Judgment U.N.SINHA, J. 1. There is one petitioner in this case named Durga Singh. He has been convicted under Section 221 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. The charge against the petitioner was as follows :- "That you, on or about the 3rd day of November 1957 at Balha, being a public servant as dafadar, legally bound as such public servant to keep in custody Maula Bux, charged with the offence of theft, an offence punishable with imprisonment, intentionally suffered Moula Bux to escape from, your custody and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 221 of the Indian Penal Code." That the petitioner was a dafadar at the relevant time is not in dispute. The prosecution case was as follows. In the night between 2nd and 3rd of November, 1957, while Md. Isa (P. W. 1) was sleeping on the west facing verandah of his house, he woke up on hearing the sound of the falling of paddy. He saw three or four persons standing near a Kothi. He raised an alarm upon which those persons took to their heels. As it happened, Khublal (P. W. 2), the servant of Md. Isa, managed to catch hold of one Moula Bux with about half a maund of paddy contained in a bag. The other persons who had been standing near the Kothi, however, managed to run away. Then the Choukidar and the dafadar were sent for through Khublal. Khublal was unable to meet the Choukidar, but he called the dafadar, that is to say, the present petitioner. Moula Bux was handed over to the petitioner, who was informed about the incident, and the petitioner, was requested to go to the police station with Moula Bux. The petitioner had said that he would go to the police station in the morning. The petitioner thereafter took charge of the paddy with which Moula Bux was found running, away, and he also took charge of Moula Bux. The petitioner went away to his house. In the morning. Md. Isa and some others went to the petitioners house, but Moula Bux was not seen there. On enquiry, the petitioner said that he knew nothing about Moula Bux and he declined , to go to the Police station. As it happened, Moula Bux was the labourer of the petitioner. The petitioner went away to his house. In the morning. Md. Isa and some others went to the petitioners house, but Moula Bux was not seen there. On enquiry, the petitioner said that he knew nothing about Moula Bux and he declined , to go to the Police station. As it happened, Moula Bux was the labourer of the petitioner. On suspicion that the petitioner had let off Moula Bux, Md. Isa filed a complaint before the Sub-divisional Officer on the 4th of November, 1957. The defence put forward by the petitioner (who had been tried along with Moula Bux) was a denial of the entire version given by the prosecution. According to the petitioners case, no such event had taken place in the night between 2nd and 3rd November, 1957. It was alleged that this case instituted by Md. Isa was really in the nature of a counterblast of a case which had been filed by Moula Bux. Some incident had taken place on the 2nd of November, 1971 in connection with the daughter of Moula Bux. There had been some altercation between the ladies of the house of Moula Bux and the ladies of the house of Md. Isa, in which Moula Bux had gone to the house of Bare Mian, an uncle of Md. Isa, to protest and remonstrate about the conduct of the females of the house of Md. Isa, upon which Bare Mian had abused Moula Bux and had ordered his assault. Thereupon, Moula Bux had run away to his own house, but he had been chased there and Bare Mian and others had dragged him and had assaulted him with fists, slaps and kicks. Moula Bux had, therefore, gone to the police station and had lodged an information regarding this incident. Bare Mian and the other persons accused by Moula Bux had been put on trial, but the case was subsequently withdrawn by Moula Bux. According to the defence case, Moula Bux had been assured by Md. Isa that the present case instituted by Md. Isa on the 4th November, 1957, would also be withdrawn. Actually the case instituted by Moula Bux was withdrawn, but the present case was not withdrawn by Md. Isa. 2. The learned Magistrate, who tried the petitioner along with Moula Bux, accepted the prosecution case and convicted the petitioner for the offence charged. Isa on the 4th November, 1957, would also be withdrawn. Actually the case instituted by Moula Bux was withdrawn, but the present case was not withdrawn by Md. Isa. 2. The learned Magistrate, who tried the petitioner along with Moula Bux, accepted the prosecution case and convicted the petitioner for the offence charged. Moula Bux was convicted and sentenced under S. 225 (B) of the I. P. C. by the learned Magistrate. On appeal by the two convicted persons, the convictions recorded by the learned Magistrate have been affirmed. Only the petitioner has come up to this Court in this case. 3. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that upon an interpretation of Section 221 of the Indian Penal Code, read with the duties of a dafadar, governed by the Bihar and Orissa Village Administration Act, 1922 (Bihar and Orissa Act 3 of 1922), it should be held that no offence had been committed by the petitioner. It is urged that the duties of a dafadar, as a public servant, are governed by Sections 27 and 28 of Act 3 of 1922, and that on the facts of the present case, the petitioner cannot be said to have committed an offence under Section 221 of the Indian Penal Code, in the sense of intentionally suffiering Moula Bux to escape when he was legally bound to keep Moula Bux in confinement. In order to appreciate the contentions raised by learned Counsel for the petitioner, it will be necessary to refer to the evidence of some of the witnesses examined by the prosecution. I have already mentioned the substance of the evidence given by Md. Isa (P. W. 1), in stating what the prosecution case was. In fact, I have also referred to the substance of the evidence of Khublal (P. W. 2), who had been able to bring the petitioner who was then the dafadar, in the same context. The evidence of Abul Hassan (P. W. 3) is to the effect that after the petitioner had arrived on being called, Moula Bux was made over to the petitioner and the latter was requested to go to the police station. The petitioner promised to go in the morning and he took away Moula Bux to his own place. The evidence of the next witness, Sl. The petitioner promised to go in the morning and he took away Moula Bux to his own place. The evidence of the next witness, Sl. Zahir (P. W. 4), is to the effect that after the petitioner had been called, Moula Bux was given in the custody of the petitioner, along with the paddy. The petitioner promised to go to the police station in the following morning. The evidence of Isaque (P. W. 5) is more or less to the same effect. He has also deposed that the petitioner had taken charge of Moula Bux as well as the paddy seized by the prosecution party. The petitioner had taken away Moula Bux and the paddy to his own house. Now, the contentions raised by learned Counsel, upon this evidence adduced by the prosecution are as follows. It is argued that if the petitioner had arrested Moula Bux by virtue of any of the powers conferred upon him by Section 27 of Act 3 of 1922, then undoubtedly he had to act according to the provision of Section 28 of the said Act. But it is contended that the petitioner had not acted under any of the provisions of section 27 of Act 3, and that in taking custody of Moula Bux, along with the paddy, the petitioner had merely volunteered to go to the police station in the next morning, along with Moula Bux. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that as a matter of fact the petitioner, acting as a dafadar, had no right even to arrest Moula Bux, when the latter had been brought to him under arrest by the prosecution party. According to learned counsel, the prosecution party, specially Khublal (P. W. 2), had a right to arrest Moula Bux by virtue of Section 59 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and if after such arrest, the prosecution party had brought Moula Bux to the dafadar, who was not a police officer within the meaning of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the dafadar, that is to say, the petitioner, had no further right to arrest Moula Bux. It is argued that a police officer, under the circumstances, could have re-arrested Moula Bux under the provision of Section 59 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but the petitioner as a dafadar had neither the right to arrest Moula Bux, nor the right to re-arrest him under the provisions of Section 27 of Act 3 of 1922. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has in this connection relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Jograj Mahto v. Emperor, AIR 1940 Pat 696 and upon three decisions of the Calcutta High Court, reported in Kalai v. Kalu Chowkidar, ILR 27 Cal 366, Puma Chandra Kundu v. Emperor, ILR 41 Cal 17 : (AIR 1914 Cal 272) and Nurul Huq v. Obayedulla, 46 Cal WN 163. 4. Upon a careful consideration of the submissions made by learned Counsel for the petitioner and upon the evidence adduced by the prosecution and accepted by the Courts below, it appears to me that the charge against the petitioner, as a dafadar, has been proved in this case. "Even assuming that the prosecution party in general, and Khublal in particular, had lawfully arrested Moula Bux, by virtue of the power conferred on a private person under Section 59 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is difficult to hold, that, after Moula Bux had been handed over to the petitioner along with the paddy seized from him, and after the petitioner had taken charge of Moula Bux along with the paddy, taking Moula Bux to his own house upon a promise to take him to the police station in the morning, the petitioner had not arrested Moula Bux by virtue of any of the powers conferred upon him by Section 27 of Act 3 of 1922. Under Section 27 of that Act, every Choukidar shall arrest the following, namely, (a) all proclaimed offenders; (b) all persons whom he may find in the act of committing any offence specified in Schedule III; (c) any person against whom hue and cry has been raised of his being concerned in any offence specified in Schedule III whether such offence has been or is being committed within or outside his union; (d) any