Judgment :- 1. The second appeal is by defendants 1 to 6 in O.S. 263 of 1952 on the file of the trial court. The suit was to set aside a summary order passed in E.A. No. 261 of 1951 and for recovery of possession of the plaint schedule properties from the defendants with future mesne profits. The trial court dismissed the suit, but on appeal by the plaintiff, who is the respondent before me, the lower appellate court reversed the decision and decreed the suit. The second appeal is directed against the aforesaid reversing decision of the lower appellate court. 2. For the appreciation of the question raised in the second appeal a few facts may be noted. The two items of plaint properties belonged to the marumakkathayam tarwad of defendants 1 to 3 and 7, of whom the 7th defendant was the karnavan. There was a personal decree against the 7th defendant granted by the Kanniparamba Village Court, in execution of which the suit items were attached. The other members of the tarwad, namely defendants 1 to 3, objected to the attachment and pleaded for the raising of the same on the ground that the properties belonged to their tarwad and were not liable to be attached for the personal decree against the 7th defendant. Finally on 29th July, 1911 a consent order was passed by the executing court, under which the parties agreed that the attachment might be confirmed "as regards the share of the debtor was concerned over the attached items", subject to certain otti rights and in other respects the claim of defendants 1 to 3 was allowed and the attachment raised. In pursuance of this order execution proceeded and the share of the 7th defendant was sold in court auction on 22nd September, 1941 and was purchased by the assignee - decree-holder. The said sale was confirmed on 25th October 1941 and a sale certificate was issued in his name on 16th December, 1941 with regard to the one-fourth share in the property held by the 7th defendant. In the meantime, on 1st September, 1941 O.S. No. 780 of 1941 was filed against the 7th defendant and others, impleading the 7th defendant as the karnavan of his tarwad. In the meantime, on 1st September, 1941 O.S. No. 780 of 1941 was filed against the 7th defendant and others, impleading the 7th defendant as the karnavan of his tarwad. A decree was passed in that suit on 14th November, 1942 and the assignee - decree-holder attached and sold the plaint schedule properties, which were purchased by the plaintiff-respondent before me. The sale was held on 19th August and was confirmed on 13th November, 1946. Thereafter, when the plaintiff applied for delivery of the property in pursuance of the sale certificate, the appellants before me, namely defendants 1 to 6, resisted delivery, whereupon the plaintiff applied for removal of resistance, which petition was dismissed. The plaintiff therefore filed the present suit for setting aside the aforesaid order and the second appeal, as observed already, arises therefrom. 3. It may be mentioned that the purchaser of the share of the 7th defendant in court auction transferred that right to defendants 4 to 6, who are the wife and children of the 7th defendant, on 18th August, 1943, and subsequently on 4th November, 1943 a partition of the plaint items was effected by defendants 1 to 6, under which the 1st defendant took his share separately, defendants 2 and 3 took their share as a tavazhi and defendants 4 to 6 took the 7th defendant's share as a group. It may be noted that this partition was after the decree in O.S. No. 780 of 1941, which itself was after the attachment of 7th defendant's share in execution of the Village Court decree. 4. The question involved in the second appeal has to be scrutinised from two angles. In the first place, what is the effect of an attachment of the share of a coparcener on his status and membership in the joint family, i.e., whether he ceases to be a member of the coparcenary or whether he continues his undivided status even after the attachment. On this question Mr. Balakrishna Eradi the learned advocate of the appellants, has invited my attention to a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Mt. Muneswari v. Sm. Jugal Mohini Dasi (AIR 1952 Cal. 368), wherein it has been held that an attachment of the undivided share of a member of a Mitakshara joint family during his lifetime operates as a division of interest and causes a severance of status. But Mr. Muneswari v. Sm. Jugal Mohini Dasi (AIR 1952 Cal. 368), wherein it has been held that an attachment of the undivided share of a member of a Mitakshara joint family during his lifetime operates as a division of interest and causes a severance of status. But Mr. Sundara Iyer, the learned advocate of the respondent, has drawn my attention to the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in K. Peramanayakam Pillai v. S.T. Sivaraman (AIR 1952 Mad. 419). In the said decision Satyanarayana Rao, J., observes at page 437: "Neither the alienation of the entirety of the interest of a coparcener nor an adjudication of a coparcener as an insolvent would have the effect of disrupting the status of the family." To the same effect is the observation of Viswanatha Sastri, J., at page 448 of the judgment. Again at page 474 Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., observes that the expression of an intention to become divided, the institution of a suit for partition, the execution of a document with the necessary recitals etc., all involve an expression of "buddhivisesha" (the exercise of the will of a coparcener) and that the same has no reference to acts of purely third parties like an attachment or court sale of a coparcener's interest or his adjudication in insolvency. 