JUDGMENT : Narasimham, C.J. - This is a revision-petition against the appellate judgment of the Sessions Judge of Sambalpur, maintaining the conviction of the Petitioner u/s 9(a) of the Opium Act and Section 41(a) of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, and the sentences of imprisonment and fine respectively for the two offences passed by the First Class Magistrate of Bargarh. 2. The Petitioner was sent up for trial for the said Acts, on the allegation that when his house was searched on the 6th December 1958 by the Excise party, he was found in possession of 33? tolas of contraband opium, 75 tolas of non-duty paid ganja and 76? tolas of duty paid ganja, a scale pan and a notebook containing the names of the customers. 3. The learned Magistrate framed charges against the Petitioner at the commencement of the trial on the 29th May 1959, and then after completing the trial, he convicted and sentenced him as Stated above. Apparently he followed the procedure prescribed in Section 251-A, Code of Criminal Procedure for trial cases situated on Police report. But he omitted to comply with the provisions of Sub-section (1) of that section inasmuch as there were no papers of the type described in Section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure in an excise case of this type. Apart from the prosecution report and the seizure list there was no other paper and the order-sheet dated the 29th May 1959 does not show whether copies of these papers were banded over to the Petitioner (accused) prior to the framing of charge. The accused also does not appear to have-made a grievance of this omission and the prosecution witnesses were, examined in chief and cross-examined piece meal on several dates. 4. Mr. Section Acharya for the Petitioner contended that the entire trial was vitiated inasmuch as the procedure prescribed in Section 252 and the succeeding sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure should have been followed and not the special procedure prescribed in Section 251-A, of that code and the adoption of the wrong procedure amounted to an illegality. In support of this contention he relied on my own decision Brijlal v. State 26 C.L.T. 647 following Premchand Khetry Vs. In support of this contention he relied on my own decision Brijlal v. State 26 C.L.T. 647 following Premchand Khetry Vs. The State, to the effect that the report of an Excise Officer for the prosecution of an offender under the Opium Act would not amount to the report of a Police Officer for the purpose of Section 251-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In that decision I left open the question as to whether the report of an officer for the prosecution of a person accused for an offence under the Bihar & Orissa Excise Act would amount to a Police report. Mr. Acharya rightly invited my attention to the fact that an offence u/s 47(a) of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act is triable as a summons case and hence the prosecution report for that offence would not, in any case, come within the scope of Section 251-A, Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with trial of warrant cases only. But as the offence u/s 47(a) of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act was tried along with an offence u/s 9(a) of the opium Act the procedure prescribed for trial of warrant cases was rightly followed. In view of the aforesaid decision, therefore, it must be held that the learned Magistrate ought to have proceeded with the trial in accordance with the procedure laid down in Section 252 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the succeeding sections and not that prescribed in Section 251-A. 5. The next question for consideration is whether on account of the adoption of the special procedure in Section 251-A, Code of Criminal Procedure the entire trial must be held to be null and void or else whether it is a mere irregularity curable in the absence of prejudice. In Mahabir Prasad v. State 23 C.L.T. 395 where I discussed the relative merits of the two modes of trial, observed that unless material prejudice was shown to have been caused to the accused person the adoption of the wrong procedure should not be interfered with. This view has been dissented from in a later Division Bench decision of the Rajasthan. High Court Ghisia and Others Vs. State, But I find that in a very recent decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Laxminarayan Khemchand Vs. This view has been dissented from in a later Division Bench decision of the Rajasthan. High Court Ghisia and Others Vs. State, But I find that in a very recent decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Laxminarayan Khemchand Vs. State, it was held (in paragraph 6) that unless prejudice was actually caused, the adoption of the procedure prescribed in Section 251-A, Code of Criminal Procedure should not be interfered with. "1'0 a similar effect is the decision of the Andhra High Court Boddepalli Lakshminarayana Vs. Suvvari Sanyasi Appa Rao and Others, where it was held that the adoption of the wrong procedure was only an irregularity curable u/s 537, Code of Criminal Procedure. 