Judgment :- 1. The 4th defendant against whom there is a concurrent decree for recovery of the property has preferred this Second Appeal. 2. The facts of the case are as follows: The suit property belonged to the tarwad of defendants 1, 2 and 3 of whom the first two are the karnavan and the senior anandiravan. Defendants 1 and 2 executed a deed of kanom, which is admitted by both parties to be a mortgage in legal effect, as per Ext. A dated 24-7-1114, in favour of the 6th plaintiff on behalf and for the benefit of plaintiffs 1 to 5 who were then minors. As the property demised under Ext. A was then outstanding with strangers, to evict whom the 1st defendant bad instituted a suit, O. S. No. 546 of 1114 on the file of the Munsiff's Court of Shertallai, covenants were made in Ext. A that the 1st defendant, who was the plaintiff in that suit, would obtain delivery of possession of the property in execution of the decree that would be passed in that suit and then hand over possession of the property to the plaintiffs and that the term of years mentioned in Ext. A would run only from the date of such delivery of possession to the plaintiffs. As was expected, the 1st defendant did secure a decree in the above-mentioned suit; but, instead of complying with the terms of Ext. A, he assigned it in favour of the 4th defendant to whom he had demised the property subsequent to Ext. A (the relative document not being filed in this suit). The 4th defendant, by virtue of the assignment of the decree, got himself impleaded as assignee-decree-holder in that suit and in execution obtained delivery of possession on 1-8-1117. The plaintiffs instituted the present suit in 1121 to recover the property with arrears of michavaram and future mesne profits from 1-8-1117 when, according to the terms of Ext A, they ought to have been put in possession of the property. 3. The 4th defendant alone contested the suit and his contentions were that Ext. A did not come to effect, that Ext. A was bad for want of necessity and consideration binding on the tarwad of defendants 1 to 3, that since Ext. 3. The 4th defendant alone contested the suit and his contentions were that Ext. A did not come to effect, that Ext. A was bad for want of necessity and consideration binding on the tarwad of defendants 1 to 3, that since Ext. Al was of no legal effect the jenmi of the property executed a kanappattom in his favour on 20-10-1115, that by virtue of that title he had impleaded himself in execution and obtained possession thereby and that the suit was barred by limitation. 4. Repelling all these contentions the learned Munsiff allowed the suit with mesne profits as prayed for in the plaint, and directed the plaintiff to give compensation for any improvements effected by the 4th defendant since 1-8-1117. On appeal by the 4th defendant, the learned Subordinate Judge also concurred in finding that the suit was not barred by limitation, that the 4th defendant being a stranger to the tarwad could not impeach the validity of Ext. A, especially since the members of the tarwad impleaded in the suit had nothing to say against its validity, that the other findings entered into by the learned Munsiff with regard to improvements, etc. were also correct; and affirmed the decree of the court below. Hence this Second Appeal by the 4th defendant. 5. As the suit has been instituted within 12 years of Ext. A the suit cannot be said to be barred by limitation. Art.123 of the Travancore Limitation Act (corresponding to Art.135 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908) allowed a period of 12 years for a mortgagee to sue for possession of the mortgaged property. The finding of the courts below in that respect has therefore only to be accepted. 6. As the 4th defendant is a stranger to the tarwad of defendants 1 to 3, as per the consensus of judicial opinion on the matter, he cannot be heard challenging the validity of an alienation of tarwad property by the karnavan and senior anandiravan of the tarwad. 7. 6. As the 4th defendant is a stranger to the tarwad of defendants 1 to 3, as per the consensus of judicial opinion on the matter, he cannot be heard challenging the validity of an alienation of tarwad property by the karnavan and senior anandiravan of the tarwad. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the 4th defendant is a tenant within the meaning of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, IV of 1961, and that he, having been admittedly in possession of the property since 1117, is entitled to fixity of tenure and therefore cannot be evicted from the property in this suit The pleadings of the defendant as put forth in his written statement, make it clear that he has taken the document, whatever that be, in his name with full knowledge of the existence of Ext. A. His contentions in the written statement were that Ext. A did not come to effect, that it could be ignored by the executants thereof & that therefore defendants 1 to 3 had every authority to execute the demise in his favour. If he was aware of Ext. A, he must necessarily be presumed to be aware of the covenant therein by the executants thereof to give the benefit of the decree and the possession secured thereunder to the plaintiffs. It is evident then that the 4th defendant with the full awareness of the contract embodied in Ext. A wanted to deceive and defeat the plaintiffs in their legal rights thereunder and had secured the demise in his favour with that purpose. The demise in his favour therefore savours a fraud upon the plaintiffs on the part of defendants 1 to 4. Qui per fraudem agit, frustra agit (what a man does fraudulently, he does in vain). 