5. The learned advocate further invites my attention to Mulla's Principles of Hindu Law, 12th Edn., page 495, where the learned author doubts the correctness of the Calcutta decision in Mt. Muneswari v. Sm. Jugal Mohini Dasi. Similarly at page 348 of N. R. Raghavachariar's book on Hindu Law, 4th Edn., the learned author observes that the same Calcutta decision cannot be sustained as correct and appears to be one rendered without proper appreciation of the principles governing the question. At any rate, there is a Division Bench ruling of our own High Court in Kittu Naidu v. Raman Chetty (1958 KLT. 431), wherein at page 434 the following passage occurs: "That is to say an alienating coparcener is undivided, even in respect of the share of the other members in the property alienated, so that on the death of any member he will succeed to his share by survivorship along with the other members". 431), wherein at page 434 the following passage occurs: "That is to say an alienating coparcener is undivided, even in respect of the share of the other members in the property alienated, so that on the death of any member he will succeed to his share by survivorship along with the other members". This passage in the judgment of our High Court puts the question beyond any shadow of doubt that in spite of the alienation by one coparcener of his share in the family property, he remains still joint even with regard to the other shares of the remaining coparceners, so that he can claim on the death of any of the remaining coparceners, by survivorship, his right to a share in such joint property. Therefore, the alienation or attachment and sale of the share of a coparcener does not ipso facto make the coparcener divided in status from the other coparceners in the joint family and until and unless the "buddhivisesha" or the mental element that is necessary for a division in status is expressed, the coparcener will remain undivided. In the light of the above principle it cannot be held in the case before me that by allowing the attachment of the 7th defendant's share in the plaint properties the 7th defendant became divided in status from the other members of the tarwad. It may also be mentioned at this stage that there is some evidence in the case to show that there are other items of properties belonging to the tarwad still remaining undivided. Hence the view of the learned District Judge that the attachment of .the 7th defendant's share did not make him a divided member has to be sustained. 6. The next angle from which the question has to be viewed is regarding the effect of the agreed order, namely Ext. B2, in the proceeding in execution of the Village Court decree; whether that had the effect of making the 7th defendant divided in status from the other members or whether it had at least the effect of completely dividing the two items of plaint properties among the members of the family so as to make the members of the family thereafter not joint tenants, but only tenants-in-common, with regard to those two items. If Ext. If Ext. B2 had that effect, then the plaint property cannot be proceeded against for a decree against the 7th defendant as the karanavan of the tarwad, for, the properties ceased to be tarwad properties after Ext. B2. On this question, firstly, the attachment order, even if agreed to by all the members of the tarwad, cannot by its wording be held to have the effect of severing the 7th defendant in status from the family and make him a divided member. Secondly, Ex. B2 cannot even be construed as an order dividing the two items of properties among the several members of the tarwad so as to make them tenants-in-common and not joint tenants any more. That means that by Ex. B2 only the 7th defendant's share was allowed to be attached or the objection to such attachment by the other members was withdrawn and the said order had no effect of partitioning, those items of property among the members of the tarwad. If so, the observation of the Division Bench of this Court in Kittu Naidu v. Raman Chetty (1958 KLT. 431), already referred to, applies to the present case, so that the 7th defendant was still a coparcener along with defendants 1 to 3 at least with regard to the remaining shares, namely the three-fourth share belonging to defendants 1 to 3 and thus he continued to be the karnavan of the joint family. Therefore, to that extent the properties could be proceeded against as tarwad properties and the decree for possession to the extent of the three-fourth share, i. e , the share of defendants 1 to 3, has to be sustained. Regarding the other one-fourth share, which was purchased by the decree-holder in the Village Court decree and thereafter transferred to defendants 4 to 6, that share ceased to be tarwad property on the consent order, Ext. B2. Therefore, to that extent namely to the extent of the share of defendants 4 to 6, the respondent is not entitled to a decree. The second appeal is therefore dismissed to the extent indicated above and the decree granted in favour of the respondent to the extent of the three-fourth share of defendants 1 to 3, is sustained. The decree is set aside to the extent of the one-fourth share belonging to defendants 4 to 6. The second appeal is therefore dismissed to the extent indicated above and the decree granted in favour of the respondent to the extent of the three-fourth share of defendants 1 to 3, is sustained. The decree is set aside to the extent of the one-fourth share belonging to defendants 4 to 6. In the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their respective costs in this court.