K. T. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner was employed by the first opponent as a fitter. He was in the service of the first opponent for about 10 years. On 22-8-58 he was charge-sheeted for in sub-ordination and negligence in the discharge of his duties. After holding the necessary inquiry on 30 an order was passed against him discharging him from service with 13 days wages in lieu of notice. He claimed that as he had put in 10 years service he was entitled to gratuity in accordance with a settlement which had been arrived at between the Union of the employees of the first opponent and the first opponent. Under the terms of that settlement by clause (4) it had been provided as follows:gratuity will not be paid to an employee who is dismissed for dishonesty or for misconduct. As no amount of gratuity was paid to the petitioner he made an application under sec. 33c of the Industrial Disputes Act to the Labour Court being Recovery Application No. 34 of 1959. The Presiding Officer of the Second Labour Court who heard the matter came to the conclusion that the petitioner must be taken to have been dismissed for misconduct for the purposes of clause (4) of the aforesaid settlement and that he was not entitled to get any gratuity. He dismissed the application of the petitioner. The petitioner has filed the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. He contends that there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record and that the case calls for the exercise of our powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. ( 2 ) WE have here to consider the effect of the order that has been passed by the manager of the first opponent on 30-8-1958. That order in terms states as under :the petitioner is discharged from service with 13 days wages in lieu of notice. ( 3 ) MR. Patwari the learned Advocate for the first opponent strenuously urged before us that where a person has been found guilty of misconduct and is thereafter discharged from service the effect of the order is that he is dismissed from service and that if he is dismissed from service he is not entitled to claim any gratuity. ( 3 ) MR. Patwari the learned Advocate for the first opponent strenuously urged before us that where a person has been found guilty of misconduct and is thereafter discharged from service the effect of the order is that he is dismissed from service and that if he is dismissed from service he is not entitled to claim any gratuity. He urges that gratuity is only payable to a person whose conduct is compatible with the faithful discharge of his duties. He says that in the present case the conduct of the petitioner was incompatible with the faithful discharge of his duties and that he is not entitled to claim any amount by way of gratuity. The question whether a person is entitled to gratuity or not is dependent upon the terms of the agreement between the workmen and the employer in a case where a settlement in that connection has been arrived at between the workmen on the one hand and the employer on the other. In this case we are concerned with the terms of the settlement and not with the general law which might have prevailed if no settlement had been arrived at in connection with the payment of gratuity between the workmen of the first opponent and the first opponent. The language used in the settlement is that gratuity would not be paid to an employee who is dismissed for dishonesty or for misconduct. In the present case the petitioner has been found guilty of misconduct. The only question that we have to consider is whether it could be said that he is dismissed for such misconduct. Mr. Patwari strenuously urged that the petitioner cannot but be regarded as having been dismissed for misconduct. He says that we must consider the language used having regard to the intention of the parties. According to his submission the intention of the manager who passed the order was not to pay any sum by way of gratuity to the petitioner. He has cited numerous authorities before us in connection with the construction which we are called upon to put upon the words used by the manager after finding the petitioner guilty of misconduct. He relied upon a recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in A. I. R. 1960 Supreme Court 919 Tale Chartered Bank Bombay v. The Chartered Bank Employees Union and Another. He relied upon a recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in A. I. R. 1960 Supreme Court 919 Tale Chartered Bank Bombay v. The Chartered Bank Employees Union and Another. He relies upon a passage at page 922 of that judgment. Justice Wanchoo has there observed that there was no doubt that an employee could not dispense with the services of a permanent employee by mere notice and claim that the industrial tribunal has no jurisdiction to inquire into the circumstances in which such termination of service simpliciter took place. He has further observed as follows: ( 4 ) IN Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd. v. Workers of Company 1952 Lab. AC 490 the Labour Appellate Tribunal had occasion to consider this matter relating to discharge by notice or in lieu thereof by payment of wages for a certain period without assigning any reason. It was of opinion that even in a case of this kind the requirement of bona fides is essential and if the termination of service is a colourable exercise of the power or as a result of victimisation or unfair labour practice the industrial tribunal would have the jurisdiction to intervene and set aside such termination. . . . . . . . In order to judge this the tribunal will have to go into all the circumstances which led to the termination simpliciter and an employer cannot say that it is not bound to disclose the circumstances before the tribunal. The form of the order of termination is not conclusive of the true nature of the order for it is possible that the form may be merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal for