JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal from the judgment and decree of G. K. Mitter J. dismissing the plaintiffs' claim for 1,16000/- with costs on an insurance in respect of two houses at Dhulian in the district of Murshidabad, west Bengal, which were lost by flood and erosion of the river and against which the same were insured. 2. The main question in this appeal is the applicability of Condition 10 of the Policy of Insurance to the facts of this case and the proper interpretation and legal effect of such condition. This condition is said to be the usual condition of the defendant Society's policy. The facts of the case may be briefly stated at the outset. On June 2, 1950 the plaintiff signed a proposal for insurance with the defendant company. The proposal expressly stated "the acceptance of this proposal is subject to the Rates and Regulations of the Insurance Associations Tariffs lodged with the Superintendent of Insurance. “There is also a space in the proposal form for a sketch plan of the building to be insured. In fact, sketch plan was attached with this proposal. The plan in the paper book shows the details of the two-storeyed building of the plaintiff at Annupnagar Bazar, Dhulian Municipality, ward No. 4, Holding No. 273a to C. It is drawn to a scale of 8 feet to an inch. There is a similar proposal form with plan in respect of the other building, although not printed in the Paper Book. 3. In the body of the proposal form the period of insurance required is stated to be expressly from "3rd June, 1950 to 2nd June 1951". "additional insurance" required is expressly stated to be also from 3rd June, 1950 to 2nd June, 1951. This additional insurance is for "loss or damage by cyclone, flood, changing of course of river, or erosion of river, landslide and subsidence". 4. The proposal form is a printed form and was one in use only for fire insurance. In fact, the printed heading of the proposal is "proposal for Fire Insurance. “The proposal actually, in fact, does not state that the insurance is for fire but the additional insurance is said to be against loss or damages by cyclone, erosion of river, food etc. as stated above. The proposal also contains full description of the building with details of construction. “The proposal actually, in fact, does not state that the insurance is for fire but the additional insurance is said to be against loss or damages by cyclone, erosion of river, food etc. as stated above. The proposal also contains full description of the building with details of construction. The sum insured is stated in the proposal to be for Rs. 51,000/- for one building and Rs. 65,000/- for the other building. The Holding Nos. respectively are 274,274a, 274b and 274c on the one hand and Holding Nos. 273, 273a, 273b and 273c on the other-all in Ward No. IV of Dhulian Municipality. 5. At the end of the proposal it was expressly declared "that, the foregoing statements are to the best of my knowledge and belief true and I agree that these are to be the basis of the contract and will be considered as incorporated in the policy to be issued. "This declaration was signed by the plaintiff. 6. On the next day, the 3rd June 1950, the Insurance company wrote to the plaintiff saying:- "In accordance with your proposal dated 2-6-1950 we hold you covered the risk from 2-6-1950 to 3-6-1051 as noted below. " This letter of acceptance before the signature contains one other sentence:-"the relative cover is enclosed herewith. This relative cover in this Appeal was not enclosed on that date but was received by the plaintiff on the 5th of June. Below this letter the risk referred to is stated in the following terms :- "nature of Risk and Situation". "one pucca built and roofed building holding No. . . . . etc. occupied as residence and/or shop for storage of medicines and/or safety matches at Dhulian, Ward No. IV, District Murshidabed; including Cyclone, Flood and/or loss by change of course of river, Diluvion and/or Erosion of River, Landslide and subsidence. " At the foot of that letter of acceptance the plaintiff is described as "insured". Although the letter of acceptance covered the risk for one whole year from 3rd June, 1950 to 3rd June, 1951 expressly, the cover note which followed two days thereafter appeared to be it cover note only for 30 days. The cover note is dated the 5th June, 1950. It is described as an "interim protection cover note. Although the letter of acceptance covered the risk for one whole year from 3rd June, 1950 to 3rd June, 1951 expressly, the cover note which followed two days thereafter appeared to be it cover note only for 30 days. The cover note is dated the 5th June, 1950. It is described as an "interim protection cover note. "It recites that the plaintiff is desirous to effect insurance from loss by fire including loss or damage by cyclone, flood and/or change of course of river and/or erosion of river, landslide and other subsidence. It also recites the fact that the plaintiff is desirous to effect the insurance for one year from 3-6-1950 to 3-6-1951. After such recital the important clause in the Cover Note reads as follows:- "the said property is hereby held insured against damage by fire, subject to the terms of the applicant's proposal and to the usual conditions of the Society's policies. It is however expressly stipulated that this Protection Note cannot, under any circumstances, be applicable for a longer period than 30 days and that it is also immediately terminated before that date by delivery of the policy, or, if the risk be declined by the notification of such declinature. " At the end of this Protection Note is set out two amounts of Premia, one for fire and the other for flood and other risks and the total premium calculated covers both these amounts. 7. On the same day, the 5th June, 1950, the Insurance Company sends two bills for premia in respect of these two houses. Again in these bills the period is expressly shown to be "from 3rd June, 1950 to 3rd June, 1951. "Then follows the amount insured and the amount of premium with the request to pay in crossed cheque. It is to be noted that although these bills also recited the letter of cover and although such interim cover note was said to be only for 30 days, full one year premium was called for. 8. On the 7th June, 1950, the plaintiff by a covering letter sent the full amounts of premium for one whole year as demanded by the bills aforesaid. It is admitted in evidence that the Insurance Company received the cheque and cashed it so that the entire premium was fully paid for one whole year in respect of this insurance. 8. On the 7th June, 1950, the plaintiff by a covering letter sent the full amounts of premium for one whole year as demanded by the bills aforesaid. It is admitted in evidence that the Insurance Company received the cheque and cashed it so that the entire premium was fully paid for one whole year in respect of this insurance. In fact, there is a receipt dated 7th June, 1950 signed by the Insurance Company. This closes the first chapter of the facts. The second chapter on the facts begins with the 18th June, 1950 when the Insurance Company was supposed to have sent from Calcutta one Prodyot Kumar Ghosh, an Assistant in the Fire Department of the Insurance Company, to Dhulian for the purpose of inspecting these properties. He was there in or about the third week of June, 1960, to be more accurate, on or about 18th June, 1950, and returned to Calcutta on the very same day after inspection. He made a written report in addition to his oral report to Shri Ganguli, the Manager of the defendant Insurance Company. This significant written report of P. K. Ghosh is not forthcoming before the Court. Although P. K. Ghosh returned on the 18th June, 1950, nothing happened for some time while by the end of June, 1950, the river was changing its course. According to the evidence of P. K. Ghosh, the river was at the time of his inspection on the 18th June, 1950, calm and was 500 yards away. The plaintiff's evidence is that he noticed the erosion for the first time in the last week of June (Q. 146). As the situation was changing and the river was changing its course and as the properties insured were in danger and as the Insurance Company had done nothing since the issue of the cover Note and as that Cover Note was about to expire, the plaintiff naturally complained on the 1st July, 1950 to the Insurance Company by a letter expressly referring to the Cover Note and saying that the policy should have been issued but was not, and that the period of 30 days of the Cover Note was about to expire. This letter called upon the Insurance Company either to send the policy of the Cover Note. Nothing happened immediately on the receipt of that letter. This letter called upon the Insurance Company either to send the policy of the Cover Note. Nothing happened immediately on the receipt of that letter. On the 2nd July 1950, the period in the Cover Note expired Even then there was no response from the Insurance Company for a few days until all on a sudden, on the 6th July, 1950, the Insurance Company wrote to the plaintiff as follows:- "In accordance with the inspection report lodged with this Company, we cancel the risk from 6th July, 1950 as noted below. The relative endorsement is under preparation and will be forwarded to you in due course. " 9. At the foot of that letter is noted what is called the "nature of Alteration" which reads as follows:- "the above Cover Note is cancelled by the General Assurance Society Limited as from 6th July, 1950. " This letter was addressed from Calcutta to the plaintiff at Dhulian in Murshidabad. This was received by the plaintiff on or about 8th or 9th July, 1950. 10. With this letter of cancellation of the risk begins the third chapter on facts. Strangely enough, unknown to the plaintiff an actual policy of insurance was formally drawn up and signed by the Insurance Company on the 12th July, 1950, after the risk had been expressly cancelled by the Company's letter of the 6th July, 1950. This is a strange, peculiar and unique kind of policy that I have come across. It was a policy which lived only for a day and died within twenty four hours. It never saw the light of the eyes of the assured for whom it was intended. It was never issued or handed to the assured. It was cancelled the very next day on the 13th July 1950. On the 15th July 1950, the insurance company is supposed to have sent to the plaintiff at Dhulian the cancellation of the endorsement. While the insurance company was doing this, on the very same day-the 15th July 1950-the plaintiff was writing to the insurance company that the company could not cancel the insurance, because. On the 15th July 1950, the insurance company is supposed to have sent to the plaintiff at Dhulian the cancellation of the endorsement. While the insurance company was doing this, on the very same day-the 15th July 1950-the plaintiff was writing to the insurance company that the company could not cancel the insurance, because. (1) it had accepted the insurance; (2) the erosion and change of river and subsidence had already commenced by the end of June and the risk had commenced and occurred; and (3) that premium was taken for the risk for one whole year effective from the 3rd June 1950 to 3rd June, 1951. The letter of the plaintiff dated the 15th July, 1950 expressly makes it clear that when the risk had commenced and the insured buildings were about to be lost, the language used in the letter being "impending loss", such cancellation could not be made by the insurance company. Even on that day the plaintiff insured did not know that in fact a policy had been drawn up in his favor and cancelled without his knowledge. On the 25th July, 1950, the defendant insurance company answered the plaintiff's letter of the 15th and the 19th July where it expressly comes out with the defence under clause 10 of the conditions of the standard policy. By this reply the insurance company stated: "According to this clause both the insured and the insurer have right to cancel the policy at any time, and the cancellation has been made in exercise of the said right as the policies have been cancelled we have no liability thereunder after the date of cancellation. You will be pair the refund of the proportionate premium on your sending a duly stamped receipt for the amount as stated in the endorsements. " With this denial closes the third chapter on facts. The proportionate premium was in fact never tendered by the insurer to the assured not put in court, and the excuse put forward in argument by the insurer for not doing so is that there was no "demand" for it within the meaning of condition 10 of the Policy and no stamped receipt was sent as requested in the insurer's letter of reply just quoted above. Neither of these reasons can hold good because the plaintiff could not demand as he was disputing the applicability and validity of condition 10 and to make a demand under such condition would amount to waiver of the objection and acceptance of Condition 10 of the Policy. 