ORDER T.P. Naik, J. This is a civil revision u/s 115 of the CPC against the appellate order of the Second Additional District Judge, Alirajpur, allowing the appeal of the non-applicant (Plaintiff) and setting aside the order of the Civil Judge, Class II, Alirajpur, dismissing the suit of the plaintiff under rule 3 of Order XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure. The facts, so far as relevant for our present purpose, are as follows: The non-applicant-plaintiff, on 24-3-1955, filed a civil suit against the applicants-defendants claiming specific performance of a contract of sale of a motor-car or, in the alternative, damages amounting to Ra. 3,564-4-0. On 18-6-1955, the suit was decreed against the defendants ex parte. The ex parte decree was, however, set aside on 19-12-1957; and the trial Court directed the issue of notices to the parties for their appearance for proceeding further with the suit. The parties appeared; and when the ease was fixed for evidence of the parties, the non-applicant-plaintiff absented himself from the hearing on 20-2-1959, on which date he had to lead his evidence. The trial Court, therefore, dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff and his witnesses were absent. The Additional District Judge Alirajpur, on appeal, by his order dated 22-10-1959 set aside the order of the trial Court dated 20-2-1959 dismissing the suit and remanded the case to it for disposal according to law. On 28-10-1959, when the case was received back by the trial Court on remand, it directed issue of notices to the parties for their appearance on 9-12-1959. It further directed that the plaintiff should be present with his witnesses, whom he might summon for that date, if necessary. On 9-12-1959, neither the plaintiff nor his witnesses were present, though the counsel for the parties were present. The plaintiff had sent a telegram praying for an adjournment. The prayer for adjournment was rejected and the case was dismissed with costs under rule 3 of Order XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure. A decree was also accordingly drawn up. The plaintiff, treating this dismissal as a dismissal under rule 8 of Order IX read with rule 2 of Order XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, applied for its being set aside under rule 9 of Order IX. A decree was also accordingly drawn up. The plaintiff, treating this dismissal as a dismissal under rule 8 of Order IX read with rule 2 of Order XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, applied for its being set aside under rule 9 of Order IX. The prayer, being refused on the ground that as the dismissal of the suit was under rule 3 of Order XVII, an application under rule 9 of Order IX was incompetent, he went up in appeal to the Court of the Additional District Judge, Alirajpur, who by his order dated 30-12-1960 set aside the order of dismissal on payment of Rs. 60 as adjournment costs and remanded the case to the trial Court for the recording of evidence and, thereafter, for its disposal according to law. The applicants (defendants) challenge this order as wrong and illegal. The question for consideration is whether the dismissal of the suit by the trial Court, which was expressly done by it under rule 3 of Order XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, should be deemed to be one made under rule 2 of Order XVII read with rule 8 of Order IX of the Code, so that an application for setting aside the said dismissal filed by the plaintiff under rule 9 of Order IX should be held to be competent. The contention of the learned counsel for the non-applicant (plaintiff) is that notwithstanding the fact that the trial Court had purported to act under rule 3 of Order XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, it should be deemed not to have so acted but to have acted under rule 2 of Order XVII read with rule 8 of Order IX of the CPC as the provisions of rule 3 of Order XVII were not in fact attracted. It is true that the provisions of rule 3 of Order XVII of the CPC do not apply unless- (1) the hearing is adjourned on the application of a party to the suit, as distinguished from an adjournment by Court of its own motion; (2) the hearing is adjourned on the application of the party who subsequently makes the default; (3) the adjournment is granted to enable the party to produce his evidence, or to cause the attendance of his witnesses, or to perform any other act necessary to the further progress of the suit; and (4) the party fails to perform any of the acts for which the adjournment was granted within the time allowed by the Court: (see Mulla's Civil Procedure Code. 12th Edn., p. 313). and in this case the adjournment was not on the application of the plaintiff who was subsequently found to have committed the default but an adjournment by the Court of its own motion; and there is ample authority for the proposition that where the Court itself adjourns the case for production of evidence by the parties quite generally without reference to anything in particular to be done by any one of the parties to the action, the adjournment does not bring into operation rule 3 of Order XVII: [see AIR 1933 234 (Nagpur) , Rukmanse v. Shankarguda AIR 1841 Bom. 88; Enatulla Basunia Vs. Jiban Mohan Roy, and Ryall Sherman ILR 1 Mad. 287. It is also true that on the date of hearing the counsel for the plaintiff was present but his physical presence alone could not be construed as his presence in Court on behalf of the plaintiff within the meaning of rule 1 of Order III. As pointed out by the Bombay High Court in Soonderlal v. Goori prasad ILR 23 Bom. 414. If a pleader does not conduct the case on behalf of his principal, his mere presence in Court is not an appearance in suit within the meaning of rule 6_ or rule 8 of Order IX. It is also significant that the presence of the counsel was practically ignored by the Court as neither any question was put to him nor was he ever called upon to appear, apply and act on behalf of his client. It is also significant that the presence of the counsel was practically ignored by the Court as neither any question was put to him nor was he ever called upon to appear, apply and act on behalf of his client. Under these circumstances, it may be that rule 2 of Order XVII would have been the more appropriate provision under which the trial Court should have acted and not rule 3 of Order XVII under which it actually purported to act. But, even so, the fact remains that, rightly or wrongly, the trial Court chose to exercise its jurisdiction under rule 3 of Order XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the rights of the parties shall have to be regulated by what it actually did than by what it ought to have done. In Faiyaz Khan Vs. Mithan, declining in somewhat similar circumstances to consider whether the lower Court