misconduct. ( 5 ) HE urged that even though the form of the order in this case is that of discharge in substance it is an order of dismissal. In the course of that judgment Justice Wanchoo has further stated that it was always open to the tribunal to go behind the form and look at the substance; and if it came to the conclusion for example that though in form the order amounted to termination simpliciter it in reality cloaked a dismissal for misconduct it would be open to it to set it aside as a colourable exercise of the power. ( 6 ) HE also relied upon a decision reported in A. I. R. 1960 Supreme Court 1264 Oil Co. Ltd. New Delhi v. Its Workmen. In that case also a question of the bona fides of the order was raised. In that case Justice Gajendragadkar observes as follows : ( 7 ) IF the contract gives the employer the power to terminate the services of his employee after a months notice or subject to some other condition it would be open to him to take recourse to the said term or condition and terminate the services of his employer; but when the validity of such termination is challenged in industrial adjudication it would be competent to the industrial tribunal to enquire whether the impugned discharge has been effected in the bona fide exercise of the powers conferred by the contract. If the discharge has been ordered by the employer in bona fide exercise of his power then the industrial tribunal may not interfere with it but the words used in the order of discharge and the form which it may have taken are not conclusive in the matter and the industrial tribunal would be entitled to go behind the words and the form and decide whether the discharge is a discharge simpliciter or not. If it appears that the purported exercise of the power to terminate the services of the employee was in fact the result of the misconduct alleged against him then the tribunal will be justified in dealing with the dispute on the basis that despite its appearance to the contrary the order of discharge is in effect an order of dismissal. ( 8 ) THESE two decisions deal with the interpretation of an order passed by an employer outwardly showing that there was simply a termination of the services of an employee. If in reality it was found that the order was the result of a finding that the employee was guilty of misconduct then the form of the order would not conclude the matter. The form of the order may be regarded as a camouflage to hide the real intention to punish the employee. If in reality it was found that the order was the result of a finding that the employee was guilty of misconduct then the form of the order would not conclude the matter. The form of the order may be regarded as a camouflage to hide the real intention to punish the employee. In that event if the employee is said to be punished then the pre-requisites which are necessary to be complied with before any punishment could be inflicted must be fulfilled and the industrial tribunal would have jurisdiction to inquire whether those pre-requisites have been satisfied or not and if those pre-requisites are found not to have been satisfied to consider the order to be bad. These authorities do not help us in deciding the question that is before us. The bona fides of the manager in passing the order of discharge are not in question. It is nobodys case that the order was in its present form by way of camouflage to hide something or to avoid certain consequences. ( 9 ) WE have in this case to interpret the order which has been passed. Having regard to the words used in the order we have to consider the order as a whole. If an employee is found guilty of misconduct it is open to the employer to dismiss him from service. If the employer is kind hearted he may elect not to dismiss him from service and may be content merely with discharging him from the employment. In the present case if the manager of the first opponent after he found the petitioner guilty of misconduct had desired to dismiss the employee for misconduct there was no necessity for him to pay any sum by way of wages in lieu of notice. The manager being entitled to and empowered to inflict the punishment of dismissal has not chosen to impose such punishment. He has passed an order of discharge with 13 days wages in lieu of notice. If the manager has acted in a generous manner-and there is no reason for us to believe otherwise-we cannot hold that an order of dismissal which is not passed should be deemed to have been passed in this case in spite of the express language used by him and in spite of the fact that he has directed payment of 13 days wages in lieu of notice. ( 10 ) MR. Patwari has relied upon several cases with a view to establish the proposition that whenever a person who has been found guilty of misconduct is discharged from service it must be deemed that he has been dismissed from service. He relied upon a decision reported in 1958 Supreme Court Reports page 828-Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India. The learned Judges of the Supreme Court had to consider the language used in Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. That Article provides as under :no such person (who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State) shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. ( 11 ) THE aforesaid Article is applicable in three different types of cases: (1) where such person is dismissed (2) where such person is removed and (3) where such person has been reduced in rank. A distinction has been made between dismissal from service and removal from service in this Article. Chief Justice Das in dealing with this Article observes as follows: a termination of the service of such a servant on such grounds must be a punishment and therefore a dismissal or removal within Article III for it operates as a forfeiture of his right and he is visited with the evil consequences of loss of pay and allowances. It puts an indelible stigma on the officer affecting his future