8. S.91 of the Indian Trusts Act, provides: "Where a person acquires property with notice that another person has entered into an existing contract affecting that property, of which specific performance could be enforced, the former should hold the property to the benefit of the latter to the extent necessary to give effect to the contract." Though this Act was not then in force in the area in which the suit arose, the principles of this section may will be applied to the facts of this case as principles of justice, equity and good conscience. Under this principle the 4th defendant, who had taken a demise in his favour with the knowledge of the prior demise and the covenant regarding possession with the plaintiffs, is obliged "to hold the property for the benefit of the plaintiffs to the extent necessary to give effect to the contract" in their favour in Ext. A. The 4th defendant has thus become a trustee for the plaintiffs who are the real tenants of the property under Ex. A and the possession which he had since 1-8-1117 was possession for and on behalf of the plaintiffs. Therefore the 4th defendant cannot be deemed to be a real 'tenant' within the meaning of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act. If a trustee for another holds a tenancy for the benefit of the other, the real tenant, within the meaning of the Agrarian Relations Act, is the other person who has the beneficial interest in the tenancy, and not the trustee thereof. 9. The Agrarian Relations Act is only an enactment which governs the relations between accredited landlords and tenants. That Act does not override the provisions of the Trusts Act. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on the provisions of S.6 of the Agrarian Relations Act to import such an over-riding effect to the provisions in the Act for tenants' fixity of tenure, especially the non obstante clause therein "notwithstanding anything contained in any law, custom, usage or contract or in any decree or order of court to the contrary". As the section provides for fixity of tenure of a tenant, "anything to the contrary" within the meaning of this non obstante clause can only refer to any provision of law, custom, contract or decree which negatives fixity of tenure to a tenant, such as the rule in the Transfer of Property Act under which every tenant could be evicted from the property either at the expiry of the term or on due service of a notice to quit and the provisions of the Contract Act which would hold the tenant to his covenant for surrender of the property on demand by the landlord. The law of trust is not one of the above category; it does not affect any agrarian relation, but only says that as between A and B who is the actual tenant and who is the affected one. The law of trust is not one of the above category; it does not affect any agrarian relation, but only says that as between A and B who is the actual tenant and who is the affected one. In other words, the Trusts Act points out who the tenant is, and not what his relation with his landlord should be. I hold therefore that the non-obstante clause in S.6 of the Agrarian Relations Act will not affect the provisions of S.91 of the Trusts Act. Under the latter Act, a person who has acquired the tenancy with knowledge of the existence of an earlier contract for tenancy in favour of another, is a trustee for the latter in relation to that tenancy and the latter shall have all the beneficial interests in the tenancy. I hold that the plaintiffs were the real tenants in the instant case, that the 4th defendant when he secured possession of the property in execution of O.S. 546 of 1114 mentioned above, constituted himself only as a trustee for the plaintiffs. 10. As between the plaintiff and the 4th defendant, no question of agrarian relation arises. The dispute between them is one of trust or, of the nature of a trust. Neither is landlord or tenant of the other. A trustee is not entitled to claim a fixity of tenure against the beneficiary; no provision in the Agrarian Relations Act lends colour to such a wanton claim. The 4th defendant cannot therefore resist the plaintiffs claim for possession of the property. 11. It follows that the decree of the courts below is correct. The Second Appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Leave granted. Dismissed.