This is an appeal against the judgment of the Commissioner Kota dated 31.3.60 by which he has set aside the judgment of the Assistant Collector Baran dated 20.4.59 and rejected the suit of the appellant for the division of holding, wrongly described by him as a suit for partition. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at great length and examined the record as well. Briefly, the facts are that the appellant preferred a suit on 5.7.57 for the division of the Khata (holding) No. 102 of village Badwa Tehsil Anta that stood jointly in the name of the parties and another land measuring 9 bighas mortgaged jointly with them. The allegation was that on 31.1.56 the appellant had got opened a mutation for having the division done; that on 25.6.56 the Panchas of village Badwa divided all fields in the holding as well as the mortgaged land half and half between the parties, which was agreed to by the respondent; and that, therefore, the appellant got the mutation rejected on 6.7.56. The appellant thereupon gave the land of her share (41 bighas) for cultivation to one Biharilal for one year Sambat 2013 on a munafa of Rs. 8oo/- out of which Rs. 500/- were given by the Panchas to the respondent towards the repayment of debts. Further it was alleged that Biharilal was the son-in-law of the respondent and, therefore in collusion with her, he wanted to deliver the possession of the land of the share of the appellant to the respondent, and that the respondent had herself threatened many a time that she would cultivate the land and not let the appellant cultivate it, 1.4.57 being the last date on which she had given this threat. The prayer was that the respondent should be restrained through a perpetual injunction from taking the possession of the land of the share of the appellant; and that the land belonging to the share of the appellant be divided and given separate Khasra numbers. This was denied by the respondent. She pleaded that the appellant had been excommunicated from the caste because of her living with her mother, herself ex-communicated from the caste. This was denied by the respondent. She pleaded that the appellant had been excommunicated from the caste because of her living with her mother, herself ex-communicated from the caste. She also pleaded that the debts due from the original holder of the land were paid off by the respondent and that it was to save herself from the responsibility of paying these debts that the appellant got the application for mutation withdrawn and rejected. She has contended that the appellant was no longer entitled to have the holding divided. She should at the utmost sue for the specific performance of the Panch Faisla i. e. the compromise arrived at by the Panchas. The prayer was that the suit be dismissed because of being not maintainable. The learned trial court after framing the necessary issues and recording the evidence of the parties decreed the suit on 19.3.58 holding that the land comprised in Khata No. 102 was liable to be divided equally between the parties and that, therefore, a preliminary decree be prepared under sec. 53 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. It was further directed that the parties may divide the land between themselves and report; and that if they could not come to such a mutual agreement, they should obtain the final decree in the matter. It so happened however, that in the decree prepared in compliance of this judgment the land was described to be situated in village Anta instead of the village Badwa. No appeal was preferred against this decree by the respondent. When the mistake in the name of village was discovered by the appellant, she applied for the correction of the name of the village under sec. 152 of Civil Procedure Code. This application was submitted on 23.2.59. The learned Assistant Collector after making necessary enquiries ordered the correction of the name of the village from Anta to Badwa on 20.4.59. The decree was amended accordingly. The appellant had also made an application for the passing of the final decree, and by this very order the Assistant Collector disposed of that application also. The respondent preferred an appeal against this order dated 20.4.59. Along with this order the copy of the amended decree was also filed. The decree was amended accordingly. The appellant had also made an application for the passing of the final decree, and by this very order the Assistant Collector disposed of that application also. The respondent preferred an appeal against this order dated 20.4.59. Along with this order the copy of the amended decree was also filed. It may be stated here that the grounds urged in the memo of appeal were that the learned Assistant Collector had committed an error in making a reference to two decrees, preliminary and final, and also preparing two decrees; that the correction in the decree had been made wrongly; that it had been wrongly held that the appellant was entitled to have the suit land divided; and that the land belonged to the respondent alone and the learned Assistant Collector had wrongly disposed of the suit under sec, 53 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The learned Commissioner decided that only one decree could have been passed in the suit and there was no need of passing two separate decrees, preliminary and final. He also held that the respondent could appeal only against the amended decree and not the original one. The reason given was that the respondent was not expected to file an appeal against the decree which was "not contemplated by law and when it was wrong inasmuch as it did not correctly indicate the land". It appears that a ground of limitation was also raised before him, and he disposed of the same without going into the details thereof with the simple observation that as there was no provision in law for a preliminary decree the order passed on 20.4.59 (wronglydescribed by the learned Commissioner as dated 20.9.59) alone, by which the decree was made final and amended, could be appealed against, the previous order (meaning the one dated 19.3.58) being only a part of the latter order. He held, therefore, that the respondent could not be barred from arguing the case on merits