ORDER 1. This is a revision petition against the order of the Third Additional District Judge, Indore, passed in proceedings for the fixation of fair rent under the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955 (hereinafter called 'the Act'). 2. The non-applicant was a tenant of the applicant-landlord in respect of a portion of premises house No.2, Kachhi Mohalla, Indore City. On 1.6.1956, he filed a suit before the appropriate Rent Controlling Authority for the fixation of fair rent under sub-section (4) of section 9 of the Act. The applicant-landlord, however, had already served him with a notice to quit and determine his tenancy as from 1.6.1956. As the non-applicant (tenant did not vacate the premises in terms of the notice, be also filed a civil suit for ejectment on 24.6.1956, wherein he also claimed damages for use and occupation of the accommodation for the period that the non-applicant would continue to be in its occupation after the determination of his tenancy. The suit for ejectment was decreed in favour of the applicant-landlord on 3.2.1958, wherein he was also awarded damages for use and occupation from 1.6.1956 to the date of the landlord obtaining possession of the accommodation. The non-applicant in consequence vacated the suit premises by the end of January 1958 and also deposited in Court the entire amount of mesne profits and costs awarded against him by the aforesaid decree. 3. On 13.3.1959, the applicant-landlord filed an application before the Rent Controlling Authority in proceedings pending against him for the fixation of fair rent under sub-section (4) of section 9 of the Act praying that on the determination of the non-applicant's tenancy as from 1.6.1956 by the decree for ejectment, the proceedings before it became infructuous and might be dismissed as such. The rent Controlling Authority agreed with the contention of the applicant-landlord and dismissed the non-applicant's suit as infructuous. The rent Controlling Authority agreed with the contention of the applicant-landlord and dismissed the non-applicant's suit as infructuous. Against the aforesaid dismissal the non-applicant (tenant) went up in appeal to the Court of the District Judge, Indore, under section 12 of the Act on the ground that he had continued in possession of the premises in question till 22.3.1959 and was, therefore, liable to pay rent or mesne profits till that date, so that he had continued to be a tenant within the meaning of the Act till that date and was consequently entitled to get a fair rent determined in the suit by him, which could not be dismissed as infructuous. The learned Additional District Judge allowed the appeal and remanded the case to the Rent Controlling Authority, inter alia, holding:– (1) That it had not been established that the applicant-landlord had obtained a decree for eviction and mesne profits as alleged by him, so that tenancy of the non-applicant (tenant) had stood determined as from 1.6.1956. (2) That even if it be granted that such a decree had been passed, it could not operate as res judicata in the Court of the Rent Controlling Authority, nor could it take away its jurisdiction to determine the fair rent. (3) That the question, whether the non-applicant-tenant's tenancy had been determined by the notice to quit ought to have been decided by the Rent Controlling Authority itself; and that in any case, on the termination of the contractual tenancy as from 1.6.1956, the tenant continued to be statutory tenant, which could only be determined under the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act. 4. The applicant-landlord challenges the aforesaid decision in this revision which has filed under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. The first question that arises for consideration is whether the High Court has jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to revise the order of the Additional District Judge passed by him as an appellate authority under section 12 of the Act. 6. Formerly, in the High Court of Madhya Bharat, the view was that the decision of the District Judge passed in appeal under the provisions of the Act was not revisable under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Kanhaiyalal vs. Neelambai, 1954 MPLJ 195. 6. Formerly, in the High Court of Madhya Bharat, the view was that the decision of the District Judge passed in appeal under the provisions of the Act was not revisable under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Kanhaiyalal vs. Neelambai, 1954 MPLJ 195. But Krishnan, J., in Naumal Brothers vs. Alihussain Kamarali, 1961 JLJ 263= 1961 MPLJ 450 , held that the decision was revisable and this view has been confirmed by a Divisions Bench of this Court in Kailashchandra vs. District Judge, Bhopal, 1963 JLJ 163= AIR 1963 MP 218 . These decisions have my respectful concurrence but as the question is of some importance, I shall in short give my own reasons for arriving at the same conclusion. 