JUDGMENT : Narasimham, C.J. - This is a revision against the judgment of the Munsif of Jaipur in a proceeding u/s 476, Code of Criminal Procedure declining to file a complaint against the opposite parties for offences u/s 471, Section 193 and other allied sections of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The Petitioner filed a suit-To Section No. 257 of 1951 in the Court of the Munsif of Jaipur on the 27th September 1951 against opposite parties 1, 2 and 3, for declaration of title and recovery of possession of the suit property (which consisted of a house) and also for recovery of arrears of rent, alleging that the three members of the opposite party were merely his tenants. He claimed title to the property on the basis of a registered sale deed dated the 28th July 1950 executed in his favour by two widows, namely Dukhei Bewa and Janjali Bewa (who were pro forma Defendants 4 and 5 in that suit. Defendants 1 and 3 entered appearance on the 6th November 1951 and took several adjournments for filing written statements, At last they filed their written statements on 9th February 1952 alleging that there was a previous agreement by the two widows for selling a portion of their house in their favour, that an advance was paid and that they (the Defendants) were put in possession of that property. They further alleged that Defendant No. 5 Janjali Bewa executed Ext. F a deed of agreement, with the consent of the Dukhi Bewa in their favour on 16th May 1950. But the document evidencing this agreement was not filed before the learned Munsif until a very last stage. 3. On the 7th April 1953 opposite party No. 2 Urdhaba Mohapatra filed another Title Suit-To S. No. 64 of 1953-against the Petitioner, Dukhi Bewa and one Cheoti Bewa daughter of Janjali Bewa, claiming specific performance of the aforesaid contract in respect of the disputed house, in favour of one Urdhaba on the 15th May 150. 4. The two suits were heard together and disposed of by the learned Munsif by endowment dated the 15th March 1954. In that litigation the deed of agreement (Ext. F) said to have been executed by Janjali Bewa in favour of Urdhaba on the 16th May 1953 was produced, and it was held to be a forgery by the learned Munsif. The two suits were heard together and disposed of by the learned Munsif by endowment dated the 15th March 1954. In that litigation the deed of agreement (Ext. F) said to have been executed by Janjali Bewa in favour of Urdhaba on the 16th May 1953 was produced, and it was held to be a forgery by the learned Munsif. After delivering his judgment on the 15th March 1954, the learned Munsif, suo motu, on the same may started Miscellaneous Case No. 92 of 954 u/s 476, Code of Criminal Procedure against the three members of the opposite party, as also the scribe and the attesting witness to that document, for offences under Sections 471 and 193, Indian Penal Code and other allied offences. In the meantime, however his decision in the two title suits was taken up on appeal before the learned District Judge in T.A. No. 43 of 1954, and T.A. No. 44 of 1954 the appellate court stayed further proceedings in Miscellaneous Case No. 92 of 1954 till the disposal of the aforesaid appeals. Eventually the learn en appellate court confirmed the findings of the Munsif and held ext. F to be a forgery and dismissed the appeals on 18th June 1956. Against this decision two second appeals, S. As. 206 and 207 of 1956 were filed by Urdhab in this Court and they were both dismissed by a single Judge of this Court on the 10th December 1938. The learned Judge of this Court, in second appeal, did not enter into any detailed discussion as to whether Ext. F was a forgery but thought that as this was a concurrent finding of fact there was DO cause for interference. Intimation was then sent to the Munsif about the disposal of the two second appeals and the vacation of the order of stay and then the learned Munsif resumed the bearing of Miscellaneous Case No. 92 of 1954 on the 22nd December 1958. The opposite parties thereupon took several adjournments which led to further delay and then, on the 16th July 1960 the learned Munsif thought that this was not a fit case for prosecuting the members of the opposite party. 5. At the outset I should dispose of a preliminary objection raised by Mr. Kanungo, appearing on behalf of opposite parties 1, 2 and 3. 5. At the outset I should dispose of a preliminary objection raised by Mr. Kanungo, appearing on behalf of opposite parties 1, 2 and 3. He urged that u/s 476B, Code of Criminal Procedure the Petitioner had a right of appeal to the District Judge against the order of the Munsif, in the Miscellaneous case and as he did not avail of the same he was not entitled to file this revision petition. He relied on M. Namberumal Chetty Vs. M. Nainiappa Mudali, ; Emperor Vs. Ram Prasad. But these two cases are clearly distinguishable. Section 476B Code of Criminal Procedure consists of two parts. The first part refers to the right of a person on whose application the Court has refused to file a complaint u/s 476, Code of Criminal Procedure to file an appeal against that refusal. The second part however confers a right on the person (against whom a complaint has been made by the Court) to file an appeal against that order. Hence, where a court proceeds with an enquiry u/s 476B suo motu and eventually decides to file a complaint, the person aggrieved will have a right of appeal