11. The fourth chapter on facts follows within almost a fortnight thereafter and by the middle of August 1950 the insured buildings were washed away. The telegram of the plaintiff dated the 13th August 1950 to the insurance company states :- "building insured under cover noted 18850 policy 44418 destroyed by change of course and erosion of river and subsidence. " This briefly sets out the relevant facts and the main incidents. The plaintiff now claims on the basis of the total loss of the buildings insured the sum of Rs. 1,16,000/- which is the total of the two sums insured viz. Rs. 51,000/- and 65,000/- respectively. The defense of the insurance company is condition 10 of the policy which may be set out at this stage as hereunder. Condition 10 of the policy reads as follows:- "this insurance may be terminated at any time at the request of the insured in which case the Society will retain the customary short period rate for the time the policy has been in force. This insurance may also at any time be terminated at the option of the Society, on notice to that effect being given to the insured, in which case the Society shall be liable to repay on demand a rateable proportion of the premium for the unexpired terms from the date of cancellation. " 12. The first question is, whether this condition can at all be attracted or applied to the facts of this case. The learned trial Judge held that condition 10 applied and that it meant an unqualified right of the insurance company to cancel at any time and that it had done so and therefore no claim could be made against the insurance company. He mainly relied on the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Sun Fire Office v. Hart (1) 14 A.C. 98. He mainly relied on the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Sun Fire Office v. Hart (1) 14 A.C. 98. The process by which the learned Judge introduced and applied condition 10 of the policy to the facts of this case, is, first, by the reference in the cover note to the expression that it was subject to "the usual conditions of the Society's policies. " From this he concluded that the assured was on notice about the usual condition of the Society's policy. Having done that, he applied condition 10 on the interpretation mentioned above. It is well-settled law that conditions may be incorporated into a contract by reference to an instrument which contains the conditions. Law reports are replete with cases how they can be incorporated, how far unknown, unnoticed and printed conditions apply to regulate unsuspecting parties in the performance of their contract. But before going into the niceties of the law on this subject, which may not be necessary here, it is essential first to see on the facts how this condition 10 of the insurance company's policy is being introduced and applied to the plaintiff. 13. Undoubtedly the evidence is that the plaintiff never actually saw the policy that was issued in this case, nor the actual conditions. But the doctrine of the notice of condition today in law is such that one may lie bound by conditions without actually seeing them so long as one is reasonably put on notice that such a condition in some other instrument is made applicable to the contract between the parties. Even then the acceptance of the risk for one whole year by the company's letter of the 3rd June 1950 which referred to cover note but failed to send it on the same day and which cover note only contained reference to the "usual conditions of the Society's policies", is a distinctive feature of the facts of this case. The letter of acceptance dated 3rd June, 1950, as quoted above was issued before the cover note. It was issued immediately upon the proposal of the 2nd June 1950. The contract of insurance became complete with that letter of acceptance. That letter of acceptance as stated above expressly insured the property for one whole year from 3rd June 1950 to 3rd June 1951. It was issued immediately upon the proposal of the 2nd June 1950. The contract of insurance became complete with that letter of acceptance. That letter of acceptance as stated above expressly insured the property for one whole year from 3rd June 1950 to 3rd June 1951. The question then is, does the mention of the relative cover note in that letter alter or reduce the unqualified condition for one year? The answer can only be in the negative on the facts here for many reasons. I shall enumerate the main reasons. 14. The first reason is that the words "relative cover" in that letter of acceptance dated 3rd June 1950 must be a cover that relates to the acceptance expressly made in unqualified way for one whole year from 3rd June, 1950 to 3rd June 1951. Therefore, if the cover note tries to cut down that period, then it would no longer be a "relative" cover note but a different cover note unrelated and repugnant to the acceptance for the full period of one year. But even then the actual cover note was issued on the 3rd June, 1950. Therefore, secondly the plaintiff could not be said in fact to have got any notice that the cover note contained any reference to any condition in the policy, and that such condition was repugnant to the period of one year, for the simple reason that he did not get the cover note on that day. Thirdly, when he did get the cover note on the 5th June 1950, it is essential to see what the cover note said. As indicated above, the cover note expressly mentioned the period of one year and the cover note demanded and received the full one year's premium. The cover note said or made a reference to the "usual conditions of the Society's policies". This is a very unfortunate expression. First, it indicates plurality of Society's policies. No one standard policy is referred to. The Society may have different policies. This Insurance Society, the defendant in this case, in fact dealt with at that time in different types of insurance like (1) fire, (2) life, (3) marine, and (4) accident. It is also in evidence that this insurance company has no standard policy whatever against flood, cyclone, erosion or change of the course of river. This Insurance Society, the defendant in this case, in fact dealt with at that time in different types of insurance like (1) fire, (2) life, (3) marine, and (4) accident. It is also in evidence that this insurance company has no standard policy whatever against flood, cyclone, erosion or change of the course of river. The printed proposal and the printed cover ante and the printed policy all indicate that these insurance documents in this case were a printed fire proposal, a printed fire cover note and a printed fire policy. If condition 10 is a usual condition of Society's fire policy, then it is debatable whether this will at all apply to the case of a policy against the loss by flood, cyclone, erosion or change of the course of a river. If there is any doubt or ambiguity, then on the well-known principles of contra preferentem, the condition must be read and interpreted against the insurance company and in favor of the assured on the ground that the language chosen is by the insurer. See 22 Halsbury (3rd Edn.) pp. 214-5 Article 404. Fourthly, although the protection note or the cover note mentioned loss or damage by cyclone, flood or change of course of a river or erosion etc., it expressly used the words "the said properties is hereunder held insured for damage by fire. " Now, here it is not added that the protection note also covered the insurance against loss or damage by cyclone, flood, erosion etc. It is necessary to remember then that by the letter of acceptance of the 3rd June, 1950 the insurer had insured the buildings against flood and erosion and thereafter had taken the full premium for such insurance, so that the insurance for one whole year against flood and erosion was complete without the cover note, and the protection speaking only of fire did not in any way qualify the insurance against flood and erosion or even introduce condition 10, the protection note having confirmed itself expressly to fire. Here again is ambiguity in the insurance company's own protection note. An ingenious argument was adopted by the learned counsel for the respondent that in the recital of this protection note 'fire' was supposed to include loss by cyclone, flood etc. and therefore the word "fire" in the operative part of the protection note would include such loss. Here again is ambiguity in the insurance company's own protection note. An ingenious argument was adopted by the learned counsel for the respondent that in the recital of this protection note 'fire' was supposed to include loss by cyclone, flood etc. and therefore the word "fire" in the operative part of the protection note would include such loss. One is not sure whether that argument is tenable, because the protection note is a printed form and in the printed form the words "including loss or damage by cyclone, flood etc. "are not there and they are here only in type. Therefore, the printed word "fire" in the operative part of the usual protection note used only against fire in its usual printed connotation could only mean fire and not flood, cyclone, erosion etc. 15. Fifthly, is condition 10 "usual condition" at all? The expression in the Protection Note is "usual condition of Society's policies". It is to be distinguished from "all” The conditions of the Society's Policies; not each and every condition of the Society's policy is obviously intended, for in that case the words "usual conditions" will not be used. In the 3rd Edition of Welford and Otterbarry's Fire Insurance at pp. 114 to 115 the "usual" expressed conditions, particularly conditions precedent contained in the policy are said to relate only to (1) mis-representation, mis-description, non-disclosure in any material particular (2) increase of risk for removal of insured property, (3) alienation of interest (4) payment of premium (5) notice and particulars of loss within a specified time (6) fraudulent claims (7) rights of the insurers upon loss including a power to enter the premises on which the fire took place and take possession of any damaged property (8) the existence of other insurance and (9) arbitration. We have carefully examined each and every condition of the policy in this case and if usual conditions are only those which are stated by Welford and Oetterbarry then Condition 10 giving a right of termination cannot be said to be a usual condition. Apply again the doctrine of contra preferentem on this point, it seems that the word "usual condition" of society's policies will not attract, on a true construction, this particular condition 10. Besides, it is noteworthy to mention here that in the standard form of Fire Policy annexed in App. Apply again the doctrine of contra preferentem on this point, it seems that the word "usual condition" of society's policies will not attract, on a true construction, this particular condition 10. Besides, it is noteworthy to mention here that in the standard form of Fire Policy annexed in App. II of the same Edition of Welford and Oetterbarry at p. 480 the "conditions" as printed at pp. 481 to 483 do not include Condition 10 relating to termination condition 10 is included in what are known as "the General conditions" printed at pp. 483 to 486 and Condition 10 of the present policy is taken verbatim from Condition 6 of such General Conditions. It is noted in Welford and Oetterbarry that these conditions are not used in what is called the Home Insurance or insurance in the United Kingdom but the form of the General Conditions including a condition like Condition 10 "is used