as well. On merits, he decided that as the plaint itself said that the suit land had already been divided between the parties no fresh "partition" (meaning thereby division) could be allowed. It was further observed that the appellant should take action for the implementation of the same. On merits, he decided that as the plaint itself said that the suit land had already been divided between the parties no fresh "partition" (meaning thereby division) could be allowed. It was further observed that the appellant should take action for the implementation of the same. It was also observed that if the land was being handed over to the respondent, proceedings should be taken to have the son-in-law of the respondent, Biharilal, ejected from the land. Yet again it was observed in reply to the contention of the appellant, "though partition had taken place yet change had not been affected in the Khatas", that "this, however, would affect the factum of partition as an entry in the record of rights was only an evidence of title, it did not create any title. The respondent could, instead of bringing a suit for partition ask for correction in the record of rights in accordance with the factum of partition". The quotation is from the Judgment of the learned Commissioner himself. In the second appeal by the unsuccessful plaintiff, it has been urged that she was entitled to have the division off her share of the suit land as the daughter of the deceased holder, Nathu, as well as on the basis of the Panch-Faisla and admission of the respondent herself. Further, it has been very vehemently contended that the first appeal to the learned Commissioner was barred by time inasmuch as the decree against which it was preferred was dated 19.3.58, and the order dated 20.4.59 was not appealable. First, we take the point of limitation. We have described above the date of the previous order passed by the trial court in the case. The suit was decided on 19.3.58. The decree was therefore to bear this very date, vice order 20 Rule 7 CPC. Even after the correction of the name of the villages this date was not to be changed. The learned trial court has also kept this very date on the decree and not changed it. Nor has it prepared any other decree in compliance of the order dated 20.4.59. Nor did it give therein (although it was so submitted before us at the bar) any direction for the preparation of any final decree. The decree as such remained the same as was prepared in accordance with the judgment dated 19.3.58, and that rightly too. Nor has it prepared any other decree in compliance of the order dated 20.4.59. Nor did it give therein (although it was so submitted before us at the bar) any direction for the preparation of any final decree. The decree as such remained the same as was prepared in accordance with the judgment dated 19.3.58, and that rightly too. Only the name of the village was changed to Badwa in place of Anta. The decree continued to remain dated 19.3.58 itself as the law in this behalf required it to be. That the order dated 20.4.59 directing the correction of the name in the village under sec. 152 Cr. P. C. was not at all appealable has been held by the Board in the unreported case, Appeal No. 7 Udaipur 1960, "Udailal Vs. Kashiram" to which one of us was a party. The Supreme Court authority in A. I. R. 1952 S.C. 405 was followed in that case. On those very reasonings, no appeal could lie against the order dated 20.4.59. The learned Commissioner was therefore entirely wrong in admitting an appeal against that order, and deciding it. That the respondent could not appeal against he decree dated 19.3.58 so long as it did not bear the name of village Badwa (in which the suit land was situated) but that of Anta, is not a ground permissible in law to admit an appeal against that order. The respondent could come in appeal only against the judgment and decree dated 19.3.58, on which date the suit was decided by the learned trial court. But she did not do so, as is evident from her memo of appeal as well as the judgment of the learned Commissioner. The appeal preferred to him should therefore be ordered to be dismissed on this ground alone. But as the copy of the decree furnished in the appeal bore the date 19.3.58, the date of the judgment in the suit, we also propose to examine whether an appeal lay on the date 20.5.59, day on which the appeal was presented, against this decree as well. That the limitation had expired on that date cannot be disputed. That no application for the extension of time under sec. 5 Indian Limitation Act was preferred or considered too cannot be disputed. That the limitation had expired on that date cannot be disputed. That no application for the extension of time under sec. 5 Indian Limitation Act was preferred or considered too cannot be disputed. That this decree dated 19.3.58 has not been specifically set aside by the impugned judgment too cannot be disputed. But still by implication it may be said that even though the learned Commissioner had been hearing and considering tentatively the order dated 20.4.59 and had set aside the same as would be evident from the reading of the introductory and operating portion of his judgment, he has set aside the decree of 19.3.58 also, and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff-appellant. It is clear when we refer to that portion of his judgment which deals with the merits of the case. Besides, it is also a matter of argument in this case whether the very suit for division, in view of the Panch-Faisla division having already admittedly taken place, can lie or not. So we, instead of ordering the dismissal of appeal against the Older dated 20.4.59 and remanding the case back to the learned lower appellate court for a decision on the maintainability of appeal against the decree dated 19.3.58 on 20.5.59, take that an application for extension of time under sec. 5 Indian Limitation Act has been made, and proceed to decide it ourselves here. Obviously, when the decree as it was framed before amendment under sec. 152 CPC could not be taken to refer to the suit land itself but could be taken to relate to the land of the holding No. 102 of Anta. It could not be gainsaid, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the