Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal filed by the Private Motor Workers Industrial Co-operative Society against the order in O.P. 112/61, a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the State Transport Appellate Authority setting aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority, Alleppey, and granting one stage carriage permit on the Haripad-Kozhencherry route to the third respondent herein and another permit on the Haripad-Punaloor route to the 4th respondent Our learned brother Vaidialingam, J., who heard the writ petition declined to exercise his powers and held that the case was not one in which a writ of certiorari could properly be issued. 2. Before dealing with the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant it would be useful to set out the facts of the case. A concern called Indira Motor Service, Haripad, was holding 8 permits in respect of six routes. Due to labour trouble or other causes the services could not be operated by them and so they surrendered their permits. The Regional Transport Authority, Alleppey cancelled the permits and invited fresh applications by notification dated 16-10-1958. All the applications received were taken up for consideration by the Regional Transport Authority and they granted seven permits on the following five routes to the appellant. Haripad-Kozhencheri via Pandalam and Pathanamthitta two permits; Haripad-Pathanamthitta, via Pandalam and Kaipattur two permits; Haripad-Chengannur via Puliyoor one permit; Haripad-Chengannur via Kodukulanji one permit and Haripad-Punalur via Pandalam one permit. As far as the 8th permit was concerned the consideration of the grant of the permit was postponed and we are not concerned with that in this case. 3. Respondents 3 and 4 filed appeals before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam (hereinafter referred to as S.T.A.T. ). The S.T.A.T. confirmed the order in respect of five of the permits in favour of the appellant society, but set aside the order in respect of two of the permits and granted one permit on the Haripad-Kozhenchery route to the 3rd respondent and another on the Haripad-Punaloor route to the 4th respondent. It is the grant of these two permits to respondents 3 and 4 that were impugned in the writ petition. 4. It is the grant of these two permits to respondents 3 and 4 that were impugned in the writ petition. 4. The main ground of attack is that the S.T.A.T. rejected the appellant's claim for the grant of the permit on the sole ground that the appellant was a new entrant while they were really experienced operators by reason of the fact that the members of the appellant's society consisted of the employees of the Indira Motor Service which was running this service. This it is stated is an error apparent on the face of the record and on that ground the order is liable to be quashed. 5. Before we consider whether there is such an error of law apparent on the face of the record we might as well see the scope of this expression. The error of law envisaged should be so patent that a bare perusal of the judgment and the record on which it is based would show that there was an error. Where two views are however possible or where the decision as to whether there is an error of law can only be arrived at after long arguments such error cannot be called an error of law apparent on the record. Only those errors of law which are patent on the face of the record can form the basis of interference in certiorari. 6. In K.P. Mushram v. B.C. Patel (AIR. 1952 Bom. 235) the following observations appear at page 241: "The error of law which can be considered to be apparent on the face of the record is not an error which can be pointed out to the superior court after a long and elaborate argument. It has been often said that a court of jurisdiction may decide wrongly in law and yet the superior court will not interfere with its decision. But the error of law contemplated is an error so patent, so manifest, that the superior court will not permit the subordinate court to come to a decision in the face of a clear ignorance or disregard of a provision of law. If the section of a statute is clearly misconstrued or if a provision of the law overlooked or not applied and that appears from the judgment of the lower court itself, then the superior court may interfere by a writ of certiorari." 7. If the section of a statute is clearly misconstrued or if a provision of the law overlooked or not applied and that appears from the judgment of the lower court itself, then the superior court may interfere by a writ of certiorari." 7. It appears from the records that the appellant society was registered before the Indira Motor Service was wound up and had stopped their transport business. Before that the appellant society was not carrying on any industrial undertaking. They were not owning any bus or holding any permit nor had they any workshop. The Society's headquarters was at Kayamkulam with no branch at Haripad or anywhere else on the proposed route. So the mere fact that the society has now taken in some of the ex-employees of the Indira Motor Service would not be sufficient to hold that the society as such was experienced in running the motor transport business. The view taken by the learned judge that the appellant cannot take advantage of the experience of the Indira Motor Service and that the appellant should be considered as a new entrant is therefore correct. 8. If that be so, the proviso to S.47 of the Motor Vehicles Act can have no application. What the proviso says is that an application from a Co-operative Society shall, as far as may be, be given preference over applications from individual owners, provided the other conditions are equal. If on considering the merits of the respective claims it is found by the S.T.A.T. that respondents 3 and 4 are definitely more qualified, this question of preference on the ground of being a Co-operative society does not arise. 