JUDGMENT M.A. Ansari, C.J. 1. These three revision petitions raise the common legal issue of whether the dealer in each petition can be assessed to sales-tax on sales, that had been concluded at Fort Cochin, when the teas sold through the aforesaid auction sales been stored in godowns within the then Travancore-Cochin State. The dealer in T.R C. 52/59 and T.R.C. 53/59 is Messrs. Malayalam Plantations, Ltd., Quilon; whereas the dealer in T.R.C. 54/59 is Messrs. Kannan Devan Hill Produce & Co., Ltd., Munnar. In the first petition the assessment year is 1955-56, in the second 1954-55, and in the third 1950-51. Therefore, all the three assessment years are prior to the States Reorganisation Act, when Fort Cochin formed part of Madras State, and was governed by enactments different to those operative in the erstwhile Travancore-Cochin State. Indeed, assessing the sales tax under the enactment governing the area where the teas be then situated is challenged on the ground of the tax being in contravention of Article 286 (1) (a), due to the property in the goods having passed in Fort Cochin, which formed part of a different State and the sales being, therefore, outside the State levying the tax. 2. To better appreciate the legal argument, we will now state the facts, that are not disputed in these petitions. The facts in T.R.C. 52/59 and 53/59 are that the petitioner brokers, Messrs. Forbes Evart & Figgis, Ltd., and Carrit Moran & Co., Ltd., had sold at auction sales conducted at Fort Cochin, teas that were stored in godowns in the Willingdon Island, which formed part of Travancore-Cochin State. The petitioner had earlier notified the auctioning agents at Fort Cochin the quantity and the price of the stock, who, after having conducted the sales, informed the petitioner the names of the bidders. The sale bills, according to the brokers sale notes, were then issued from the petitioner Head Office at Quilon; and, on payment, the stocks were delivered to the buyers from the Willingdon Island godowns. In T.R.C. 52/59 the total turnover is Rs. 67,63,100-6-3, and the dealer objects to Rs. 62,13,604-3-0 being included, because that amount was the price of teas sold in auction sales at Fort Cochin. In T.R.C. 52/59 the total turnover is Rs. 67,63,100-6-3, and the dealer objects to Rs. 62,13,604-3-0 being included, because that amount was the price of teas sold in auction sales at Fort Cochin. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner has confirmed the tax on the aforesaid turnover; but the Appellate Tribunal has sustained the objection to sales-tax on the aforesaid amounts being unconstitutional, though, under the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act they could be treated as part of the taxable turnover. 3. The turnover m T.R.C. 53/59 is Rs. 59,08,804-7-1, and the dealer disputed the liability to pay tax on Rs. 53,46,184-11-0. which objection of the tax being un-constitutional has been upheld by the Appellate Tribunal. 4. The facts in T.R.C. 54/59 are similar. The sales of teas owned by this dealer were also concluded at Fort-Cochin, when the goods were stocked in godowns situated in the Travancore-Cochin State. The deliveries of the goods were also made to the buyers from the godowns in the Travancore-Cochin State. The dealer raised the objection, that the bargains having been concluded at Fort Cochin, which was then beyond the limits of the taxing State and the ownership of the commodity having passed immediately on the conclusion of the bargains, the sales were outside and covered by Article 286 (1) (a). The Appellate Tribunal has come to the conclusion in this case as well that the ownership in the commodity having passed at Fort Cochin, the property had not passed within the taxing State, accordingly they would be outside sales for purposes of Article 286 (1) (a) and exempt from taxation. These three revision petitions been therefore filed against the appeals having been so allowed. 5. It would be of advantage at this stage to state the several provisions, under which the State seeks to tax the auction sales, that had taken place at Fort Cochin. Section 2 (j) with Explanation (2) of the General Sales ax Act, No. XI of 1125, reads as follows: 2 (j). 5. It would be of advantage at this stage to state the several provisions, under which the State seeks to tax the auction sales, that had taken place at Fort Cochin. Section 2 (j) with Explanation (2) of the General Sales ax Act, No. XI of 1125, reads as follows: 2 (j). sale with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions means every transfer of the property in goods by one person to another in the course of trade or business for cash or for deferred payment or other valuable consideration and includes also a transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of a works contract, but does not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge; * * * Explanation (2). Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Sale of Goods Act for the time being in force, the sale or purchase of any goods shall be deemed for the purpose of this Act, to have taken place in the State wherever the contract of sale or purchase might have been made. (a) if the goods were actually in the State at the time when the contract of sale or purchase in respect thereof was made: or (b) in case the contract was for the sale or purchase of future goods by description, then, if the goods are actually produced in the State at any time after the contract of sale or purchase in respect thereof was made. 6. Tea is excluded from the definition of agricultural or horticultural produce, and the charging section of the Act provides that, subject to the provisions of the Act, every dealer shall pay for each year a tax on his total turnover for such year. The dealers would be, therefore, liable to pay the tax on their turnovers, for which the goods been sold, notwithstanding such sales having taken place outside the Travancore-Cochin State, provided the goods sold be within the aforesaid State, because of the fiction contained in Explanation (2) to section 2 (j). It is also necessary to state that the position under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, No. IX of 1939, that was then operative in Fort Cochin, was not different, because the definition of salet under section 2 (h) had Explanation (2) similarly worded, and provided for similar legal fiction. It is also necessary to state that the position under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, No. IX of 1939, that was then operative in Fort Cochin, was not different, because the definition of salet under section 2 (h) had Explanation (2) similarly worded, and provided for similar legal fiction. Further, turnover was defined by section 2 (i) of the aforesaid Act to mean the aggregate amount, for which goods be either brought by or sold by a dealer, and section 3 authorised levy of tax on such turnovers, tea having been excluded from the definition of agricultural produce. It follows that in these petitions there is no hardship arising from double taxation. 7. The dealer objection is that these sales would be outside and, therefore, exempted under Article 286 (1) (a); but in Deputy Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax and Sales-tax, Trivandrum v. A. V. Thomas and Co., Ltd., I.L.R. 1960 Kerala 1395, to which one of us was a party, a different view has been taken. It has been held there that the words outside sale in the Constitutional provision do not mean transfer of ownership according to the Sale of Goods Act and therefore, Explanation (2) to section 2 (j) is not violative of Article 286 (1) (a). The dealer learned advocate has, however, urged that the aforesaid decision has become doubtful in view of the later pronouncement in India Copper Corporation, Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1961) XII S.T.C. 56, cultural where the assessee company, the India Copper Ltd., carried on business in copper, and its General Manager Office was situated in Bihar. The period of the assessment in dispute before the Supreme Court was from January 26, 1950 to March 31, 1950; and the Superintendent of Sales-tax, Bihar, had computed the company tax liability to be Rs. 3,60,703-4-0, which included the aforesaid period. The company disputed the liability in respect of sales during the period on the ground that though the property in the goods had passed within the State of Bihar, delivery was effected outside the State for consumption and, therefore, such sales were outside and exempt from tax by Article 286 (1) (a) as it originally stood before the amendment. The company disputed the liability in respect of sales during the period on the ground that though the property in the goods had passed within the State of Bihar, delivery was effected outside the State for consumption and, therefore, such sales were outside and exempt from tax by Article 286 (1) (a) as it originally stood before the amendment. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., delivering the majority judgment, has at p. 63 observed as follows: The next question is, does a sale take place outside the where as a result of the contract of sale, the property in the goods passes to the purchaser within the State; in other words, is a sale completed by the passing of property within the State not inside a State, for the mere reason that as a direct result of the sale the goods are delivered outside the State. The answer depends on the meaning to be attributed to the words a sale or purchase which has taken place outside the Statet occurring in the body of Article 286 (1). The expression outside the State" is capable of being understood in more senses than one. It could be understood as comprehending cases where no element or ingredient which constitutes a sale takes place within the State; in other words, as applying solely to those cases where there exists no territorial nexus between the State imposing the tax and the sale. Obviously, this could not have been intended to be incorporated in Article 286 (1) because the tax in such cases would be beyond the legislative power of the State under Entry 54 of the State List read with Article 246 of the Constitution. The expression outside has, therefore, to be understood not as a sale so outside as not to have any territorial connection between the State in question and the sale, but in a somewhat narrower sense. The real difficulty arises in ascertaining the precise content of the narrower sense in which the word is used as meaning a sale in substance outside the State though there might be some elements of the sale which, if the exemption under Article 286 (1) (a) were not enacted, would enable a State to levy a tax on the sale & Sales-tax on the ground that it was within the legislative power of the State under Article 246 read with Entry 54. The learned Judge at the next page answers the question these words: "The key to the problem is afforded by two indications in the Article itself: (1) the opening words of Article 286 (1) which speak of a sale or purchase taking place and (2) the non-obstante clause in the Explanation which refers to the general law relating to sale of goods under which property in the goods has by reason of such sale or purchase passed in another State. These two together indicate that it is the passing of property within the State that is intended to be fastened on for the purpose of determining whether the sale in question is inside' or outside' the State, and therefore, subject to the operation of the Explanation, that State in which property passes would be the only State which would have the power to levy a tax on the sale." The learned Judge again states the legal position in these words: Where the terms of the Explanation are satisfied, the sale transaction will, by a legal fiction created by it, be deemed to take place inside the State of delivery and therefore outside the State in which the property passes. The conclusion reached, therefore, is that where the property in the goods passes within State as a direct result of the sale, the sale transaction is not outside the State for the purpose of Article 286 (1) (a), unless the Explanation operates. 