JUDGMENT Pandey, J. This appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against a reversing decree of Golvalker J., by which the plaintiff's suit for a declaration that he held khasra Nos. 276, 278, 287/7 and 294/2, total area 32.70 acres, village Manamau as an occupancy tenant was dismissed. By a deed dated 17th March 1951, the then proprietor of village Manamau granted to the plaintiff a lease of the disputed plots. Subsequently, by an order dated 10th July 1954, Nislar-cum-Compensation Officer, Hoahangabad, held that the lease was void and directed that those plots be recorded as vested in the State. Being aggrieved by that order, the plaintiff filed a suit for declaration that, notwithstanding that order, he continued to hold the plots in occupancy right. The first appeal Court, agreeing with the Court of first instance, held that, while khasra N03. 276 and 278 were Chhota Ghas plots and vested in the State, khasra Nos. 287 /7 and 294/2 were khudkashi plots of the proprietor, that they were not liable to vest in the State under provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahal, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (hereinafter called the Act), and that the lease, in BO far as it related to these two plots, was not void. Accordingly, in regard to these two plots, the claim for declaration was allowed. It was accepted before the learned single Judge, as it was rightly conceded before us, that having regard to the view taken in Rao Shankar Pratap Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh 1969 MPLJ 1110 : AIR 1980 MP 86 (FB), even khasra Nos. 287 /7 and 294/2 could not be regarded as khudkasht plots of the proprietor. That being so, the learned single Judge held that all the disputed plots had, under the provisions of the Act, vested in the State. The correctness of the legal position implicit in this view is challenged in this appeal. Having heard the counsel, we have formed the opinion that there is no substance in this appeal. The learned counsel for the plaintiff relied upon section 4 of the Act and contended that thereunder only the proprietary right-and not the cultivating right-vested in the State. The correctness of the legal position implicit in this view is challenged in this appeal. Having heard the counsel, we have formed the opinion that there is no substance in this appeal. The learned counsel for the plaintiff relied upon section 4 of the Act and contended that thereunder only the proprietary right-and not the cultivating right-vested in the State. It is sufficient to point out that, under clause (a) of section 4(1) of the Act, all rights, title and interest in land, which the proprietor had, including the cultivating right, vested in the State unless, by other provisions of the Act, either the proprietary right in particular plots, or any subordinate right carved out of it and assigned to third persons, was expressly saved. The relevant provision which governed the matter was contained in section 6 of the Act, which read as under : 6(1) Except as provided in sub-section (2), the transfer of any right in the property which is liable to vest in the State under this Act made by the proprietor at any time after the 16th March 1950 shall, as from the date of vesting, be void. (2) Where on the application of the transferor or the transferee, the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that any transfer of property referred to in sub-section (1) was made by a proprietor in good faith and in the ordinary course of village management, he may declare that the transfer shall not be void after the date of vesting. As pointed out by a Division Bench of this Court in Singhai Shrinandanlal Vs. Laxman Singh and Another, , any transfer made in contravention of section 6(1) of the Act after 16th March 1950 and before the date of vesting-31st March 1950-was valid till the date of vesting and became, unless the requisite declaration was obtained u/s 6(2) of the Act, void as from the date of vesting, The learned counsel for the plaintiff however relied upon section 45 (1) of the Act to put forward an ingenious argument in support of the plaintiff's claim. Section 45 (1) was as follows : Subject to the provisions of section 41, any person who immediately before the date of vesting was in possession of any holding as an absolutes occupancy tenant or an occupancy tenant shall, on and from the date of vesting, be deemed to be a tenant of the State and shall hold the land in the same rights and subject to the same restrictions and liabilities as he was entitled or subject to immediately before the date of vesting. According to the learned counsel, since the lease was valid till the date of vesting, the plaintiff was an occupancy tenant of the disputed plots immediately before the date of vesting and had, therefore, to be regarded u/s 45 (1) as continuing to hold the plots even after that date as a tenant of the State on the same terms and conditions. There are two answers to this argument. When, under the statute, the vesting and the transaction becoming void are simultaneous without any time lag, it cannot be urged that the plaintiff was holding a valid lease immediately before the date of vesting. Secondly, the view commended for acceptance would make the provisions of section 6 nugatory. Such a consequence should if possible, be avoided by adopting the rule of harmonious construction. It will be seen that section 45 (1) was a general provision enacted to declare that the tenancy rights would remain unaffected with this exception that, as a necessary consequence of vesting, the State would replace the proprietor as the landlord. On the other hand, section 6 was a special provision dealing with certain transfers made by proprietors between the two dates therein specified. On the principle generals specialibus non derogant, the general provision contained in section 45 (1) cannot be regarded as abrogating or controlling the special provisions of section 6. The learned counsel also urged that it was inconceivable that lease-hold rights could be expropriated without payment of any compensation. This was answered in Singhai Shrinandanlal Vs. Laxman Singh and Another, by pointing out that since, in such cases, the lease subsequently became void, the lessee had a remedy against his lessor u/s 65 of the Contract Act. In the view we have taken, the appeal fails and is dismissed. The plaintiff shall bear his own costs and pay those of the defendant in this Court. Laxman Singh and Another, by pointing out that since, in such cases, the lease subsequently became void, the lessee had a remedy against his lessor u/s 65 of the Contract Act. In the view we have taken, the appeal fails and is dismissed. The plaintiff shall bear his own costs and pay those of the defendant in this Court. Other costs shall be borne by the parties as directed by the learned single Judge. Counsel's fee here according to schedule. Final Result : Dismissed