person in whose possession anything is found which may reasonably be suspected to be stolen property, or who may reasonably be suspected of having committed an offence with reference to such thing; and (e) any person who obstructs a police officer while in the execution of his duty, or who has escaped, or attempts to escape, from lawful custody. There is no controversy that a dafadar has the same right as the chowkidar. Under Section 27 (2) of the Act, a dafadar shall also exercise all the powers conferred on a Choukidar under sub-section (1) of this section. As a matter of fact under the definition given by Section 4 (4) of the Act, a dafadar merely means a head choukidar. It is clear, therefore, that under section 27 (1) (ii) (d), a dafadar is bound to arrest a person in whose possession anything is found which may reasonably be suspected to be stolen property, or who may reasonably be suspected of having committed an offence with reference to such thing. The prosecution case, as indicated above, is that the prosecution party had handed over Moula Bux along with the paddy said to have been stolen by him, to the petitioner and had told him all about the occurrence. Under these circumstances, the petitioner had taken custody of the person of Moula Bux as well as the suspected property, namely, the paddy. The Petitioner had thereafter taken away Moula Bux, along with the paddy seized, to his house. The conclusion must follow that the petitioner as the dafadar had actually arrested Moula Bux by virtue of the power conferred upon him, as mentioned above. The Petitioner had thereafter taken away Moula Bux, along with the paddy seized, to his house. The conclusion must follow that the petitioner as the dafadar had actually arrested Moula Bux by virtue of the power conferred upon him, as mentioned above. It may be, that not being a police officer within the meaning of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the petitioner was not governed, by Section 59 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in the sense that he should re-arrest Moula Bux, after the latter had been handed over to him, but I do not see how it can be said, on the facts alleged and established, that the petitioner, had not arrested Moula Bux. Under Section 46 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the person making an arrest shall actually touch or confine the body of the person to be arrested, unless there be a submission to the custody by word or action. In this case, after the prosecution party had put Moula Bux in charge of the petitioner, the petitioner had taken away. Bux and the suspected stolen property to his own house. It is clear that Moula Bux had submitted to the custody of the petitioner by action, and, therefore, the petitioner as the dafadar had arrested Moula Bux. So far as Act 3 of 1922 is concerned, there does not appear to be any prohibition in a dafadar arresting a person under the powers given to him by Section 27, if any other individual gives an information to him to the effect that a person has been found in possession of property which may reasonably be suspected to be stolen property. In my opinion, if a dafadar receives information, which may lead to an inference that a person has been found in possession of property which may reasonably be suspected to be stolen property, or upon which a person may reasonably be suspected of having committed an offence with reference to such thing, the dafadar in exercise of his own rights under Section 27 of Act 3 of 1922 can arrest the person concerned. Only because Section 27 of the Act does not mention any power of a Chowkidar to re-arrest, it is difficult to hold that he cannot arrest by virtue of his powers, even if circumstances exist under which he can take action under Section 27 (1) (ii) (d) of the Act. In my opinion, on the facts of this case, the petitioner, being a public servant, was legally bound as such public servant, to keep Moula Bux in confinement. After the petitioner had taken Moula Bux to his own house along with the seized paddy it was his clear duty to act under the provisions of Section 28 of Act 3 of 1922. Under that section whenever a dafadar or choukidar arrests any person under Section 27, he is bound to take the arrested person forthwith to the police station within the limits of which the union was situated. In this case, of course, the arrest having been made at night, it was open to the petitioner to take Moula Bux to the police Station as soon as it was convenient to do so in the following morning. But according to the facts found, the petitioner must have let off Moula Bux, after taking him to his own residence. 