JUDGMENT Dwivedi, J. - By our order dated April 28, 1961, we decided this appeal but we reserved reasons for the order. We are now setting forth the reasons. 2. The dispute relates to house No. 76/100 situate in Coolie Bazar, Kanpur. It belonged to one Smt. Janki Kuer. She was the absolute owner. The Appellant was her tenant. On June 2, 1946, she executed a will whereby she bequeathed the house to the 1st Respondent. Durga Prasad through whom the Ist Respondent instituted the suit culminating in this appeal was one of the Sarbarakars of the Ist Respondent. Smt. Janki Kuer died on June 6, 1946. Sometime after her death the 1st Respondent instituted suit No. 920 of 1947 in the court of the Judge of Small Causes at Kanpur for arreass of rent against the Appellant. In the suit the Appellants, filed a written statement apparently denying the first Respondent's title to the house. The Judge of the court of Small Causes returned the plaint since a question of title to immoveable property was involved in the suit. After the return of the plaint on July 28, 1947 the Respondent No. 1 served a notice on the Appellant terminating his tenancy on the ground of forfeiture of tenancy rights. The Appellant refused to quit and the Ist Respondent instituted a suit for his ejectment. The suit was founded on two grounds, namely (1) that the Appellant had denied the Ist Respondent's title in his written statement in the earlier suit and had consequently forfeited his tenancy rights, and (2) that the Appellant had committed wilful default in the payment of rent. The Appellant controverted the allegations in his written statement and claimed that he had not incurred forfeiture of his tenancy rights and that he had not committed wilful default in the payment of rent. He admitted that he had taken the house on rent from Smt. Janki Kuer but pleaded that after her death Smt. Vidya Wati, one of the Respondents in this appeal, took possession of her properties alleging herself to be her daughter and that he had in good faith paid a sum of Rs. 108 to her as advance rent for a year. He did not admit that the alleged will was executed by Smt. Janki Kuer in favour of the Respondent No. 1. 3. 108 to her as advance rent for a year. He did not admit that the alleged will was executed by Smt. Janki Kuer in favour of the Respondent No. 1. 3. The Munsif, who heard the suit, held that the will was not a genuine document and appeared to be forged and that the 2nd Respondent was, therefore, the owner of the property in suit as an heir of Smt. Janki Kuer. He also held that the Appellant had paid advance rent for one year to the 3rd Respondent. In view of his first finding, he did not express any opinion on the question whether the Appellant had forfeited his tenancy rights. But he was of the opinion that the denial by him of the Ist Respondent's title was bona fide. In view of these findings he dismissed the suit. 4. On appeal the Civil Judge held that the will in favour of the Ist Respondent was a genuine and valid will. Differing again from the Munsif he also held that the appellant had forfeited his tenancy rights by denying the title of the 1st Respondent in the rent suit. He, therefore, allowed the appeal of the Ist Respondent and decreed its suit for possession of the house. 5. Feeling aggrieved with the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge the Appellant preferred a second appeal in this Court. The appeal was heard by Chaturvedi, J. Before him the Appellant did not challenge the correctness of the finding of the Civil Judge that the will in favour of the 1st Respondent was a genuine and valid will. Second finding of the Civil Judge that the Appellant has forfeited his tenancy rights was however, vehemently assailed. Two arguments were advanced on his behalf. Firstly, it was argued that the denial by the tenant of the title of an assignee or an heir of the former landlord did not invite forfeiture of tenancy rights u/s 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act (hereinafter called the Act). Secondly, it was argued that taking all the circumstances and facts into consideration the averment of the Appellant in the written statement filed in the rent suit could not be interpreted as denying the title of the 1st Respondent to the house. Secondly, it was argued that taking all the circumstances and facts into consideration the averment of the Appellant in the written statement filed in the rent suit could not be interpreted as denying the title of the 1st Respondent to the house. Both the arguments were found to be untenable by the learned Judge, and re arrived at the conclusion that the Appellant had forfeited his tenancy rights by denying the title of the 1st Respondent in his written statement in the rent suit. He was also of the view that his denial was not bona fide. Accordingly he dismissed the appeal, but granted leave to appeal to a Division Bench. The present appeal has been preferred in pursuance of the leave granted by the learned Judge. 