judgment, that it could not be executed against the respondent and she could not feel aggrieved against it. She could, therefore, very safely ignore it. Nor could she have cared to appeal against it. It could be only after the insertion of the name of village Badwa therein that she could take it that it related to the suit holding No. 102 and could be executed against her. Within a week of the passing of the order to amend the decree she applied for the copy thereof and soon after for the copy of the amended decree. She got the latter copy on 18.5.59; and the appeal was filed on 23.5.59. Within a week of the passing of the order to amend the decree she applied for the copy thereof and soon after for the copy of the amended decree. She got the latter copy on 18.5.59; and the appeal was filed on 23.5.59. The delay in filing the appeal was therefore absolutely due to sufficient cause, and capable of being condoned under sec. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. And it is ordered accordingly. Now about the merits of the appeal against the decree dated 19.3.58. It is a well established principle of law about the appeal against such amended decree that the delay condoned under sec. 5 referred to above could relate only to the grounds of appeal so far as they arose out of amendment the (same judgment of the Board as has be referred to in para 12 above and the cases referred therein may be perused). Other grounds which could be raised even without amendment cannot be allowed to be raised in such a belated appeal. The grounds raised in this appeal before the learned Commissioner have been narrated in para 7 above. They cover the whole case. But in the peculiar circumstances of this case, when with a wrong name of the locality the decree was inexecutable against the suit holding No. 102, the respondent came to be aggrieved only upon the amendment of the name of the village. She could, therefore, raise all the grounds she could have raised, if the decree had been framed correctly originally, and she had appealed against it. The point that (emerges for determination, therefore, is whether a suit for the division of the holding is maintainable or not in the present case. The learned trial court has held it to be maintainable and it has decreed the division. The learned lower appellate court has, however, dismissed it on the ground that when there had been already a division, only an implementation thereof could be asked for and not the division itself. There cannot be any dispute to the principle that a holding once divided cannot be ordered to be divided again. But we have to see whether in this case the suit-holding had been actually divided in accordance with the provision of sec. 53 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, the only section dealing with the division of holding in the Act. There cannot be any dispute to the principle that a holding once divided cannot be ordered to be divided again. But we have to see whether in this case the suit-holding had been actually divided in accordance with the provision of sec. 53 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, the only section dealing with the division of holding in the Act. It would be necessary to re-produce this section, so far as it is relevant for the present purpose, to appreciate this point. Sec. 53, so far as relevant for the purposes of the present case, reads: Sub-sec. (2): "A division of a holding shall be effected in the following manner :— (i) By agreement between the co-tenants in respect of— (a) such division of the holding; and (b) distribution of rent over the several portions into which the holding be so divided; or (ii) By the decree or order of a competent court passed in a suit by one or more co-tenants for the purpose of dividing the holding and distributing the rent thereof over the several portions into which it is divided." It would be seen that vide clanse(1) of this-section a division by agreement between the co-tenants can be complete only if it is an agreement about the distribution of rent over the division of the holding besides the division itself. Unless there is, therefore, a distribution of rent also of the several portions effected, the division cannot be called to have been completed. The plaintiff appellant in this case did state that there had been effected a division of the suit-land by the panchas of the village and he has also submitted a copy Ex.P/2 of the Panch Faisla. But neither the plaint nor the document Ex.P/2 anywhere says that there had been a distribution of rent of the holding also between the parties. The division cannot, therefore, be called to have been completed in accordance with the provision of sec. 53(2)(i)(a) and (b) of the Act. What the appellant had prayed, as stated above also, was that the land allotted to his share by Ex.P/2 should be given separate Khasra Nos. and the division effected actually — "mere hisse ki adhi taqsim farmai ja kar nambran aleheda farmaye jawen". This! can be called only the basis of his suit for actual division. It cannot be inferred therefrom that the division had actually taken place. and the division effected actually — "mere hisse ki adhi taqsim farmai ja kar nambran aleheda farmaye jawen". This! can be called only the basis of his suit for actual division. It cannot be inferred therefrom that the division had actually taken place. Nor from para No. 2 of the plaint can it be inferred that the division had been completed. What is said therein is only that the Panchas of Badwa had brought out a compromise between the parties by dividing the suit-holding equally between the parties and also paying a part of the debt of the deceased holder. As the distribution of the rent between the two portions of the holding was also necessary to complete the division by agreement, Ex. P/2, which alone is the basis of the plaint of the appellant, it cannot be called to have finally divided the suit holding. The appellant could, therefore, very well bring the suit for for division on the basis of that compromise and his suit should not have been dismissed in the face of the above referred clear provision of law i|n this behalf. The direction given by the learned