7. Under section 12 of the Act, the right of appeal has been given to the 'Court of the District Judge' and not to 'the District Judge' and consequently the District Judge presiding over such a Court exercises his jurisdiction as a Court of law and not as persona designata. It was pointed out by a Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Kiron Chandra vs. Kalidas Chattarji, AIR 1943 Ca1. 247, that:– "It seems to be established that when a statute provides that a particular matter shall be determined by 'a court' and not by an individual Judge, the officer presiding over the Court must be deemed to exercise his jurisdiction as 'Court' and not as persona designata. Difficulties do arise, however, when the expression used is not 'Court' but 'Judge' and in such cases one has got to look to the entire provision for the purpose of determining whether the matter is to be heard by the Judicial Officer as a Court or in his own personal capacity." This decision was cited with approval in Sawatram Ramprasad Mills, Co., Ltd. vs. Vishnu, 38 MPLC 454=ILR 1949 Nag 905. 8. In National Telephone Co., Ltd. vs. Post-master-General, 1913 AC 546, Lord Parkar, enunciating the rule, said:– "Where by statute matters are referred to the determination of a Court of record with no further provision, the necessary implication is, I think, that the Court will determine the matters, as a Court. 8. In National Telephone Co., Ltd. vs. Post-master-General, 1913 AC 546, Lord Parkar, enunciating the rule, said:– "Where by statute matters are referred to the determination of a Court of record with no further provision, the necessary implication is, I think, that the Court will determine the matters, as a Court. Its jurisdiction is enlarged, but all the incidents of such jurisdiction, including the right of appeal from its decision, remain the same." (Page 562) While in the words of Lord Atkinson– "It is simply the question of extending the jurisdiction of an existing Court of law, with all its incidents including a right of appeal to a new matter closely resembling in character those matters over which it has already jurisdiction as a Court of law." (Page 555) And in the words of Viscount Haldane, L.C. – "When a question is stated to be referred to an established Court without more, it......imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach and also that any general right of appeal from its decisions likewise attaches." (Page 522) 9. In sub-section (4) of section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the term 'district' is defined to mean – The local limits of the jurisdiction of a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction (hereinafter called a District Court). So that the 'Court of the District Judge' becomes syonymous with the 'District Court'. Under section 3 of the Code, the District Court has been made subordinate to the High Court, though section 4 has provided that in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force of any special jurisdiction or power conferred or any special form of procedure prescribed, by or under any other law for the time being in force. 10. The result, therefore, would be that the decisions of the 'Court of the District Judge' would be open to revision by the High Court, unless this power of revision had been taken away by the Act. Now, the only words of limitation contained in the Act are that 'the decision of the appellate Court shall be final'. There a re no words taking away the High Courts power of revision such as those that were inserted in section 20 of the Relief of Indebtedness Act. Now, the only words of limitation contained in the Act are that 'the decision of the appellate Court shall be final'. There a re no words taking away the High Courts power of revision such as those that were inserted in section 20 of the Relief of Indebtedness Act. The words in that Act were – "Any person aggrieved by an order of a Debt Relief Court may within 90 days of such order apply to the District Court for revision of the order on the following grounds:– (a)…………… (b)…………… (c)…………… But subject to such orders as the District Court may pass thereon; such order shall be final and no application for revision shall be against such order." And consequently a Division Bench of this Court in Hiralal vs. Parasramsao, 27 MPLC 447=ILR 1941 Nag. 581 held that these words created a statutory bar which prevented the High Court from revising the order of the District Court under that Act. 11. So far as the implication of the