for insurance abroad. "In Underhill's Encyclopedia of Forms 2nd Edition 579 form 59 this identical clause is reproduced with the note "inserted in policies effected abroad, rarely used in this country. "It will thus appear that this Condition 10 is a peculiar condition devised and applied for colonial and under-developed countries and hardly ever used in England. In India where indiscriminate imitation of foreign laws is widely prevalent, it is unfortunate that Indian Insurance Companies should have thought fit to adopt this colonial clause for their home consumption. But even that, "I am afraid, will not make it the "usual" condition within the meaning of the expression used in the cover note. 16. Sixthly, again a reference to the Policy itself makes the situation more ambiguous. The operative part of the policy in the present case is significant. In the first part, the policy reads as follows:- "Further, it is hereby declared and understood that the insured having agreed to pay an additional premium of Rs. . . . . . . . . . . the insurance under this policy is extended to cover loss and damage to the property insured caused by cyclone, and/or flood and/or change of course of river and/or erosion of the river and/or landslide and/or subsidence. " Now, this part of the insurance against Cyclone and flood etc. does not make the insurance subject to the conditions printed on the policy. This is a significant omission. " Now, this part of the insurance against Cyclone and flood etc. does not make the insurance subject to the conditions printed on the policy. This is a significant omission. The second part of the operative clause in the policy reads as follows: - The Society hereby agrees with the insured (but subject to the terms and conditions printed on the back hereof or otherwise expressed hereon which are to be taken as part of this Policy) that if the property above described, or any part thereof, shall be destroyed or damaged by Fire or Lightning at any time between the 3rd June, 1950 and 3rd June, 1951. In this part of the insurance against "fire” The policy is made expressly subject to the terms and conditions printed on the back thereof. That means in plain language the condition will only be the condition of a fire policy and if the property was destroyed or damaged by fire then such conditions including condition 10 would apply but omission to say that even the insurance against flood, cyclone and erosion etc. are also subject to the same fire condition must be read contra preferentem against the insurance company and in favor o the assured. Upon that view condition 10 cannot be applied to a case such as this where the policy is a combined policy of fire and flood and where the loss is a loss entirely due to flood and erosion and not due to any fire at all. 17. Seventhly, it will follow from this that the construction of the conditions in the fire policy to include also flood will mean that every condition will have to be re-read and re-constituted by reading into such condition the word "flood" wherever the word 'fire' occurs. 17. Seventhly, it will follow from this that the construction of the conditions in the fire policy to include also flood will mean that every condition will have to be re-read and re-constituted by reading into such condition the word "flood" wherever the word 'fire' occurs. For instance, Condition 4 using the words "subject to increased risk of fire" or "not caused by fire"; Condition 5 using the words "loss by theft during or after the occurrence of a 'fire' or "the burning of property by order of any public authority" ; Condition 7 (h) and (i) where the word fire is used, or Condition 6 which excludes this insurance when the direct of indirect or proximate or remote cause is inter alia to this very cyclone or convulsion of nature covered by this insurance itself, the result being that condition 6 has to be totally excluded when the loss is due to cyclone or convulsion of nature. To keep on construing each and every such condition relating to fire as one including fire and flood and also to exclude clauses will be really creating new conditions and an entirely new policy. No court can and should do that and embark on such a course. I do not think that it is the duty of the assured either to keep on construing conditions with a view to find out which one applies to his particular insurance or not. As the Insurance company is the author of the policy and the author of the conditions, and is the draftsman and editor of their language, a duty is cast upon the insurance company to frame such conditions in such policies in a reasonably intelligent and clear language and if there be any ambiguity in failing to do it then such ambiguity must be resolved against the Insurance Company and in favor of the assured. Sec. 22 Malsbury (3rd Edn.) pp. 214-5 Article 404 already referred to. Wills, J. pointed in General Accident Insurance Corporation v. Cronk, (2) 17 T. L. R. 233. "he (assured) must be taken to have applied for the ordinary form of policy issued by the Company. If the wrong form of policy was tendered to him he, no doubt, had the right to insist on receiving the correct one. " 18. Wills, J. pointed in General Accident Insurance Corporation v. Cronk, (2) 17 T. L. R. 233. "he (assured) must be taken to have applied for the ordinary form of policy issued by the Company. If the wrong form of policy was tendered to him he, no doubt, had the right to insist on receiving the correct one. " 18. Eighthly, on the 6th July 1950 when the Insurance Company purported to cancel the risk the situation thereby created demands careful examination and scrutiny. The cover note expired oft the 3rd June 1950. Therefore, the cover note after this date of expiry was no longer applicable to introduce even the usual conditions of the Society's policies which could only be attracted by the cover note expressly saying so. The cover note, as quoted above, clearly provided in unmistakable and unambiguous language as follows :- "It is, however, expressly stipulated that this protection note cannot, under any circumstances, be applicable for a longer period than Thirty Days." If the protection note could not last more than 30 days at the outside then on the 6th July 1950 when the Insurance Company was purporting to cancel the cover note it was doing something which it could not do; the reason here must be stated clearly. If the cover note expired with the efflux of 30 days then there is no point and reason why anybody should think of canceling an expired cover note:-it has expired with the efflux of time under the terms of its own contract. Then comes the very serious question on: the interpretation of this clause in the cover note. As will be seen from the clause of the cover note quoted above that the cover note indicates only three courses:- (1) The currency of the cover note for 30 days as a maximum period, (2) Policy could be issued before that period in which case the period of 30 days will be reduced and (3) The Insurance Company can decline the risk within the period of 30 days. These are the three courses open if neither of these three possibilities fructifies then it becomes an insurance for one year on the terms of this clause. The clause quoted above plainly says that the property is "hereby insured" subject to (1) applicant's proposal and (2) under usual conditions of the Society's policies. These are the three courses open if neither of these three possibilities fructifies then it becomes an insurance for one year on the terms of this clause. The clause quoted above plainly says that the property is "hereby insured" subject to (1) applicant's proposal and (2) under usual conditions of the Society's policies. Thereafter in an independent sentence it goes on to provide, "it is, however, expressly stipulated that this protection note cannot, under any circumstances, be applicable for the longer period than thirty days and that it is also immediately terminated before that date by delivery of the policy, or if the risk be declined by the notification of such declinature. " If this part of the clause cannot be applied, as I have shown it cannot be, then the property by the terms of this cover note remains "hereby insured", The Insurance Company in this case allowed 30 days' maximum period without taking either of the two courses stipulated in the cover Note, namely. (1) Issuing a policy before date, or (2) By declining the risk within that date. By allowing 30 days to expire not only by reason of the very terms of the cover note itself but also by reason of the letter of acceptance of the 3rd June 1950 whereby the Insurance Company clearly stated that the risk was covered from the 3rd June 1950 to 3rd June 1951, the contract of insurance became complete for one year after the expiry of 30 days mentioned in the protection note. 19. The legal effect must be clearly stated here. First, if there is a conflict between the letter of acceptance and the cover note then the letter of acceptance must prevail. The contract of Insurance is then complete by reading the proposal and the acceptance together. A formal policy is not always necessary to show the completion of an insurance-it certainly is usual. See 22 Halsbury (3rd Edn.) p. 206, Article 389 and p. 209 Art. 395. The proposal itself said nothing about the standard condition or usual conditions of policies; it only said, as I quoted above, that the statements in the proposal were to be the basis of the contract and would be considered as incorporated in the policy to be issued. The proposal itself said nothing about the standard condition or usual conditions of policies; it only said, as I quoted above, that the statements in the proposal were to be the basis of the contract and would be considered as incorporated in the policy to be issued. If the policy contains or the cover note contains nothing that cuts down the only period of insurance which is expressly stipulated in the letter of acceptance dated the 3rd June 1950, then the policy or the cover note purporting to so cut down that period must yield to the proposal and its acceptance as contained in the letter of acceptance dated the 3rd June 1950. 20. On the principle laid down by Farwell, L. J. that in such a case of conflict between the proposal and a cover note it is the policy or the cover note which must yield to the proposal. Farwell, L. J. in re: Brodley and Essex and Suffolk Accident Indemnity Society (3) 1912-1 K. B. 430, stated the law on the point in the following terms:- "it is the universal practice for the companies to prepare both the form of proposal and the form of policy; both the issued by them on printed forms kept ready for use; it is their duty to make the policy accord with and not exceed the proposal, and to express both in clear and unambiguous terms, lest (as Fletcher Moulton, L. J., quoting Lord St. Leonards, says in Joel v. Law Union and Crown Insurance Co. (4) 1908 2 K. B. 863, 886) provisions should be introduced into policies which 'unless they are fully explained to the parties, will lead a vast number of persons to supplies that they have made a provision for their families by an insurance on their lives and by payment of perhaps a very considerable portion of their income, when in point of fact, from the very commencement, the policy was not worth the paper upon which it was written. ' It is especially incumbent on insurance companies to make clear, both in their proposal forms and in their policies, the conditions which are precedent to their liability to pay, for such conditions have the same effect as forfeiture clauses, and may inflict loss and injury to the assured and those claiming under him out of all proportion to any damage that could possibly accrue to the company from non-observance or non-performance of the conditions. Accordingly, it has been established that the doctrine that policies are to be construed "contra preferentem" applies strongly against the company: In re Eiherington (5) 1909 1 K. B. 591. It has been further held that if the proposal be in one form, and the office draws up the policy in a different form, varying the right of the assured, courts of Equity would rectify the policy so as to make it accord with the proposal: Collett v. Morrison (6) 1851 9 Hare, 162: Griffiths v. Fleming, (7) 1909 1 K.B. 805; and in cases like the present, where the proposal is "considered as incorporated" in the policy, the Court will, on construction of the two documents, read together, give effect to the proposal as overriding the policy where they differ. " These observations, to my mind, briefly put forward the two fundamental notions of Insurance Jurisprudence namely (1) the principle of construction of the conditions "contra preferentem" for the simple reason that the Insurance Companies are the authors of such condition and (2) secondly, that if there is a conflict between the proposal incorporated us part of the policy and the policy itself, then the proposal must live and the policy must fail on the point of conflict. 