9. The appellate authority has discussed the claims of these different applicants and has selected respondents 3 and 4 as the best suited in the interests of the travelling public. That is the main criterion on which the grant of the permit has to be made. To select one out of many applicants who would best serve the purpose of the Motor Vehicles Act is a complex process. The Tribunal has written a detailed order discussing the respective claims and has given valid and convincing reasons why respondents 3 and 4 were chosen in preference to the appellant society. Preference of one, over another in such circumstances cannot be interfered with by the issue of a writ of certiorari. 10. The Tribunal has written a detailed order discussing the respective claims and has given valid and convincing reasons why respondents 3 and 4 were chosen in preference to the appellant society. Preference of one, over another in such circumstances cannot be interfered with by the issue of a writ of certiorari. 10. S.47 of the Motor Vehicles Act lays down the general principles governing the granting or refusing a stage carriage permit. These conditions are not necessarily exhaustive in details and in deciding between one applicant and another the Regional Transport Authority or the appellate authority may well consider other allied matters. For example, if there are two applicants and only one permit is to be granted and one of the applicants was an old operator, the Transport Authority may well take into account the fact that one of the applicants is an old, experienced operator and as such better qualified to serve the interests of the public and better entitled to the permit. 11. After all, primarily it is the duty and the obligation of the authorities of the Motor Vehicles Act to grant or refuse to grant a particular permit to a particular person and this court under Art.226 of the Constitution can only see if the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules made thereunder had been complied with. 12. A faint attempt was made to argue that after the grant of the permit by the R.T.A. the appellant society was operating the bus services for more than two years and had gained considerable experience and therefore the qualification acquired after the grant of the permit also ought to have been considered by the S.T.A.T. Without going into the merits or the tenability of the contention put forward, we cannot allow this point to be taken for the first time here when no such plea was taken earlier before the Tribunal whose decision is challenged now. The point was not raised in the writ petition also. 13. On the extent of the powers of the High Court exercisable under Art.226 of the Constitution, we have the leading cases in G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman (AIR. 1952 SC. The point was not raised in the writ petition also. 13. On the extent of the powers of the High Court exercisable under Art.226 of the Constitution, we have the leading cases in G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman (AIR. 1952 SC. 192) where Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J., referring to the powers of the High Court has stated: "Such writs as are referred to in Art.226 are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission, error, or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. However extensive the jurisdiction may be, it seems to us that it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decisions impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made." It is also stated: "The Motor Vehicles Act is a statute which creates new rights and liabilities and prescribes an elaborate procedure for their regulation. No one is entitled to a permit as of right even if he satisfied all the prescribed conditions. The grant of a permit is entirely within the discretion of the transport authorities and naturally depends on several circumstances which have to be taken in to account," 14. Similar observation has been made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa (AIR. 1954 SC. 440). There it is stated as follows: "An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of 'certiorari' but it must be a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings, e. g. when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error which can be corrected by 'certiorari' but not a mere wrong decision." Their Lordships also cited with approval the following observation of Morris L. J., in Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appellate Tribunal (1952-1 K.B. 338). In other words, it is a patent error which can be corrected by 'certiorari' but not a mere wrong decision." Their Lordships also cited with approval the following observation of Morris L. J., in Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appellate Tribunal (1952-1 K.B. 338). "It is plain that'certiorari' will not issue as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. It does not lie in order to bring up an order or decision for re-hearing of the issue raised in the proceedings. It exists to correct error of law where revealed on the face of an order or decision or irregularity or absence of or excess of jurisdiction where shown." 15. There is a complete and precise scheme for regulating the issue of permits providing what matters are to be taken into consideration by the Tribunal as relevant in granting a permit and if the provisions have been complied with, this court will not interfere with the discretion exercised by such Tribunals and convert itself into a court of appeal and then examine the correctness or otherwise of the orders made by the Tribunal. The learned judge was, therefore, justified in declining to interfere with the order of the S.T.A.T. The appeal is devoid of merits and is dismissed with costs (one set). Advocate's fee Rs. 200. Dismissed.