commissioner also does not seem to be warranted. The appellant could not sue for specific performance. There is no provision in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act for such a suit. The only provision is that laid down in sec. 53 and the jurisdiction of the civil courts is barred by sec. 256 thereof. There did not arise any occasion for the praying of the correction of entries in the record of rights also. Such a correction could be applied for under provisions of sec. 136 read with sec. 133 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, only when the division had been completed. Unless there was a complete division, the recourse to such a procedure could not be permitted. It may be disputed that when the appellant has stated in the para No. 2 of his plaint that he had given over his share of the suit holing for cultivation to one Beharilal and therefore a transfer of possession had taken place, this transfer of possession made obligatory on the appellant as well as entitled him to report the same factum to the Tehsildar and have it recorded. A transfer of possession could be reported and recorded in the annual registers under sec. 133 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. A transfer of possession could be reported and recorded in the annual registers under sec. 133 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. But this report and recording is to be done only of the transfer of such rights or interest in any land as is required by the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act or any rule made thereunder to be recorded in the annual registers. Vide rule 74 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue (Land Records) Rules 1957. It can be only the tenant (so far as relevant for the present purpose) that can be recorded in the Khasra Gir-dawari, and through it carried to the Jamabandi Khewat Khatauni. So long as the division was not complete inasmuch as neither the actual shares of the Khasra numbers comprising the suit-holding had been demarcated nor the rent thereof distributed in accordance therewith, the appellant could not be entered as a tenant on any portion of the suit-holding which was continuing to be recorded as joint in the name of both the parties. The officers responsible for the maintenance of the land records could separate the names of the two Khatedars only when the areas in their actual possession along with rent thereon was actually divided and laid down on the site. Neither the plaint nor Ex.P/2, which has led to the suit, anywhere say that the portions coming to the actual possession of the two parties, had been earmarked on the site and their rent, also distributed in accordance with the same. Under the circumstances this remedy too was not available to the appellant. What has been stated above would go very clearly to show that the division of the suit-holding between the parties was not completed in accordance with the provision of sec. 53 of the Act by an agreement between the parties or by a Panch-Faisla. What has taken place could be called to be only an agreement to divide which was to be actually effected. This suit should be termed only for this purpose. It cannot be deemed to be barred by any provision of sec. 53 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. Rather, this section contemplated such a suit and it deserved to be entertained under it. The learned Sub-Divisional Officer had rightly so decided it. This suit should be termed only for this purpose. It cannot be deemed to be barred by any provision of sec. 53 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. Rather, this section contemplated such a suit and it deserved to be entertained under it. The learned Sub-Divisional Officer had rightly so decided it. The learned Commissioner appears to have mis-conceived the law applicable to the case as well as the facts and his decision could not be upheld. The above conclusion would be warranted even by the rules framed by the Board to implement the provision of sec. 53 of the Act. Rule 18 thereof contemplated the valuation of the holding before making a division in accordance with the method given therein. Rule 19 laid down principles to be observed in dividing a holding. Rule 20 laid down that a map would be prepared and placed on record showing in different colours the plots given to each party and if any field had been subdivided the same shall be demarcated on the site at the expenses of the parties. Rules 18 and 19 may not be required to be followed in the present suit because of the parties having already agreed through the Panchas to equally divide each of the fields comprising the suit-holding. But the provision of Rule 20 were still required to be complied with. That is to say each portion had to be demarcated on the site at the expenses of the parties and the rent thereof also distributed. The division was, therefore, not at all complete and it has to be done and can be done through a suit under sec. 53 read with the above referred rules alone. In the appeal to the learned Commissioner also no objection to the division order by the learned Sub-Divisional Officer had been taken. Nor any such objection was taken in this second appeal. The division order to be made by the learned Sub-Divisional Officer cannot but be confirmed in this second appeal. Also only the learned Sub-Divisional Officer should have further demarcated the actual portions coming into the share of each of the parties. As he has not done so the same shall be done now. As a result, this appeal is hereby accepted, the order of the learned Commissioner Kota set aside and that of the learned S.D.O, Baran restored. Also only the learned Sub-Divisional Officer should have further demarcated the actual portions coming into the share of each of the parties. As he has not done so the same shall be done now. As a result, this appeal is hereby accepted, the order of the learned Commissioner Kota set aside and that of the learned S.D.O, Baran restored. It is further directed that the fields comprised in the suit-holding shall be demarcated equally on the site at the expenses of the parties and rent distributed over the two sub-holdings created as a result of division.