5. I have considered the duties of a dafadar under Section 27 of Act 3 of 1922, on the assumption that the arrest of Moula Bux by Khubla (P. W. 2) had been an arrest under the provision of Section 59 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It appears to me, however, upon a consideration of the evidence on record, that the arrest of Moula Bux by Khublal (P. W. 2) was really not covered by Section 59 (1) of the Code. The evidence of Md. Isa (P. W. 1) was that after he had raised an alarm, the culprits had taken to their heels and thereafter Khublal had caught Moula Bux. According to Khublal (P. W. 2) he was sleeping in the cattle-shed of his malik and he got up on hearing some hulla. He then saw three or four persons running away and he managed to catch hold of one of them, namely, Moula Bux. According to Khublal (P. W. 2) he was sleeping in the cattle-shed of his malik and he got up on hearing some hulla. He then saw three or four persons running away and he managed to catch hold of one of them, namely, Moula Bux. It is clear to my mind, that the apprehension of Moula Bux by Khublal did not fall within the powers of Khublal, as a private person, to arrest Moula Bux under Section 59 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under that provision of law, a private person may arrest any person who commits a non-bailable and cognizable offence "in his view". Now, according to the evidence of Khublal, the offence of Moula Bux, if any, had not been committed "in his view". The expression "in his view" has been interpreted by this Court in the case of Abdul Aziz v. Emperor, AIR 1933 Pat 508. It has been stated by Dhavle, J., thus; "Section 59, Criminal P. C., however, only entitles a private person to arrest any person who in his view commits a non-bailable and cognizable offence, and the words in his view mean in his presence or within sight of him and not in his opinion ". If this interpretation is accepted, then it is clear that Moula Bux had not committed any non-bailable and cognizable offence in view of Khublal. Rowland, J., in the same case stated thus : "It is popularly believed that a private person is entitled to arrest not only a criminal whom he ? in the act of doing the crime, but one whom ? sees in the act of flight immediately after. This is not the law; see ILR 27 Cal 366 and Bolai De v. Emperor, ILR 35 Cal 361. If it is felt that the law is not in conformity with public feeling and the public conscience the only remedy is by way of amendment". The decision of ILR 27 Cal 366 mentioned by Rowland, J., is one of the decisions relied upon by earned counsel for the petitioner. I will consider this decision in due course. If it is felt that the law is not in conformity with public feeling and the public conscience the only remedy is by way of amendment". The decision of ILR 27 Cal 366 mentioned by Rowland, J., is one of the decisions relied upon by earned counsel for the petitioner. I will consider this decision in due course. Upon the interpretation of the expression "in his view", reference has been made in the course of the argument to the decisions of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Sheo Balak Dusadh v. Emperor, AIR 1948 All 103, and in the case of Nazir v. Rex AIR 1951 All 3 (FB). In my opinion, upon the Division Bench decision of this Court reported in AIR 1933 Pat 508, the expression "in his view" must be interpreted in the light of the decision of this Court. 6 The four decisions relied upon by learned Counsel for the petitioner, mentioned above, in my opinion, do not assist him in his contentions. The decision of ILR 27 Cal 366 was a decision the year 1900. This case was governed by Act of 1893 of the Bengal Council. The duties of a dafadar in Act 1 of 1892 have been enumerated, in section 13 thereof. There does not appeal to be any corresponding provision in this Act, by which a choukidar or a dafadar can arrest under the circumstances mentioned in section 27 (l) (ii) (d) of Bihar and Orissa Act 3 of 1922. Under Act 1 of 1892, even if a choukidar comes across a person in whose possession anything is found which may reasonably be suspected to be stolen property, or who may reasonably be suspected of having committed an offence with reference to such thing, the choukidar does not appear to have any power to make an arrest. Under those circumstances, it was stated in the case of Kalai and others, that a choukidar purporting to act under section 13 (4) of Act 1 of 1892 would merely assist a private arrest and report the fact of such private arrest to the police station. It was stated that this Act did not contemplate that the Choukidar should exercise the duties set out in section 59 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was stated that this Act did not contemplate that the Choukidar should exercise the duties set out in section 59 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was, therefore, held that the petitioners in that case could not have been held guilty within the terms of section 225 of the Indian Penal Code. This decision is distinguishable for the reason that a Choukidar or a dafadar governed by Act 3 of 1922, has the power to assist private persons in making such arrests as they may lawfully make, under section 27 (1) (iv) and over and above that he can himself arrest if circumstances exist which can bring into operation the provision of section 27 (1) (ii) (d) of the Act. I have already held that in the instant case, the petitioner had arrested Moula Bux under the circumstances indicated by the prosecution, case, and, therefore, the decision reported in ILR 27 Cal 366, is of no assistance. The second decision relied upon by learned Counsel for the petitioner is the case of