Judgment.- This Second Appeal raises the question whether a Hindu minor is bound by a deed of family arrangement entered into on his behalf by his natural guardian in bona fide settlement of claims against the minor’s estate and for his benefit. One Arunachalam Pillai married two wives, Ammalammal and Sengamalathachi. By his first wife, Ammalammal, he had no issues. He had a daughter named Dhanalakshmi and a son named Palani by his second wife Sengamalam. One Rathnasami Pillai was the son of his first wife’s younger brother. Arunachalam Pillai desired that his daughter Dhanalakshmi should be given in marriage to Rathnasami Pillai. He executed a settlement deed on 17th February, 1936 in and by which he settled the A Schedule properties attached to that deed absolutely in favour of Dhanalakshmi and Rathnasami Pillai. Items 1 and 2 of the B Schedule properties attached to that settlement deed were to be enjoyed by Arunachalam Pillai himself during his lifetime and after him they were to be taken absolutely by Rathnasami and Dhanalakshmi. Item 3 of the B Schedule therein was directed to be enjoyed by his first wife Ammalammal without any right of alienation and after her lifetime that property was to be taken by Dhanalakshmi and Ratnasami absolutely. On the date of that settlement deed the settlor’s second wife, Sengamalam, was enciente and she gave birth to the son Palani on 5th April, 1936. The second wife Sengamalam did not like the settlement made by her husband as aforesaid and dissensions arose between her and her husband. Acting as the guardian of her minor son, Palani, she filed the suit O.S. No. 11 of 1937 on the file of the District Munsif’s Court of Tiruvayyaru against her husband Arunachalam Pillai and Rathnasami Pillai challenging the validity of the settlement deed. During the pendency of this suit Arunachalam Pillai died and the suit itself was withdrawn and dismissed on 18th August, 1938. But the dispute between Rathnasami and Sengamalam was not resolved and there was mediation between them by persons interested in the welfare of the minor’s family. A deed of family arrangement, dated 23rd February, 1940 was brought about between Rathnasami and Sengamalam by which Rathnasami obtained 3 items of properties absolutely for himself and relinquished all his claims under the settlement deed in his favour executed by the late Arunachalam Pillai. A deed of family arrangement, dated 23rd February, 1940 was brought about between Rathnasami and Sengamalam by which Rathnasami obtained 3 items of properties absolutely for himself and relinquished all his claims under the settlement deed in his favour executed by the late Arunachalam Pillai. The items of properties obtained by Rathnasami Pillai under the family arrangement were R.S. 506/5: 12½ cents, R.S. 523/1: 39 frac12; cents, R.S. 456/8: 27½ cents, all situated in the village of Peramur, Tanjore district. These three items were numbers 3, 8 and 9 of the A Schedule properties attached to the settlement deed of Arunachalam Pillai. The net result of the family arrangement was that Rathnasami Pillai who got about 1½ acres of land under the settlement from Arunachalam Pillai gave up his claim for a good portion of those lands and was content to receive 80½ cents under the family arrangement between him and Sengamalam. Rathnasami Pillai did not marry Dhanalakshmi as proposed and wished for by Arunachalam Pillai. He sold all the three items of properties to one Sivakolunthu Pillai under a registered conveyance, dated 17th February, 1941. Sivakolunthu conveyed one of the items to one Natesa Moopanar and another item to Ramasami Pillai. Rathnasami Pillai died and Dhanalakshmi married one Subbaraya Pillai in 1944. Palani, the son of Arunachalam Pillai, filed O.S. No. 86 of 1957 on the file of the District Munsif’s Court of Tiruvaiyaru for recovery of possession of the three items of properties which Rathnasami Pillai took under the family arrangement executed on his behalf by his mother Sengamalam. To that suit he impleaded his mother as the first defendant, Sivakolunthu Pillai, the alienee from Rathnasami as the second defendant and Natesa Moopanar and Ramasami Pillai the alienees from Sivakolunthu Pillai as defendants 3 and 4. Defendants 1 and 3 were ex parte and defendants 2 and 4 contested the suit. The plaintiff’s case was that the properties comprised in the settlement deed of his father and in the deed of family arrangement by his mother were all ancestral properties incapable of being disposed of either by his father or by his mother. Defendants 1 and 3 were ex parte and defendants 2 and 4 contested the suit. The plaintiff’s case was that the properties comprised in the settlement deed of his