those persons to whom a grant was made in the first instance but whose grant has been set aside by the Appellate Tribunal? I am only indicating this to show that after all there is no right of appeal against the decision of the S.T.A.T. The circumstance that the grant made by the Appellate Tribunal cannot be taken up by way of further appeal is no ground for accepting the contention that the legislature intended that all orders in the first instance by way of grant or refusal must start only from the R.T.A. onwards. 36. No particular section of the Act or any rule has been brought to my notice by any of the learned counsel for the writ petitioners to show that the legislature in any way intended to limit the powers of either the R.T.A. or the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in the matter of granting permits. 36. No particular section of the Act or any rule has been brought to my notice by any of the learned counsel for the writ petitioners to show that the legislature in any way intended to limit the powers of either the R.T.A. or the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in the matter of granting permits. I am well aware, and I have already dealt with that aspect earlier, that the only provision that I could see in this chapter, which may be said to place some sort of limitation in the matter of grant of permits is that contained in sub-section (3) of section 47. In fact, Mr. K. V. Surianarayana Iyer, learned counsel for the third applicant, was prepared to go to the extent of contending that the power to restrict or limit the number of stage carriages under sub-section .(3) is really to be considered as part of the power of that authority who grants the permit and therefore a rejection of an application under section 57 (3) proviso on the basis that there has been a limitation under section 47 (3) itself amounts to a refusal to grant a permit which can be canvassed before the Appellate Tribunal. I am not inclined to embark upon the correctness or otherwise of this contention in these proceedings because I have already indicated that at the time when the S.T.A.T. was dealing with this matter no such limitation was in existence because the notification under section 47 (3) by the R.T.A. had been withdrawn long ago. For the present purpose I am prepared to proceed on the basis that the only limitation that the legislature has found it necessary to place is to be found in sub-section (3) of section 47 read with section 48. Section 48 clearly shows: Subject to the provisions of section 47, a Regional Transport Authority may, on an application made to it under section 46, grant a stage carriage permit in accordance with the application or with such modifications as it deems fit or refuse to grant such a permit. Section 47 also enjoins on the R.T.A. in considering an application for a stage carriage permit to have regard to the various matters mentioned in clauses (a) to (f) in sub-section (1) of section 47. In particular, clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) require to be noticed. Section 47 also enjoins on the R.T.A. in considering an application for a stage carriage permit to have regard to the various matters mentioned in clauses (a) to (f) in sub-section (1) of section 47. In particular, clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) require to be noticed. That is, every time when the R.T.A. is considering an application for the grant of a stage carriage permit, it is bound to have regard to the interests of the public generally, the advantages to the public of the service to be provided including the saving of time likely to be effected thereby and any convenience arising from journeys not being broken, the adequacy of other passenger transport services operating or likely to operate in the near future, whether by road or other means between the places to be served, and the benefit to any particular locality or localities likely to be afforded by the service. I am leaving out clauses (e) and (f) for the present. I am referring to clauses (a) to (d) in particular for this purpose. Admittedly in cases where applications are filed suo motu by the various parties for grant of permits, the R.T.A. is bound to receive those applications provided they are made within less than six weeks before the date on which they desire that the permit should take effect under the provisions of section 57 (2). Section 45 gives a right to a person to apply for a permit. Section 46 deals with various matters which have to be stated in the application. 37. Section 57 casts a duty on the R.T.A. to whom such applications have been made suo motu, to publish those applications in the prescribed manner and call for representations in connection therewith, and there is also an obligation to hear the applications, along with any representations that may be received, and that hearing must be a public hearing where the applicant as well as the person making the representation shall have an opportunity of being heard. 38. The question of making even a provisional fixation as to the number of permits to be granted will arise only in cases where the R.T.A. invites applications tor such grants. As for instance, in the notification issued under section 57 (2) in this case the R.T.A. has stated that applications for the grant of four permits are called for. 38. The question of making even a provisional fixation as to the number of permits to be granted will arise only in cases where the R.T.A. invites applications tor such grants. As for instance, in the notification issued under section 57 (2) in this case the R.T.A. has stated that applications for the grant of four permits are called for. But when several applicants file applications suo motu for the grant of stage carriage permits on a particular route there is no question of the R.T.A, having to fix even provisionally, tentatively, or administratively the number of permits that are to be granted at that time, unless it be there is a limitation placed under sub-section (3) of section 47. But if there has been a limitation placed under section 47 (3), the matter will not come up before the R.T.A. for consideration as to the grant of a permit because under sub-section (3) of section 57 proviso, the R T.A. would have summarily to refuse to receive the application because there is already a limitation placed under section 47 (3). In all other cases, so long as there is no limitation fixed under section 47 (3), there is an obligation on the part of the R.T.A. to consider every application, however large they may be, for grant of permit regarding a particular route and in that connection the R.T.A. is bound to consider the interests of the public and the advantages that the public will have by the proposed service, It will also have to take into account, in considering the grant of a permit for a stage carriage, the adequacy of other transport services already operating or elikely to operate in the near future. To take a concrete case, if 20 persons apply suo motu for grant of stage carriage permits under section 47 (3) the R.T.A. cannot certainly be heard to say that it will hear only two of the applicants. The question as to how many stage carriage permits is to be issued to persons from among the various applicants is to be decided only by the R.T.A. after having due regard to the various provisions contained in the various clauses in sub-section (1) of section 47. 39. I am adverting to this aspect to show that in such cases there cannot even be a previous fixation of the number of permits to be granted. 39. I am adverting to this aspect to show that in such cases there cannot even be a previous fixation of the number of permits to be granted. If there cannot be a provisional fixation of any number when applications are received suo motu, I fail to understand why, when the R.T.A. is provisionally mentioning in a notification issued under section 57 (2) regarding the grant of a particular number or permits it should not have the power either to reduce the number or permits or to increase it after having due regard to the various matters mentioned in section 47 (1). 40. The question can also be considered from another point of view. Supposing the R.T.A. calls for applications for the grant of four permits and ultimately at the time of the actual grant, taking into account the various matters mentioned in section 47 (1) of the Act derides in the interests of the public generally to grant only two out of the permits. Is it open to one of the applicants to compel the R.T.A. to grant even the other permits merely on the basis that the notification under section 57 calls for applications for the grant of four permits? In my view, it is not open to a party to compel the R.T.A. to grant the very same number of permits though a number may have been specified in a notification issued under section 57 (2) of the Act. If that is so, the question then remains as to whether any limitation has been placed on the powers or an Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal functioning under section 64 of the Act has necessarily to take into consideration the various matters mentioned in section 47 for considering whether a grant is to be made or not and if so whether the grant is to be made in favour of a particular applicant before it. If it is open to the R.T.A. to either reduce the number referred to in the notification or to increase the number referred to in the said notification, I am not able to find anything in the statute which takes away such a power when the Appellate Tribunal exercises the jurisdiction under section 64. It will be remembered that the order that is appealed against is one by the R.T.A. refusing to grant a permit. It will be remembered that the order that is appealed against is one by the R.T.A. refusing to grant a permit. In considering the application of the particular appellant, it is certainly open to the Appellate tribunal not only to substitute a grant made in favour of another person by granting it in favour of the appellant or allow the other permit to stand and also to grant an additional permit provided, it does so having due regard to the the various matters mentioned in section 4 (1). 41. Therefore, from any of the provisions of the Act or the Rules, I am not convinced that either the R.T.A. or the S.T.A.T. has no jurisdiction to grant either a lesser number of permits than that mentioned in the notification under section 47 (1) or a larger number of permits than that referred to in the said notification. 42. The affidavit filed by the R.T.A. also does not state that there is any guiding factor or principle that has to be followed by it when it decided to mention the number of permits that is to be granted in a notification under section 57 (3) of the Act. Therefore, I have to proceed on the basis that the fixation of a number in a notification under section 57 (2), is on a purely provisional basis which could be altered either way, i.e., by way of decrease or by way of increase at the time of the actual grant itself. I am prepared to accept the contention urged by Shri V. K. K. Menon, Shri P. Govindan Nair and Shri K. V. Surianarayana Iyer, and other learned counsel who have opposed these various writ petitions, that the Appellate Tribunal in such circumstances, has certainly, got only a power but also a jurisdiction in proper cases to increase the number of permits to be granted over and above that referred to in the notification under section 57 (2). 43. There is also one other aspect that has to be adverted to, namely, a number to be fixed in the notification under section 57 (2) certainly is not made obligatory under any provision of the Act or the Rules. 43. There is also one other aspect that has to be adverted to, namely, a number to be fixed in the notification under section 57 (2) certainly is not made obligatory under any provision of the Act or the Rules. On the other hand, it will be seen that under section 57 (3) what is made obligatory on the R.T.A. is to publish the applications for the grant of permits and also to indicate the date, which should be not less than 30 days from the date of the application, as also the time and place at which those applications and representations will be considered. Barring this there is no other duty on the part of the R.T.A. to fix the number of permits that is to be granted. Even if they purport to make a provisional fixation in the notification under section 57 (2) it has absolutely no support based on any section of the Act, or the rules framed thereunder. 44. Learned counsel Mr. V. K. K. Menon drew my attention to certain decisions on this aspect, where the question of the power of the Appellate Tribunal for granting permits in excess of that fixed by the R.T.A. have come up for consideration. 45. Learned counsel also drew my attention to the observations of the Supreme Court in Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P. A.I.R. 1954 SC 728, as to what exactly is the nature of the right of the members of the public to carry on transport activities. The learned counsel in this connection urged that the Supreme Court itself has recognised that the right to use the public road is a common law right and what is done by the statute in question is only to place a reasonable restriction on that right in the interests of the public. The same view have also been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the later decision reported in Raman and Raman v. State of Madras A.I.R. 1959 SC 694. In fact the learned Judges specifically refer to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act in question. 46. The same view have also been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the later decision reported in Raman and Raman v. State of Madras A.I.R. 1959 SC 694. In fact the learned Judges specifically refer to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act in question. 46. So far as the question of the power of the Appellate Tribunal is concerned, there are three decisions two of the Rajasthan High Court reported in J. G. Singh Transport v. State Transport Authority A.I.R. 1957 Rajasthan 99 and Automobile Transport Ltd. v. Nathuram A.I.R. 1959 Rajasthan 121, and the decision of the Punjab High Court reported in S.C.T. Society v. Chief Commissioner A.I.R. 1958 Punjab 465. 47. Before I advert to these decisions, I will advert to a decision of a Division Bench of the Travancore-Cochin High Court reported in P.I. Scaria v. P. K. Krishnan A.I.R. 1957 T.C. 224, where the learned Chief Justice and my learned brother Mr. Justice M. S. Menon, had to consider the power of the R.T.A. itself to grant more number of permits than that referred to in the notification under section 57 (3) of the Act. 48. In the Travancore-Cochin decision, it will be seen that though the R.T.A. had called for applications for the grant of two permits, ultimately that authority granted three permits and the point of attack was that R.T.A. has no jurisdiction to enhance the number of permits. That contention was negatived by my learned brother Mr. Justice Varadaraja Iyengar and against the learned Judges order an appeal was taken and that appeal was also rejected by the learned Chief Justice and Mr. Justice M. S. Menon with these observations at page 255: "Learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to Invite our attention to any provision of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act IV of 1939), or of the Travancore Cochin Motor Vehicles Rules, 1952, which will in any way indicate that the 4th respondent is confined to the number of permits indicated in the notification and that a grant of permits beyond that number will be without jurisdiction." Though I find from the order of Mr. Justice Varadaraja Iyengar that has been quoted in the judgment that a reference was made to a fixation under section 48 of the Act, that aspect has not been adverted to by the learned Judges and the learned Judges have again proceeded on the basis that no provision in the Act or the Rules has been brought to their notice which will in any way indicate that the R.T.A. is confined to the number of permits shown in the notification. Therefore, the question as to what will be the effect of a limitation placed under present section 47 (3) of the Act was not to be considered in these proceedings. 