21. Incidentally the observations of Farwell, L. J. also emphasise that proper attention of the assured is to be drawn by the insurance companies to such policies and to the conditions appearing therein. 21. Incidentally the observations of Farwell, L. J. also emphasise that proper attention of the assured is to be drawn by the insurance companies to such policies and to the conditions appearing therein. Speaking of conditions and particularly of conditions precedent in insurance policy, Farwell, L. T. at pages 432-435 of the Report makes the following pertinent observations:- "I agree with him, because I think that, reading the policy with the proposal form (in accordance with the provision in the form that the form is incorporated in the policy), and construing the policy most strongly against the society, in the interests of honesty and fair dealing this is the better construction; any other construction would convict the society of having issued a tricky policy calculated to deceive and entrap the unwary and of insisting on the success of their devices. I think it is the duty of all insurance companies to state in clear and plain terms, as conditions precedent, those provisions only which are such not wrap them up in a number of clauses which are not conditions precedent at all; and I think further that it is their duty to call attention to such conditions in their form of proposal so as to make sure that the insurers understand their liabilities. " 22. Here in this appeal the situation is far worse than the one contemplated by Farwell, L. J. because here the conditions are openly said to be conditions of fire policy. To wrap and clothe them with interpretation and construction to include flood as I have indicated, is clearly an impossible task, for here a fire policy with fire conditions is required to do the work for flood as well. Even then, a N. B. clause in the policy here is significant and reads as follows :- "Policy-holders are requested to read the policy and its conditions in order to ascertain that it is in accordance with their intention and if incorrect, should be returned immediately." But this sounds, like irony in the facts of this case because this policy was never seen by or handed over to, the assured. It was born on the 12th; it died on the 13th and its whole life was spent in the office of the insurance company itself without traveling to the assured for whom it was intended. It was born on the 12th; it died on the 13th and its whole life was spent in the office of the insurance company itself without traveling to the assured for whom it was intended. Therefore, this N. B. Clause is of no assistance to the policy-holder because he never "held” The policy in his own hands and, therefore, could not know of the conditions, far less Condition 10 giving unqualified right of termination at any time. If this N. B Clause be a part of the bargain contained in the policy then condition 10 of the policy cannot be applied because those conditions were not "read" and could not be "read" by the assured in the facts of this case. Secondly, this period between the 3rd and the 6th June 1950, is significant from other points of view. On that date, the 6th July, 1950, the Cover Note had expired. On that date, the 6th July, the policy had not been issued because that came on the 12th July. If neither the Cover Note nor the Policy could be called in aid, then, I fail to see how Condition 10 which can come only by the door of the Cover Note or the Policy can at all be introduced to the facts of the case at the time when, in fact, the risk was cancelled and the termination purported to be effected. This appears to me to be a conclusive answer against the insurance company for holding that Condition 10 could not be applied or invoked between the 3rd July 1950 and the 6th July 1950 when it was purported to be done. Nor do I think the subsequent policy on the 12th July 1950 which died the green fly's death after twenty-four hours on the 13th July could at all be created in order to invoke and apply Condition 10 when the insurance company on its own admission on the 6th July 1950 had cancelled the risk. I do issue a policy when the risk itself had been cancelled and declined by that insurance company. I do issue a policy when the risk itself had been cancelled and declined by that insurance company. It is impossible to resist the conclusion that this strange creation of this unseen policy was actuated by no other motive than to apply Condition 10 of the policy as the insurance company realised that the Cover Note having expired and policy not being issued it could not any more apply Condition 16 to terminate the insurance. Hence this absurd policy after the risk had been cancelled. 23. Thirdly, then it means that for that period between the 3rd and the 6th July 1950, the insurance company was in possession, receipt and retention of the full premium for one whole year. Welford and Otter-Barry's Fire Insurance, 3rd Edition at page 81 says ''where no policy has been issued to the proposer before the loss, by no means conclude, may raise the presumption in the absence of any circumstances leading to a contrary conclusion, that the insurers have definitely accepted his proposal," Lord Esher M. R. in Canning v. Farquhar, (8) 16 Q.B.D. 727 at p. 731 makes this clear; "if the premium is offered and accepted, there is at once an insurance, and the year for which the insurance runs commences then, and if the policy is drawn up properly, that will appear in it. " In fact, demand for premium has been said to be enough as in Xencs v. Wickhamm (9) L. R. (1866) 2 H. L. 296 at p. 308. The law is dearly summarised in Art. 389, p. 206 of Simond's Edition of Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. 22 in the following terms :- "Where a proposal in the normal form is accepted without qualification, the contract is complete and the insurances are bound to issue, and the proposer to accept a policy in accordance with the stipulations of the proposal. The insurers cannot then seek to introduce variations by issuing a policy containing different terms, though, if they in fact do this, the proposer will probably be bound by the varied terms if, with knowledge of them, he indicates by word or act his assent to the variation of the terms already agreed. " 24. An attempt was made to say that the letter of acceptance of the 3rd June 1950, did not create a complete contract of insurance because the premium was not mentioned. " 24. An attempt was made to say that the letter of acceptance of the 3rd June 1950, did not create a complete contract of insurance because the premium was not mentioned. That argument cannot prevail for many reasons. The first and foremost reason is that the proposal was made on the basis of the condition that I have quoted at the beginning of this judgment, namely, that the acceptance of this proposal was subject to the Insurance Association's tariffs. Therefore, whatever such tariffs would be, would apply to the premium in this case and the proposer, namely, the assured, agreed to abide by such tariffs. Besides, this view is confirmed by the declaration at the end of the proposal that the proposer expected a policy to be issued and whatever was not inconsistent with the statements in the proposal but included in the policy would be acceptable by the proposer. That would include premium because a policy will always mention the premium. In any event, the Cover Note itself however indicated the premium and which fact shows that at the time of the letter of acceptance on the 3rd June, 1950 the premium must have been agreed to between the parties. For these reasons we are bound to hold that, in the particular facts and circumstances of this case, Condition 10 of the policy cannot be applied to defeat the claim of the assured. The next question raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is a much larger question that Condition 10 in the insurance policy is totally bad and void. It is contended that Condition 10 is illegal and unreasonable and should not be enforced by any Court even if it had applied. It is not necessary for us to finally decide this larger question having regard to the view which we have already expressed. It is. however, necessary for us to make our observation on the interpretation and construction of Condition 10 of the policy, and, particularly, on the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Sun Fire Office v. Hart (1) 14 A. C. 98, because they appeared to weigh with the trial Judge in denying relief to the assured appellant. The main propositions for which Sun Fire Office v. Hart and Ors. The main propositions for which Sun Fire Office v. Hart and Ors. 14 A. C. 98 is usually cited as an authority are two:- (1) In order to justify the right of termination nothing is required except the existence of a desire on the part of the insurer to get rid of future liability, whether such desire be prompted by causes which prevent the policy attaching or by any other cause whatever. (2) The sufficiency of the reasons moving the insurers to desire a termination of the risk which they had undertaken is a matter which the insurers are constituted the sole judges and their reason is not justiciable by the Court. 25. This decision stands in isolation in the record of cases. It is noticed without comment in all the leading textbooks on Insurance Law including Walford and Otterbarry and Macgillvray on Insurance. It is unfortunate that this decision, in the first place, was based on ex-parte argument because the respondents did not appear before the Privy Council. In the second place, before applying the principle of that decision it is not always remembered that the condition of the policy construed by the Privy Council was very different from the condition that we have to construe in the case, and thirdly that Lord Watson who delivered the opinion of the Privy Council in that case was careful to insist on certain indispensable conditions. It is, therefore, necessary that we should draw attention to these considerations. Condition 3 in that particular policy which the Privy Council construed reads as follows:- " (3) If after the risk has been undertaken by the society anything whereby the risk is increased be done to property thereby insured, or to upon, or if any building thereby insured, or building or place in which property thereby insured is contained or if any property thereby insured be removed from the building or place in which it is therein described as being contained, without in each and every of such cases the assent or sanction of the society, signified by endorsement thereon, the insurance as to the property affected thereby ceases to attach. If by reason of such change, or from any other cause whatever, the society or its agents should desire to terminate the insurance effected by the said policy, it shall be lawful for the society or its agents so to do, by notice to the insured, or to the authorised representative of the insured, and to require the policy to be given up, for the purpose of being cancelled; provided that in any such case the society shall refund to the insured a rateable proportion for the unexpired time thereof, of the premium received for the insurance. " 26. Now, in that case the insurers terminated the insurance stating the causes of such termination. The causes were-there were three fires in the plantation and there were threats for continued incendiarism and, therefore, it is stated:- "on the 8th of October, 1885, the agent gave written notice in due form to the insured that, in consequence of these occurrences, the society