father and in the deed of family arrangement by his mother were all ancestral properties incapable of being disposed of either by his father or by his mother. The case of the contesting defendants was that the properties were the self-acquired properties of Arunachalam Pillai that the settlement by Arunachalam was valid and binding upon the plaintiff and that in any event the family arrangement entered into by the first defendant on behalf of the plaintiff being a bona fide settlement of disputes between the members of the family cannot be challenged by the plaintiff. The learned District Munsif of Tiruvaiyaru who tried the suit upheld the plaintiff’s claim and granted a decree in his favour as prayed for. On appeal by the second defendant, the judgment and decree of the trial Court were reversed and the suit was directed to be dismissed. This Second Appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff. The learned Subordinate Judge of Tanjore has found that the suit properties were the self-acquired properties of Arunachalam over which he had full powers of disposal. This finding was challenged before me by learned counsel for the appellant. It is not necessary to record any finding on the nature of the properties whether they were joint family properties in which the plaintiff had a right by birth or the self-acquired properties of Arunachalam as I am clearly of opinion that the deed of family arrangement entered into by the first defendant on behalf of the plaintiff is valid and binding upon the plaintiff. The recitals in Exhibit A-3 the deed of family arrangement show that after the withdrawal of the suit, O.S. No. 11 of 1937 in the Tiruvaiyaru Munsif’s Court by the first defendant and after the death of Arunachalam Pillai, Rathnasami put forward claims under the settlement died in his favour by Arunachalam and the first defendant Sengamalam resisted those claims. The deed of family arrangement came into existence as a result of mediation by persons interested in the minor’s family and in Rathnasami who wanted to avoid a protracted and costly litigation which may prove to be ruinous to the interests of the minor. The deed of family arrangement came into existence as a result of mediation by persons interested in the minor’s family and in Rathnasami who wanted to avoid a protracted and costly litigation which may prove to be ruinous to the interests of the minor. It is not disputed that the first defendant acted bona fide and in the interests of her minor son and compromised a claim against his estate in a manner beneficial to the interests of the minor. The only question raised on behalf of the appellant is that a natural guardian of a Hindu minor can under no circumstance bind the ward by a family arrangement so called which in effect and in substance is nothing but a gift of the minor’s estate by the guardian to ansher. It must be pointed out that a family arrangement is not a pure gift as it i in settlement of conflicting disputes relating to the minor’s estate and a compromise by the guardian on behalf of the minor and a buying off of a claim against the estate. The family arrangement or a compromise of claims against the estate cannot be worse than an alienation by a guardian on behalf of a minor. If the natural guardian of a Hindu minor can alienate the estate of the ward for purposes of necessity and benefit as has been recognised by a long course of decisions commencing from Hunoomanpersaud’s case1it stands to reason that the guardian can also bind the minor by a family arrangement provided such an arrangement is for his necessity or benefit. In Baboo Lekraj Roy v. Baboo Mahtab Chand2the guardian compromised a suit launched against the minor’s estate for recover of money. The deed of compromise was confirmed by the Court. 16 years after the compromise the minor came of age and brought a suit against the guardian to recover the amount paid under the deed of compromise. The quondam minor challenged the compromise as being fraudulent and collusive between the guardian and the third party. The Judicial Committee held that the guardian was justified in making the compromise to protect the infant’s estate. At page 399 their Lordships observed: “It is undoubtedly the duty of guardians scrupulously to regard the interest of minors in dealing with their estates, and the Court will, when necessary, enforce the performance of this duty. The Judicial Committee held that the guardian was justified in making the compromise to protect the infant’s estate. At page 399 their Lordships observed: “It is undoubtedly the duty of guardians scrupulously to regard the interest of minors in dealing with their estates, and the Court will, when