8. The respondent learned advocate has urged that the property in the goods having passed, on the conclusion of the auction sales at Fort Cochin, according to the Sale of Goods Act, the Madras State alone would have the authority to tax, and the erstwhile Travancore-Cochin State could not tax because the sale would be outside for the latter. In support of the argument, he has further relied on C.I.T., Madras v. Mysore Chromite, Ltd., 1955 S.C.J. 185, where the question for decision was whether incomes from sales where property in the goods had passed outside India, could be made liable to pay the income-tax; and it was held that as the property in the goods had passed outside the country, the income could not be made so liable there are difficulties in accepting the arguments. It is not disputed that the constitutional prohibition against cultural outside sales being taxed remains identical even after the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956, which had deleted the Explanation to Article 286 (1) (a), and has substituted in Article 286 (2) the provision that "Parliament may by law formulate principles for determining when a sale or purchase of goods takes place in any of the ways mentioned in clause (1)." 9. It should further be recalled that Parliament has since enacted the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (No. 74 of 1956), whose section 4 (2) provides that a sale or purchase of goods would be deemed to take place inside a State if the goods be within the State in the case of specific or ascertained goods, at the time the contract of sale be made; and sub-section (1) says that when a sale or purchase of goods is determined in accordance with sub-section (2) to take place inside a State, such sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place outside all other States. It is clear that under section 4 (2) of the Act, the sales would be inside and liable to tax, and the position under Explanation (2) to section 2 (j) of the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act is not different. Now, were we to accept the argument urged before us, we would be holding that by section 4 (2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, the sales, that had been earlier constitutionally exempt, had become subsequently liable to sales-tax. We do not think the conditions after the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956, had so fundamentally changed as to necessitate the Parliament providing for a different principle for determining what would be outside sale. It is clear that by section 4 (2) lex situs is made the basis for deciding which sale would be inside, and there are no compelling reasons to drive us to the conclusion that the position was different prior to the aforesaid Constitutional amendment. Further, it is not disputed that lawyers had recognised, in Conflict of Laws, lex situs to be a satisfactory principle for settling conflicting legal claims, and that consensus was well established when the framers of our Constitution were at work. Further, it is not disputed that lawyers had recognised, in Conflict of Laws, lex situs to be a satisfactory principle for settling conflicting legal claims, and that consensus was well established when the framers of our Constitution were at work. We do not think that in laying down the principle for settling claims of the several States to levy sales-tax, they adopted lex actus, which at the time was generally regarded not to be a correct basis for settling the conflict of rules. Therefore, when it is held that the passing of the property within the State is intended to be fastened on for the purpose of determining whether the sale in question be inside or outside the State, obviously the reference is to the law of the State, where the goods be then located; and according to that law, in the cases before us, the sales must be deemed to be in the Travancore-Cochin State. For these reasons, we are of the view that the passages relied on by the respondent learned advocate do not justify our taking a different view to what was taken in Dy. Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax and Sales-tax v. A. V. Thomas & Co., Ltd., I.L.R. 1960 Kerala 1395. 10. In this connection it may be stated that in India Copper Corporation Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1961) XII S.T.C. 56 the question inviting adjudication was whether the benefit of the Explanation can be claimed where the goods been delivered in a different State, but not for consumption and the majority view is that the Explanation sale should be confined only to delivery-cum-consumption State. The larger question came in by way of general discussion, and there is no observation that lex situs has no place in determining the State where the property in the goods had passed. On these grounds, we hold that these revision petitions are covered by the earlier decision of this Court covering the same question, from which we find no compelling grounds to differ. The revision petitions are, therefore, allowed with costs, the Tribunal orders are reversed, and the original assessment orders are hereby restored. This judgment will govern all the three revision petitions. 11. Let the recovery of the taxes be stayed for two weeks, in order that the respondents may prepare their applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.