word 'final' is concerned, Krishnan J., in Naumal Brothers vs. Alihussain Kamarali, 1961 JLJ 253 = 1961 MPLJ 450 , has pointed out that the mention of the word 'final' in any section dealing with an appeal does not exclude the revisional powers of the Superior Court if it is otherwise competent all that it excludes is, further appeal or other occasion to re-agitate the question as of right by the aggrieved party and that revisional power being discretionary, is not incompatible with a provision in statute that the order sought to be revised will be final. To the same effect are the observations of the Division Bench in Shrikrishna vs. Badrilal, 1954 MPLJ 1041=ILR 1954 MB 96. "Section 9 (3) clearly lays down that the decision of the appellate Court shall be final. This shows that further appeal is definitely inhibited by the legislature. But the expression 'final decision' does not preclude revision to the High Court. There is ample authority in support of this proposition." See also K. Parthasarthi Naidu vs. C. Koteshwar Rao, AIR 1924 Mad 561, Phani Bhusan Sen vs. Sanat Kumar, AIR 1935 Cal 773 and Indian Homeopathic Medical Association vs. Kanai Lal Pal, AIR 1950 Cal 263 . 12. But the expression 'final decision' does not preclude revision to the High Court. There is ample authority in support of this proposition." See also K. Parthasarthi Naidu vs. C. Koteshwar Rao, AIR 1924 Mad 561, Phani Bhusan Sen vs. Sanat Kumar, AIR 1935 Cal 773 and Indian Homeopathic Medical Association vs. Kanai Lal Pal, AIR 1950 Cal 263 . 12. It may, however, be argued that the present case is not within the general rule deducible from the decision of the Court of appeal, because the 'Court of the District Judge' while exercising power under section 12 of the Act, was not exercising its ordinary jurisdiction wherein it would have been subordinate to the High Court, but a special jurisdiction and consequently its decision not having been made in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction, was not amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the provisions of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 13. The argument arises from a close analysis of the decision reported in National Telephone Co. Ltd. vs. Postmaster General, 1913 AC 546, Rangoon Botatoung Co. Ltd. vs. The Collector, Rangoon, 39 IA 197, Secretary of State for India vs. Chelikani Rama Rao, 43 IA 192, Secretary of State for India vs. Hindustan Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd., 58 IA 259, Maung Ba Thaw vs. Ma Pin, 61 IA 158, Shiromany Sikh Gurudwara vs. Ram Prasad Das, 63 IA 180 and Mitter, J. after an elaborate analysis of these decisions, drew the following conclusions in Nur Mohammad vs. S.M. Sulaiman, 49 CWN 10 at 16. "(1) That the general rule is that when a matter reaches a Civil Court, the procedure of Civil Courts would be attracted including the provisions regulating appeal from its judgments, decrees or orders, but (2) This general rule is applicable only when the matter comes to that Court as part of its ordinary jurisdiction and not by reason of a special jurisdiction having been conferred upon it." 14. The question then arises whether the Court of the District Judge is exercising any 'special jurisdiction' when hearing an appeal under section 12 of the Act. The question then arises whether the Court of the District Judge is exercising any 'special jurisdiction' when hearing an appeal under section 12 of the Act. The only reason that has been advanced for contending that it is a special jurisdiction is that under sub-section (4) of section 9 of the Act, the dispute relates to a right or liability which is itself the creation of the statute and which, apart from the statute, would not come within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. 15. In my opinion, the aforesaid argument gives a very rigid construction in the expression 'special jurisdiction' which in the words of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Shiromany Sikh Gurudwara vs. Ram Prasad Das, 63 IA 180 must be determined by the character, the variety and the importance of the questions to be dealt with by a tribunal and to the terms in which the right of appeal to the High Court is provided by the section. 