49. In J. G. Singh Transport v. State Transport Authority A.I.R. 1957 Rajasthan 99, the learned Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Dave had to consider the legality of an additional grant made by the appellate authority. At page 100 the second question that arose before the learned Judges as to whether on appeal under section 64 (a) of the Act the Appellate Authority can increase the number of permits limited by the R.T.A. under section 48 was considered. The ultimate decision of the learned Judges appear to be that notwithstanding the limitation placed by the then section 48 of the Act there is nevertheless a power and jurisdiction in the appellate authority to increase the number of permits. So far as that particular aspect is concerned, I reserve expressly liberty to consider that question as and when it arises. So far as these proceedings are concerned, I am not prepared to go to that extent because it does not arise here. But what is to be noted is that the learned Judges in that judgment were prepared to accept the jurisdiction in an appellate authority to grant more number of permits than that indicated in the notification that may have been issued by the R.T.A. inspite of a limitation under section 48 (a). But the learned Judges are very cautious, if I may say so with respect, when they observe at page 101. "It may however be observed at the same time that the Appellate Authority also should while increasing the number of permits take into consideration all those facters which the Regional Transport Authority is required to Consider by the law. In other words, the Appellate Authority also should not proceed arbitrarily. "It may however be observed at the same time that the Appellate Authority also should while increasing the number of permits take into consideration all those facters which the Regional Transport Authority is required to Consider by the law. In other words, the Appellate Authority also should not proceed arbitrarily. We should not be understood to mean that in the present case we approve of the Appellate Authority order in giving permits to all the respondents. We cannot go into the merits of the order in this writ application and therefore we do not express any opinion on that point. We have only to see if the Appellate Authority had the jurisdiction to hear and decide the appeal which was before it. Our conclusion is that it had such jurisdiction because the appeals were filed by persons aggrieved by the refusal of permits."� 50. The next decision that requires to be noticed is the decision of the same High Court in Automobile Transport Ltd. v. Nathuram A.I.R. 1959 Rajasthan 121. There again, it will be seen that applications for the grant of three permits were called and three permits were granted by the R.T.A. and The Regional on appeal apart from the three permits already granted five more permits were granted by the Appellate Tribunal. The question arose as to whether the Appellate Tribunal has got a jurisdiction to grant the excess number of permits. Mr. Justice Jagat Narayan who delivered the judgment on behalf of the Bench observes at page 122: Having heard the learned counsel for the parties we are satisfied that the above contention raised on behalf of the petitioners has no force. The Act nowhere provides that a decision of the Regional Transport Authority limiting the number of stage carriages on any specific route is final and binding on the appellate authority. Section 64 which provides for an appeal by a person aggrieved by the refusal of a permit no where lays down that in deciding the appeal the Appellate Authority cannot increase the number of permits fixed by the Regional Transport Authority without giving notice to the existing operators. Section 64 which provides for an appeal by a person aggrieved by the refusal of a permit no where lays down that in deciding the appeal the Appellate Authority cannot increase the number of permits fixed by the Regional Transport Authority without giving notice to the existing operators. The contention which is referred to in the observations quoted above was the contention that the Appellate authority while deciding an appeal under section 64 had no jurisdiction to increase the number of permits along the route without giving notice of its intention of doing so to the existing operators. 51. The learned Judges again are prepared to proceed on the basis that a decision or a limitation placed by the R.T.A. under the old section 48 (a) corresponding to section 47 (3) is not even binding on the R.T.A. itself. Here again, while I agree with the learned Judge view that an appellate authority functioning under section 64 has got a jurisdiction to grant more number of permits, I do not express any view on this particular proposition laid down by the learned Judges that a decision under the old section 48 (a) is not even binding on the R.T.A. itself. That question will have to be investigated further when it directly arises for decision. 52. The last decision that requires to be noticed is the one reported in S.C.T. Society v. Chief Commissioner A.I.R. 1958 Punjab 465. That was also a case where an appellate authority granted one permit more than that referred to in the notification issued by the R.T.A. At page 466 the learned Judges, in overruling the contention that the Chief Commissioner in that case who was the appellate authority, could not grant an additional permit when following the procedure laid down in section 57 observes as follows: This means that the appellate authority has no power to decide the appeal finally when an appeal is filed under S. 64 (a) against the refusal to grant a permit to the appellant. Moreover before an appeal is filed, the Transport Authority has to comply with the provisions of section 57, which was admittedly done in the present case, and then the record goes to the appellate authority for decision of the appeal. Moreover before an appeal is filed, the Transport Authority has to comply with the provisions of section 57, which was admittedly done in the present case, and then the record goes to the appellate authority for decision of the appeal. No reason has been brought to my notice which should impel me to hold that in such circumstances the appellate authority has no power to decide an appeal finally but has to remand the case for observing afresh the provisions of section 57 of the Act and then the Transport Authority should grant additional permit or permits. I respectfully agree with the observations of the learned Judge extracted above. 53. Therefore, the one principle that emerges from the various decisions adverted to by me earlier clearly is that the R.T.A. has got jurisdiction to grant more number of permits than that referred to in the notification under section 57 (2). The Appellate Tribunal functioning under section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act has got also equally power and jurisdiction to grant more number of permits than that referred to in the notification under section 57 (2). But no doubt the decisions of the Rajasthan High Court in particular referred to by me, if I may say so with respect, are prepared to go further and hold that even when a limitation is made by action being taken under the old section 48 of the Motor Vehicles Act corresponding to the present sub-section 3 of section 47, the said limitation is not binding on the authority who made the limitation, namely, the R.T.A. and much less is it binding on the Appellate Tribunal. So far as that point is concerned, I have already stated that it is not necessary at all for me to express opinion in these matters as the question does not directly arise for decision. But the broad principle that the R.T.A. and the Appellate Tribunal have got both jurisdiction and power to enhance the grant of number of permits is clearly laid down by the decisions referred to earlier and so far as that principle goes I am in respectful agreement with those decisions. 