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1961 DIGILAW 153 (ALL)

Pheku Singh v. Attiraji Kunwar

1961-07-25

W.BROOME

body1961
JUDGMENT W. Broome, J. - This criminal revision application is directed against orders passed by the S. D. M. of Rasra (District Ballia) under Section 488 Cr. P. C. awarding maintenance at the rate of Rs. 15 per month to the opposite party, Attiraji Kueri against her husband Pheku Singh, the present applicant. 2. The learned Magistrate's has held that Attiraji Kueri was turned out by Pheku Singh from his house and that he has been refusing or neglecting to maintain her ever since. These findings are not challenged by the applicant, but he contends that since he has offered to maintain his wife on condition of her living with him and she refuses to live with him without any just ground, she has forfeited her right to maintenance. This aspect of the case was considered however by the learned Magistrate's and he came to the conclusion that the wife had good ground to refuse to go back and live with her husband because he had gone to the length of denying that she was married to him. He remarks "It is not possible for a woman having self-respect to go and live with a man who was denying the married status to her." And the learned Sessions Judge of Ballia, to whom the applicant went in revision, points out in addition that the husband has made allegations of unchastity against the wife and as a result his offer to take her back and keep her with him cannot be considered to be genuine. 3. The proviso to Cl. (3) of Section 488 Cr. P. C. lays down that if the husband offers to maintain his wife on condition of her living with him and she refuses, the Magistrate's may nevertheless pass an order for maintenance if he is satisfied that there is just ground. The explanation appended to this proviso shows that remarriage of the husband or the fact that he is keeping a mistress may be just ground for the wife's refusal to live with him; but it is obvious that this explanation is not to be regarded as exhaustive and that other circumstances may also be taken into consideration and may be treated as `just ground.' 4. In the present case, the circumstances relied upon by the courts below as constituting just ground for the wife's refusal to live with her husband are his denial of the factum of ' marriage (with the implication that Attiraji Kueri was living with him merely as a concubine or mistress) and the allegations which he has levelled against her of unchastity and of illicit connection with other persons. 5. Learned counsel for the applicant argues that mere denial of the validity of the marriage does not amount to "just ground" as required by proviso to Cl. (3) of Section 488 and relies in this connection on In Re. Gulabdas Bhaidas, I.L.R. 16 Bom. 269. But it is to be noted that in the present case the applicants allegations were more objectionable. In Gulabdas, Bhaidass case the defendant did not actually deny his marriage with the petitioner, but merely asserted that the marriage was invalid under the Hindu Law for want of certain essential ceremonies; whereas in the present case the applicant has totally denied that there was any form of marriage between him and Attiraji and has asserted that she had been living with him just as a mistress, which was another way of saying that she was a woman of unchaste character. 6. I am satisfied that the allegations of unchastity levelled against the wife in the present case constitute "just ground" for her refusing to go back and live with her husband. That was the view expressed in Kamala Gangalamma v. Venkatarami Reddi, AIR 1950 Madras 385 and in Jambapuram Subbama v. Jambapuram Venkata Reddi, AIR 1950 Madras 394, with which I respect fully agree. The applicant clearly asserted that his wife had had a child by some one else and that while he was away from home she contracted illicit intimacy with other persons on account of her loose character. As pointed out in the above mentioned Madras decisions, deliberate false allegations of this kind must be held to amount to legal cruelty sufficient to entitle the wife to live separate from her husband and yet to claim maintenance. There was thus just ground for Attiraji Kueris rejection of the applicants offer and she was still entitled to maintenance despite her refusal to go back and live with him. 7. There is also another aspect of the matter that deserves consideration. There was thus just ground for Attiraji Kueris rejection of the applicants offer and she was still entitled to maintenance despite her refusal to go back and live with him. 7. There is also another aspect of the matter that deserves consideration. The applicant has made his offer to maintain his wife on condition that she goes back to live with him in the same breath as he has levelled the allegations of unchastity against her; and it is quite obvious that this offer to take her back is nothing more than a device to evade the payment of maintenance. The circumstances are such that I am not prepared to treat his offer as genuine and bona fide, and I conclude on this ground also that the learned Magistrate's was fully justified in awarding maintenance despite the offer. 8. This revision application is accordingly rejected.