16. Examining the provisions of the Act in the light of the aforesaid observations of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, I find:– I. That under sub-section (4) of section 9 of the Act, the landlord or the tenant claiming that the rent payable to or by him as the case may be was inadequate or excessive in comparison with the reasonable amount of rent as defined in the Act has been given the right to file a suit, though before the Rent Controlling Authority. II. That by section 11 of the Act the Rent Controlling Authority has been given the same powers which the Civil Court has under the Code of Civil Procedure and it has been enjoined on it to follow the procedure laid in the Code of Civil Procedure while trying the suit. III. That the questions that are to be brought before the Rent Controlling Authority are the determination of a fair rent in comparison with the 'reasonable annual rent' and as the landlord has been debarred under section 7 of the Act from accepting any premium or any other additional payment over and above such reasonable rent, provision has been made for claiming its refund by a suit under section 10 of the Act. IV. IV. The question to be decided by the Rent Controlling Authority is an ordinary incident of the relationship between a landlord and a tenant, because the landlord had the legal right to receive and the tenant has the legal liability to pay rent in respect of the demised premises whether the rent to be so received or paid be the contractual rent or statutory rent. If due to the Act the right of the landlord to receive anything over and above the statutory rent was barred he had yet the legal right to recover a fair rent for the premises let out by him to the tenant. This fair rent to which the landlord was in law entitled instead of being determined by the ordinary Civil Courts was being determined by the Rent Controlling Authority. If the dispute of this character were before an ordinary Civil Court, it would, in the words of Lord Shaw in Secretary of State for India vs. Chelicani Rama Rao, 43 IA 192 at 198 require a specific limitation to exclude the ordinary incidents of litigation' and consequently even if under the Act the matter in the first instance is decided by the Rent Controlling Authority and then reaches the Court of District Judge by way of an appeal, it is difficult to see how it can be said that it was not intended to reach that Court as part of that Court's ordinary appellate jurisdiction. 17. Considering all the aforesaid circumstances, it appears that the State having decided to restrict a landlord's freedom to contract in respect of rent of his premises was creating a forum of speedier determination of the rent of his premises as also for the refund of excess payment received by him in contravention of such provision and in making it subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of District Judge, it was not creating any special jurisdiction but only including a new subject-matter as part of the ordinary appellate jurisdiction of that Court. 18. 18. In my opinion, the principles laid down in Secretary of State for India vs. Chelicani Rama Rao 43 IA 192 at 198, where the Board bad occasion to consider a case under the Madras Forest Act in which against the judgment of the Forest Settlement Officer in respect of claims to lands within the notified area an appeal to the District Court was provided would be applicable here. Speaking whether further proceedings against the orders of the District Judge were competent, the Judicial Committee said:– "When proceedings of this character reach the District Court, that Court is appealed to as one of the ordinary Courts of the country with regard to whose procedure orders and decrees the ordinary rules of the Civil Procedure Code apply." 19. I am, therefore, of opinion that the Court of District Judge, when hearing an appeal under section 12 of the Act against the order of the Rent Controlling Authority in a suit under sub-section (4) of section 9 of the Act, is not exercising any special jurisdiction and consequently, being a Court subordinate to the High Court, its decision is open to revision by the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 20. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the suit for fixation of fair rent had become infructuous on the passing of the decree for eviction, which determined the tenancy of the non-applicant as from 1.6.1956. 21. There is no merit in the learned Judge's criticism that the applicant-landlord had not placed the necessary material before the Rent Controlling Authority for coming to the conclusion that such a decree had in fact, been passed when admittedly the parties were not at issue on the point. In the memorandum of appeal before him the position was not controverted, nor was the fact controverted before me. The case, therefore, had to be decided on the footing that such a decree had been passed by a competent Civil Court, whereby the tenancy of the non applicant had stood determined as from 1.6.1956. 22. In the memorandum of appeal before him the position was not controverted, nor was the fact controverted before me. The case, therefore, had to be decided on the footing that such a decree had been passed by a competent Civil Court, whereby the tenancy of the non applicant had stood determined as from 1.6.1956. 