54. But the broad principle that the R.T.A. and the Appellate Tribunal have got both jurisdiction and power to enhance the grant of number of permits is clearly laid down by the decisions referred to earlier and so far as that principle goes I am in respectful agreement with those decisions. 54. Learned counsel further alleged that even if in the original notification under section 57 (2) the permits had been stated to be not four but six different types of representations would have been made and that has been denied by the Appellate Tribunal taking upon itself the power to grant additional permits. I am not able to appreciate this kind of reasoning because I put very directly to learned counsel for the petitioner to show how exactly the representation would be different when made in pursuance of a notification calling for grant of 4 permits and how exactly it will differ if the notification had been issued inviting applications for grant of 6 permits and no satisfactory answer is given. Therefore, this contention also does not appeal to me. 55. So far as this aspect is concerned, there is no provision in the Act or in the Rules which makes it obligatory on an R.T.A. to indicate the number of permits to be granted in a notification issued under section 57 (2). Any number that may be mentioned is, I consider, only on a purely provisional or tentative basis which could be either reduced or increased at the time of the actual grant both by the R.T.A. and also the Appellate Tribunal, having, no doubt, due regard to the interests of the public and other matters mentioned in section 47 (1) of the Act and this power can be exercised so long as there is no limitation of the number of buses on a particular route or region that has been arrived at by virtue of the powers vested under section 47 (3) of the Act. 56. 56. So long as the fixation or mentioning of the number in a notification under section 57 (2) is not by virtue of any statutory duty or by virtue of obligation imposed upon the Tribunal under the rules, it has absolutely no legal sanction behind it excepting to give an indication to the prospective applicants that four persons whose applications may be accepted will have a right to run a transport service in the particular route in question. That does not in any way take the powers of either of the authorities to alter by way of increasing or by way of decreasing or revising it in proper case. 56. (a) The Rajasthan High Court had to consider the old section 48-A of the Act when there was no section corresponding to the provisions of section 48 as it now stands and also when there was no provision similar to the provisions of the proviso in section 57 (2) of the Act as it stands giving power to the authorities to summarily reject an application without following the procedure laid down in sub-section 3 of section 57 of the present Act. No doubt, under the old Act there appears to have been a rule which more or less corresponds to the proviso to section 57 (3) of the present Act. But there was no section corresponding to the present section 48 of the Act. Section 48 clearly shows that the grant of a permit must be only subject to the provisions of section 47 and under section 47 (3) power is given to the R.T.A. to limit the number of stage carriages. Therefore, when granting a permit under section 48, the authority must have regard also to any limitation that it has placed by virtue of its powers under sub-section (3) of section 47. I am only indicating this aspect to show that when the question directly arises, in a proper case, these aspects will have to be more fully considered. 56. (b) At this stage I may also mention that Shri V. R. Krishna Iyer, learned counsel for the petitioner in O.P. No. 423 of 1961 urged that the number of permits to be issued mentioned in the notification issued under section 57 (2), namely, Court Ext. I, must be considered to be an exercise of the powers of limitation under section 47 (3) of the Act. I, must be considered to be an exercise of the powers of limitation under section 47 (3) of the Act. I am not inclined to accept this contention. A sample notification under section 47 (3) for this particular region has been already filed as Court Ext. II. A reading of the notification under section 57(2) namely, Court Ext. I and the notification under section 47 (3), namely, Court Ext. II, clearly shows how radically each of them differs. Section 47 (3) speaks of a limitation whereas the notification Court Ext. I relates to the grant of permits. Therefore that contention cannot be accepted. 57. Then a subsidiary aspect was mentioned on this point. That is, even assuming that the Appellate Tribunal has got powers or jurisdiction to grant an increased number of permits, in the particular circumstances of this case the Appellate Tribunal has exercised that power arbitrarily and without regard to the provisions of section 47 of the Act. I cannot accept this contention. A reading of the order of the Appellate Tribunal clearly shows that the latter has considered the various stage carriage permits granted for the route in question ever since 1951 and it is also seen that it is of the view that the need for the introduction of more services in the island appears to be necessary. There was no controversy that even in respect of a 4th grant that was made by the R.T.A. as late as March 1960 though applications were invited only for the grant of two stage carriage permits, that authority actually granted six permits. The R.T.A. is also of the view that there is greater demand for stage carriage services over this thickly populated island and the Appellate Tribunal, having due regard to the interests of the travelling public has considered it necessary to grant two additional permits and therefore, ultimately, it comes to the conclusion that six permits will have to be issued to the parties mentioned therein. Therefore, I cannot certainly say that the Appellate Tribunal has not adverted to the material facts which have to be taken into account, in such circumstances, and therefore the order of the Appellate Tribunal, when it decided to grant two additional permits has to be sustained. 58. Then the question arises as regards the individual claims made by the various writ petitioners. 58. Then the question arises as regards the individual claims made by the various writ petitioners. I will take up each of the applications one by one. Here again, there is a common ground of attack, namely, that the Appellate Tribunal, instead of independently considering the individual qualifications of the various applicants, has been largely guided by certain observations made by the High Court when the matter came up before them on a prior occasion. The grievance of the petitioners appears to be that the learned Judges have laid down certain principles which have to be taken into account in the matter of granting stage carriage permits under the Motor Vehicles Act. Ignoring those principles, and taking only the observations of the learned Judges, the State Transport Appellate Authority has granted permits in favour of applicants Nos. 1 to 5 and 17. Apart from this common ground of attack, each of the writ petitioners has placed before me his special qualifications which, according to them, have not been considered or taken into account by the Appellate Tribunal. 