under the second part of that section and the fact that the Court too action suo motu is immaterial. In the aforesaid two decisions this was the factual position. But In the present case though the Court initiated the enquiry u/s 476, Code of Criminal Procedure suo motu On 15th March 1954, it eventually decided not to file a complaint. Hence neither the first part nor the second part of Section 476B, Code of Criminal Procedure has any application and there is no right of appeal. This view has been taken in Narotam Das Agarwal Vs. Bhagwan Das and Another, where the earlier decision of that Court in Emperor Vs. Ram Prasad, was distinguished. In Sita Ram Vs. Brij Behari, also the same view was taken. In my opinion therefore the Petitioner bad no right of appeal against the order of the Munsif u/s 476B, Code of Criminal Procedure. Over-ruling the objection of Mr. Kanungo therefore I bold that the present revision petition is maintainable. 6. Coming to the merits of the case it is unnecessary to sum up the entire evidence including the circumstances on the basis of which the learned Murali held Ext. Over-ruling the objection of Mr. Kanungo therefore I bold that the present revision petition is maintainable. 6. Coming to the merits of the case it is unnecessary to sum up the entire evidence including the circumstances on the basis of which the learned Murali held Ext. F to be a forged document and also disbelieved the evidence of the scribe and attesting witness They have been described in detail in the judgment of the learned Munsif. There is no doubt that there is a prima facie case not only against opposite parties 1, 2 and 3 for using a forged document as genuine, but also against opposite parties 4 and 5 for giving false evidence before the lower court. Opposite party No. 4 claimed to be the scribe of the forged document and gave evidence as d.w. 2. Opposite party No. 5 gave evidence as d.w. 3 and claimed to have attested the forged document. 7. The main grounds on which the learned lower court has declined to file a complaint for the prosecution of the members of the opposite party is the inordinate delay of nearly nine years since the date of commission of the offence (1951). Delay is undoubtedly a circumstance to be taken into consideration in considering the propriety of starting a criminal case. But, it should be remembered that so far as the offence of using a forged document as genuine and' other allied offences committed in relation to a proceeding in a civil court are concerned delay of several years is unavoidable. If the trial court is of the view that the impugned document is a forgery and decides to file a complaint and subsequently the entire proceeding is stayed until the disposal of the civil appeals pending before the District Judge, delay of several years is unavoidable. Then again the aggrieved party may not be satisfied with the appellate judgment of the District Judge and may go up to the High Court on second appeal and the disposal of the second appeal would also take some years. Thus, until the final disposal of the civil litigation which must necessarily take several years the criminal proceeding will have to be stayed. This is what happened in the present case. If the aggrieved party chooses to go up to the supreme Court there will be further unavoidable delay. Thus, until the final disposal of the civil litigation which must necessarily take several years the criminal proceeding will have to be stayed. This is what happened in the present case. If the aggrieved party chooses to go up to the supreme Court there will be further unavoidable delay. Hence, if mere delay is to be considered as a sufficient ground for not filing a complaint for the prosecution of persons who appear prima facie to have committed offences under Sections 471 and 193, Indian Penal Code etc. in relation to a civil proceeding, for all practical purposes such offenders will escape justice altogether. 8. In the present case the delay was partly unavoidable due to the protracted nature of the civil litigation and partly brought about by the conduct of the opposite parties themselves. The learned Munsif initiated' the proceeding u/s 476, Code of Criminal Procedure on the 15th March 1951 (Miscellaneous Case No. 92 of 1954) on the very day on which he delivered judgment in the two main title suits and held the document, to be a forgery. Further proceedings in respect of this criminal case were stayed by the District Judge before whom the Munsif's decision was taken up on appeal. Again, when the matter was taken up to this Court on second appeal, there was further stay. As soon as the Munsif received intimation about the disposal of the second appeals by this Court and the vacation of the stay order, he revived the aforesaid criminal proceeding on the 22nd December 1958. There was some further delay in getting the records from the superior courts. But some of the subsequent adjournments, especially those granted on the 28th April 1959, 23rd June 1959 and the 22nd August 1959, were due to the opposite parties themselves. They cannot be permitted to take advantage of their own delay. 