terminated the policy from that date, in accordance with clause 3 of the general conditions. " This being so, the question whether the insurers should have a good cause or state the cause, or a cause which is justiciable by the court under such a clause was not an issue before the Privy Council. From that point of view, the discussions in Lord Watson's judgment whether the cause need at all be stated in the notice terminating the insurance or whether the insurers and not the court are the sole judges of the sufficiency or otherwise of the cause did not really arise for decision on that case and it is all the more unfortunate that opinions were expressed on these points when the respondent did not even appear. It is needless to say that this insurance case, with this condition, came from the British Colonies, and not on any insurance policy current in the United Kingdom. But the most important feature of this Privy Council decision is that there the clause emphasised "if by reason of such change or from any other cause whatever. “The words "such change" indicated the change in the risk mentioned in the first paragraph of that policy. That was good cause indeed. Then again the latter portion also uses the word "or from any other cause whatever. “This indicates that there must be a cause or some cause. “The words "such change" indicated the change in the risk mentioned in the first paragraph of that policy. That was good cause indeed. Then again the latter portion also uses the word "or from any other cause whatever. “This indicates that there must be a cause or some cause. But Condition 10 in the policy before us is much wider. It does not stipulate for any cause whatever. It may be causeless termination or what may be described as purely whimsical and capricious termination. Condition 10 of the policy in the present appeal is not dependent on any cause far less such cause being justiciable in a Court of law. The question therefore, is, do the observations of Lord Watson apply even to such a wide and uncontrolled plenary power of termination. In our view it is doubtful whether Lord Watson would have made such observations as His Lordship did in that case in connection with a condition like Condition 10 of the present appeal before us. The other point decided by the Privy Council decision does not concern us here and that is whether any other cause should be read as ejusdem generis and it was held by Lord Watson that it was not so because of the word "whatever". As no cause is required in the present Condition 10 of the policy before us no such question arises. 27. Then comes the limitations which Lord Watson himself expressed even on the clause which His Lordship was considering. That will be apparent from some of the observations which I shall quote from his judgment in this case. At p. 103 of that report Lord Watson observes: "there may be many circumstances calculated to beget, in the mind of a fair and reasonable insurer, a strong desire to terminate the policy, which it would be inconvenient to state and difficult ton prove; and it must not be forgotten that the whole business of fire insurance offices consists in the issue of policies, and that they have no inducement, and are not likely, to curtail their business, without sufficient cause. On the other hand, the insured gets all the protection which he pays for, and, when the policy is determined, can protect his own interests by effecting another insurance. " 28. On the other hand, the insured gets all the protection which he pays for, and, when the policy is determined, can protect his own interests by effecting another insurance. " 28. It appears from this observation that His Lordship was thinking (1) of a ''fair and reasonable insurer" and (2) a presumption of a sufficient cause in such a fair and reasonable insurer and (3) the protection which the insured gets after the termination by having time to protect his own interest by "effecting another insurance". Again at p. 194 Lord Watson observes:- "their Lordships are accordingly of opinion that the condition must be read in the literal sense of the language which the contracting parties have chosen to employ, and that it would include any and every cause which could reasonably induce an insurer to desire the termination of the policy. " Here again his Lordship is emphasising a cause which could "reasonably induce" an insurer. These considerations are not applicable to Condition 10 of the present policy before us. No question of any reasonable inducement arises here; mere desire here is enough on the strict language of this clause. It is the option of the insurer or his whim. That will be enough. Would such a clause pass the limitations which Lord Watson had in mind when he was expressing his opinion in (1) Sun Fire Office v. Hart, we do not think so. 29. It is now necessary to examine how wide Condition 10 is of the policy in order to find out whether it is so unreasonable and whether it is in such breach of fundamental obligation under the contract of insurance that any court of law could enforce it or should enforce it. The main features of Condition 10 of the policy are (1) the insurance can be terminated at any time, (2) without any cause and however unreasonable and (3) only a notice is required but then it does not stipulate for any reasonable notice nor have a minimum period of notice nor does it make it clear whether the insurance terminates on the date of the notice given or from the date of the receipt of the notice by the assured, a point which becomes important if one considers Lord Watson's argument that the assured gets a chance to effect further insurance with any other insurers after the termination. Obviously some limitation must have to be read in Condition 10 before it can at all be applied by any court. Surely, the words "at any time" in Condition 10 cannot mean a time after the loss had occurred under the insurance. It cannot also mean long anterior to the date of the notice. Supposing, the insurer exercised their option and decided to terminate the contract but between such decision and the notice that it ultimately gives a period of time, say one month, elapses. In such a case can the termination be antedated in that manner so far as the notice is concerned. We do not think it can be. 30. Then if it is going to be any kind of termination without any cause, does such a construction frustrate the very fundamental obligation under a contract of insurers ? This raises a very large and important question of law. The orthodox theory about the freedom of contract was based on the assumption that a party to a contract was free to choose whether or not he would enter into it so that if he chose to enter into a contract which was onerous to him he has himself to thank or blame, as the case may be. From this orthodox point of view the courts declined to interfere. But the emergence of standard form contracts changed the whole aspect of contractual freedom. The bargaining powers of the parties are today not so equal and the insurance companies from this point of view verbally dictate terms to the assured through their association and printed forms and printed conditions and terms. Bramwell, L. J., in Parker v. South Eastern Railway Co. (10) 1877 2 C.P.D. 416 at 428 posed the question if some unreasonable condition was inserted like forfeiting 1000 if the goods were not removed within forty-eight hours, and His Lordship expressed there the view that: "there is an implied understanding that there is no condition unreasonable to the knowledge of the party tendering the document and not insisting on its being read-no condition not relevant to the matter in hand. " Again, in more recent time Denning, L. J., in John Lee and Son (Grantham) Ltd. and Ors. " Again, in more recent time Denning, L. J., in John Lee and Son (Grantham) Ltd. and Ors. v. Railway Executive (11) (1949) All England Report 581 definitely expressed the view that an unreasonable onerous term in a standard form contract would :not be enforced by Courts and the learned Lord Justice put it in his graphic language: "there is the vigilance of the common law which, while allowing freedom of contract, watches to see that it is not abused. " 31. Refreshing and modern as the view of Denning, L. J., is in that case, it is still doubtful whether a condition in the contract could be completely deleted on the ground of its being unreasonable. Lord Haldane speaking of a contract with a railway company which contained a drastic exemption clause observed in Grand Trunk Rail Co. of Canada v. Robinson (12) (1915) A.C., 740 at p. 747, "such a contract can not be pronounced to be unreasonable by a court of justice. " A year later in 1916 Lord Loreburn gave vent to the orthodox view in F. A. Tamplin S. S. Co. Ltd. v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products Co., Ltd. (13) (1916) 2 A. C. 397 at p. 404, that "no court has an absolving power. " Lord Simon in British Movietonews Ltd. v. London and District Cinema, Ltd., (14) (1952) A. C. 166 at p. 183, sided with this view. 32. The law appears to be growing on this subject and it is still in a state of flux. The trend seems to be in favor of interference by the courts only in extreme cases. This view is represented in Sze Hai Tong Bank Ltd. v. Rambler Cycle Co. Ltd, (15) (1959) A. C. 576 at pp. 586-87. In this latest decision of the House of Lords, Lord Denning laid down the following principle :- "the exemption, on the face of it, could hardly be more comprehensive, and it is contended that it is wide enough to absolve the shipping company from responsibility for the act of which the Rambler Cycle Company complaint, that is to say, the delivery of the goods to a person who, to their knowledge, was not entitled to receive them. If the exemption clause upon its true construction absolved the shipping company from an act such as that, it seems that by parity of reasoning they would have been absolved if they had given the goods away to some passer-by or had burnt them or thrown them into the sea. If it had been suggested to the parties that the condition exempted the shipping company in such a case, they would both have said: 'of course not'. There is, therefore, an implied limitation on the clause which cuts down the extreme width of it; and, as a matter of construction, their Lordships declined to attribute to it the unreasonable effect contended for. " "but their Lordships go further. If such an extreme width were given to the exemption clause, it would run counter to the main object and intent of the contract. For the contract, as it seems to their Lordships, has, as one of its main objects, the proper delivery of the goods by the shipping company, 'unto order or his or their assigns', against production of the bill of lading. It would defeat this object entirely if the shipping company was at liberty, at its own will and pleasure, to deliver the goods to somebody else, to some one not entitled at all, without being liable for consequences. The clause must therefore be limited and modified to the extent necessary to enable effect to be given to the main object and intent of the contract; see Glynn v. Margetson and Co. (1893) A. C. 351 at p. 357; G. H. Renton and Co. Ltd. v. Palmyra Trading Corporation of Panama, (1956) 1 Q. B. 462 at p. 501 and (1957) A.C. 140 at p. 164. "to what extent is it necessary to limit or modify the clause? It must at least be modified so as not to permit the shipping company deliberately to disregard its obligations as to delivery. " This view is also shared in J. Spurling Ltd. v. Bradshaw (16) reported in (1956) 2 All E. R. 121 where a drastic exemption clause again was intended to be applied only when the party trying to avail of it was carrying on the contract and was held not to avail him if he was deviating from it or was in breach of a term which went to the root of the contract. 33. 