59. So far as this common ground of attack is concerned it should not be forgotten that the manner in which permits had been granted by the Transport Authorities over this route was the subject of an attack before the learned Judges. It is also clear from a perusal of the decision of the learned Judges reported in Vypeen Transport Corporation v. S.T.A.T. I.L.R. 1960 Kerala 1408 that such of the applicants who had obtained permits at the hands of the subordinate authorities, have attempted their best to sustain the grant and in that connection the learned Judges had no other option but to consider their relative qualifications for the grant of permits. If under these circumstances the High Court has made observations either in favour of a party or against a party, it is not only right but it is the duty of the Subordinate Tribunal to give due consideration to these observations of the learned Judges. It has no right to ignore those observations. It is equally open to a party to take advantage of any observations that have been made in his favour by the High Court. It has no right to ignore those observations. It is equally open to a party to take advantage of any observations that have been made in his favour by the High Court. Equally, if notwithstanding The Regional the attempt made to sustain a grant in his favour an applicant has not been able to convince the learned Judges about the justice of the grant in his favour, he must also take the consequences of the observations of the High Court. It is not as if the matter indirectly or incidentally arose before the High Court on a former occasion. The subject-matter of attack in that writ proceeding was the grant of permits over this route and the learned Judges, in my opinion, if I may say so with respect, were fully justified in considering also the relative qualifications which each applicant had and which in their opinion was either sufficient or not sufficient for the grant of a stage carriage permit over this route. 60. The principles that should govern the authority in the matter of grant of permits have been laid down by Mr. Justice M. Madhavan Nair who delivered the judgment on behalf of the Bench in the decision reported in Vypeen Transport Corporation v. S.T.A.T. I.L.R. 1960 Kerala 1408. That, as I mentioned earlier, arises out of an attack against the order of the S.T.A.T., Trichur modifying in certain respects the grant of permit made by the R.T.A. After considering the various matters that may be considered by the Transport Authorities in the matter of grant of permit, the learned Judge observes at page 1065: The seating capacity of the bus, the rate of fare the applicant proposes to charge, the convenience provided for passengers in the bus, the type of the vehicle particularly the power of its engine and the efficiency of its mechanical system are all matters that have a material relevancy in the assessment of operational facilities of the several applicants for the permit. Then the learned Judge observes: These aspects of the question, viz., the experience of transport service on the route, the facilities for operation of the service, financial capacities and the ownership of a vehicle, the type of the vehicle, the accommodation and conveniences extended to the passengers in it and like other relevant matters do not appear to have been considered as material factors in the grant of permits by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in the impugned order. 61. The learned Judge again criticises the attitude of the Transport Authorities in that, in the opinion of the learned Judges, these authorities have been considerably influenced by the fact that a particular applicant was an Ex-Havildar in the Army and another applicant was a co-operative society of Ex-Servicemen. I may mention that the reference to the Ex-Havildar is to applicant No. 48 and the reference to the co-operative society is to applicant No.77. Again the learned Judges in particular consider the qualifications of applicants Nos. 48 and 64 to which I will have to advert when I consider the two writ petitions filed on behalf of these applicants. 62. Therefore, the question will have to be considered as to whether the S.T.A.T. when it granted the permits in favour of applicants Nos. 1 to 5 and 17 has in any way acted contrary to the principles laid down by the learned Judges in their decision referred to above. In fact, it will also be seen that the learned Judges proceeded on the basis that the existing operators on the route are applicants Nos. 1 to 5 and 17. The learned Judges again observe with reference to these applicants at page 1057. Fairness requires that the case of these non-disqualified operators who alone among all the applicants have got present or recent experience in plying buses on the route, and are sad to have operational facilities, and financial position, ought to have been considered before new operators, who had little or no experience in the matter and who had no bus to their credit, were introduced on the line. Therefore, these observations made by the learned Judges in favour of applicants Nos. 1 to 5, and 17 have to be properly borne in mind by the Subordinate Tribunals when they had to consider the question of grant of permits. 63. Therefore, these observations made by the learned Judges in favour of applicants Nos. 1 to 5, and 17 have to be properly borne in mind by the Subordinate Tribunals when they had to consider the question of grant of permits. 63. Therefore, I am not inclined to accept this common criticism levelled against the order by the learned counsel appearing for the respective petitioners that the S.T.A.T. has been very much influenced by the observations made by the learned Judges in the decision referred to above. Then the question is whether the attack that there has been no independent and proper consideration of the relevant claims of the various petitioners by the S.T.A.T. is justified in the circumstances of this case. In that connection, I will have to take up each one of these writ petitioners and consider their relative qualifications as against applicants Nos. 1 to 5and 17 in whose favour a grant has now been made by the S.T.A.T. 64. Coming to O.P. No. 422 of 1961, i.e., the writ petition filed by applicant No. 48, on behalf of this applicant Mr. V. M. B. Menon, learned counsel, referred to the circumstance that nowhere the learned Judges have said that police reports, if any, as against the existing operators have to be ignored. On the other hand, Mr. V. M. B. Menon, learned counsel, referred me to the observations of Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in N.P.T. Co. Ltd. v. N.S.T. Co. Ltd. A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 232 to show that police reports which are given to the Road Transport Authorities regarding the unsatisfactory operation of a particular service can certainly be considered and taken into account by the R.T.A. in considering the preferential claims of the applicants. The proposition stated as such is absolutely incontrovertible. But the position is whether there is anything on record to show that so far as applicants Nos. 1 to 5 and 17 are concerned, the police reports in this case are such as to disqualify them from getting permits. It is not necessary for me to go further regarding this matter except quoting one of the observations of the learned Judges in Vypeen Transport Corporation v. S.T.A.T. I.L.R. 1960 Kerala 1408 at page 1066. The learned Judges considered the question as to how far the convictions enlisted by the Narakkal Police would govern the issue of permits in this cases. The learned Judges considered the question as to how far the convictions enlisted by the Narakkal Police would govern the issue of permits in this cases. The learned Judges take note of the fact that the S.T.A.T., Trichur was not prepared to fgo into the so-called convictions stated to have been enlisted by the Police. The learned Judges observe: In view of that, we are in agreement with the observation of the S.T.A.T. that the R.T.A was not justified in screening and disqualifying the existing and past operators on the basis of the list of convictions furnished by the Police.