Judgment :- 1. Two questions are raised in this appeal, one on merits and the other regarding the jurisdiction of the lower court to pass the order, which is questioned in the appeal before us. The latter question does not seem to have been raised before the lower court, but is posed for decision before us for the first time in appeal. 2. A few facts which are relevant for the appreciation of the questions argued, may be briefly stated. The Palai Central Bank Ltd. filed an application before the District Court, Parur, in 1952 for adjudicating the appellant before us an insolvent. This petition was later on transferred to the file of the Additional District Court, Parur and was re-numbered as I. P. No. 41 of 1957. The Jai Hind Bank Ltd., Thodupuzha, sought to get itself impleaded in this petition as a supplementary petitioner, which was disallowed by the lower court with the observation that the said bank was allowed to watch the proceedings. Thereafter, the Jai Hind Bank Ltd. filed another petition, namely, C.M.P. No. 2309 of 1955 seeking to get itself impleaded as a supplementary 2nd respondent, which was allowed by the lower court by its order dated 24th March, 1955. Before that, on 5th January 1953, a petition for winding up the Jai Hind Bank Ltd. was filed and on 24th July, 1957 an order for winding up was passed. Subsequently on 21st June, 1958, the lower court adjudicated the appellant before us insolvent and the appeal, as already indicated, is directed against that order of adjudication. 3. The contention that the appellant has not committed any act of insolvency may be straightaway disposed of. The act alleged is the execution of a partition deed by the appellant and his brothers and sisters, under which a major portion of the properties has been allotted to the brothers and sisters and also to the wives of the appellant and his brother, in lieu of large amounts of sthreedhanam alleged to have been received by them at the time of their marriages. It is in evidence that the liabilities of the appellant exceed a lakh of rupees. There is no evidence, at any rate satisfactory evidence, to show that the properties allotted to the share of the appellant are sufficient to meet his liabilities. It is in evidence that the liabilities of the appellant exceed a lakh of rupees. There is no evidence, at any rate satisfactory evidence, to show that the properties allotted to the share of the appellant are sufficient to meet his liabilities. Moreover, he has not made any attempt to pay any of the several debts, which indicates that he is not in a position to pay them. In the above circumstances, we are inclined to agree with the lower court on this question and bold that on merits the order of the lower court is correct. 4. The next and more important question that has been urged before us is the one regarding the lack of jurisdiction of the lower court to adjudicate the appellant an insolvent. The argument is that since one of the creditors, who was a supplemental respondent before the lower court, namely the Jai Hind Bank Ltd., was ordered to be wound up before the order of adjudication was passed, the lower court had no jurisdiction to pass the order of adjudication, because of S.45B of the Banking Companies Act, 1949. S.45B, shorn of the words not relevant for the purposes of the present case, reads: "The High Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and decide any claim made by or against a banking company which is being wound up or any other question whatsoever, whether of law or fact, which may relate to or arise in the course of the winding up of a banking company, whether such claim or question has arisen or arises before or after the date of the order for the winding up of the banking company" ......................... Under this section the High Court alone has jurisdiction to entertain and decide any claim by or against a banking company in liquidation or to decide any other question, which may relate to or arise in the course of such winding up. Therefore, what we have to consider in this case is whether the claim or prayer made by the Palai Central Bank Ltd. before the lower court to adjudicate the appellant an insolvent is a claim by or against the Jai Hind Bank Ltd., which is in liquidation, or whether it is a question which may relate to or arise in the course of the winding up of the said Jai Hind Bank Ltd., 5. In a recent decision of this Court in Jaini Ali v. Narayana Pillai (1961 KLT. 174) Raman Nayar, J. had occasion to consider this question. In that decision our learned brother held that, although the word "claim" was a word of wide import, it could not be said that a debtor presenting an insolvency petition made any claim against his creditors, even though they be parties to the petition, the claim, if any, in a debtor's insolvency petition being only a claim in rem. The learned judge further held that claims by or against a banking company in liquidation, to come within the scope of S.45B of the Banking Companies Act, must have an intimate and direct bearing on its winding up and on the functions of the liquidator and he went on to observe that, the sole question involved in the insolvency petition being whether the debtor should be adjudicated, that question could not be construed as a question, which might relate to or arise in the course of the winding up of a creditor banking company. In this decision the learned judge has considered all the relevant decisions on the point and has disagreed with a decision of the Orissa High Court in H. Naik v. Jitendranath Das (AIR. 1954 Orissa 139) Since we are in entire agreement with Raman Nayar, J., we do not propose to consider the relevant decisions over again. 6. For the impugned proceeding to come within the scope of S.45B of the Banking Companies Act there should be present in the proceeding any one of the two elements: either the proceeding must be a claim by or against a banking company in liquidation or it must involve a question which may relate to or arise in the course of the winding up of a banking company. In the present case the petitioning creditor being the Palai Central Bank Ltd., which was not in liquidation at the time of the adjudication, the Jai Hind Bank Ltd., which was being wound up being only a supplemental respondent, we fail to appreciate how the claim for adjudication by the Palai Central Bank Ltd., could be a claim by the Jai Hind Bank Ltd. in liquidation, though the Jai Hind Bank Ltd. be a supplemental respondent and be also interested in the adjudication. Claims by or against a banking company in liquidation must have an intimate and direct bearing on its winding up and on the functions of the liquidator, to come within the scope of S.45B of the Banking Companies Act. In this case such a direct and intimate bearing between the claim by the Palai Central Bank Ltd. for adjudicating the appellant an insolvent and the winding up of the Jai Hind Bank Ltd. is lacking; nor can it be said that the petition by the Palai Central Bank Ltd. to adjudicate the appellant an insolvent relates to or arises in the course of the winding up of the Jai Hind Bank Ltd. Therefore the impugned proceeding is neither a claim by or against a banking company in liquidation nor does it involve any question relating to or arising in the course of the winding up of the said banking company. 7. But a passage from the judgment of Raman Nayar, J. is sought to be pressed into service in support of his contention by the learned advocate for the appellant. The passage reads: "But I am of the view that the question whether a debtor should or should not be adjudicated on his own application - the position would be different if the company were the applicant - is not the question or claim coming within the scope of the section". The learned advocate argues that the clause in parenthesis, namely, "the decision would be different if the company were the applicant" connotes that in the case, where the petitioning creditor is a banking company in liquidation, such proceeding is a question or claim coming within the scope of the section. He points out that the expression used in the parenthetical clause is "would be different" and not "may be different" and therefore he contends that Raman Nayar, J. has decided by that observation that in the case where the petitioning creditor is a banking company in liquidation, such proceeding involves a question or claim coming within the scope of S.45B. He points out that the expression used in the parenthetical clause is "would be different" and not "may be different" and therefore he contends that Raman Nayar, J. has decided by that observation that in the case where the petitioning creditor is a banking company in liquidation, such proceeding involves a question or claim coming within the scope of S.45B. The argument appears to have some force; but we would observe that, for one thing that matter was not before the learned judge and therefore the observation should not be construed as a considered decision which has the force of ratio decidendi; secondly, we are not ourselves called upon to decide that question in this appeal, for, in the present case also the petitioning creditor is not a banking company in liquidation. Therefore, we desist from deciding or expressing any opinion on that question in this case. In the result we confirm the order of the lower court and dismiss the appeal with costs, one set. Dismissed.