6. The judgment under appeal is reported in Ramdas Vs. Shree Ram Lakshman Janki, AIR 1953 All 797 . 7. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has urged before us that Clause (g) of Section 111 of the Act does not apply to case where, as here, the lessee admits the title of his lessor and denies only the title of his lessor's transferee to the demised property. Drawing our attention to the material words of that clause, which are: In case the assessee renounced his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself, he submitted that there was no express or implied reference in these words to the transferee of the lessor. In support of his argument he also relied upon a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Sheikh Abdulla Vs. Mohammad Muslim, AIR 1926 Cal 1205 . 8. A lessor has certain primary and auxiliary rights in the demised property. One of the primary rights is the right to evict the lessee from the property in certain circumstances, and as an auxiliary to that right there springs the right to give notice in writing to the lessee of intention to determine the lease and to ask the lessee to quit the property. One of the primary rights is the right to evict the lessee from the property in certain circumstances, and as an auxiliary to that right there springs the right to give notice in writing to the lessee of intention to determine the lease and to ask the lessee to quit the property. Section 109 of the Act provides that, if the lessor transfers the property leased, or any part thereof, or any part of his interest therein, the transferee in the absence of a contract to the contrary, shall possess all the rights of the lessor as to the property or part transferred so long as he is the owner of it. We think that it follows from this section that all the rights, primary and auxiliary, of the lessor to the property stand transferred to his transferee, and the letter becomes substituted for the former. In plain language he becomes for all practical purposes the lessor. The proviso to Section 109 also makes this position clear, for if the transferee does not become the lessor, how he can be entitled to receive the rent from the lessee. Clause (g) of Section 111 says that when there is a forfeiture of tenancy rights, the lessor or his transferee may give notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease. Put at its highest, the word 'transferee' in the clause may be construed to give impliedly a power to the transferee of the lessor to determine the lease an account of the lessor forfeiting his tenancy rights during the period of his ownership of the demised property; put at its lowest, the word may be construed to empower the transferee of a lessor to determine the lease when a lessee has forfeited his rights during the period of his lessor's ownership of the demised property. Even if the latter meaning is the correct meaning, we fail to understand why a transferee of a lessor, who gets the right of determining the lease for forfeiture of tenancy rights incurred during his predecessor-in-interest's ownership of the demised property, should not get a right to determine the lease when the lessee from his predecessor-in interest incurs forfeiture of his tenancy rights during his ownership of the demised property, for after all the source of either right of his is to be found in Section 109, which provides that all rights of the lessor shall pass to him on transfer of the demised property. Section 111 indicates the various circumstances in which a lease is determined; one of them is by forfeiture. The section is worded in a general language which is apt-to extend to the lessor as well as his transferee, and there appears to be no sensible reason why the extensive scope of the section should be cut down and limited to the lessor only. For instance, it stands to reason that the lease should stand determined not only when the interest of the lessee and the lessor in the whole property become vested at the same time in the lessee but also when the interest of the lessee and the transferee of the lessor in the whole of the property become vested in the lessee. See Clause (d) of Section 111. The same will be the case with respect to other clauses of Section 111. We, therefore, reject the argument of Learned Counsel for the Appellant. 9. The view that we are taking is supported by several authorities Jones and Wife v. Mills 142 ER 664, Deo d. Bennett v. Long 173 ER 1047, C. Venkatachariar v. C. Rangaswami Ayyangar AIR 1919 Mad. 266, C. Rama Ayengar v. Anga Gurusami Chetti AIR 1919 Mad. 897. 