ILR 41 Cal 17 : (AIR 1914 Cal 272). This decision was given in 1913. Purna Chandra Kundus case had merely followed the case of Kalai v. Kalu reported in ILR 27 Cal 366. It was held in this case that the choukidar in question was not a police officer within the terms of Section 59 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was held that as the first petitioner had been arrested by a private person within the terms of Section 59 of the Act, and had been made over to a choukidar to be taken to the Police station, the case was governed, by the authority of Kalai v. Kalu, reported in ILR 27 Cal 366. In my opinion, this decision is also of no assistance to learned Counsel for the petitioner in connection with the duties of a choukidar or a dafadar governed by Bihar and Orissa Act 3 of 1922. The last case of the Calcutta High Court relied upon by learned Counsel for the petitioner is the case of Nurul Haq v. Obayedulla, reported in 46 Cal WN 163. In my opinion, this decision is also distinguishable on its own facts. The last case of the Calcutta High Court relied upon by learned Counsel for the petitioner is the case of Nurul Haq v. Obayedulla, reported in 46 Cal WN 163. In my opinion, this decision is also distinguishable on its own facts. It is not at all clear as to whether the persons arrested, and who had been handed over to the Choukidar and the dafadars with an instruction to take them to the Police Station, had been seen by the choukidar and the dafadars in the actual act of committing any offence. The prosecution case mentioned by the learned Judge really indicates to the contrary. The facts also do not make it clear whether the choukidar and the dafadars had been given any such information which could lead them to believe that the two thieves in question had been found in, possession of any property which might reasonably be suspected to be stolen property or that the thieves in question could have reasonably been suspected of having committed an offence with reference to such thing. The decision was really concerned with the question as to whether the petitioners as dafadars were "legally bound" to keep the escaping persons in confinement, within the meaning of Section 223 of the Indian Penal Code. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied, upon some of the observations made by the learned Judge at page 167 of the report, where it has been stated thus; "A Chaukidar or a dafadar is not a police officer within the meaning of this section 17 Cal WN 978 and ILR 27 Cal 366. Consequently even, assuming that the complainants party made over the persons arrested to the present petitioners and the present Petitioners undertook to take them to the police station and thus to oblige the complainants party, this would not render them legally bound as dafadars to keep such persons in confinement. They would not be functioning as dafadars at all while thus keeping the persons in confinement. On the other hand if any illegality attached to the arrest by the complainants party, any person including the present petitioners might have to bear the consequences if they thus took any part in the arrest or confinement. Section 59 (2), Cr. P. Code, did not authorise the dafadars to re-arrest. On the other hand if any illegality attached to the arrest by the complainants party, any person including the present petitioners might have to bear the consequences if they thus took any part in the arrest or confinement. Section 59 (2), Cr. P. Code, did not authorise the dafadars to re-arrest. Even assuming that it was open to the present petitioners to re-arrest the alleged thieves under Section 23 of the Village Self-Government Act, they were not bound to re-arrest and it is not the prosecution case that such re-arrest was made by them as a matter of fact." The observations with reference to Section 23 were made merely on assumption, as has been stated by the learned Judge himself. The case does not appear to have been decided upon an interpretation of any of the provisions of Sections 23 and 24 of Act V of 1919 which had governed the dafadar and the Choukidar in that case. On the contrary, the observation that it was not the prosecution case that "re-arrest was made by them", distinguishes Nurul Huqs case, 46 Cal WN 163 from the instant case. The decision of Nurul Huq, 46 Cal WN 163 therefore, is not of any assistance in interpreting Section 27 (1) (ii) (d) of the Bihar and Orissa Act 3 of 1922. The decision of this Court in the case of AIR 1940 Pat 696 is also of no assistance to learned Counsel for the petitioner. In this case, Meredith J., after quoting the whole of Section 27 (1) (ii) of Act 3 of 1922, specifically stated that none of the provisions of Section 27 (1) (ii) was applicable to the facts of that case. It was stated that the choukidar had not caught the person in question there, namely, Faujdar, in the act of committing any offence, nor was stolen property seen in his possession, nor had he obstructed the police or escaped from police custody. On this and other grounds it was held that the conviction of the petitioner was not maintainable. In the instant case, it is clear that property said to have been stolen was seen