necessary, enforce the performance of this duty. But the interests of infants would seriously suffer if a notion were to prevail, that guardians were bound for their own security to contest all claims against an infant’s estate, whether well or ill-founded; and such a notion might prevail if the compromise of a claim of debt confirmed by a decree of a Court were to be set aside after sixteen years without distinct proof of fraud.” In Venkataraghava v. Rangamma3the daughter of a deceased Hindu brought a suit in the Court of the District Munsif for a declaration that the defendant was not the adopted son of her father as he claimed to be. It was found in that suit that the alleged adoption was valid and the suit was accordingly dismissed. The adoptive mother conveyed a certain item of property by way of gift to the daughter, who brought the suit. There was evidence to show that the adoptive mother made the gift bona fide to her daughter with a view to adjust the litigation about the validity of the adoption. The adopted son challenged the gift and sought to recover possession of the gifted property from the donee. A Division Bench of this Court consisting of Muttusami Ayyar and Parker, JJ., held that the gift as a family arrangement will bind the minor provided it was bona fide and was brought about for his benefit. At page 500 the learned Judges observed: “The next question considered by the Subordinate Judge is as to the validity of the gift made to the respondent. At page 500 the learned Judges observed: “The next question considered by the Subordinate Judge is as to the validity of the gift made to the respondent. If, as observed, by him, the transaction was substantially not a mere voluntary act, but one concluded bona fide by the appellant’s mother, as his guardian, in view to adjust the litigation then pending about his adoption, it might be valid.” In Annapurnamma v. Seetha Ramanjaneyaratnam4 it was held by a Division Bench, (Subba Rao, C.J., and Manohar Pershad, J.) that an avoidance of family disputes is only one of the main grounds which go to validate a family arrangement, and that the essential test of the validity of a family arrangement is whether it amounted to a bona fide settlement of conflicting claims. In that case a family arrangement entered into by a de facto guardian on behalf of a minor was upheld as valid and binding upon the minor. Mr. T.S. Kuppuswami Iyer, learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the decision of this Court in Ramaswami Chettiar v. Karuppayya Thevar1as an authority for the proposition that a minor can never be bound by a family arrangement entered into on his behalf by his or her natural guardian. The facts of that case were as follows. There were two brothers Karuppayya Thevar and Velayutha who were members of a joint undivided Hindu family. They executed an usufructuary mortgage on 4th September, 1921 in favour of one Ramaswami Chettiar. They executed another mortgage on 29th November, 1932 in favour of the same individual. On 17th May, 1944 one of the brothers Velayutha Thevar executed a settlement deed, Exhibit B-1, conveying his undivided share in the family properties to Ramanatha, the son of his brother, Karuppayya. Ramanatha was a minor on the date of the transaction, and he was represented by his father, Karuppayya Thevar as his guardian. The mortgagee Ramaswami Chettiar instituted the suit, O.S. No. 48 of 1946 on the file of the District Munsif’s Court, Pattukottai to enforce the mortgage dated 4th September, 1921. The suit was decreed. Karuppayya Thevar filed an application, E.A. No. 174 of 1949 for scaling down the two mortgages. The mortgagee Ramaswami Chettiar instituted the suit, O.S. No. 48 of 1946 on the file of the District Munsif’s Court, Pattukottai to enforce the mortgage dated 4th September, 1921. The suit was decreed. Karuppayya Thevar filed an application, E.A. No. 174 of 1949 for scaling down the two mortgages. Ramaswami Chettiar contended that there had been a partition between Velayutha and Karuppayya, that Velayutha had transferred his interest in the properties to Ramanatha under a settlement deed and that therefore the terms of section 9-A (7) of Madras Act IV of 1938 came into operation, and that no relief should be granted by way of scaling down in respect of that half share. One of the contentions raised was that Exhibit B-1, the settlement by Velayutha should be construed as an alienation of the joint family properties in favour of Ramanatha. It was also contended that Exhibit B-1 can be upheld as a family settlement. These contentions were repelled. Venkatarama Ayyar, J., in dealing with the contention of family settlement observed thus at page 550: “Nor