10. Sheikh Abdulla Vs. Mohammad Muslim, AIR 1926 Cal 1205 , no doubt, goes the whole length with the argument of Learned Counsel for the Appellant. The learned Judges said there: There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the denial of the right of an assignee from the original lessor by the tenant does not work a forfeiture of the tenancy. This principle has been long settled and this cannot and is not disputed at the bar. The learned Judges said there: There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the denial of the right of an assignee from the original lessor by the tenant does not work a forfeiture of the tenancy. This principle has been long settled and this cannot and is not disputed at the bar. It may be observed that there is no discussion and no reasons are given for the view. The learned Judges have assumed that the principle has long been settled. It may also be noticed that the rule, as stated by learned Judges, was conceded at the bar to be correct. With respect to the learned Judges we are unable to agree with them. 11. The next argument of Learned Counsel for the Appellant-and it is the crucial argument-is that having regard to all the circumstances of the case the Appellant cannot be held to have forfeited his tenancy rights. The Respondents' case of forfeiture of tenancy rights is solely founded on the Appellant's written statement in the Respondent's earlier rent suit No. 191 of 1946. The written statement was filed on 12-2-47, and is Exhibit. 2. 12. The question of forfeiture of tenancy is often beset with difficulty. There is a plethora of cases, both Indian and foreign, on the topic, but a search for an exactly applicable authority would often go un-rewarded. It is, therefore, necessary to be clear about the principles that surround and govern forfeiture of tenancy rights. Firstly, the denial of the landlord's title must be unequivocal and absolutely definite, for the law strongly leans against forfeiture. See Shiam Bihari Lal Gaur v. Madan Singh 1945 AWR (HC) 338. Secondly, when the landlord's title is denied in writing, the writing should be construed as a whole without giving undue emphasis to one or the other part of it. The writing should be examined with a view to ascertain whether the writer really intended to renounce his character as lessee by setting up a title to the demised property in himself or in a third party. When the writing consists of a written statement, we should not overlook the fact that pleadings in India are often marked by prolixity and flourish, and in interpreting pleadings due allowance should be made for these inveterate defects. Thirdly, the onus of proving forfeiture of tenancy rights lies on the landlord Plaintiff. When the writing consists of a written statement, we should not overlook the fact that pleadings in India are often marked by prolixity and flourish, and in interpreting pleadings due allowance should be made for these inveterate defects. Thirdly, the onus of proving forfeiture of tenancy rights lies on the landlord Plaintiff. He must unambiguously prove that the lessee has directly and unequivocally repudiated his title to the demised property and has thereby lost his tenancy rights. If at the end of the day the Court is left in doubt or if it takes the view that the writing, which is alleged to repudiate the title of the landlord, is equivocal, he would fail. Lastly, it is now well settled that the lessee may in good faith and for his own protection put the transferee of his lessor to strict proof of his title to the demised property before making payment to him. He has not entered into any agreement directly with him. If there are several claimants to a demised property, he must be sure who is the rightful owner thereof before he is saddled with the liability of paying rent to any one of them. In Mountjoy v. Collier 4 M and G (sic)43 Erle, J. said, A tenant is liable to the person who has the real title, and may be forced to pay to him, either in an action for use and occupation, if there has been a fresh demise or an arrangement equivalent to one, or in trespass for the mesne profits. It would be unjust, if being so liable, he could not show that as a defence. In Jone's case 142 ER 664 it has been held that a tenant could refuse payment of rent to the successor-in-interest of his lessor until the latter proved his title to the demised property. The same principle is deducible from Deo v. Cooper (1840) IM and G 135. In Smt. Mallika Dassi v. Makhan Lal Chowdhry 9 CWN 928, it was held that if the lessee was ignorant of the sale of the demised property by his lessor and had no belief in it, he could put he transferee to the proof of his title