6. I have carefully re-examined the question in the light of the observations contained in the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in Ghisia and Others Vs. State, but with great respect I see no reason to change my previous view the only person who might possibly feel aggrieved by the adoption of the procedure in Section 251-A, Code of Criminal Procedure is the complainant because if the trial eventually ends in the acquittal of the accused he (the complainant) loses the special right conferred on, him by Section 417(3), Code of Criminal Procedure to approach this High Court direct against the order of acquittal. So far as the accused is consented no prejudice is ordinarily caused except perhaps in a case where his prayer for adjourning the case for the purpose of cross-examination of the p.ws. is refused and he is compelled to cross-examine them without adequate preparation Section 251-A, Code of Criminal Procedure was specially inserted in the Code of Criminal Procedure with a view to provide for spicier trial of offences where there has been a previous police investigation, without in any way jeopardising that the fair trial of the accused. It is well known that most of the serious offences are investigated by the police in the first instance before being brought to trial, whereas complaint cases generally deal with offences of leas serious type though there may be exceptions where even in respect of serious offences a party approaches the Magistrate with a complaint instead of lodging information with the police. It is therefore difficult to imagine how the special procedure prescribed in Section 231-A, Code of Criminal Procedure which is intended ordinarily for the trial of serious offences-could by it self be prejudicial to the accused. Speedier trial is, on the whole, beneficial as much to the accused as to the complainant and the right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses-which is a very valuable right-is amply safeguarded by conferring discretionary power on the Magistrate concerned to grant adjournments for that purpose, in the proviso to Sub-section (7) of Section 251.A, Code of Criminal Procedure. Mr. Acharya however urged that f the special procedure prescribed in Section 251-A, Code of Criminal Procedure is followed in a case like the present, where there has been no previous investigation and no papers of the kind referred to in Section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure it will be difficult for the accused to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses as soon as they are examined in chief, and this must necessarily result in prejudice. But there is nothing to prevent the accused from asking for adjournments after the examination in chief of prosecution witnesses is over, so that he may be ready to cross examine them on the next date. I would therefore reiterate my previous view that the adoption of the wrong procedure (namely that prescribed in Section 251.A, Code of Criminal Procedure) is a mere irregularity and should not be interfered with, unless prejudice is actually caused to the accused. 7. In the present case, there can be no question of prejudice. Though the charge sheet of the Excise Officer was submitted to the Magistrate on the 7th December 1958, due to some reason or other the trial did not commence till the 29th May 1959 on which date the Magistrate framed charges and gave an adjournment till the 27th June 1.959. On that date only one prosecution witness was present and the defence rightly objected to the cross-examination of that witness as it would be prejudicial to the accused. The case was then adjourned to the 25th July 1939 when three prosecution witnesses were examined in chief, cross examined and discharged. On that date only one prosecution witness was present and the defence rightly objected to the cross-examination of that witness as it would be prejudicial to the accused. The case was then adjourned to the 25th July 1939 when three prosecution witnesses were examined in chief, cross examined and discharged. On that date the Petitioner did not ask the Magistrate for adjournment for the purpose of cross examination on the ground that he was unaware of the nature of the evidence that would be adduced against him as, by then, copies of all the papers, dealing with the preliminary investigation of the case by the Excise Officers, were supplied to him. On the other hand, he cross-examined the three prosecution witnesses and on the next day of adjournment, namely, 25th July 1959 he cross examined the remaining prosecution witnesses. The trial continued for several months thereafter. But on no occasion was any specific prayer made for recalling the prosecution witnesses for further cross examination. Here also it was not alleged that the Petitioner did not get a fair opportunity to adequately cross examine all the prosecution witnesses or to adduce evidence on his behalf. As no prejudice has been caused to the accused by the adoption of the procedure prescribed in Section 251-A, Code of Criminal Procedure I am not inclined, to interfere with the trial. 8. On merits also there is absolutely no reason for me to interfere with the concurrent findings of the two lower courts. The large quantities of opium and ganja seized from the possession of the Petitioner leave no room for doubt that they could not have been painted by his enemies. Considering the fact that he was selling them unauthorisedly to other persons and making handsome profits, the sentence is not at all severe. The revision petition is dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed