JUDGMENT T.C. Raghavan, J. 1. The second appeal is by the 1st defendant in O. S. No. 1055 of 1120 on the file of the District Munsiff's Court, Vaikom against the decree granting a declaration against him that the assignment of the suit property in his favour by P. W. 4 was for and on behalf of the father of the plaintiffs and also declaring that the 2nd plaintiff was entitled to recover possession of the plaint property with past and future mesne profits, which decree was confirmed in appeal by the learned Subordinate Judge of Vaikom. 2. To better appreciate the questions raised in the second appeal a few relevant contentions of the parties may be recited. The plaint made the following allegations: The plaint property originally belonged to the tarwad of the father of the plaintiffs, namely, Parameswara Kaimal. One Govinda Kaimal, who was the karnavan of the tarwad, was deposed from karanavasthanam and was being maintained by Parameswara Kaimal and on this ground the tarwad owed him monies. For these amounts a bond was executed by the tarwad karnavan, Velayudha Kaimal, in favour of one Kurian Chacko in 1092 benami for Parameswara Kaimal. Subsequently, a suit was filed by Kurian Chacko to recover the amount and a decree obtained. In execution of the decree the plaint property was attached, sold and purchased by Kurian Chacko benami for Parameswara Kaimal, Parameswara Kaimal meeting all the expenses of the litigation. A little later, since Chacko was in involved circumstances, at his request, the right covered by the court sale was transferred in the name of the 1st defendant benami for Parameswara Kaimal. The 1st defendant is the son-in-law of the 2nd defendant, whose husband was one Thaiparambil Gopala Pillai, a first cousin of Parameswara Kaimal. Parameswara Kaimal had the assignment effected in the name of the 1st defendant in consultation with and on the advice of the said Gopala Pillai, with whom Parameswara Kaimal was on very intimate terms. The transfer by Chacko was in 1106 and thereafter, Parameswara Kaimal continued to meet the further expenses for executing the decree and finally on 14th Kanni, 1110 got delivery of the property. After some time he leased the property to P. W.1, who was in possession thereof for two years. Thereafter, the 2nd defendant's husband, Thaiparambil Gopala Pillai, took the property on lease. After some time he leased the property to P. W.1, who was in possession thereof for two years. Thereafter, the 2nd defendant's husband, Thaiparambil Gopala Pillai, took the property on lease. The 2nd defendant subscribed for a chit and prized the same. The prize amount was received by Parameswara Kaimal, who agreed to pay the future instalments of the chit. Parameswara Kaimal consequently directed Gopala Pillai to pay the tax of the property and also to pay the instalments of the chit from the income of the properly. In 1117 Gopala Pillai died and Parameswara Kaimal fell ill. Defendants 1 and 2 took possession of the property and a little later in 1118 the 2nd defendant filed a suit against Parameswara Kaimal for the balance of chit subscriptions. That suit was compromised, Parameswara Kaimal having paid the chit amount and the 1st defendant agreeing to surrender the property to Parameswara Kaimal. In 1119 Parameswara Kaimal executed a deed of settlement in favour of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs filed the suit, out of which the second appeal arises, for recovery of possession of the property, as the 1st defendant failed to surrender the property and claimed title to it himself. 3. Defendants 1 and 2 contested the suit. Their contentions, inter alia, were that the suit was not maintainable, because of Sec. 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure; that the purchase in the name of Kurian Chacko was not benami for Parameswara Kaimal; that the transfer by Chacko in the name of the 1st defendant was also not benami but was fully supported by consideration, the consideration having been paid in cash by the 1st defendant; that Parameswara Kaimal was never in possession of the property nor was P. W. 1 or Gopala Pillai and that the 1st defendant dealt with the plaint property after the purchase in his own right, for example, he mortgaged the property in 1112 to the Travancore Sirkar for securing an agricultural loan. 4. 4. Both the lower courts found concurrently that the property was purchased by Parameswara Kaimal benami in the name of Kurian Chacko; that the transfer of the same by Chacko in the name of the 1st defendant was for and on behalf of Parameswara Kaimal at his instance; that Parameswara Kaimal spent the entire expenses for executing the decree and securing possession of the property; that Parameswara Kaimal got possession of the property and thereafter, leased the same at first to P. W. 1 and subsequently to Thaiparambil Gopala Pillai and that Section 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure had no application to the case. Consistently with the aforesaid findings the lower courts granted the decree under second appeal against the 1st defendant. 5. In the second appeal considerable arguments have been advanced before me both on the question of benami as well as on the question regarding the applicability of Section 66. On the first question regarding the benami nature of the court purchase in favour of Kurian Chacko as well as the transfer by Chacko in favour of the 1st defendant, there is overwhelming evidence in the case to justify the conclusion of the lower courts. Similarly regarding the possession of the property by Parameswara Kaimal and his leasing out the same to P. W. 1 and thereafter to Gopala Pillai, there is equally strong evidence in support thereof. On these questions, which are questions of fact, I do not think I will be justified in entering into any lengthy discussion, in view of the concurrent findings by the lower courts against the defendants. To mention only a few outstanding pieces of evidence, Kurian Chacko as P. W. 4 deposes that Parameswara Kaimal met all the expenses of the litigation and the court purchase in his name was benami. He also deposes that the transfer in favour of the 1st defendant was at the instance of Parameswara Kaimal and he did not receive any consideration whatsoever from the 1st defendant. P. W. 