33. It may not be out of place here to refer to another Privy Council decision to show how irrelevant and irreconcilable conditions in a policy are sometimes incorporated in a particular contract of insurance. In Home Insurance Co. of New York v. Victoria Montreal Fire Insurance Co. (17) 1907 A.C. 59, the Privy Council considered a contract of a re-insurance which was engrafted on an ordinary printed form of fire insurance policy and incorporated all its terms which included inter alia a clause prohibiting an action thereon unless commenced within twelve months next after the fire. Lord Macnaughten in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council expressed the clear opinion that having regard to the true construction of the contract which carelessly purported to include many conditions inapplicable to the insurance, the clause prohibiting action unless commenced with twelve months, was held to be inapplicable. Lord Macnaughten observed that such a clause was reasonable in the original policy for the assured could sue immediately on incurring the loss but it could not apply where the insured was unable to sue until the direct loss was ascertained between the parties over whom he had no control. The ratio of this decision lays down the very important principle that even where there was a clear printed clause, it might be so unreasonable and inapplicable that the court will go to the length of holding so and not apply the clause. 34. In the 21st Edition of Anson's Law of Contract the learned editors' summary of the modern legal position is given at p. 164 in the following terms:- "but this doctrine of 'abuse of contract' has not yet been directly applied in any case and indeed, has not found much favor among lawyers in general. There is still a reluctance to walk upon the shifting sands of public policy and to absolve the parties from an agreement into which they have formally entered on the grounds merely that it is unreasonable. It may be that the law will expand to meet changing economic conditions, but it can not yet be said with certainty that this power exists. It may be that the law will expand to meet changing economic conditions, but it can not yet be said with certainty that this power exists. " The modern legal position is stated in a bolder and more venturesome form, in the 5th Edition of Cheshire and Fifoot on the Law of Contract at p. 115 where the learned authors say: "in a number of cases, now extending over many years, judges have ruled from time to time that no exemption clause, however wide, may protect a party who has broken the basic duties created by the very nature and Character of the contract. " After reviewing all these recent decisions, the learned authors ultimately come to this conclusion at p. 117 as follows: "It may therefore be concluded with some degree of assurance, that the doctrine, by whatever name it may be called, has been accepted by the courts and that it will be used to prevent a person from sheltering behind a clause whom, by his own conduct, he has destroyed the very contract into which that clause has been inserted." 35. Where the question is that if an assured enters into a contract of insurance, for one year and then finds that his insurance may be terminated at any time without any cause at the option of the insurer and with any kind of notice, then does it go against the very basis of a contract of insurance? A contract of insurance is a contract of indemnity and is a special kind of contract. It is a contract for a period which covers the risk and also the indemnity for the loss when the risk comes on to the property or the object insured. Both the risk and the loss are covered by this contract. To allow an insurer to earn a portion of the premium by maintaining the insurance only for the safe period of risk and to permit him to escape when the indemnity is inevitable by the small price of returning the unexpired portion of the premium raises far-reaching question of the clause being repugnant to the fundamental obligation under a contract of insurance. It is, therefore, not very profitable to try to seek analogies from the right to termination in other branches of contract jurisprudence such as, hire-purchase agreement, termination of lease or safe deposit or locker agreement under which performance of the contract starts from the beginning, even though it is terminated before time. In defence of Condition 10 of the policy, all that can be said is that such a condition is found in accident policies such as may be seen at pages 484, 526, 552, 545 in Underhill's Encyclopedia of Forms 2nd Edition. In further defense it has been said that Condition 10 is mutual and reciprocal. It gives right not only to the insurer to terminate at his option but also to the assured at his request. Thirdly, Mr. Roy in defense of Condition 10 tried to distinguish the decisions on exemption clause by suggesting that the exemption clause cases were (1) unilateral and (2) attempted to wipe out past liability, not future risk. On this point he contends that Condition 10 is not unreasonable because it accepts liability upto the date of the termination and it casts also an obligation upon the insurance company to return ratable proportion of the premium for the unexpired term. 36. It is unnecessary to pursue this large question any further having regard to the view that we have already taken. I think I have said enough to show at any rate that any blind, indiscriminate and mechanical application of the decision of the Judicial Committee in Sun Fire Office v. Hart and ors. (1) 14 A. C. 98 should be avoided in deciding on the interpretation of this particular Condition, like Condition 10 in the Policy before us. The learned trial Judge in addition to this decision of the Judicial Committee suggested two other reasons, one for the insurer and the other for the assured, why such right of termination should be held to be reasonable. One reason which he gives is that the assured may want to go out of business or sell his property and, therefore, he should not be compelled to continue his insurance. The other reason that he puts forward is that, similarly, insurance companies may for some reason be desirous of limiting their business, or they may even intend to close a part of the business, in which event they should have the right to terminate. The other reason that he puts forward is that, similarly, insurance companies may for some reason be desirous of limiting their business, or they may even intend to close a part of the business, in which event they should have the right to terminate. All that we need say is that to spell out a right of termination for these two reasons may not be safe, because if the assured loses his insurable interest by going out of or selling the business as aforesaid, then the policy naturally will cease. Indeed it is also provided in condition 8 of the policy which expressly says in its different sub-clauses, including sub-clause (d) that the insurance will cease if the interest in the property passes from the insured otherwise than by will or operation of law. 37. The only Indian decision in Sun Fire Office v. Hart and Ors, (1) 14 A.C. 98, is F.O. Chotirmal Hiranand v. Clise Insurance Co., (18) A.I.R. 1927 Sind 116, a decision of a single Jodge Madgavkar, A.C. At page 118 of that report the learned Acting Judicial Commissioner of Sind noticing this argument of reasonableness observed :- "with regard to the question of good cause, there is no such condition expressed either in the policy or its conditions. It is argued by the plaintiffs on the authority of New Zealand Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Societe des Altiers et Chantiers de France, (19) 1919 A.C.I., Choonilal v. Ahmadabad Fine Spinning and Weaving Co., A.I.R. 1922 Bom. 44: 46 Bom. 806; Chottalal v. Chapi, A.I.R. 1923 Bom. 75, that the power of cancellation must be employed subject to an implied condition of good and reasonable cause. These cases however hardly go to the extent necessary for the plaintiff's case. They are merely applications of the general principle that a party may not take advantage of his own wrong and that a party which has contracted to deliver goods and who himself is responsible for the breach can not escape damages under a general power of avoiding the contract, without showing reasonable cause for non-delivery, since such cause is implied in the general power. That principle however has no application in the present case, as is pointed out by Lord Watson in Sun Fire Office v. Hart (1) 14 A.C. 98, a general condition reserving the power of cancellation by the insurance company is not necessarily void or subject to a condition of good cause shown, the reason being as follows". (Here the observations of Lord Watson are set out which have already been quoted by me elsewhere in this judgment). 38. Mr. T. P. Das, learned counsel far the appellant, advanced the argument that even taking one's stand on Condition 10 of the policy and apart from the facts which we have already noticed, the terms of Condition 10 as such have not been satisfied in this case. His first point is that notice under Condition 10 of the policy is condition precedent to the termination and is not a condition subsequent. The wards used in condition 10 may be recalled as: "this insurance may also at any time be terminated at the option of the Society on notice to that effect being given to the insured. " He therefore contends with a good deal of force that the word 'on notice' shows that the termination must be after notice. Although the words 'at any time' and 'at the option' are there, they must be read together with on notice to that effect' and harmonised so that no termination either at the option or at any time could be effective unless it is upon notice to that effect 'given' to assured. In support of this contention he has relied on the decision of Lord Denman, C. J. in R. v. Arkwright (22) (1848) Q. B. R. 960-116 E. R. 1130, particularly at page 969-70 where Lord Denman, C. J. observed: "the words 'on' or 'upon' may either mean before the act done to which it relates or simultaneously with the act done, or after the act done, according as reason and good sense require, with reference to the context and the subject matter of the enactment: Regina v. Humphrey (23) 10 A. and E. 335, 370. It can not here mean simultaneously with, for the notice is manifold, and continued for many days: if it means before, all the inconvenient consequences will follow which we have already pointed out. It can not here mean simultaneously with, for the notice is manifold, and continued for many days: if it means before, all the inconvenient consequences will follow which we have already pointed out. We must therefore construe it as synonymous with after; that is the order must be made after notice given. So understood the section is reasonable throughout:" 39. In this case the notice of cancellation is dated the 6th July, 1950. It says that the risk is cancelled as from the 6th July, 1950. This notice does not reach the assured at Dhulian until the 8th July, 1950. Therefore, Mr. Das contends on the language of Condition 10, that cancellation could not be as from the date when the insurer was writing the notice. We think, Mr. Das is right in this argument. If he was not right then curious situations would arise. Supposing, after this notice was sent and before it reached the assured the house was destroyed by flood on the 7th July, 1950 then the assured without any notice and believing that his property was fully insured with all premium paid at the date of loss, would find that he had been in a fool's paradise. That will be the result of holding that notice in this clause is only an information of a fait accompli by reason of the words 'to that effect'. Such a course and such an interpretation would not even, according to Lord Watson in Sun Fire Office v. Hart (1) leave the assured the remotest chance or possibility of having his property insured again with some other insurer after he has been let down by the first insurer. It would be a most unreasonable construction to interpret this condition in this manner. Therefore, the notice of termination in this case must strictly speaking be held to be bad. If it was not terminated as from the 6th July but from the 8th July, the notice does not say so. Mr. Subimal Roy, learned counsel for the respondent insurer, in defense contends that if the receipt of the notice is insisted then the condition may be difficult to apply and unworkable and will mean different times for different assured and, of course, it will not be strictly 'at any time' or at the insurer's 'option'. Mr. Subimal Roy, learned counsel for the respondent insurer, in defense contends that if the receipt of the notice is insisted then the condition may be difficult to apply and unworkable and will mean different times for different assured and, of course, it will not be strictly 'at any time' or at the insurer's 'option'. We do not think there is much force in that argument, because the words 'at any time' or 'at the option' must be read together with the words 'on notice'. Secondly, receipt of the notice must not be reduced by a strained construction to a mere matter of information of a past event leaving no chance or opportunity to the assured to take other steps in protection of the property. 