can Exhibit B-1 be upheld as a family settlement because one of the parties to the settlement was a minor. The principle on which family settlement are upheld is that persons who solemnly agree to a settlement of rights on a particular basis are precluded from setting up any rights in opposition thereto as against persons who are parties to that settlement or their representatives. But an. essential condition for the enforcement of this principle is that the parties sought to be bound by the arrangement, should have the capacity to enter into it; and as Ramanatha was a minor on that date, Exhibit B-1, cannot be upheld as a valid family arrangement.” It is quite clear on the facts of that case that the impugned transaction could not operate as a family arrangement as there was no situation of contest between the parties, no settlement of conflicting claims and no preservation of the minor’s estate saved and freed from a claim made against it. I do not understand the observation of the learned Judge quoted above as laying down the proposition of law that the natural guardian of a minor is incompetent to enter into a compromise on his behalf bona fide and for the benefit of the minor. I do not understand the observation of the learned Judge quoted above as laying down the proposition of law that the natural guardian of a minor is incompetent to enter into a compromise on his behalf bona fide and for the benefit of the minor. Under the Guardians and Wards Act which of course applies only to certificated guardians, section 27 prescribes the duties of property guardian. The guardian of the property of a ward is bound to deal with the property as carefully as a man of ordinary prudence would deal with it if it were his own. Mayne in. his Hindu Law, nth Edition, at page 296 observes thus: “The rule laid down in section 27 of the Guardians and Wards Act (V11I of 1890) that a guardian may do all acts which are reasonable and proper for the realisation, protection and benefit of the property and is bound to deal therewith as carefully as a man of ordinary prudence would deal with it, if it were his own, would cover all acts of the guardian on behalf of the minor other than alienations of the infant s property, as to which, the test of necessity or demonstrable benefit as explained by Lord Atkinson in Palaniappa Chetty’s case2 must apply.” Reference may be made to section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardian Act,. (XXXII of 1956) which is as follows: "(1) The natural guardian of a Hindu minor has power, subject to the provisions of this section, to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor or for the realisation, protection or benefit of the minor’s estate ; but the guardian can in no case bind the minor by a personal covenant. (2) The natural guardian shall not, without the previous permission of the Court,- (a) mortgage or charge, or transfer by sale, gift, exchange or otherwise, any part of the immovable property of the minor, or, (b) lease any part of such property for a term exceeding five years or for a term extending more than one year beyond the date on which the minor will attain majority. (3) Any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian, in contravention of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him.‘ The natural guardian of a Hindu minor no doubt occupies a fiduciary position. The duties of the guardian are in the nature of a sacred trust. So long as the guardian acts bona fide in the interests and for the welfare of the minor and the transactions on behalf of the minor result in benefit to the minor and so long as the transactions are free from any taint of fraud, malpractice, or abuse of power the yard-stick of a prudent man’s conduct in respect of his own property to test the validity of the guardian’s transactions can well be applied. Otherwise no guardian can manage the estate of a minor effectively and efficiently. In my opinion, Exhibit A-3 is a valid family arrangement binding upon the plaintiff. Learned counsel for the appellant next contended that as the second defendant alone has preferred an appeal to the lower appellate Court the judgment and decree of the trial Court should not have been set aside in regard to items of properties conveyed by the second defendant in favour of defendants 3 and 4. The memorandum of appeal to the lower appellate Court included all the suit items and of course the second defendant was interested and entitled to maintain the appeal with regard to all the items of the suit properties. There is no substance in this contention. In the result Second Appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. No leave. V.S. ------ Appeal dismissed.