JUDGMENT Srivastava, J. - This is a Defendant's second appeal that arises out of a suit for ejectment and for recovery of damages for use and occupation. The second appeal came up first before Hon'ble Mr. S.N. Sahai. He thought that one of the questions raised in it was of substantial importance and as there was no authoritative pronouncement of this Court on that question he referred the cast to a Bench. That is how the case has come before us. 2. The Appellant was a tenant of the respondent in respect of the disputed shop on a monthly rent of Rs. 40. The rent, for the months of April and May l953 fell in arrears and on the 1st of June, 1953 the Plaintiff sent a notice to the Defendant demanding the sum of Rs. 80. The notice was served next day. The statutory period of one month, during which the demand had to be complied with, expired on the 2nd of July 1953 but the rent was not paid. The Plaintiff thereupon served a notice terminating the Defendant's tenancy. This notice was sent on the 3rd of July 1953 requiring the Defendant to vacate the shop by the end of that month. The notice was served on the Defendant on the 4th of July 1953. This notice too was not complied with. The Plaintiff then filed a suit on the 11th of August, 1953 for the ejectment of the Defendant and for the recovery of Rs. 14-3-0 as damages for use and occupation for the period 1st of August, 1953 to 11th of August, 1953. Before this suit was filed the Defendant had sent by money order a sum of Rs. 160 due from him on account of rent for four months, April, May, June and July 1953. The suit was contested by the Defendant on various grounds. The Defendant pleaded inter alia that he had sent a money order for Rs. 120 to the Plaintiff in July, 1953, but the same had been refused. He also pleaded that he had not committed any wilful default in payment of rent and that as rent had been accepted after the service of the notice of ejectment that notice had really been waived. 3. The trial court decreed the suit for ejectment, but dismissed the claim for damages for use and occupation. He also pleaded that he had not committed any wilful default in payment of rent and that as rent had been accepted after the service of the notice of ejectment that notice had really been waived. 3. The trial court decreed the suit for ejectment, but dismissed the claim for damages for use and occupation. The Defendant filed an appeal against that decision and the Plaintiff filed a cross objection. In the appellate court besides the plea that the notice of ejectment had been waived it was urged that the suit for ejectment was not maintainable in view of the coming into force of the Rent Control and Eviction (Amendment) Act (No. X VII of 1954). Both these contentions were however, over ruled. The cross objection too was not found to be of any force. Both the appeal and the cross objection were, therefore, dismissed with costs. 4. The Defendant has now come up in second appeal and only two grounds have been pressed on his behalf before us. It is contended in the first place that rent having been accepted after the notice of ejectment had been served the notice must be deemed to have been waived. The suit for ejectment could not, therefore, be decreed. The second contention is that in any case Act XVII of 1954 having come into force and the original Cl. (a) of sub S. (1) of S. 3 of the UP Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act having been substituted during the pendency of the suit by a new clause The new clause should have been complied with. That clause required that at least three months rent should be due before a notice of demand could be served. No notice demanding three months' rent in arrears had ever been served by the Plaintiff. The only notice served related only to two months' rent. The entire rent due had been paid before the suit was filed. The suit for ejectment could not therefore be maintained without the permission of the District Magistrate. 5. The simple answer to the first contention is that the sum of Rs. 160, which had been sent in August, 1953 by money order and accepted by the Plaintiff, represented the rent due for the months of April, May, June and July 1953. The tenancy of the Defendant had been terminated with effect from the 31st of July, 1953. 5. The simple answer to the first contention is that the sum of Rs. 160, which had been sent in August, 1953 by money order and accepted by the Plaintiff, represented the rent due for the months of April, May, June and July 1953. The tenancy of the Defendant had been terminated with effect from the 31st of July, 1953. The rent accepted was, therefore, in respect of the period prior to the termination of the tenancy. By such acceptance no intention of the Plaintiff to continue the tenancy could be inferred. What is necessary in order to constitute waiver of a notice of ejectment is that rent must be realised in respect of a period subsequent to the termination of the tenancy. In other words there must be such conduct from which it could be inferred necessarily that the landlord had the intention of continuing the tenancy, or treating it as subsisting. [vide S. 113 of the Transfer of Property Act, particularly illustration (a)]. In the present case no such intention can be inferred. The Defendant was a tenant upto the 31st of July and was liable to pay rent upto that date even if he complied with the notice of ejectment and vacated the premises. If he tendered the rent for that period there was no reason why the Plaintiff should not have accepted the amount. There could not, therefore, be any waiver of the notice of ejectment in the present suit. 6. The second contention also appears to be unacceptable. S. 3(1)(a) of the UP Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act, as it was originally enacted provided:- 3 (1) Subject to any order passed under Sub-section (3) no suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation, except on one or more of the following grounds: (a) that the tenant has wilfully failed to make payment to the landlord of any arrears of rent within one month of the service upon him of a notice of demand from the landlord;...." 7. The Plaintiff had complied with this requirement because before the suit was filed on 11th of August 1953 a notice demanding arrears of rent had been served and the rent demanded had not been paid in spite of the service of the notice. The Plaintiff had complied with this requirement because before the suit was filed on 11th of August 1953 a notice demanding arrears of rent had been served and the rent demanded had not been paid in spite of the service of the notice. The court below has found that the default in the payment was wilful. 8. During the pendency of the case Act XVII of 1954 was passed which came into force on the 30th of September, 1954. This was an amending Act and by it the original Cl. (a) of Sub-section (1) of S. 3 was substituted by a new clause which reads as follows:- (a) that the tenant is in arrears of rent for more than three months and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month of the service upon him of a notice of demand." The change introduced by the new provision related to two things. Under the old clause wilful default in payment was necessary. It was no longer necessary under the new clause. The other distinction between the two clauses was that under the old clause no period was provided for which the rent was to be in arrears before it was demanded. Under the new clause the tenant was to be in arrears for more than three months before the notice of demand could be served. 