in the possession of Moula Bux. Moula Bux had been apprehended by Khublal in the circumtances mentioned above. Thereafter, the petitioner had been informed about the circumstances in which Moula Bux had been arrested. In the instant case, it is clear that property said to have been stolen was seen in the possession of Moula Bux. Moula Bux had been apprehended by Khublal in the circumtances mentioned above. Thereafter, the petitioner had been informed about the circumstances in which Moula Bux had been arrested. The property, which was reasonably suspected to be stolen property, was produced before the petitioner. The petitioner had in fact taken charge of Moula Bux as well as the property said to have been suspected to be stolen property. The petitioner had thereafter taken away Moula Bux to his own house. It is clear, to my mind that, as distinguished from the facts of Jograjs case, AIR 1940 Pat 696 the provisions of Section 27 (1) (ii) (d) were attracted in this case. Jograj Mahtos case, AIR 1940 Pat 696 cannot, therefore, be brought in aid of the contentions raised by learned Counsel for the petitioner. 7. In submitting his contention as to whether the petitioner can be said to have arrested Moula Bux, learned Counsel for the petitioner has drawn our attention to Section 21 of the Chotanagpur Rural Police Act, 1914 (Bihar and Orissa Act 1 of 1914). It is contended that there is a distinction between arrest and merely taking a person in custody. It is urged that under Section 27 of the Bihar and Orissa Act 3 of 1922, a choukidar has the power to arrest, whereas section 21 (1) (vi) of Act 1 of 1914 has authorised a village-police man appointed under this Act, to receive into custody persons who have been lawfully arrested. It is therefore, urged that there being a distinction between the expression "arrest" and "receive into custody" as contemplated by the legislature itself, what the petitioner had done in the instant case was that he had merely taken Moula Bux in his custody with a promise to take him to the police station later on. It is urged that the petitioners had merely volunteered to take Moula Bux, in ? custody, in order to assist the prosecution party and that if the petitioner had thereafter. allowed Moula Bux to escape, he had not contravened the provisions of Section 221 of the Penal Code, as he was not legally bound to keep Moula Bux in confinement, not having arrested him himself. custody, in order to assist the prosecution party and that if the petitioner had thereafter. allowed Moula Bux to escape, he had not contravened the provisions of Section 221 of the Penal Code, as he was not legally bound to keep Moula Bux in confinement, not having arrested him himself. In my opinion, the argument of learned Counsel for the petitioner in this context is without any force. It appears that under Section 21 of Act 1 of 1914, a village-Policeman appointed under that Act, has no such power as is contemplated by Section 27 (1) (ii) (d) of Act 3 of 1922. There is no provision in Section 21 of Act 1 of 1914 which can authorise a village-Policeman appointed, under that Act, to arrest any person in whose possession anything is found which may reasonable be suspected to be stolen property, or who may reasonably be suspected of haying committed an offence with reference to such thing. The powers of a village-policeman appointed under Act 1 of 1914 appear to be more limited under Section 21 of that Act. In my opinion, it is not possible to accept the contention of learned Counsel for the petitioner to the effect, that on the facts established in the instant case, the petitioner had merely volunteered to take in custody Moula Bux and the paddy and that having taken Moula Bux to his residence, he was not legally bound to keep him in confinement. 8. The finding of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, on appeal, to the effect that Moula Bux had been caught red-handed along with a bag of paddy, and as such, he was a person found in possession of a thing which could reasonably be suspected to have been stolen, amply justifies his conclusion that the petitioner was under an obligation to arrest Moula Bux and was under a duty to keep him under arrest when he had been caught by other persons. Added to it, the conclusion to which I have arrived, namely, that on the facts established in this case, the petitioner as a dafadar had arrested Moula Bux and had thus taken him, in custody, clearly support the conviction of the petitioner under Section 221 of the Indian Penal Code. 9. In the result, it must be held that the petitioner has been rightly convicted under Section 221 of the Indian Penal Code. 9. In the result, it must be held that the petitioner has been rightly convicted under Section 221 of the Indian Penal Code. So far as the sentence is concerned, the maximum sentence that can be imposed for a conviction under this section on the facts established, is one of two years imprisonment with or without fine. The sentence of six months rigorous imprisonment awarded is, therefore, not excessive. It must, therefore, be held that there is no merit in this application which is accordingly dismissed. G.N.PRASAD, J. 10 I agree.1963I