career. ( 12 ) HE has further observed as under :the use of the expression terminate or discharge is not conclusive In spite of the use of such innocuous expressions the Court has to apply the two tests mentioned above namely (1) whether the servant had a right to the post or the rank or (2) whether he has been visited with evil consequences of the kind herein before referred to? If the case satisfies either of the two tests then it must be held that the servant has been punished and the termination of his service must be taken as a dismissal or removal from service or the reversion to his substantive rank must be regarded as a reduction in rank and if the requirements of the rules and Art. 311 which give protection to Government servant have not been complied with the termination of the service or the reduction in rank must be held to be wrongful and in violation of the constitutional right of the servant. ( 13 ) THIS decision merely lays down that where the termination or the discharge of the services of an employee is by way of punishment then it would attract the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. ( 14 ) MR. Patwari also relied upon a case reported in 1957 (2) Labour Law Journal 37 between the Municipal Corporation Greater Bombay and another and Labour Appellate Tribunal of India and another. It is a decision of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. In that case the meaning of the expression retrenchment was considered and it was held that the expression retrenchment meant discharge of surplus labour or staff and did not mean termination of the contract of employment for other causes. At page 39 Justice J. C. Shah (as he then was) has observed that punishment by discharge was recognised by standing order 21 cl. 1 sub-cl. (f) applicable in that case. He has further observed that it was clear from the provisions referred to therein that the Bombay Industrial Relations Act and the standing orders had made a distinction between dismissal or discharge from service which may be ordered by the employer for misconduct of the employee and the termination of the contract of employment which may be effected by the employer or the employee and that before an order in the nature of discharge or dismissal can be passed the employee must be given an opportunity of showing cause and submitting his explanation at a formal inquiry. He has further observed that mere termination of service is not dismissal or discharge from service and that termination can take place by notice in the manner prescribed by standing order 26 applicable in that case. If any thing this decision is against ( 15 ) MR. Patwari. He has further observed that mere termination of service is not dismissal or discharge from service and that termination can take place by notice in the manner prescribed by standing order 26 applicable in that case. If any thing this decision is against ( 15 ) MR. Patwari. A distinction is made between dismissal from service for misconduct and discharge from service for misconduct. No doubt the learned Judge has observed that the form of the order terminating the employment is not always decisive of the true nature of the order and that if an order in form terminating the employment is passed merely to camouflage an order dismissing or discharging from employment a Court may be entitled to come to the conclusion having regard to the circumstances in which the order was passed that the requisite formalities not having been followed the order was unlawful and could not be given effect to. As I have already indicated earlier no question of camouflage arises in this case when the order was passed by the manager of the first opponent. ( 16 ) MR. Patwari relied upon the case of Provincial Transport Services reported in 1958 (1) Labour Law Journal 758. In that case also it has been observed that the form of the order is not decisive of the matter and termination of services may be a cloak for dismissal. ( 17 ) A reference has also been made to a decision reported in A. I. R. 1953 Calcutta 188 Ramesh Chandra v. State of West Bengal. In that case the provisions of section 240 of the Government of India Act 1935 came up for consideration. By sub-section (3) of that section it has been provided that no person who is a member of a civil service of the Crown in India or holds any civil post under the Crown in India shall be dismissed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. Mr. Patwari strongly relied upon paragraphs 51 52 and 53 of the judgment of Mr. Justice Das. In that case instead of using the word dismissed the word used was `discharged. It was argued by the Senior Government Pleader in that case that sub-secs. (2) and (3) of sec. Mr. Patwari strongly relied upon paragraphs 51 52 and 53 of the judgment of Mr. Justice Das. In that case instead of using the word dismissed the word used was `discharged. It was argued by the Senior Government Pleader in that case that sub-secs. (2) and (3) of sec. 240 contain the words `dismissed or `reduced in rank and that the section did not apply as the plaintiff in that case was not dismissed but merely `discharged. Reference is then made to Murrays Oxford Dictionary and it is stated that the word `discharge in that dictionary is defined to include `dismissal from service and the word `dismissal is defined to include discharge from service. The learned Judge there observed that if the contention that `dismissal did not include `discharge be accepted the congruous result would be that a person who was merely reduced in rank would enjoy the immutable protection conferred by sec. 240 (3) but a person who was subjected to a more serious penalty by way of a `discharge would he deprived of the protection. He further pointed out that in I. M. Lalls case reported in 75 Indian Appeals Page 225 the purported `removal of the civil servant was held to be synonymous with `dismissal so as to attract sec. 240 (3 ). He held that the word `discharge had the same