� This practically concludes the contention of Mr. V. M. B. Menon. It is not as if, after these observations of the learned Judges, it is still open to the Appellate Tribunal, when the matter comes back to consider whether there is any police report which has to be considered. On the other hand, the learned Judges have positively stated that the original order of the S.T.A.T. wherein he declined to take note of any of these things was perfectly correct. The learned Judges further observe that the R.T.A. was not justified in taking this circumstance into account to exclude the existing operators. Therefore, the question of consideration or non-consideration of the police report does not matter in this case because one should proceed on the basis, in the view of the learned Judges observation, there is no police report in this case worth considering and which can be put as against the claims made by the existing operators. It would be worthwhile to note what exactly is the basis on which the R.T.A. granted a permit in favour of this applicant. The R.T.A. in considering his qualification states that applicant No. 48 is an Ex-Serviceman and an automobile mechanic and that he has got a motor driving licence and he is a resident of the locality and he was a Havildar of more than four years standing in the Transport Section and was in charge of heavy motor vehicles. The R.T.A. states that he is a native of the island, a recepient of Burma Star and War Medal and his case has been recommended by Military authorities. The R.T.A. states that he is a native of the island, a recepient of Burma Star and War Medal and his case has been recommended by Military authorities. So far as the claim made by the applicant regarding a workshop is concerned, the R.T.A. is of the view: Though he claims to have a workshop it is reported that this is not correct. At this stage I may mention that one point that was sought to be made out by Mr. V. M. B. Menon is that even the Appellate Tribunal on a former occasion was satisfied with his claim of workshop. But I do not think there is any basis for this assumption. Though I am very reluctant even to refer to an order which has been set aside by this court, still for purposes of completing this part of the case it is desirable that I advert to the extract from the S.T.A.T., Trichur, order referred to in the present order of the S.T.A.T. In the extract it is stated that the claim that was made by the writ petitioner appears to be that he was having a small workshop in a thatched building but unfortunately he was not able to show that workshop to the R.T.A. when he inspected the locality and it is the view of the S.T.A.T., Trichur, that it is not disputed that after the date of the grant of the permit the petitioner has put up a well-equipped workshop. That is an absolutely irrelevant circumstance which could not be taken into account by any of these authorities functioning under the Act. I am only referring to that aspect to show that the case of the writ petitioner that he had a workshop at the time when he made the application for the grant of a permit is not supported by the materials on record. 65. Thus the R.T.A. granted the permit in his favour on the ground that among the various groups that have been eliminated, applicant No. 48 is one in a particular group who has got experience both as an automobile mechanic and as also one in charge of heavy motor vehicles in the army. In this connection it will be seen that the grant of a permit in favour of this writ petitioner was confirmed by the S.T.A.T., Trichur. In this connection it will be seen that the grant of a permit in favour of this writ petitioner was confirmed by the S.T.A.T., Trichur. But when the matter came up before the learned Judges again, the learned Judges observe at page 1067 of the report: So also is the case of applicant No. 48 who is said to have had control and supervision over heavy motor vehicles while he was in the Army. We are constrained to say that in comparing with the experience of existing operators or recent operators on the route, the past experience of this applicant, at what period we are not taken into confidence, cannot be put on a par with that of the former. Therefore, it will be seen that the learned Judges were of the view that the petitioners qualifications do not stand on Transport Authority a par with those of the existing operators. 66. Coming to the present order of the S.T.A.T. it is not as if that authority does not consider the relative qualifications that have been urged on behalf of the writ petitioner. The S.T.A.T. considers the case of applicants Nos. 48 and 64 and takes note of the fact that applicant No. 48 was a Havildar in the Army in charge of heavy motor vehicles for four years and that by itself is not a relative circumstance to be taken into consideration. Finally the Appellate Tribunal is of the view that the 48th applicant who has no experience either in the operation cf the service or in any other matter connected with transport industry is not eligible for a permit. Therefore, it has considered the qualifications that were placed in the forefront by the present writ petitioner and the S.T.A.T. was not satisfied that his qualifications stand on a par with those of the existing operators. Therefore, in my opinion, the order of the S.T.A.T. rejecting the claims of the writ petitioner is perfectly justified in the circumstances of the case. 67. Coming to applicant No 77, who is the petitioner in O P. No. 423/61, that is a case of a co-operative society and it is the grievance of the petitioner as voiced by its learned counsel, Mr. 67. Coming to applicant No 77, who is the petitioner in O P. No. 423/61, that is a case of a co-operative society and it is the grievance of the petitioner as voiced by its learned counsel, Mr. V. R. Krishna Iyer, that the Appellate Tribunal has not at all adverted to the qualifications of the writ petitioner and also has not properly appreciated the position that a co-operative society is entitled to a preferential claim under the proviso to section 47 when all the qualifications are equal. The whole question is whether the qualifications urged on behalf of the society can be considered to be equal to those possessed by the applicant in whose favour the grant has been made. 68. In the order of the R.T.A. the reasons for choosing the Edavankkad Ex-Servicemens Multi-purpose Co-operative Society which is applicant No. 77 have been given. The existing operators were eliminated on the ground that there has been police reports. That reasoning has not found favour with the High Court. After eliminating certain groups of persons the R.T.A. finds only two of the individual applicants, namely, applicants Nos. 48 and 64, as being qualified to get a permit. In view of the fact that the R.T.A. was of the view that the qualifications of the remaining individuals were inadequate, it proceeds on the basis that co-operative societies and limited concerns deserve better consideration. Considering the claims of co-operative societies, it considers two societies, one a fish-marketing co-operative society at Nayarambalam and the other the writ petitioner. The first society is eliminated on the ground that motor transport business is not one of the objects of the society. But in the by-law of the writ petitioners society there is a clause to the effect that passenger road transport service is one of its objects. Another circumstance that seems to have weighed with the R.T.A. is that the said society has among its members several Ex-Servicemen as drivers and mechanics and the activities of the society are also confined to the island. In view of these circumstances the R.T.A. granted one permit in favour of the writ petitioner under the proviso to section 47 to the effect that conditions being equal, a co-operative society has got a claim to preferential treatment. 