by purchase. This view was reiterated in H. Mathewson v. Jadu Matho 12 CWN 525. Hatimullah and Others Vs. This view was reiterated in H. Mathewson v. Jadu Matho 12 CWN 525. Hatimullah and Others Vs. Mahamad Abju Choudhury, AIR 1928 Cal 312 , it was said that where a tenant denied bona fide the title of the transferee to the demised property on the ground of seeking information of his title or having such title established in a court of law in order to protect himself, he did not forfeit his tenancy rights. It was further said that where the tenant in good faith disclaimed the transferee's title not with a view to protect his own interest but with a view to bolster up the claim of a third person to the demised property, he would incur forfeiture of his tenancy rights. In Venkatachariar's case AIR 1919 Mad. 266, Sadasiva Aiyar, J. after referring to several decided cases, formulated his own view thus: If a tenant honestly doubtful and not intending to identify himself with a third party who sets up a title in himself against the real landlord, merely puts his alleged derivative landlord to the proof of the latter's title before the tenant could recognise him as such, such conduct may not work a forfeiture of the tenancy and may not constitute such a disclaimer of the title of the landlord as would work a forfeiture. It was found by the learned Judge in that case that the tenant's denial of the transferee's title to the demised property was deliberate and malicious in that their only object was to support a rival claimant to the property. It is not necessary to deal in detail with other cases on the point. See Mathewson v. Jad(sic) Mahto (11), and Rukmini Vithu Vs. Rayaji Dattatraya Pai, AIR 1924 Bom 454 . 13. In the light of principles elucidated above, we shall now examine the written statement of the Appellant in suit No. 191 of 1946. * * * * 14. There appears to us nothing in the written statement to suggest that the Appellant was prompted by ill-will or malice against the Ist Respondent, nor his counsel for the Ist Respondent drawn, our attention to any evidence of material circumstances surrounding the making of the written statement for proving the same. * * * * 14. There appears to us nothing in the written statement to suggest that the Appellant was prompted by ill-will or malice against the Ist Respondent, nor his counsel for the Ist Respondent drawn, our attention to any evidence of material circumstances surrounding the making of the written statement for proving the same. We have already said that the onus of proving that the Appellant had incurred forfeiture of his tenancy rights, in view of his averments in the written statement, lay upon the Ist Respondent. It was, therefore, bound to prove that the Appellant had made those averments in bad faith. We have seen the plaint of the Ist Respondent in the ejectment suit; we do not find any allegation in that plaint to the effect that the Appellant had made averments in his written statement in the rent suit in bad faith. Consequently there wait no specific counter-allegation in the written statement of the Appellant in the ejectment suit that his averments in the written statement in the rent suit were made in good faith. No issue was framed by the trial court on the question of good or bad faith. Therefore, if there is any evidence on record to prove bad faith of the Appellant (which we have already stated has not at all been shown to us), that evidence cannot be seen by the Court. See Sri Venkataramana Devaru and Others Vs. The State of Mysore and Others, AIR 1958 SC 255 . We are, therefore, not bound by the finding of the first appellate court that the Appellant did not bona fide make the allegations in his written statement in the rent suit. 15. To sum up, a reading of the appellant's written statement in the rent suit as a whole, after giving due allowance to linguistic flourish therein, gives us an impression that the Appellant was not really denying the title of the 1st Respondent of the house but was putting it to proof of its title to the house. At any rate, we cannot say with certainty that he was unambiguously repudiating the 1st Respondent's title to the house and not trying to put it to the proof of its title to the house. In Wisbech St. Mary Parish Council v. Lilley (1956) 1 AELR 301, one Mr. Donger was the tenant of a cottage belonging to Wisbech St. At any rate, we cannot say with certainty that he was unambiguously repudiating the 1st Respondent's title to the house and not trying to put it to the proof of its title to the house. In Wisbech St. Mary Parish Council v. Lilley (1956) 1 AELR 301, one Mr. Donger was the tenant of a cottage belonging to Wisbech St. Mary Farish Council. He had lived in the cottage for about 40 