connotation as `removal. He also held that there was no ground to hold that the word `dismissal in sec. 240 did not include `discharge. The learned Judge in that case were considering the language of sec. 240. In the context of the words used in that enactment it was held that the expression `dismissal included `discharge from service for misconduct. Since the passing of the Government of India Act 1935 there have been various enactments dealing with questions affecting labour. These enactments draw a distinction between dismissal for misconduct and discharge for misconduct. Even in the provisions corresponding to sec. 240 Government of India Act 1935 in the Constitution of India Article 311 makes a distinction between dismissal from service and removal from service. ( 18 ) MR. Patwari drew our attention to the provisions of the Employees State Insurance Act 1948 He relied upon sec. 73 of that Act. Even in the provisions corresponding to sec. 240 Government of India Act 1935 in the Constitution of India Article 311 makes a distinction between dismissal from service and removal from service. ( 18 ) MR. Patwari drew our attention to the provisions of the Employees State Insurance Act 1948 He relied upon sec. 73 of that Act. That section provides as under :no employer shall dismiss discharge or reduce or otherwise punish an employee during the period the employee is in receipt of sickness benefit or maternity benefit nor shall he except as provided under the regulations dismiss discharge or reduce or otherwise punish an employee during the period he is in receipt of disablement benefit for temporary disablement or is under medical treatment for sickness or is absent from work as a result of illness duty certified in accordance with the regulations to arise out of the pregnancy or confinement rendering the employee unfit for work. ( 19 ) THIS section draws a distinction between the punishment of dismissal and the punishment of discharge. If an employee is punished by way of dismissal it cannot be equated with the punishment by way of discharge The fact that an employee after he is found guilty may be discharged from service as distinguished from being punished by way of dismissal from service is brought out in sec. 39 of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 Sub-section (1) of that section provides during the pendency of any conciliation proceeding before a conciliation officer or a Board or of any proceeding before a labour Court of Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an Industrial Dispute no employer shall for any misconduct connected with the dispute discharge or punish whether by dismissal or otherwise any workman concerned in such dispute. Sub-section (2) (b) of that section provides that during the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute the employer may in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute for any misconduct not connected with the dispute discharge or punish whether by dismissal or otherwise that workman subject to the proviso thereunder contained. This section clearly refers to an employee being discharged for misconduct It also refers to an employee being punished by dismissal for any misconduct. This section clearly refers to an employee being discharged for misconduct It also refers to an employee being punished by dismissal for any misconduct. The expression `dismissal and the expression `discharge in connection with punishment for misconduct have acquired in industrial law different connotations and the one cannot be equated with the other having regard to what has been stated in Murrays Oxford Dictionary. ( 20 ) MR. Patwari relied upon a decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in A. I. R. 1957 Allahabad 241 Chaman Lal Seth v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another. In that case the Court was construing the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. In that case the order in terms stated that the petitioner was discharged from service. The Court there observed that the use of the word `discharged in its opinion was not conclusive. It stated that it was the substance of the matter which mast be looked at and if in fact the petitioner had been removed from service as a punishment the use of the word `discharge would not absolve the Government from complying with the provisions of Article 311 (2 ). In the view of the Court the question was whether the termination of the petitioners service brought about by the order of discharge was tantamount to his removal from service and the answer to that question would depend upon whether the nature and incident of the action resulting in removal were to be found in the action of discharge. In that case having regard to the language used in Article 311 (2) it was held that the order of discharge was tantamount to an order of removal from service. This decision does not very much assist Mr. Patwari. In Article 311 (2) the words dismissed or removed from service appear. On a true construction of the order the Court held that the petitioner in that case had been removed from service for the purpose of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. . ( 21 ) MR. This decision does not very much assist Mr. Patwari. In Article 311 (2) the words dismissed or removed from service appear. On a true construction of the order the Court held that the petitioner in that case had been removed from service for the purpose of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. . ( 21 ) MR. Patwari next referred to the Supreme Court case of State of Bihar v. Gopal Kishore Prasad reported in 1960 (1) Labour Law Journal 577 in that case summarizing the position of a probationary public servant Chief Justice Sinha has observed that if the probationer was discharged on any one of those grounds referred to by him earlier without a proper inquiry and without his getting a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his discharge it would amount to a