9. The Defendant contended that because of Sections 14 and 15 of the UP Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act the new clause having come into force during the pendency of the suit became applicable to it and as its requirements were not fulfilled the suit for ejectment could not be maintained. 10. Ss. 14 and 15 of the UP Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act, on which reliance has been placed in this connection, are as follows:- 14. Execution of pending decrees for execution-No decree for the eviction of a tenant from any accommodation passed before the date of commencement of this Act shall in so far as it relates to the eviction of such tenant, be executed against him as long as this Act remains in force, except on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 3: Provided that the tenant agrees to pay to the landlord "reasonable annual rent' or the rent payable by him before the passing of the decree, which ever is higher. 15. 15. Pending suits for eviction-In all suits for eviction of a tenant from any accommodation pending on the date of the commencement of this Act, no decree for eviction shall be passed except on one or more of grounds mentioned in S. 3. 11. The argument of the Learned Counsel for the Appellant is that by enacting Sections 14 and 15 of the Act the Legislature clearly intended that the provisions of the Act should be applicable to pending cases and the provisions which were to be applicable were the provisions as they stood amended from time to time. If, therefore, Cl. (a) of sub S. (1) of S. 3 was amended during the pendency of the present suit before a decree for ejectment could be passed it was for the Plaintiff to satisfy the court that the requirements of the amended provisions were fulfilled, that is, the Defendant had been in arrears for more than three months and though a notice of demand had been served upon him, he had not paid the arrears within a month of the service of the notice. It was not in dispute in the present case that no such notice had been served. The essentials of the new clause were therefore not complied with in the present case. 12. There is nothing in the amending Act XVII of 1954 to show that the amendment was intended to have retrospective effect. In fact in First Appeal No. 229 of 1947 connected with First Appeal No. 264 of 1955, decided by a Bench of this Court on the 23rd of November, 1954, it has been held that the amending Act was not retrospective in effect. Nor can the provisions of Sections 14 and 15 of the Act make the amending Act retrospective. Even a cursory perusal of those sections will show that the only purpose of S. 15 was to make the provisions of the Act applicable to suits pending on the date on which the original Act came into force. The words 'pending of the date of the commencement of this Act' make this position quite clear. Even a cursory perusal of those sections will show that the only purpose of S. 15 was to make the provisions of the Act applicable to suits pending on the date on which the original Act came into force. The words 'pending of the date of the commencement of this Act' make this position quite clear. We may in this connection emphasise the word 'this' used before the word 'Act.' It is noteworthy that the word used was 'this' and not 'the' clearly indicating that only the Act as it was originally passed was intended to apply to the case pending at the time of its commencement. The other S. 14 was intended to make the provisions of the Act applicable to decree passed before the date of the commencement of the original Act (UP Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act). The word 'this' is to be found in S. 14 also used before the word 'Act'. It cannot, therefore, be maintained with the help of these Sections 14 and 15 that the amending Act XVII of 1954 was also given retrospective effect and became applicable to cases pending on the date on which the amending Act commenced. If this amending Act was intended to be given retrospective effect, as is contended for by the Appellant, language would have been used to make the intention clear. Serious consequences, which could never have been contemplated by the Legislature, will ensue if the new clause is held applicable to pending suits. Most of such suits would necessarily fail as the landlords cannot be expected to have complied before filing the suit with requirements of a clause which did not even exist when they terminated the tenancy of the tenants and filed the suit after fully complying with the law as it then stood. The amended clause substituted by Act XVII of 1954 could, therefore, have only prospective effect and could not affect suits filed before the amending Act came into force. 13. Reliance was also placed by the Learned Counsel for the Appellant on the case of Raja Ram v. Madho Prasad 1954 AWR (HC) 257. That case, however, appears to be clearly distinguishable. The UP Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, as it was originally passed, did not apply to newly constructed buildings or parts of buildings which were incomplete on the 1st day of July 1946. That case, however, appears to be clearly distinguishable. The UP Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, as it was originally passed, did not apply to newly constructed buildings or parts of buildings which were incomplete on the 1st day of July 1946. Raja Ram had, therefore, filed his suit against Madho Prasad, his tenant for the ejectment of the latter from an accommodation to which the clause was not applicable, after terminating his tenancy u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act on the understanding that his case was not governed by the UP Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act. The case was decreed by the trial court and was pending in appeal when Act III of 1947 was amended and by the deletion of certain words in the definition of 'accommodation', given in S. 2(a)(iii) of the Act, the Act was made applicable to newly constructed buildings and to those buildings also which were incomplete on the 1st day of July 1946. The result of the amendment was that with effect from the date of the amendment the operation of the original Act was extended to certain new and incomplete buildings which were not covered by the Act as it was originally passed. For the purposes of those new buildings and the buildings which were incomplete on the 1st day of July 1946 Act III of 1947 came into force on the date on which the amending Act was passed. The result was that with the help of S. 15 the Act was held to be applicable to Raja Ram's case also which was pending when the amending Act was passed. In that case, therefore, the requirements of S. 15 were fulfilled. This is not so in the present case. The Appellant cannot, therefore, get any help from the case of Rajo Ram v. Madho Prasad 1954 AWR (HC) 257. 14. We, therefore, find no force in the contention of the Appellant that in was necessary for the Plaintiff to comply with the amended Cl. (a) of Sub-section (1) of S. 3 of the UP Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act also. The Plaintiff's suit could not fail on account of the non compliance with that provision. 15. Both the points urged in appeal being thus without any substance the second appeal must fail and is accordingly dismissed with costs.