Judgement KRISHNAN, J. : The appellant - a mill labourer of about 35 years of age - was sent up and convicted on a charge of murder of his own wife - a middleaged woman and mother of four children, the eldest of whom is the main witness (a girl aged about 11 or 12 years). She was stabbed 19 times with a knife on different parts of the body and several of the wounds are such that each by itself would result in death. The lesser sentence of imprisonment for life has been imposed. The only question of fact is as to the origin of the fatal quarrel, of which there are two accounts of law : whether the words used by the wife during the quarrel can, in this context, be treated as grave and sudcjen provocation extenuating the offence and reducing it to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. 2. The unfortunate couple lived in the outskirts of the city of Indore, the husband working as a mill-labourer and often in need of money as he had a weakness for liquor. The wife was also earning as a cook in a hospital and was supplementing it by rolling bidis. As often happens, the wife and the appellant used to quarrel, the latter disappearing for days together. On the one hand, the daughter's evidence is that this was after unsuccessful demand of money which the wife could not spare as she had to look after the children. The appellant's own account, on the other hand, is that she used to turn him out. In this background, the husband developed an obsession that the wife was living an immoral life and was having improper intimacy with different men. Whether it was a justifiable suspicion of just a delusion of a drunkard, he had charged the wife on several previous occasions with immorality and always got the answer that she had been living as a loyal wife and his suspicions and charges were baseless. 3. The common ground in this case is that on the afternoon or evening of the 27th March, 1960, both husband and wife were at their house as also the eldest child - a girl named Sushila (P. W. 1) aged about 11 or 12 years. 3. The common ground in this case is that on the afternoon or evening of the 27th March, 1960, both husband and wife were at their house as also the eldest child - a girl named Sushila (P. W. 1) aged about 11 or 12 years. The woman had been rolling bidis when there was a quarrel and the girl came out shouting that her mother was being killed. The wife came outside and soon fell down in front of the house with as many as 19 stab injuries on her and the husband standing nearby with a knife of which the blade was broken. The neighbours collected, but too late to be of any help to the woman. The direct evidence is from the girl, to the following effect : Her father had been away for several days and on that day he returned at about 4 P. M. and as usual demanded money from the mother. She refused with her usual reply that she wanted money for the children. This led to an exchange of strong language. The appellant sat on the verandah while the girl went out for a short time to bring some lemons or some fruits. On her return, the appellant asked the girl to go to his mother i.e., the girl's grandmother and bring some money and tried to persuade her to do so by offering 2 annas. But the girl scented some imminent trouble and refused to go, while the younger boy was sent on that mission. After this, the appellant walked into the house again, caught hold of his wife who was rolling bidis, and started stabbing her. Having received five or six stabs, she tottered outside and fell on the verandah, the girl meanwhile running out and shouting for help. The point to note about the evidence of this girl as well as of the neighbours who gathered the story from her, is that the quarrel starts with a demand for money without the least reference to any immoral conduct. But it has been brought out in the cross-examination that the girl herself and those who drive (sic) the evidence from her, stated to the police that the quarrel started with the husband charging the wife with immorality. But it has been brought out in the cross-examination that the girl herself and those who drive (sic) the evidence from her, stated to the police that the quarrel started with the husband charging the wife with immorality. Not that there could not have been quarrels on other occasions regarding money but on this occasion, the quarrel certainly started with the charge - justified or otherwise of immorality, and the girl as well as the neighbours were trying to suppress it in the Court, most probably, because of an understandable sense of delicacy. 4. The appellant himself was at the thana very shortly after the incident, it being immaterial whether he went there of his own accord or was being persuaded or dragged by the neighbours. Later on, he gave a confession before the Magistrate which was recorded in the usual manner. He admits having attacked his wife but his account is that he had reasons to suspect her of infidelity and had on previous occasions asked her to behave more properly and always met with a rebuff : "On the 27th, I had my roti with my mother, but went to my wife to persuade her. I talked to her for an hour and a half, but she paid no heed. Then she said, "I have not done it till now; but now I shall go and take another man, I did not go to call you and you may go away. " Thereupon, I became very angry. In fact, four days before this, I had seen her at Siyaganj talking to another man whose name I do not know. When I came near them, they separated." 