40. In developing this argument, Mr. Das says, with a good deal of force, that it must be always a reasonable notice and if the notice is so unworkable that the assured gets no time or opportunity to protect himself then the notice must always be held to be bad. We agree that that is the only way to read a commercial document imposing a condition of such extreme nature. To read otherwise would make an unreasonable clause already extreme to the utmost still more unreasonable. The question what is reasonable or not certainly will depend on the facts of each case, but that does not make a condition unworkable. So, even assuming that Condition 10 is a valid clause its terms strictly speaking have not in this case been followed by the insurance company and, therefore, the act of termination even within the letter of the condition has not been established. Before concluding this branch of law and with Condition 10, notice should be taken of Mr. Das's argument that even independently of the words 'on notice' in Condition 10 the expression 'at any time' must have some limitation or else it will lead to absurd situation. He gave a graphic and harrowing description. One of his illustrations is-an insured house surrounded by different houses which have caught fire. The Insurance company comes to know about it and when the loss of the insured house is inevitable but when not even a spark has touched it, the assured receives a telephonic call from Insurance company saying that under Condition 10 it terminates the policy. One of his illustrations is-an insured house surrounded by different houses which have caught fire. The Insurance company comes to know about it and when the loss of the insured house is inevitable but when not even a spark has touched it, the assured receives a telephonic call from Insurance company saying that under Condition 10 it terminates the policy. Is such a termination justified on the ground that the words used are 'at any time'? Is the termination justified when the lass is inevitable and inescapable although technically at that exact time chosen for termination the insured house had not actually caught fire but did soon thereafter? Apparently such a termination will be neither fair nor reasonable as pointed out by Lord Watson. In this ease the situation is not very dissimilar. The river had started changing its course. The situation had become dangerous to the point of making the loss of the insured building almost inevitable as indeed the subsequent event proved. No insurer could be found at this stage to insure such a property on the 6th July when the river has started eroding at the end of June. 41. This disposes of the question of Condition 10 and its applicability to the facts of this case. Except making the above observations and recording the arguments as aforesaid, it is not necessary for us to hold that Condition 10 is always illegal, unreasonable and void and we do not do so, having regard to the view that we have taken first that Condition 10 does not apply to the facts of this case and secondly the limited construction of the meaning of Condition 10 which we have indicated. It is desirable that the insurance companies and insurance associations in India should recast this colonial condition to bring it in line with the progressive countries of the world. 42. I now come to the question of valuation. The learned trial Judge holds that the plaintiffs have not adduced any evidence to show what was the cost incurred for the original construction of the property or of the additional construction. An analysis of the evidence will be necessary to determine this point. Before examining the evidence on this point, it will be useful to refer to the basic principles of valuation or assessment of loss in a fire insurance contract. An analysis of the evidence will be necessary to determine this point. Before examining the evidence on this point, it will be useful to refer to the basic principles of valuation or assessment of loss in a fire insurance contract. The first principle to bear in mind in assessing the loss follows from the indemnity nature of fire insurance contract. The assured is not fully indemnified unless, so far as money can do it, he is restored to the position existing at the time of the fire. The amount recoverable is therefore measured by the amount of loss, that is to say, by the value which the fire has taken away from his property. See: page 318, Art. 644 of Vol. 22 of Simond's Edition of Halsbury. The principle is also stated in similar terms by Lord Selborne in Westminister Fire Office v. Glasgow Provident Investment Society (24) 13 App. Case. 699 at p. 704. 43. The next principle for valuing the loss is marked by a distinction between valued and unvalued policies. Where the policy in which the claim of the assured arises is a valued policy, the valuation placed upon the subject matter in the policy conclusively establishes the sum required for the purpose of a full indemnity, except in the case of fraud or mistake. In such a case, the assured is relieved from the necessity of dealing with the question of amount and is entitled, on proving the fact of his loss, to recover the full amount insured upon the subject matter of insurance. See 3rd Edition of Walford and Otter-Barry Fire Insurance, p. 281. 44. Now the present policy in this Appeal is not a valued policy. Where the policy is not a valued policy, the amount of insurance specified in the policy itself does not necessarily represent the measure of indemnity. It may be disregarded except as fixing the maximum sum for which the insurers may be held to be liable. The assured under an unvalued policy must prove the extent and value of his loss and the amount recoverable will be calculated accordingly. In other words, the amount thus calculated may correspond with the amount of insurance but it is recoverable not as being the sum specified in the policy, but as being the sum which has been proved to be required for full indemnity. See Walford and Otter-Barry, 3rd Edition p. 282. In other words, the amount thus calculated may correspond with the amount of insurance but it is recoverable not as being the sum specified in the policy, but as being the sum which has been proved to be required for full indemnity. See Walford and Otter-Barry, 3rd Edition p. 282. This question of valuation in the case of a partial loss is in one sense independent of the consideration whether the policy is valued or unvalued for instance, where there is a partial loss and where the subject matter is not destroyed but partly damaged or partly lost, the assured being entitled to an indemnity only, can not recover more than the amount of the damage he has actually sustained. In such cases, it is immaterial that the policy is a valued policy since what is valued is the subject matter of insurance and not the amount of the loss. But as Walford and Otter-Barry in the 3rd Edition of their work on Fire Insurance at p. 283 indicates, the law is:- "Hence the valuation is only operative in the case of a total loss of the subject matter and is not, in the case of a partial loss arising out of damage to the subject matter, taken into consideration. " 45. The third principle of valuation is that the value of the subject matter is its value at the time of the loss. Its value at any other time, such as for instance, at the commencement of the risk or even its prime cost, is not the determining factor. See the 3rd Edition of Walford and Otter-Barry, p. 364. Therefore the learned trial Judge's reference to the absence of the original cost of construction appears to be over-emphasised. Prim facie, therefore, the basis of calculation is either the market value of the property destroyed or the cost of the reinstatement. Theoretically the market value or the cost of reinstatement may be the same but, in fact, there is frequently a good deal of difference. Besides the market value in the present instance where the whole locality including the railway station Dhulian Ganga has been washed away and is still under the water, no question of market value of such property can arise and at the time of the loss when the river was eroding the area, nobody would pay any value to buy such a house. Therefore, in such a case, the cost of present construction of similar house in the condition it was at the time of the loss or cost of such reinstatement is the only basis which can be applied in this case. 46. Keeping these principles in view it will be necessary to examine the position in fact and in evidence with regard to valuation. The proposal made barely two months before the actual loss stated the sums insured to be respectively Rs. 51000/- and Rs. 65,000/ -. As pointed out, the proposal contains descriptions of the buildings insured. As there has been a total loss, this valuation is at least some evidence of the proposer himself what the contemporaneous value of his property was. Not only so, this statement in the proposal is expressly said to be the 'basis' of the contract. Such a stipulation means that if there is any mis-description or mis-representation on this point, the insurance would be avoided, as also expressly provided here by condition I of the policy. Therefore, this is a piece of evidence and a relevant piece of evidence on the value of the property when there is a total loss of the property. Ordinarily the weight of the evidence regarding value appearing in the proposal may not be great because the statement is not subject to cross-examination but that consideration does not apply here as the assured himself came to the box to support this valuation and was cross-examined. The onus of proving the value is no doubt on the assured but as Walford Otter-Barry on their work on Fire Insurance state, "the onus of proving the over-valuation lies on the insurers. “The insurer in this case has not even suggested, far less proved, that there was any over-valuation in the proposal. I have no doubt, if it was a fact, that the insurers would have proved the over-valuation and thus avoided all policy liability. The policy also that was drawn up in this case itself stated that the value to be respectively Rs. 51,000/-and Rs. 65,000/ -. Nothing has been shown, except negative criticisms, which we shall presently discuss, by the insurance company to discredit this valuation. The policy also that was drawn up in this case itself stated that the value to be respectively Rs. 51,000/-and Rs. 65,000/ -. Nothing has been shown, except negative criticisms, which we shall presently discuss, by the insurance company to discredit this valuation. It must be emphasised in this connection that under express condition II of the policy of insurance it is expressly provided that the insured shall at all times at his own expense produce, procure and give to the Society all particulars, plans, specifications, books, vouchers, invoices, duplicates, documents, proofs and information with respect to the claim as may be reasonably required by or on behalf of the Society. The defendant Society in this case did not call for any further proof or particular to question the amount of loss. 47. So far as the oral evidence is concerned, the plaintiff has pledged his oath that the approximate value of each would be Rs. 65,000/- and Rs. 51,000/- (See plaintiff's q. 107. The buildings in this case were built 40 years ago and subsequently a second storey was added to each of the buildings. The land is approximately 7 ton 8 cottahs. The plaintiff has also given evidence about the value of the land and on the plan of the insured building and the structures (see plaintiff's evidence qq. 250-257. The only criticism made of this evidence is that the plaintiff did not produce his books of account or the municipal records of Dhulian. The books of account could] at best show at what cost 40 years age the building was constructed and indicated above, the value of the buildings at the time of the loss is the material question. Nor is it established that the municipal records are in existence to show the value of these properties (see plaintiff's answer to q. 265), Even drawing the adverse inference for the plaintiff's non-production of the books of account and the municipal records of Dhulian we are unable to come to the conclusion that the value of these properties respectively for Rs. 65,000/- and Rs. 51,000/- can thereby be dismissed, especially on such evidence on record among which there is a full plan annexed to the proposal with measurements. 