22. Then again, the learned Additional District Judge was in error in holding that the Rent Controlling Authority was not bound by the decision of the Civil Court determining the tenancy of the non-applicant as from 1.6.1956 and decreeing his eviction from the suit premises because the provisions of section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not in terms apply. 23. In the first place, it is settled law that the principle of res judicata is much wider than the terms of the section and that, therefore, recourse may properly be had to the general principles of the doctrine of estoppel by record: See Mithoolal Giridharilal vs. Babu Jainarain Bahadurlal, 27 MPLC 149=AIR 1941 Nag. 366, Jagna vs. Dhekal, 28 MPLC 224=ILR 1942 Nag. 779, Manohar vs. Laxman, 35 MPLC 26=ILR 1947 Nag. 91. Munni Bibi vs. Tirlokinath, 58 IA 158 and Maung Sein Done vs. Ma Pan Nyum, 59 IA 247. Consequently the judgment and decree of a Civil Court, if given in a suit decided earlier, shall operate as res judicata in the suit before the Rent Controlling Authority. In the case of Durga Shankar vs. Gurucharan & another, 1906 All WN 1, it was held that whereas between the parties in a revenue suit, a civil Court of competent jurisdiction had decided the title to the property adversely to the plaintiff, who claims profits, the Revenue Court is not competent to ignore that decision: See also Bhawani Singh vs. Dilawar Khan, ILR 31 All 253 and Gobindi vs. Saheb Ram, ILR 31 All 257. 24. In the instant case the jurisdiction of the Rent Controlling Authority to determine fair rent depended on the parties cantinuing to have the relationship of landlord and tenant so that there was a liability of the non-applicant to pay rent to the applicant, because, unless there was such a liability in respect of rent, the fixation of rent would have no meaning. The proceedings for fixation of rent with reference to any accommodation are initiated because the landlord or the tenant, as the case may be, wishes to enhance or reduce the rent agreed upon on the ground that the rent is in adequate or excessive in comparison with the reasonable annual rent. Consequently, if and applicant ceased to be a landlord or a tenant the person wishing to enhance or reduce the rent agreed upon disappears. It is true that in order to give any working effect to an Act dealing with landlord and tenants, it is sometimes necessary that the words 'landlord and tenant' must include, as they often do in ordinary parlance, ex-landlords and ex-tenants: [See Karnani Industrial Bank Ltd. vs. Satya Niranjaa, AIR 1928 AC 227 at 230, but there is no such necessity in this case. Under sub-section (3) of section 9 of the Act, the rent fixed under sub-section (4) is payable from the date of filing of the suit and as in the instant case, this was the very date on which the non-applicant's tenancy was determined, there would be no occasion for the tenant to claim a refund by a suit or otherwise. On the relationship of landlord and tenant ceasing between the parties as from 1.6.1956, the claim of the applicant ex-landlord against the ex-tenant non-applicant was not in respect of rent as such but for damages for use and occupation. The amount due under this head was not necessarily the contractual rent but only such sum as the trial Court determined on the basis of the evidence before it and as it considered just and equitable under the circumstances of the case. The amount so determined could in no case he called 'rent' within the meaning of the Act, nor could any refund be claimed by the ex-tenant from the sum so determined and paid under the decree of the Civil Court unless and until that decree was modified in his favour. 25. I am, therefore, of opinion that the Rent Controlling Authority was correct in holding that on the passing of the decree for ejectment the proceedings before it had become infructuous. 25. I am, therefore, of opinion that the Rent Controlling Authority was correct in holding that on the passing of the decree for ejectment the proceedings before it had become infructuous. The decision of the Additional District Judge to the contrary is erroneous and is hereby set aside with costs, because in refusing to give effect to the Civil Court's decree and in permitting the suit for the determination of the fair rent to proceed under the circumstances of the case he was assuming jurisdiction to determine fair rent, which it did not possess under the facts and circumstances proved of the case. 26. In the result, the application for revision is allowed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 50, if certified.