69. In view of these circumstances the R.T.A. granted one permit in favour of the writ petitioner under the proviso to section 47 to the effect that conditions being equal, a co-operative society has got a claim to preferential treatment. 69. This reasoning of the R.T.A. has admittedly not found favour with the S.T.A.T., Trichur and the S.T.A.T. has nagatived the grant in favour of the society and has given the permit in favour of another applicant. 70. In fact, even in the High Court judgment it will be seen that the learned Judges had to make an observation to the effect that the transport authorities have been considerably influenced by the fact that a particular applicant is a co-operative society composed of Ex- Servicemen. This really relates to the present writ petitioner, applicant No. 77. That observation has been made, notwithstanding the fact that the S.T.A.T., Trichur has expressly set aside the grant in its favour but I proceed on the basis that these observations must have been made by the learned Judges because they were also criticising the R.T.A. also for having granted a permit in favour of such a co-operative society merely on the basis that it is composed of Ex-Servicemen, namely, drivers, mechanics and other personnel. 71. In the present order, the S.T.A.T. has certainly adverted to these matters. The Appellate Tribunal is of the view that this society has no experience in motor transport. No doubt, there is a slight mistake in the statement made by the S.T.A.T. when it says that the 77th applicant is a co-operative society which came into existence recently. Mr. V. R. Krishna Iyer pointed out that the society was constituted as early as 1949. I will assume this statement to be correct but from that it does not follow that they have got any experience in the motor industry and the only qualification is that it consists of Ex-Servicemen and one of its objects is to run stage carriage and motor service. That will not entitle the 77th applicant to get a permit for the route in question especially when there are other applicants who have got qualifications superior to those possessed by the society. Therefore, the order of the S.T.A.T. in negativing the grant on favour of the 77th applicant has also to be sustained. 72. That will not entitle the 77th applicant to get a permit for the route in question especially when there are other applicants who have got qualifications superior to those possessed by the society. Therefore, the order of the S.T.A.T. in negativing the grant on favour of the 77th applicant has also to be sustained. 72. Coming to applicant No. 64, who is the petitioner in O.P. No. 429, in my view, he stands more or less on a par with applicant No. 48 and his fate, so far as I could see, is almost sealed by the observations of the learned Judges of the High Court. The learned Judges had to consider the grants in favour of applicant No. 48 and applicant No. 64 and it is the view of the learned Judges that both these applicants had admittedly no bus, neither possessed nor owned, and had no experience of any transport operation on the route concerned and they were chosen for the grant of permits merely because the R.T.A. refused to consider the case of existing bus operators, namely, applicants Nos. 1 to 5, 17, 30 and 31. In particular, the learned Judges observe that so far as experience of applicant No. 64 for operating a bus service prior to 1937 it can hardly be said at this distance of time after a lapse of 22 years to be on a par with the experience of operators who have been and are running services on the line. 73. The main reason that operated in the mind of the R.T.A. when it decided to grant a permit in favour of applicant No. 64 is the fact that he has got experience in motor transport when he was running a bus service for five years till 1937 and that due to his illness he had to give up his service. The other circumstances are that he is a resident of the island, that he has acquired mechanical knowledge and he is an Ex- Serviceman. It is on these grounds that the R.T.A. decides to grant permit in favour of the writ petitioner. No doubt, this order was confirmed by the S.T.A.T., Trichur, and when the matter came up to the High Court, as already pointed out, the view of the learned Judges, so far as this applicant is concerned, is that he stands on a par with applicant No. 48. No doubt, this order was confirmed by the S.T.A.T., Trichur, and when the matter came up to the High Court, as already pointed out, the view of the learned Judges, so far as this applicant is concerned, is that he stands on a par with applicant No. 48. When the matter came back to the S.T.A.T. the latter considers again the various qualifications of applicant No. 64. It is the view of the S.T.A.T. that the experience of this petitioner who had an occasion to conduct service for about 5 years prior to 1937 cannot certainly be taken to be a relevant consideration for grant of permit especially when there are other operators who have got existing services operating on this particular route. Therefore, this view, as I indicated, is in accordance with the observations of the learned Judges of the High Court. 74. Mr. S. Narayanan Potty, learned counsel, urged one circumstance which according to him has been totally missed by the S.T.A.T. According to him, raghtly or wrongly, the writ petitioner has been granted a permit by the R.T.A, as early as 30th November 1958, and till the date when the matter came before the Appellate Tribunal on remand, namely, on 25th February 1961, the writ petitioner has been running a service. That qualification acquired by him subsequent to the grant and during the pendency of an appeal and a writ petition and a further remand has not been taken into account by the S.T.A.T. In this connection the learned counsel relied upon certain observations contained in the judgement of the learned Chief Justice sitting with Mr. Justice Madhavan Nair in the decision reported in P. S. N. Motors Ltd. v. Gangadhara Menon 1960 K.L.T. 1234. It is the contention of the learned counsel that the learned Judges have laid down that subsequent experience obtained by a person can certainly be taken into account in granting a permit in his favour. I am not inclined to accept the contention of the learrned counsel. I am not able to see that the learned Judges have laid down that the qualifications, if any, obtained by an applicant on the basis of the grant of a permit which itself is directly under attack in these proceedings can be taken note of by an Appellate Tribunal for considering the qualifications of the various applicants. I am not able to see that the learned Judges have laid down that the qualifications, if any, obtained by an applicant on the basis of the grant of a permit which itself is directly under attack in these proceedings can be taken note of by an Appellate Tribunal for considering the qualifications of the various applicants. If this contention is accepted, in my view, it will be putting a premium on persons, totally unqualified, for being put on the route with an off chance of their becoming qualified some time later for the simple reason that an appeal against an order granting a permit in his favour is not expeditiously disposed of but due to some reason or other gets delayed. Granting of permits on this basis will certainly be doing violence to the provisions of section 47 of the Act. What the interests of the public require is that operators with actual experience ordinarily must be put on the route and not operators who have no experience but who could be expected to get experience some time later on the basis that the permit is granted in his favour. I do to me as laying down a proposition as contended by Mr. Potty. The S.T.A.T. is perfectly justified in not taking into consideration the so-called experience acquired by this writ petitioner. Therefore, the negativing the claim of applicant No. 64 has also to be sustained. 