48. But the more important aspect of this valuation is the admission in the evidence given on behalf of the defendants. 65,000/- and Rs. 51,000/- can thereby be dismissed, especially on such evidence on record among which there is a full plan annexed to the proposal with measurements. 48. But the more important aspect of this valuation is the admission in the evidence given on behalf of the defendants. The most significant evidence on this point is given by Prodyot Kumar Ghose of the defendant company. He was an assistant in the Fire Department of the defendant company. He was the person who was sent out to Dhulian for inspection of the properties. His definite answer to q. 74 is that "the object of inspection was to see the structure of the building, occupation of the building surrounding and any other point or points concerning out business". In answer to q. 70 this witness avoided giving the value of the property insured by saying 'no, I simply remarked that it appeared to me that the valuation they have mentioned was exorbitant'. This was the answer he gave after he had given evidence of his talk with the assured about the valuation of the properties. (Ghosh's qq. 67-69). Having said that he answered q. 86 by saying that a part of his enquiry related to the rate of premium applicable to this insurance. Then followed his answer that he himself ascertained the rate. Finally in answer to q. 88 and q. 89 he admits that in the case of the present plaintiff his rate was correct. A rate of premium depends on the value of the property and the nature of the risk and if the rate is fixed after such local inspection by the insurer himself then it is some evidence again not conclusive-that the value put by the assured was prima fade right. But the most significant point about Ghose's evidence is that he made a written report. That report has not been produced. It is not even stated in the affidavit of documents that it is lost. It was not until the trial began and the evidence for the defense was called that the report of Ghose was said to be missing The affidavit of documents in this case by the defendants was made in June 1951 without mentioning this report of Ghose at all. It is difficult to resist the obvious conclusion that this report is deliberately kept back. Ghose himself says in answer to qq. It is difficult to resist the obvious conclusion that this report is deliberately kept back. Ghose himself says in answer to qq. 34 to 36 that all these reports are normally to be found in their office but "today these reports are not found because we have destroyed our old records". Then again he says that the office keeps the records only for 4 or 5 years. But the report was made in 1950. The affidavit of documents was made in 1951. Therefore 4 years had not expired then. Therefore, it is natural to expect that the report was in existence at the time when the affidavit of documents was filed by the defendant in this suit and it was deliberately concealed at that time. If it was in existence in 1951 it becomes all the more strange that such an important document should be 'destroyed' during the dependency of this suit. The defendant's Manager, Ganguly, gives amazing evidence on this missing report. In answer to p. 187 he says that the report is missing and in answer to p. 188 when he was asked if things happened like that in his office, he with can dour answered 'yes'.-The defendant admits that the proposal contained description of the buildings and a sketch plan (qq. 242-45). He also admits (q. 238) that the company did not dispute that there has been a total loss of these properties which have been washed away by the river. He admits that he did not up to the date of the suit offer any challenge to the valuation (p. 250). His answer was that it was not necessary because under the policy the company was not bound by the valuation put by the plaintiff. The question now is not whether the company is bound by the plaintiff's valuation but the question is now what is the valuation on the facts as proved in this case. 49. On these facts it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the written report of P. K. Ghose of the defendant company has been deliberately withheld. He made that report after personal inspection of the properties on the spot. If there was any material over valuation, I have no doubt in my mind, that the report would have contained such remark. He made that report after personal inspection of the properties on the spot. If there was any material over valuation, I have no doubt in my mind, that the report would have contained such remark. But as the report did not contain any challenge to the valuation and probably agreed with the valuation of the plaintiff, that is why it is today not thought safe to produce the same. Then again, it is unthinkable that this report which concerns so many persons whose claims altogether are said to amount to several lakhs of rupees should be found missing in this manner. Ghose made one report covering all these different properties in that locality. A report which concerns so many persons and where so many interests were involved could not disappear in this manner even without leaving copies of the same in the office. One would expect a respectable Insurance company in this respect at least in its affidavit of documents to state that the report was made but has since been lost, but that is not done. In answer to q. 91 the author of this report, Ghose, definitely says that he did not say in his report that the plaintiff's insurance should be cancelled. If that be so, then the Insurance company's letter of cancellation dated 6th July 1950 stating "in accordance with the inspection report lodged with this company we cancel the risk from the 6th July 1950" is clearly a false statement. It is, therefore, again reasonable to infer and the law entitles this court to infer that if the inspection report had been produced then it would not have supported this statement in the notice of cancellation. We, therefore, draw the inference from the defendant's non-production of this report that, had it been produced it would have supported the valuation of the plaintiff. We have no hesitation in the facts and circumstances of this case to hold that the report is being deliberately withheld for the reasons indicated above and we do not believe and accept the defendant's evidence that the report is missing. 50. A reference at this stage may be made to the evidence of two other witnesses on behalf of the plaintiff on the question of valuation-one is Surendranath Bhattacharyya and the other is Bibhuti Bhusan Das. Surendra Nath Bhattacharyya is an Overseer-cum-Inspector of the Dhulian Municipality. 50. A reference at this stage may be made to the evidence of two other witnesses on behalf of the plaintiff on the question of valuation-one is Surendranath Bhattacharyya and the other is Bibhuti Bhusan Das. Surendra Nath Bhattacharyya is an Overseer-cum-Inspector of the Dhulian Municipality. His clear evidence is that the erosion started in the third week of June, 1950 (q. 16). In answer to q. 19 he says that he prepared the plan of the house at the time of assessment, that he has seen the house through and through anal that he assessed the value of the houses at that time. In answer to q. 20 he gives the value of these houses to be respectively 'round about Rs. 60,000/-to Rs. 65,000/- each'. It is true that at the time when he was assessing the building, he was not acting on behalf of the Municipality (q. 24), but he denied the charge that he never assessed the building (q. 25). The next witness is Bibhuti Bhusan Das, a pleader at Jangipur and whose home is in Dhulian itself. He was also a Municipal Commissioner from 1942 to 1952 and has lived all his life in Dhulian. His evidence therefore, is important on this point. His evidence is that formerly the house was one-storeyed building but thereafter a second storey was added to each. One of the houses had 9 rooms in the ground floor and 6 rooms in the first floor besides 2 varandahs in the ground floor and 3 verandahs upstairs (q. 7. The second storey was added according to his evidence 12 or 14 years after the first floor was built (q. 10. In answer to q. 12 his positive evidence is, one of the houses is a little bigger than the other and the valuation of one house is from Rs. 60,000/- to Rs. 65,000/- and the other house from Rs. 50,000/- to Rs. 55,000/ -. He had personally been inside the house himself (q. 13. In describing the nature of construction his answer to q. 14 is that it was a good house, with cemented floor and mosaic and there were some door panels of teak wood. He was also asked about the Municipal records but in answer to qq. 50,000/- to Rs. 55,000/ -. He had personally been inside the house himself (q. 13. In describing the nature of construction his answer to q. 14 is that it was a good house, with cemented floor and mosaic and there were some door panels of teak wood. He was also asked about the Municipal records but in answer to qq. 18 and 19 from the court, he says that he ceased to be a Commissioner from 1952 and if the records are there, they would show the valuation of these properties. I can not get away from the feeling that if the municipal records of Dhulian were available and if they could disprove the plaintiff's valuation, the defendant insurance company which had insured, 7, 8 or 10 buildings in this locality worth ten lakhs of rupees altogether would have left no stone unturned to produce the municipal records to contradict the plaintiff's valuation if his valuation was really inaccurate. This witness is not only a practicing pleader but he is a survey-knowing pleader (q. 28). 51. On the analysis, therefore, of all the evidence on record and taking the minimum valuation in Bibhuti's evidence, we are satisfied that the value of the loss in the present case is at least Rs. 50,000/- in respect of one house and Rs. 60,000/- in respect of the other. The total loss, therefore, is Rs. 1,10,000/ -. We therefore hold that Condition 10 of the policy does not apply to the plaintiff in this case. We also hold that the cancellation of the risk by letter dated 6th July 1950 was improper and not in accordance with the strict letter and language of Condition 10 and answer both the Issues Nos. 4 and 5 in the negative. We also hold that the properties were lost in the manner alleged in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the plaint and answer Issue No. 6 in the affirmative. Finally on Issues No. 7 and 8 we hold that the plaintiff suffered loss to the extent of Rs. 50,000/- and Rs. 60,000/- and the plaintiff is entitled to claim Rs. 1,10,000/- on this insurance. So far as Issues Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are concerned, we have already discussed and answered the effect of the letter of acceptance dated the 3rd June 1950 and of the proposal, cover note and the policy. 52. 50,000/- and Rs. 60,000/- and the plaintiff is entitled to claim Rs. 1,10,000/- on this insurance. So far as Issues Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are concerned, we have already discussed and answered the effect of the letter of acceptance dated the 3rd June 1950 and of the proposal, cover note and the policy. 52. In the result, the Appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the learned trial Judge are set aside. The plaintiff-appellant is entitled to the costs here and below. This Appeal is certified as a fit one for engagement of two Counsel. The judgment will carry interest at the rate of 3 per cent. per annum.