Judgment :- 1. The suit which gave rise to this second appeal was for recovery of property from the defendants with mesne profits past and future ignoring the summary order passed on E. A. No. 163/1949 on the file of the District Munsiff of Payyoli. 2. The facts are as follows: The suit property belonged to Chovvayil tarwad in jenm in possession. There was a suit for partition of that tarwad, registered as O.S. 1106 of 1943 on the file of the District Munsiff of Payyoli and by the final decree therein the suit property was allotted to the plaintiffs. When plaintiffs applied by the E.A. 163/1949 for delivery of the property they were obstructed by the 1st defendant who claimed to be in possession of the property under a lease, Ext. B1, dated 25-9-1943 granted by Kunhunni Adiyodi the karnavan of the plaintiffs' tarwad. Plaintiffs' application for removal of the obstruction was dismissed by the executing court on 31-8-1950. Plaintiff has therefore instituted this suit to ascertain her right to the property as per the allotment in the final decree of the partition suit and to recover the property from the defendants. The contention was that the 1st defendant had been in possession of the property even from 1109 (1934) under an oral lease from the karnavan of the plaintiffs' tarwad, and that Ext. B1 was only a renewal by a registered document of the prior oral arrangement of 1109 and that therefore he was entitled to fixity of tenure in respect of the suit property. 3. The learned Munsiff accepted the defence contention, and dismissed the suit with costs. On appeal by the plaintiffs, the learned District Judge found that the oral lease of 1109 was untrue, that Ext. 3. The learned Munsiff accepted the defence contention, and dismissed the suit with costs. On appeal by the plaintiffs, the learned District Judge found that the oral lease of 1109 was untrue, that Ext. B1 lease was actually executed on 27-10-1943 (the day it was registered) on a stamp paper purchased by a stranger on 25-9-1943 and secured from him for the purpose of concoting a lease thereon, that the lease having come into existence only subsequent to the institution of the partition suit (which was on 12-10-1943) was affected by lis pendens and as such totally invalid so far as the plaintiff was concerned, that the lease was an improvident transaction by which the tarwad would not be bound, that the members of the tarwad have treated it as void when they framed the suit for partition alleging the property to be in direct possession of the tarwad, and that the lease under Ext. B1 would not therefore enable the 1st defendant to claim lawful possession of the property or resist the plaintiffs' claim to possession thereof, and decreed the suit with mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 35/- from 15-2-1949 when 1st defendant resisted delivery to the plaintiffs. Hence this second appeal by the 1st defendant. 4. The lease relates to a piece of land 121/2 acres in extent. The learned District Judge has found that at the time of the lease there were 130 bearing cashew trees on the property, that the demise of the same at an annual rent of as. 4 was an improvident transaction calculated to defeat the members of the tarwad who have instituted the suit for partition and separate possession of the tarwad properties, and that the power of management of a karnavan would not enable him to grant such improvident leases to the detriment of the tarwad. It may be noted in this connection that the 1st defendant the lessee is no other than the brother-in-law of the karnavan who executed the same, and also that on the day the lease was executed, the lessee became entitled to a fixity of tenure under the tenancy laws then in force in the area in which the property is situate. In these circumstances the inference is inevitable that there was fraud perpetrated in the grant of the lease designed to deprive the members of the tarwad, who had gone to court to enforce partition, of the fruits of their decree. That a karnavan cannot execute improvident leases to the detriment of the tarwad has been held by this court in Muhammed v. Ramakrishna Iyer (1958 KLJ. 577). 5. The finding of the learned District Judge is that the lease deed Ext. B1, was executed on 27-10-1943. This being a finding of fact cannot, as I have held in S. A. 78 of 1955, be questioned in this second appeal. This suit was instituted on 12-10-1943. Under S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act, after the institution of the suit any dealing with the property involved therein by a party thereto is void in relation to the reliefs granted to parties by the decree therein. It follows that the lease in Ext. B1 executed by the karnavan, who was the 1st defendant in the partition suit, regarding a property sought to be partitioned as in direct possession of the tarwad and decreed as such cannot avail against the plaintiffs to whom it was allotted by the final decree therein. Act IV of 1961 does not purport to over-ride the provisions of S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act or the laws relating to validity of contracts. Agrarian reform does not contemplate legislation of every illegal transaction entered into by tenants. There is therefore no merit in the contention of the 1st defendant-appellant. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant urged, that whatever be the finding of fact entered by the lower appellate court, it is obvious that the 1st defendant wanted to secure a lease of this property when he took Ext. B1 and has been in possession of the property from the date of Ext. B1 "bona fide believing himself to be a tenant" of the suit property, and that as such he is entitled to be treated as a tenant as per Explanation II to Clause.50 of S.2 of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act and entitled to a fixity of tenure and consequent indemnity from eviction in this suit. The question then arises whether he had been "bona fide believing himself to a tenant". The question then arises whether he had been "bona fide believing himself to a tenant". If the transaction has been entered into with the object of defeating the tarwad and depriving the members thereof of the fruits of the decree in the suit for partition, it savours of fraud in its very origin. Fraud is ordinarily a matter for inference from circumstances. The circumstances attendant on the execution of the lease Ext. B1 are, in my opinion, clearly indicative of a fraud upon the tarwad. Fraud is apt to avoid all transactions based on it. Both the lease and the possession that followed it have their origin in fraud, and are therefore tainted with fraud. No court of law can give effect to a transaction vitiated by fraud. If the lease was secured in fraud of the members of the tarwad the defendant must be knowing that his possession of the property is in fraud of the members of the tarwad to whom the property was allotted by the decree in partition suit and cannot therefore be "bona fide believing himself to be a tenant." Bona fides always implies that the belief is entertained after due care and attention. Here the care and attention if at all was not to be just and truthful but the other way about, to defeat persons in their lawful pursuit of their legal rights. There cannot be the least bona fides in such an acquisition or continuance of tenancy. The feeling or belief can always be one-wise only and that is that he has succeeded so far in defeating the decree holder-members of the tarwad. A design to defeat one in securing the decree or reaping the fruits of the decree that he is legitimately entitled to is certainly a fraud in legal connotation. The fraud that was in the transaction at its origin must necessarily permeate the possession secured and continued under it, all through. I hold therefore that the defendant is not a person "bona fide believing himself to be a tenant" and therefore he cannot claim the benefit of explanation II to S.2 (50) of Act IV of 1961. 7. If the karnavan was incompetent to enter into the lease it was avoidable at the instance of the members of the tarwad. I hold therefore that the defendant is not a person "bona fide believing himself to be a tenant" and therefore he cannot claim the benefit of explanation II to S.2 (50) of Act IV of 1961. 7. If the karnavan was incompetent to enter into the lease it was avoidable at the instance of the members of the tarwad. The learned District Judge has found that the members of the tarwad had avoided the lease by their persistent prosecution of the suit for partition of this property as one in direct possession of the tarwad itself. It is too much to think that the 1st defendant, who was the brother-in-law of the karnavan, who was in collusion with him after the institution of the suit for partition to defeat the decree therein and who stepped in time to obstruct the decree, was unaware of the proceedings in that case. The lease having been avoided, to the knowledge of the 1st defendant, there cannot be no tenancy in his favour; nor can he be said to have been "bona fide believing to be a tenant." 8. As I have already found that the lease is vitiated by lis pendens and therefore incapable of conferring any right thereunder on the 1st defendant, he has no right to resist the plaintiffs in executing the decree in their favour. The plaintiffs are therefore entitled to decree. 9. In the result I find that the decree of the learned District Judge disregarding the lease by the 1st defendant and allowing the plaintiffs to recover the property with mesne profits from the date of resistance by the 1st defendant is correct. The second appeal fails. It is dismissed with costs. Leave granted. Dismissed.