1 also gives evidence that Parameswara Kaimal was in possession of the property after the court purchase and from him he took the property on lease and was in possession thereof for two years. There are also other items of evidence to prove these questions in favour of the plaintiffs. P. W. 1 also gives evidence that Parameswara Kaimal was in possession of the property after the court purchase and from him he took the property on lease and was in possession thereof for two years. There are also other items of evidence to prove these questions in favour of the plaintiffs. Therefore, I accept these findings and would on their basis examine the legal question regarding the applicability of Section 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 6. Section 66(1) enacts that no suit shall be maintained against any person claiming title under a purchase certified by the Court in such manner as may be prescribed on the ground that the purchase was made on behalf of the plaintiff or on behalf of some one through whom the plaintiff claims. Two questions arise in considering the applicability of this provision. The first is whether a suit is maintainable against a transferee from a person claiming title under a purchase certified by the Court and the second question is whether in the present case Section 66(1) is a bar to the suit. On the first question I am inclined to hold that Section 66(1) applies to suits not only against the certified purchasers but it applies to suits against transferees from such certified purchasers as well. This conclusion of mine finds support in Moulavi Ali Ahmed v Sm. Shamsunnessa (AIR 1938 Cal. 602), wherein S. K. Ghose J. observes at page 604 that the objection under Section 66 applies to a suit against the assignee of the benamidar. In support of this the learned Judge refers to an earlier decision of the same High Court. I am convinced that, in principle, Section 66 should apply to a suit against the assignee of the benamidar equally as it applies to a suit against the benamidar himself, if that plea is open to the benamidar. If so, the plea of bar of suit under Section 66 can be raised by the 1st defendant in the present suit, though he is only a transferee from the original benamidar certified auction purchaser, Kurian Chacko. 7. The question is whether Section 66(1) applies to the present case, though the plea is available to the 1st defendant as assignee from the benamidar. 7. The question is whether Section 66(1) applies to the present case, though the plea is available to the 1st defendant as assignee from the benamidar. In this context I would refer only to two decisions of the Madras High Court, though other decisions of other High Courts have also been brought to my notice. The first case I would refer to is Muniappa Mudali v Thangavelu Mudali ( AIR 1937 Mad. 362 ), wherein Venkataramana Rao J. observes that Section 66(1) has to be strictly applied, its object being to prohibit, on grounds of public policy, a suit against the certified purchaser on the ground specified in the section. The learned Judge observes further that if the cause of action is not based on the benami purchase, but on a contract, or title acquired subsequent thereto, Section 66 is not a bar. This finds support in Ramathai Vadivelu Mudaliar v. Peria Manicka Mudaliar ( AIR 1920 PC 30 ), wherein Viscount Cave observes that a purchaser undertaking, prior to sale, to convey the purchased property to another at the purchase price, in consideration of the other supplying the necessary funds to the purchaser and binding himself by an agreement subsequent to sale, to carry out the original undertaking, is not protected by Section 66 from being sued by that other for conveying the property to him. The other case which I would refer to is Vadrevu Suryanarayana v. Kocherlakota Venkata Subbarao ( AIR 1951 Mad. 943 ). In this case Rajamannar C. J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observes at page 948 thus : "It appears to us that the real test is this. If the plaintiff's title depends ultimately on the benami nature of the transaction, then, Section 66 would certainly be a bar, but if the plaintiff's title is dependent upon other facts and circumstances like, for example, the application of the general law or the carrying out of a separate contract, then Section 66 would not be a bar." I am in respectful agreement with the aforesaid view expressed by the Madras decisions and I would apply those principles to the present case. 8. In this case the prayer in the plaint is for a declaration that the assignment of the sale right executed by P. W. 4 in favour of the 1st defendant was benami for Parameswara Kaimal. 8. In this case the prayer in the plaint is for a declaration that the assignment of the sale right executed by P. W. 4 in favour of the 1st defendant was benami for Parameswara Kaimal. There are, of course, certain allegations in the plaint that the purchase in the name of P. W. 4 was itself benami for Parameswara Kaimal. But the title of Parameswara Kaimal and the cause of action for the suit do not depend upon the benami nature of the court purchase. On the other hand there is independent evidence to prove that the transfer in the name of the 1st defendant was itself benami, apart from the evidence regarding the benami nature of the court purchase in the name of P. W. 4. Therefore, even if that portion of the case regarding the benami nature of the court purchase in the name of P. W. 4 falls to the ground, even then the plaintiffs are entitled to succeed on the basis of the finding that the transfer in the name of the 1st defendant was benami for Parameswara Kaimal. To put it differently, the plaintiffs' title does not depend upon the benami nature of the certified purchase, but it depends on the benami nature of the transfer in favour of the 1st defendant. Even if it is found that P. W. 4 was the real owner of the property, even then, if it is found that the subsequent transfer in favour of the 1st defendant was benami for Parameswara Kaimal, the plaintiffs are entitled to succeed. If, on the other hand, the 1st defendant were a transferee for consideration, the position would have been different. In the aforesaid view, I confirm the decision of the lower courts and dismiss the second appeal with costs.