9. It is true that if, on account of long lapse of time evidence may not be forthcoming to establish the aforesaid offences, a Court may be justified in declining to file a complaint. But in the present case it is not alleged that the necessary evidence that was available before the learned Munsif in the civil litigation is not available now. Chhoti Bewa (daughter of Janjali Bewa) was examined as p.w. 3 in that litigation. But in the present case it is not alleged that the necessary evidence that was available before the learned Munsif in the civil litigation is not available now. Chhoti Bewa (daughter of Janjali Bewa) was examined as p.w. 3 in that litigation. She claims to have been an eye-witness to the forcible taking of the thumb impression of her mother on some document. There were also some intrinsic circumstances in ext. F to show that the thumb impression of Janjali Bewa was taken prior to the scribing of that document. The opposite parties' conduct in not producing the document at the early stages of the civil litigation is also a circumstance to be considered. In addition there are some witnesses (see p.ws. 4 and 5 of Criminal Case No. 1031 of 51/46 T of 1952) who supported Dukhi Bewa's statement that her mother's thumb impression was forcibly taken on blank paper. In view of the seriousness of the allegations made against the members of the opposite party and in view of the wide prevalence of the offence of forgery and perjury in law courts, no Court should decline to take action when there is a prima facie case merely because of long delay. 10. Some reliance was placed by Mr. Kanungo on the judgment (Ext. 5) of a First Class Magistrate of Jaipur in a criminal case which Choti Bewa had brought against the Petitioner, one Narayan Mohapatra and some other persons for offences under Sections 379 and 384, Indian Penal Code. She alleged there that on the 29th November 1951 her thumb impression had been forcibly taken on a blank piece of paper by the accused persons. That case however ended in acquittal. But that judgment shows that the Magistrate did not disbelieve her story but merely observed that a civil litigation was then pending, and that this question would be fully thrashed out, there. Though in that judgment there are some observations about the existence of party faction in the village, they cannot be taken as sufficient to show that Chooti Bewa's evidence is unbelievable EO as to lead to an inference that there is no prima facie case against the opposite parties. Though in that judgment there are some observations about the existence of party faction in the village, they cannot be taken as sufficient to show that Chooti Bewa's evidence is unbelievable EO as to lead to an inference that there is no prima facie case against the opposite parties. Moreover that criminal case related to another document in which Choti Bewa's thumb impression was forcibly taken though that offence was alleged to have been committed at the same time as the taking of the thumb impression of Janjali Bewa on Ext. F. Hence in my opinion there are sufficient materials to be placed before the criminal' court for the prosecution of the members of the opposite party. 11. There is sufficient authority for the view that in cases of this type mere delay will not be an adequate ground for declining to take action. Thus in Kuldip Singh Vs. The State of Punjab and Another, though there was an interval of more than six years, the Supreme Court directed further enquiry with a view to prosecute the offende'r and refused to drop the proceeding merely on account of delay observing that the offence committed was a serious offence of a kind that is unfortunately becoming increasingly common and which is difficult to bring home to an offender. In Kuldip Singh v. Amar Singh A.I.R 1951 P&H 166 though a forged receipt was used as a genuine Receipt sometime in 1948, the learned Judge held that mere delay of nearly ten years was not a sufficient ground for dropping the proceeding. Mr. Kanungo however relied on some observations in Venkata Swamy v. Lakshmi Narayand AIR 1959 AP 201 (207) where a delay of 12 years was considered sufficient for not taking action though a serious, offence under Sections 467 and 471, Indian Penal Code were committed in relation to a proceeding in a civil court. But even in that decision some strong observations were made about the necessity for prosecuting persons committing forgery as they were obviously a danger to society and it was held that the District Judge rightly exercised his discretion in filing a complaint for the prosecution of the offenders. But even in that decision some strong observations were made about the necessity for prosecuting persons committing forgery as they were obviously a danger to society and it was held that the District Judge rightly exercised his discretion in filing a complaint for the prosecution of the offenders. The main reason which weighed with the learned Judges' in not proceeding with the matter was that after the appeal against the order of the District Judge was filed in the High Court that Court stayed the order for four years pending disposal of the appeal. Hence; though ultimately the learned Judges declined to prosecute the offenders nevertheless the observations therein are not very much in favour of the opposite parties. 12. I would therefore all'ow this revision petition, set aside the order of the Munsif of Jaipur dated the 16th July 1960 and direct that a complaint be filed before the appropriate court by the Registrar for the prosecution of the various members of the opposite party for the offences committed by them in relation to the proceedings before the learned Munsif in T.S. No. 257 of 1951. Final Result : Allowed