Judgment :- 1. The decree holder in O.S. 184 of 1955 on the file of the Shertalai Munsiff's court is the revision petitioner. In execution of his decree he had attached the decree in O.S. 851 of 1112, got himself impleaded as additional decree-holder and got the properties sold by the court in 1956. The sale was set aside under 0.21 R.89 on deposit of the sale amount. Subsequent to this in 1958 the respondent attached the decree in O.S. 154 of 1112 for the realisation of the amount due to him under the decree in O.S. 647 of 1952. It was objected by the revision petitioner on the ground that the amount in court deposit belongs only to him. The contention was negatived and the revision has been filed against the order. 1. The question for decision is whether or not the deposit made by the judgment-debtor for the purpose of setting aside the execution sale under 0.21 and 89 can be regarded as an asset liable to rateable distribution under S.73 CPC. I have been referred to the decision in Hari Saha v. Faizlar Rahman (40 Cal. 619) where it was held that although money paid into court under 0.21 R.89 might be regarded as assets under S.73 of the Code, it was not available for rateable distribution because it was specially paid for the benefit of a particular decree-holder and the court had no jurisdiction to utilise the money for any other purpose. This principle does not appear, however, to have been followed by Rankin J., in Nur Muhamed Dawood v. Bilasiram Thakursidass (ILR. 47 Cal. 515) in which he was dealing with a similar question under 0.21 R.55 CPC. The learned judge says: "The money, paid with whatever motive, if paid to the court, is paid upon terms of the code whatever they may be. These terms, as I read S.73, have been laid down so that distinctions in the form in which execution has been had, in the precise extent to which execution has been allowed to run, in the exact source or genesis of the fund in court, are now no part of the definition of the assets that are subject to distribution rateably." This decision has been followed in a later case in Chittagong Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Indo Burmah Traders Bank Ltd., (AIR. 1931 Cal. 521). 3. 1931 Cal. 521). 3. In the case in Bhattoo Singh v. Raghunadhan Prasad Singh (AIR. 1933 Pat. 303) the case law on the subject has been fully reviewed and it was held: "All money paid by a judgment-debtor into court under stress of execution before sale, whether to avoid attachment or whether made at an earlier or late stage, should he treated as assets held by the court liable to rateable distribution under S.73. Money paid into court under 0.21 R.89 ought not to be exempted from this category. The money paid with whatever motive, if paid to the court, is paid upon terms of the code whatever they may be." 4. In Atmaram Akoji v. Uderaj Sheodin (AIR. 1933 Nag. 347) the question was considered and it was held: "Although R.89 specifically mentions payment to the decree-holder, that is only an injunction to the judgment debtor as to what amount he has to pay for the purpose of getting the sale set aside. The sale may be held at the instance of one of the execution creditors, but any amount received from the judgment-debtor in court under pressure of the sale (e.g. under 0.21, R.89) must enure for the benefit of all the execution creditors who have acquired a claim to rateable distribution under S.73." 6. A similar view was taken in Chunnilal v. Karamchand (ILR. 46 Bom. 895). At page 901 their Lordships observed: "When an attachment has been levied on property in execution of a decree then any attempt by the judgment-debtor to deal thereafter with the property must be considered as contrary to the attachment, and the transferee or mortgagee must be considered as taking the transfer or mortgage, subject to all claims which could be made against the property attached, which by the law are not confined to claims of creditors attaching before the transfer, but will also include the claims of any other execution creditors who may apply for execution before the assets are realised." 7. I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed in these decisions. It, therefore, follows that the amount in deposit in court does not enure to the benefit of the revision petitioner alone but to all those execution creditors who have acquired a claim to rateable distribution under S.73 CPC. I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed in these decisions. It, therefore, follows that the amount in deposit in court does not enure to the benefit of the revision petitioner alone but to all those execution creditors who have acquired a claim to rateable distribution under S.73 CPC. It will be open to the learned District Munsiff when the occasion arises to see whether the respondent could lay his claim under the provisions of S.73 CPC. The order of the learned District Munsiff cannot therefore be said to be wrong. The revision petition is dismissed but without costs. Dismissed.