which had made a, decree in favour of the plaintiff under rule 3, Order XVII was justified in doing so, the learned Judge said: The right of appeal does not depend on what the Court ought to have done but on what it actually did was to pass a decree on merits. Against such a decree the law allows an appeal. When the appeal comes up for decision, the appellate Court has then to decide whether the order passed was a proper order and one which the Court below had jurisdiction to pass. If it decides this question in the negative, it will set the order aside. In Shri Kiahan v. Radhakishen AIR 1924 AIL 144 : ILR 45 All. 669, Agarwala J"., speaking for the Division Bench, said: The question whether an application for restoration is maintainable must be decided upon an interpretation of the order which the Court passes. If there is any doubt about the intention of the Court passing the order as to whether it intended to proceed under Order 12, rule 3 or Order 17, rule 2 in that case we can say that the order should be construed as one which 'ought' to have been passed. But this cannot be done when the Court expressly passes an order under one of the two rules. In that case, the aggrieved party should file an appeal against the order which is in fact a decree and not apply for restoration. But this cannot be done when the Court expressly passes an order under one of the two rules. In that case, the aggrieved party should file an appeal against the order which is in fact a decree and not apply for restoration. Both these cases were cited with approval in Faiyazkhan v. Mithan AIR 1852 All. 652, where the Division Bench repelled the contention that a decree passed by the trial Court under rule 3 of Order XVII could be Bet aside by an appellate Court under rule 13 of Order IX of the CPC and the decisions reported in Raja Singh v. Mannasingh AIR 1954 All. 222 and Rafiq Ahmad v. Mohammad Shafi AIR 1940 All. 217 were not followed. In my opinion the view of law enunciated in Faiyazkhan v. Mithan ILR 1949 A11.759 : AIR 1949 All. 423 is more in consonance with the general principles of law and has to be preferred. It is trite that a Court has jurisdiction to decide rightly as well as: wrongly, and that the appellate Court or the revisional Court to which it is subordinate looks to its decision to find out if it is right or wrong. If it has purported to act under any specific provision of law, the decision has to be judged with reference to that provision, and the forum which examines the correctness of the decision has also to be determined with reference to that provision. It is what a Court. actually does which determines the forum and gives jurisdiction to the appellate or revisional Court and not what it ought to have done. If it were otherwise a great deal of uncertainty would be introduced into this class of litigation which could never be the intention of the law. As matter of judicial consideration also, when a specific provision is mentioned (unless it be a clerical or typing error), it would not be open to anybody to contend that the judicial intent was something different than what the plain and unambiguous language of the judgment warranted as the language of the judgment was the best indication of the Court's intent. Consequently, where a decree has been passed expressly under a specific provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, however erroneously, the remedy is as provided by, that provision, viz., by an appeal or revision: [See Faiyaz Khan Vs. Consequently, where a decree has been passed expressly under a specific provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, however erroneously, the remedy is as provided by, that provision, viz., by an appeal or revision: [See Faiyaz Khan Vs. Mithan, , Lalchand v. Kaka Ram AIR 1927 Lah. 562 (1), Syed Baker Hussain v. Mirya Hussain Mirza AIR 1923 Pat. 223 and Balbahadar Singh v. Walaiti Ram AIR 1954 Pepsu 65. The matter may, however, be different where the specific section is not mentioned and we are left to refer from the surrounding circumstances what the section under which the Court had acted could have been. Regard being had to the presumption that a judgment is presumed to be correct till the contrary is shown, we may as a matter of judicial consideration, give to the judgment the best possible meaning and may presume every fact that would make it legal and valid rather than illegal or without jurisdiction. So that, in such cases, if we find that a particular judgment would be a valid one if passed under rule 2 of Order XVII of the CPC and an invalid one if the Court had purported to act under rule 3 of Order XVII, we may well presume that which would make it legal and with jurisdiction. That this has been the view of this Court can also be gathered from the decision of Padhye J., in AIR 1948 310 (Nagpur) at p. 464: It cannot be denied in this ease that the lower Court did proceed under Order XVII, role 3 and decided the ease on merits.' It has also passed a decree dismissing the plaintiff's suit. It is immaterial whether this decree IS right or wrong because if it was wrong it could be set aside in appeal preferred therefrom and not in any other way. At any event the Court passing such a decree has no jurisdiction to set aside the decree passed by it in a proceeding started on an application for restoration of a suit to file and this Court cannot also do it in revision against an order refusing to restore the suit to file. The decree passed by the lower Court would therefore stand apart from the fact whether it was right or wrong because the proper remedy for having it set aside was not followed by the plaintiff. The decree passed by the lower Court would therefore stand apart from the fact whether it was right or wrong because the proper remedy for having it set aside was not followed by the plaintiff. This case was, no doubt, overruled on another point by Rao and Tambe JJ. in Motital Joshi v. Mohammad Shaft 1956 NLJ 121 : AIR 1956 Nag. 179; but so far as the aforesaid observations are concerned, they are, in my opinion, still good law. The learned counsel for the non-applicant brought to my notice a case reported in Pratap Singh v. Moolchand 1961 JLJ 211; but that case has no application to the facts of this case, because in that case neither was a decree passed in fact, nor did the lower Court proceed to decide the suit on merits specifically under rule 3 of Order XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure. The application for revision is, therefore, allowed. The order of the lower appellate Court is hereby set aside and that of the first Court restored. The application of the plaintiff for setting aside the dismissal of the suit and the decree passed thereon under Order IX of the CPC is hereby dismissed with costs throughout. Counsel's fee Rs. 25, if certified. Final Result : Allowed