years and had paid rent upto October 1953 at the rate of 10 S. yearly. Thereafter he suffered from protracted illness and became impecunious. It appears that he then purported to transfer the cottage to one Mr. Lilley and with that view he entered into an agreement for the sale of the cottage with him. One of the clauses in the agreement was that the vendor would sell and the purchaser would purchase the entire interest of the vendor in the cottage. It appears that long after that agreement one Mr. Farrow, the solicitor of Mr. Donger, wrote a letter to the solicitor of the Council informing that Donger had told him that he owned the cottage for more than 40 years and had never paid rent. The Council claimed that the agreement read along with the letter of Mr. Farrow proved that Donger had repudiated the title of the Council to the cottage and that he had, therefore, put an end to his interest as tenant. The claim was, however, not accepted by Court of Appeal. Sir Raymond Evershed, M.R., said thus: ... it is said by counsel that the statement in Mr. Farrow's letter ... proved this: that Mr. Donger at the date of the transaction was asserting that he was the absolute owner of this cottage, and that, contrary to the facts, he had never paid any rent in respect of it: so that such assertion, plus the sale to Mr. Lilley.... amounted to an act aimed at enabling Mr. Lilley to set up a title adverse to the Counsel. I was myself inclined to think during the argument, assuming these facts are true, that Mr. Donger was really deceiving Mr. Lilley by telling him (contrary to the fact) that no rent was paid, and that he was the owner, in order that be might extract 20 from Mr. Lilley.... It may be, as Romer, L.J., pointed out, that Mr. I was myself inclined to think during the argument, assuming these facts are true, that Mr. Donger was really deceiving Mr. Lilley by telling him (contrary to the fact) that no rent was paid, and that he was the owner, in order that be might extract 20 from Mr. Lilley.... It may be, as Romer, L.J., pointed out, that Mr. Donger (who was old then and in a very ailing condition) may have regraded the slight sum of 10S. a year as of no account, and may genuinely have thought that he had paid and was paying no rent in any true sense of the term. On either view, it seems to me, put at its highest, by no means clear, as an inference from these facts (assuming them all to be true), that this was a transaction aimed at enabling Mr. Lilley to set up a title adverse to the true owner. At page 304 of the Report Sir Raymond Evershed went on to say- .... I for my part agree with the Judge that in the end of all, when reliance is placed on a disclaimer, it is a question of fact how far, properly interpreted, the transaction ought to be treated as having gone. Put interrogatively, in the language of counsel's own formulation: Can it be said here that the parish council proved land clearly proved, because they are the Plaintiffs, and the onus is on them) that Mr. Donger let Mr. Lilley into possession with the intention of enabling Mr. Lilley to set up an adverse title? He concurred with the view of the Judge that the denial by the tenant of his landlord's title must be a clear denial and must be clearly proved. 16. We have quoted somewhat copiously from the remarks of Sir Raymond Evershed to show how cases of the nature before us often turn upon a strict interpretation of the writing of the tenant (alleging to contain a disclaimer of the landlord's title) and on onus of proof. We think that the remarks of Sir Raymond Evershed furnish considerable guidance on the question before us, and, examining the Appellant's written statement in the rent suit in the light of those remarks, we do not feel satisfied, as already stated, that the Appellant had unambiguously repudiated the 1st Respondent's title to the house. We think that the remarks of Sir Raymond Evershed furnish considerable guidance on the question before us, and, examining the Appellant's written statement in the rent suit in the light of those remarks, we do not feel satisfied, as already stated, that the Appellant had unambiguously repudiated the 1st Respondent's title to the house. In our opinion, his written statement is more susceptible of the construction that he was putting the 1st Respondent to the proof of its title to the house. On that view we would hold that the 1st Respondent has failed to discharge the onus of proving that the written statement of the Appellant in the rent suit unambiguously disclaimed the 1st Respondent's title to the house and that his interest as a tenant, therefore, came to an end. 17. We accordingly hold that the Appellant has not forfeited his tenancy rights and is not liable to be ejected from the house.