removal from service within the meaning of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. This case does not carry the matter any further. ( 22 ) STILL one more decision relied upon by Mr. Patwari was that reported in 58 Bom. L. R. 673 Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of India. In that case a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court was considering an order discharging the appellant in that case. Chief Justice Chagla. in the course of his judgment observed that it could not be disputed that if the Government had discharged the appellant without giving any reasons at all that order could not have been challenged by the appellant because the appellant being a temporary servant had no security of tenure and could not claim to continue in Government service for any length of time and the Government like any other employer would be entitled to dispense with his services at any time it thought proper. The question was whether true fact that the Government had given a reason for dispensing with the services of the appellant altered an order of discharge into an order of dismissal or removal. Chief Justice Chagla then proceeds to state that the Court must look at the substance of the matter and it should not be influenced by the language used in the order and the mere fact that Government chose to use the expression `discharge was not conclusive of the matter and notwithstanding the use of that expression it might still be an order of dismissal or removal. This decision merely reiterates the fact that an order which purports to be an order of discharge may not in reality be an order of discharge. ( 23 ) IN order to determine whether an order which purports to be an order of discharge is in reality an order other than that of discharge surrounding circumstances have to be considered. The mere fact that the order of discharge has been passed after the employee had been found guilty of misconduct does not by itself suffice for the purpose of holding that the order is not what its language says or implies but is something different from what the language used in the order implies. As we have indicated earlier an order of discharge may be passed after an employee has been held guilty of misconduct. The authority may take a lenient view of the matter the authority may take a charitable or generous view and instead of imposing the extreme punishment of dismissal may be content with passing an order of discharge. In this case there is nothing on the record to warrant the conclusion that the authority namely the manager of the first opponent wanted to inflict the extreme punishment of dismissal. On the contrary far from being desirous of inflicting such a punishment the manager has ordered the payment of 13 days wages in lieu of notice. In such circumstances it would be manifestly unjust to regard the order passed by the manager of the first opponent as an order imposing the extreme penalty of dismissal. We have to consider the order as a whole and having regard to the language used and having regard to the intention of the manager as evinced by the terms of that older we can not but hold that the order was an order of discharge and not of dismissal. ( 24 ) IT is next urged that under the terms of the agreement arrived at between the workmen of the first opponent and the first opponent in connection with the payment of gratuity the expression dismissed for dishonesty or misconduct appearing in clause (4) was intended to cover both dismissal for dishonesty or misconduct and discharge for dishonesty or misconduct. It urged that the expression dismissed for dishonesty or misconduct was intended to cover the termination of the employment of the workman on his being found guilty of dishonesty or of misconduct. In considering the meaning to be given to the words used in clause 4 of the agreement she have to consider the intention of the parties. There is nothing on the record to indicate that by using the expression dismissed for dishonesty or for misconduct it was intended by the parties to cover an order of discharge from service for dishonesty or misconduct. The agreement was arrived at between the Union of workmen of the employer on the one hand and the employer on the other. It was arrived at between the parties who were conversant with the distinction in industrial law between dismissal and discharge. There is nothing to indicate that the expression dismissed for dishonesty or misconduct covered any order of discharge for dishonesty or for misconduct. ( 25 ) IT is lastly urged that no relief should be given in this case inasmuch as even though there might be an error committed by the Second Labour Court in interpreting the language of the settlement the error is not one which is apparent on the face of the record and that we should not interfere with that order in the exercise of the power given to us under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reliance was placed in this connection on a decision reported in 62 Bombay Law Reporter page 146 Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Malikarjun Bhavanppa Tirmale. It is a decision of the Supreme Court. Justice Das Gupta who delivered the judgment of the Court observed in that case at page 152 as follows: ( 26 ) ARTICLE 227 corresponds to s. 107 of the Government of India Act 1915 The scope of that section has been discussed in many decisions of Indian High Courts. However wide it may be than the provisions of sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is well established that the High Court cannot in exercise of its power under that section assume appellate powers to correct every mistake of law. Here there is no question of assumption of excessive jurisdiction or refusal to exercise jurisdiction or any irregularity or illegality in the procedure or any breach of any rule of natural justice. Here there is no question of assumption of excessive jurisdiction or refusal to exercise jurisdiction or any