JUDGMENT N.U. Beg, J. - This second appeal arises out of a suit for partition. There were a large number of plaintiffs. All of them except Kuber compromised the suit. Kuber's case was that he was the co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned. One of the pleas raised on behalf of the defendant was that the claim of Kuber was barred by Section 41 of the Transfer of property Act. Kuber's claim was accepted by the lower court. Dissatisfied with this order the defendant filed this second appeal. 2. When the appeal came up for hearing it was urged on behalf of the appellant that in spite of the fact that a plea under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act was taken on behalf of the defendant and issues framed in that regard, the lower appellate court had not given any finding on this point. Gurtu, J. who heard the appeal at that stage framed an issue on the point and remitted it to the court below for a finding. The court below has returned a finding in favour of the defendant and has held that Kuber's claim was barred by Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. 3. On behalf of Kuber an objection was filed against this finding by his learned counsel. He has argued before me that the ingredients of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act have not been made out in the present case in so far as there is no evidence that the vendee made a bona fide enquiry about the title of the vendor. It is argued that the three conditions, are necessary for the applicability of Section 41, They are ; (1) that the transferor must be an obstensible owner of the property transferred with the consent of the person interested ; (2) that the transfer must be for consideration; and (3) that the transferee must have acted in good faith after having taken reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to transfer the same. It is not argued before me that conditions nos. 1 and 2 are not made out. The findings of the lower court on these points must therefore be taken to be correct. I have also examined the same and agree with the reasons given by the lower court in support of its findings. It is not argued before me that conditions nos. 1 and 2 are not made out. The findings of the lower court on these points must therefore be taken to be correct. I have also examined the same and agree with the reasons given by the lower court in support of its findings. The sole argument before me is that condition no. 3 has not been fulfilled. In the present case D. W. 1 Sant Bux, who was originally defendant no. 3 in the case, stated that Bachchu had given his share to Mewa and Suraj Bali, who were his nephews, and Mewa and Suraj Bali had taken actual possession. The evidence of D. W. 1 Sant Bux was corroborated by D. W. 3 Bhagwan Prasad. In the copy of the khatauni for 1291 F. the name of Bachchu is recorded. It is therefore proved that Bachchu has transferred his share to the vendors of the defendant, that the name of Bachchu was recorded in the revenue paper and that the vendors had remained in possession of the property sold throughout. Under the circumstances of the case I am of opinion that no further enquiry was needed on the above facts the vendees would be protected by the provisions of Section 41 of the Transfer property Act. I therefore, agree with the finding of the lower court that the transferee had taken reasonable care to satisfy heir of that his transferor had power to make the transfer. 4. I, accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the court below and dismiss the plaintiff's suit with costs. 5. Leave to appeal to Bench is refused.