5. No doubt, the appellant had been in a highly abnormal state of mind immediately before his attack on his wife; but his account of the origin of that quarrel is substantially correct; in this regard the daughter has not told us the truth; the other witnesses have derived it from her. If the quarrel started with the husband charging the wife with immorality and with her being seen with another man at Siyaganj a few days before and their separating on sight of the husband, the wife was put on a trial of calmness and good behaviour. If the quarrel started with the husband charging the wife with immorality and with her being seen with another man at Siyaganj a few days before and their separating on sight of the husband, the wife was put on a trial of calmness and good behaviour. Whether it was justified or was merely a delusion in the mind of the husband, it was expected that the woman would do something to pacify him. If it was true, she should have promised good behaviour in future and shown genuine penitence. If it was false, she should have repudiated it with a certain amount of restraint. But what the wife stated was certainly apt to infuriate the husband. There is no doubt that words to this effect, if not those very ones, were spoken by the wife. We are not concerned with her folly in doing this, for which certainly she has been more than amply punished but we are concerned with the state of mind induced in the husband by these words and to decide whether it is one of grave and sudden provocation attracting Exception 1 and mitigating the offence to one of culpable homicide under Sec. 304 Part I. 6. Though there are quite a large number of reported cases dealing with the effect of the wife's words on the mind of a jealous husband, no hard and fast rule can be laid down for the very simple reason that individual psychologies differ as much as individual facial expressions. However, a set of general patterns are traceable; and it becomes our duty to see if this falls into one of those, in which there is general judicial opinion that grave and sudden provocation has been caused. While it is difficult to make an analysis of the effect on a mind which is already abnormal and highstrung two elements are always found in such cases. The first is one of great surprise; in other words, ,speech or conduct on the part of the wife that has altogether been unexpected. The second is a moral revulsion which prompts him to acts of violence which he would not have thought of in a normal state of mind. In two reported cases, the position was near, though not altogether similar to that in the present case. The second is a moral revulsion which prompts him to acts of violence which he would not have thought of in a normal state of mind. In two reported cases, the position was near, though not altogether similar to that in the present case. In re, Murugian, (S) AIR 1957 Mad 541 , the husband was taking the wife to task for her improper intimacy with a third person; but the latter, instead of showing regret or atleast keeping silent, replied that she would continue her intimacy with the third person. The Court remarked- "In a society where adultery is made punishable and where the lawfully wedded wife has not merely resorted, to adultery but would also swear openly in the face of the husband that she would persist in such adultery and also abuse the husband for remonstrating against such conduct, we feel that we should take a more serious view of the psychological situation thus created to arrive at the conclusion whether it could not be a case of the husband losing his self-control by reason of the provocation and whether such provocation was not grave and sudden enough to make him lose such self-control. The Court should view it as a psychological problem and not one where reasoning as to the legality or otherwise of the right of parties is to be considered before the emotion of the man is roused to action. Each case has to be considered in the circumstances that prevail at the given situation and there can be no generalisation on such issues." In the present case, there is neither proved past conduct of this nature, nor any persistence shown by the wife. But there is the surprise and revulsion. In re, Chervirala Narayan, AIR 1958 Andh Pra 235, a young man's wife had just joined him; but already he had vague suspicions about her past conduct. She confessed to him that she had had illicit intimacy with a third man and was already pregnant by him. There again we find the surprise and revulsion. 7. Both these precedents apply to the instant case by way of broad analogy. In this case, the wife does deny the charge and as the husband had really nothing very definite to go upon, he should not have been infuriated by the denial. There again we find the surprise and revulsion. 7. Both these precedents apply to the instant case by way of broad analogy. In this case, the wife does deny the charge and as the husband had really nothing very definite to go upon, he should not have been infuriated by the denial. But she continues it by threatening thereafter to do the very act with which he was charging her; in other words, she has created a sudden moral revulsion in the man. In addition, she insults him by saying that she wants him no more. 8. We would, therefore, alter the conviction to one under Sec. 304 Part I, I. P. C. and reduce the sentence to one of seven years rigorous imprisonment. With this modification, the appeal is dismissed.