irregularity or illegality in the procedure or any breach of any rule of natural justice. If anything it may merely be an erroneous decision which the error not being apparent on the face of the record cannot be corrected by the High Court in revision under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure or under Art 227 ( 27 ) IN the case before us we have to consider the order passed by the Second Labour Court. The Presiding Officer of that Court in the course of his judgment observes that it was clear that the manager having found the applicant guilty of misconduct intended to terminate his service. That no doubt is true. He then proceeds to state that the termination of service on the ground of misconduct was in his opinion nothing but dismissal for misconduct whatever the language in which the order was couched. He proceeds to state to use his own words as follows: ( 28 ) SURELY while terminating the service of the applicant the manager never intended to pay any gratuity to the applicant under this settlement. Instead of using the word `discharge the General Manager could very well have used the word dismissed but I think the Manager did not see any distinction between the word discharged and `dismissed. In my opinion the applicant must be taken to have been dismissed for misconduct for the purpose of clause (4) of the settlement Ex 23. ( 29 ) THERE is no evidence of any sort to indicate the intention of the authority passing the order. The Presiding Officer of the Second Labour Court was under an obligation to consider the order that has been passed as a whole. That order after stating in terms that the petitioner was discharged proceeded to order payment of 13 days wages in lieu of notice. The Presiding Officer has failed to consider the effect of this provision. He has imputed an intention to the manager of dismissing the petitioner when the manager did not himself use the word `dismissal. He has failed to take into account the language used by the manager and imputed to the manager an intention which the manager never expressed. The Presiding Officer has failed to consider the effect of this provision. He has imputed an intention to the manager of dismissing the petitioner when the manager did not himself use the word `dismissal. He has failed to take into account the language used by the manager and imputed to the manager an intention which the manager never expressed. It was open to the general manager to dismiss the employee by way of punishment without paying him any wages in lieu of notice. The manager did not choose to do so. There is nothing on the record which would justify the Presiding Officer of the Second Labour Court in thinking that the manager did not see any distinction between the word discharged and dismissed. There is a manifest error which is apparent on the face of the record. There is no reason why we when we find such error should not interfere in the exercise of our powers under Art. 227 of the Constitution. ( 30 ) MR. Daru the learned advocate for the petitioner has invited our attention to an unreported judgment of the Supreme Court delivered on 12/12/1960 in Civil Appeal No. 243 of 1959 Shri Ambica Mills Co. Ltd. v. Shri S. B. Bhatt and another. Mr. Justice Gajendragadkar who delivered the judgment of the Court in that case observes after referring to the well known observations of Danning L. J. in the case of Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal (1952) I All. E. R. Page 122 as follows:difficulty however arises when it is attempted to lay down tests for determining when an error of law can be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Sometimes it is said that it is only errors which are self-evident that is to say which are evident without any elaborate examination of the merits that can be corrected and not those which can be discovered only after an elaborate argument. Sometimes it is said that it is only errors which are self-evident that is to say which are evident without any elaborate examination of the merits that can be corrected and not those which can be discovered only after an elaborate argument. In a sense it would be correct to say that an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari must be self-evident that is what is meant by saying it is an error apparent on the face of the record and from that point of view the test that the error should be self-evident and should not need an elaborate examination of the record maybe satisfactory as a working test in a large majority of cases: but as observed by Venkatarama Ayyar J. in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Sayed Ahmad Ishaque and Ors. (1955) 1 S. C. R. 1104 at p. 1123 `there must be cases in which even this test might break down because judicial opinions also differ and an error that may be considered by one Judge as self-evident might not be so considered by another. Judicial experience however shows that though it cannot be easy to lay down an unfailing test of general application it is usually not difficult to decide whether the impugned error of law is apparent on the face of the record or not. ( 31 ) ON the facts of the present case in respect of the judgment given by the Presiding Officer of the Second Labour Court it is not difficult to decide whether the error of law in this case is apparent on the face of the record. In our view the error is of a manifest character and we are entitled to correct the same under Article 227 of the Constitution. ( 32 ) IN the result we set aside the order passed by the Second Labour Court on 14/03/1960 and direct the Presiding Officer of the Second Labour Court to determine the amount payable to the petitioner on the footing that be is entitled to be paid gratuity within the terms of the settlement arrived at between the Union of the employees of the first opponent and the first opponent. We order the first opponent to pay to the petitioner the costs of the Special Civil Application. Petition allowed. .