75. So far as the other two applicants, namely, Nos. 29 and 46, covered by O.P. Nos. 481 and 501, are concerned, they can be dealt with together. Mr. M. P. Menon, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner in O.P.No. 501 of 1956, and also Mr. M. I. Joseph, learned councel appearing for the writ petitioner in O.P. No. 481/61, urged that their client qualifications have not been taken into account. It is unnecessary to go further into this matter because admittedly neither of the Subordinate Tribunals have considered these applicants for being granted a permit over this route. Applicant No. 29 qualification appears to be that he has a rice mill and is conducting a flour mill also. That has nothing to do with the experience that can be urged by way of experience in the matter of motor transport business. Applicant No. 29 qualification appears to be that he has a rice mill and is conducting a flour mill also. That has nothing to do with the experience that can be urged by way of experience in the matter of motor transport business. Again the qualification of applicant No. 46, appears to be that he is a business expert but that again has nothing to do with experience in transport service. 76. The one consideration that was urged on behalf of these two writ petitioners is that applicant No. 17 in whose favour a permit has been granted by the Appellate Tribunal stands almost on a par with these applicants and therefore when applicant No. 17 was chosen there is a absolutely no reason why the claims of these two applicants should have been rejected. 77. I am unable to accept this hne of reasoning. The R.T.A., the S.T.A.T., and also the High Court on a prior occasion have all proceeded on the basis that the 6 existing operators running stage carriages on the route are applicants Nos. 1 to 5 and 17. The attempt that is now made by learned counsel for these two writ petitioners is to show that applicant No. 17 has got a permit for the first time on this route in the grant made by the R.T.A. in March 1960. Factually it does not appear to be correct, because in 1951 two permits which were granted to applicant No. 5 were operated by applicant No. 5 in partnership with applicant No. 17 as Coastal Transports. Therefore, from 1951 onwards applicant No. 17 appears to be on the scene over this identical route. Anyhow, when all the authorities have proceeded on the basis that applicant No. 17 was on the route from 1951 onwards it is not open to me to go beyond what amounts to a finding of fact and try to find out whether he is a person who has come on the scene for the first time only in March 1960. 78. Therefore, the main contention that is sought to be urged is that applicant No. 17 has come into the scene along with applicants Nos. 29 and 46 in March 1960 and therefore his claims should not have been considered by the Appellate Tribunal. 78. Therefore, the main contention that is sought to be urged is that applicant No. 17 has come into the scene along with applicants Nos. 29 and 46 in March 1960 and therefore his claims should not have been considered by the Appellate Tribunal. I have already dealt with this contention and I am of the view that this contention cannot be accepted at all. 79. The relative qualifications of these two applicants have already been adverted to by me and therefore the refusal of the S.T.A.T. to grant permits in favour of these two applicants will have also to be sustained. Even otherwise, the S.T.A.T. has considered the individual claims of these two applicants and has found that they do not have any experience of motor transport and their qualifications do not come anywhere near the qualifications possessed by the existing operators. 80. Then there remains the case of applicant No. 23 which is the subject-matter of O.P. No. 530 of 1961. Applicant No. 23, on the basis that it is a limited company, got a permit from the R.T.A. That permit was set aside by the S.T.A.T., Trichur and ultimately the appellate authority has also negatived the grant in his favour. Mr. Abdul Khader, learned counsel for this writ petitioner, again urges that his clients claims have not been considered by the Appellate Tribunal. But the question is what is the qualification of this limited company. Even the Regional Transport Authority which chose to grant a permit was forced to do so because it eliminated the existing operators on the ground that there are police complaints against the manner in which the services were being run by them. Then from the other group, it was not able to find any individual operator except applicants Nos. 48 and 64. Thus it proceeds on the basis that when there are no other qualified individuals, the case of co-operative societies and limited concerns deserved better consideration. On that ground the co-operative society, namely, applicant No. 77 was granted a permit. Then coming to applicant No. 23 the R.T.A., is of the view that in the absence of sufficiently qualified individuals, limited concerns should be given preference next to co-operative societies. No provision of statute or rules have been placed before me by Mr. Abdul Khader which would justify this type of grant to limited concerns. Then coming to applicant No. 23 the R.T.A., is of the view that in the absence of sufficiently qualified individuals, limited concerns should be given preference next to co-operative societies. No provision of statute or rules have been placed before me by Mr. Abdul Khader which would justify this type of grant to limited concerns. It is really on this basis, though there is no qualification to their credit, that the R.T.A., decided to grant one permit to applicant No. 23. That grant was admittedly set aside by the S.T.A.T., Trichur. 81. Considering the claim of applicant No. 23, the present S.T.A.T. is also not satisfied that the company has got any qualification to its credit which would justify a grant of permit for this particular route, more especially when there are other applicants who possess superior qualifications. 82. Therefore, the rejection of the claims of applicant No. 23 will also have to be sustained. 83. So far as applicants Nos. 1 to 5 and 17 in whose favour the grant has been ultimately made by the Appellate Tribunal, are concerned, it is the view of the Appellate Tribunal that they have got experience in transport service and they are financially well off to enable them to conduct the service properly. All of them appear to be having workshops and they are all residents in the island and according to the Appellate Tribunal these qualifications referred to above are sufficient qualifications to enable them to get the permits. The qualifications relied upon by the Appellate Tribunal appear to be correct and there is no error either in the reasoning of the Appellate Tribunal or in the conclusions arrived at in favour of applicants Nos. 1 to 5 and 17 which will justify interference at the hands of this court under Article 226. 84. In the result, all these writ petitions fail. In O.P. No. 422 of 1961, applicant No. 1 will get his costs, in O.P. No. 423 of 1961, applicant No. 2 will get his costs, in O.P. No. 429 of 1961, applicant No. 3 will get his costs, in O.P. No. 481 of 1961, applicant No. 4 will get his costs, in O.P. No. 501 of 1961, applicant No. 5 will get his costs; and in O.P. No. 530 of 1961, applicant No. 17 will get his costs.